Aspects of Portuguese rule in the Arabian Gulf, 1521-1622 by Salman, Mohammed Hameed
The University of Hull
Aspects of Portuguese Rule in the Arabian Gulf, 152 1-1622
Being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
In the University of Hull
By
Mohammed Hameed Salman (MA)
December 2004
Abstract
Summary of Thesis submitted for PhD in history
By Mohammed Hameed Salman
On
Aspects of Portuguese Rule in the Arabian Gulf, 1521 - 1622.
This study deals with Portuguese rule over the Arabian Gulf from 1521, after the
occupation of Hormuz, Bahrain and Qatif, to 1622 when Portuguese power declined
after the capture of Hormuz by an English-Persian alliance.
The work is organised into an introduction and five thematic chapters, each of
which addresses one or more political and economic aspects of Portuguese rule in this
period. The introduction provides a summary of the primary Portuguese sources, and
other English, Arabic, and Turkish sources which pertain to the Portuguese invasion
of the Gulf. There then follows a short description of the geography of the Gulf.
Chapter One deals with Portuguese expansion and objectives in the East. In
addition, the chapter discusses the commercial contacts between India and the Gulf
before the Portuguese arrived. Particular attention is paid to the political and social
structure of Hormuz. Chapter Two discusses the economic life of the Gulf during the
sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century. This chapter also
examines the commercial experiences or influences that the Portuguese brought to the
people of the Gulf, and the economic aspects of the Portuguese presence.
Chapter Three examines the basis and character of Portugal's political
administration in the East in general, and in the Gulf in particular. This chapter also
addresses relations between the Portuguese viceroyalty and the local governors.
Chapter Four opens with a discussion of local resistance in the Gulf against the
Portuguese. It deals also with the arrival of the Ottomans in the Gulf in the sixteenth
century and their conflict with the Portuguese, and with Portuguese relations with
Persia during the reign of Shah Abbas.
Finally, Chapter Five assesses the reasons for the collapse of Portuguese
domination in the Gulf in 1622 and its effects on the region. It discusses in detail why
Hormuz, as one of the most important props of the Portuguese empire in the East, fell
as an easy victim, even though it was thriving economically.
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Glossary
A icaide
Bab
Bahar
Caffila
Cámara municipal
Cap itdo-mór
Portuguese official; 'chief of the sea'
A narrow strait; a gate
Persian unit of weight; in different parts of Asia,
it was worth about 210-30 kg
Caravan
Municipal chamber of a city or town
Captain-Major
Carreira da India
	 Cape route or trade route via the Cape of Good Hope
Cartaz	 A passport or safe-conduct for a ship, given in exchange
for a fee or as a diplomatic privilege
Casa da India
	 The 'India House' in Lisbon, at which goods arriving
from Asia were unloaded and auctioned, and customs-
duties collected
Casado	 Literally a married settler, and in fact used as a juridical
category to denote a permanent resident of a settlement
at times sub-divided into 'white' (branco) and 'black'
(preto)
Coja	 Or Khwaja in Persian, a respected person
Cruzado	 Portuguese coin, worth 360 reis and 2.00 ashrafis in
the sixteenth century, and 400 reis in the seventeenth
century
Dhow
Dom
Ducat
Estado da India
Faramãn
Fazenda Real
Feitor
Largest lateen-rigged Arab or Indian ship
of the time
A title of the Portuguese nobility, from the Latin
dominus, abbreviated as D. The feminine is Dona
A gold coin, originally Venetian but used also in
the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe
Portuguese 'State of India'
Arabic (in Persian farman), an order or decree from the
Shah of Persia
Portuguese Royal Treasury
Factor, Crown or private trading agent
Feitoria	 Factory, Crown trading post
Fidalgo	 Literallyfilho de algo, 'son of a somebody'; a member of
the upper nobility, corresponds to Spanish hidalgo
Fusta	 A small ship with Latin shape
Grab Arabic: ghurab (crow), a coasting vessel ranging up to
300 tons, with one or two lateen-rigged masts according
to size: smaller ones also carried oars
Imám	 Religious leader
Jabal	 Hill or mountain
JazIrat	 An island; sometimes a peninsula
Khulas	 Type of date famous in the Gulf
Khür	 Bay or creek; a deep channel between shoals
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Lascar	 Arabic: askar, most commonly a native sailor but, at that
time, also a native soldier or artilleryman
Mouros	 Moors, Portuguese expression for the Muslims
Mrziban	 Type of date famous in the Gulf
Muqarrarryas	 Persian expression for a fixed tribute
Nakhoda	 Persian: nãkhudã, the skipper of any native or country
craft in the Gulf
Naveta	 Small ocean-going vessel
Nua
Pataca
Quintal
Reis
Shahbandãr
Shähi
Shaikh
Shatt
Suhaili
Tanga
Large Portuguese ship or carrack
Silver Portuguese coin worth 1.22 ashrafi
Unit of weight, the Portuguese hundred weight of
130 lb.; the light quintal weighed 51.405 kg and the
heavy quintal 58.7 kg
The basic accounting unit in the Portuguese monetary
system (singular real)
Persian: harbour-master or chief of customs
Persian currency, 200 shãhis usually worth 1 toman
Chief, or old man
Fresh water river; large river
South-westerly wind
Silver coin worth 60 reis, from the Indo-Muslim tan/ca
Toman	 Still the currency of Iran. During the period of this study
its value declined from about £3 to about £1
Ushur	 An Arabic expression of port duties
Veador	 Comptroller
Vedor da Fazenda
	 Financial superintendent
XeraJIm (Ashrafi)	 Silver coin worth 300 reis, from the Egyptian ashrafi
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Introduction
Portugal, a small kingdom on the fringes of Europe, in just a few years established an
empire in the East, from East Africa and the Arabian Gulf' to the Indonesian
archipelago and China Sea.
Portuguese motives centred essentially on the economic potential of seeking out
the places of origin of spices, and they used their modern European naval power and
political sytems to carry out these aims. From an early stage in their voyages to the
Indian Ocean they unilaterally declared that all spice trade was to be conducted by
themselves or their allies. In addition, the Portuguese strove to enhance their image in
history by encouraging their chroniclers to write and publish works on the heroism of
Os Lusladas in the age of discovery.2
This study deals with the period of Portuguese control over the Gulf, from 1521
after they occupied the kingdom of Hormuz, Bahrain and Qatif on the Arabian coast, to
1622. The period covered by this thesis was a critical one in the history of the Gulf,
beginning with the rise of Portuguese power and ending with its decline. The year 1521
saw the first revolt in the Gulf against the Portuguese, less than four months after the
capture of Bahrain and Portugal's claim that it controlled the entire region. The terminal
date, 1622, marked the end of Portuguese supremacy in the Gulf: after the capture of
Hormuz by English and Persian forces, the Portuguese lost it forever. It was therefore
the year in which the major concentration of Portuguese power in the Gulf collapsed.
The period of Portuguese influence in the Gulf has been generally regarded as
one of the most important periods in the region's history. When the Portuguese invaded
Since the early 1960s the Arab states have substituted 'Arabian Gulf for 'Persian'. The usage has not
been commonly adopted in English. In this thesis the neutral term 'Gulf will be used to avoid
confusion.
2 See below, pp. 20-25.
9
at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Gulf underwent a significant number of
events and processes which changed its political and social life. Within this context, the
arrival of the Portuguese in the East and the occupation of Hormuz are no longer viewed
as uncritically as they once were. This study will examine and discuss Portuguese
activities in both the economic and political spheres. One of the purposes of this work is
not merely to supply historical materials but also to add pertinent interpretation of those
materials. It is an attempt to lay the foundations for an economic and political history of
the Gulf during the Portuguese period. The core function of this study is to assess
whether these activities affected relations between the Portuguese and other local
powers in the Gulf, and the Persians in particular and, by extension, if these
relationships were responsible for the fall of Hormuz in 1622. Some writers believe that
the facts always speak for themselves. Nevertheless, as most people know from their
own experience, 'facts' often speak with conflicting voices.
A belief persists that the Portuguese were able to control trade routes by keeping
their hands tightly on the strategic positions and the important islands and straits. All of
this enabled them to monitor trade between Europe and Asia, and also that which took
place among Asian ports themselves - the 'country trades'. They therefore changed the
face of commerce by diverting it from traditional networks to the oceanic Cape route.3
In addition, by claiming sovereignty over the ocean, the Portuguese claimed to be able
to control maritime trade and its taxes, because it is well known that the vast bulk of
their revenue came from the sea, not from the land. 4 These activities, in fact, had the
financial support of the great merchant princes of Antwerp, who, realising the
revolutionary change in trade that the Portuguese discoveries involved, hastened to
enjoy the benefits. With Antwerp's aid, the Portuguese fleets in the east were kept
M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofez, Asian Trade and European influence in the Indonesian Archzpelago
between 1500 and about 1630 (The Hague, 1962).
M. Pearson, The Indian Ocean (London, 2003), p. 118.
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reinforced by the home government. Armada followed armada, and the Portuguese
dominated Indian waters. 5
 Within about eight years, the Portuguese were able to make
further progress in their plans to occupy the two trade arms of the Indian Ocean; first the
Gulf, attacked by Afonso da Albuquerque, and second the Red Sea.
When the Portuguese arrived, the Gulf was not heavily populated. Most of the
inhabitants lived on the coast and earned their livelihoods through trade. There were
limited ways of living off the land, nomadic cattle breeding being one, and also sources
of income connected with the transportation of merchandise by caffilas (caravans) and
the sale of Arabian and Persian horses. However, of much greater importance in
monetary terms were the products of the sea. There were three sources of income
connected with the sea - transit trade, fishing and pearling. The inhabitants of the Gulf
who lived on the coasts could derive income in several ways from transit trade,
especially from Indian goods. Hormuz is an outstanding example. The port established a
kingdom from this, the main source of its wealth, from the beginning of the fourteenth
century. Hormuz was engaged in many wars in the Gulf and on the coast of Oman as a
result of the attempts of certain rulers to force shipping to pass by its harbours and to
pay customs there, avoiding the harbours of its opponents in that area.
1. Organisation of the Study
This thesis is divided into an introduction, five chapters and a conclusion. The
remainder of the introduction will provide a summary of the primary Portuguese
sources, and other English, Arabic, and Turkish sources which pertain to the Portuguese
For important discussions of connections between Antwerp and Portugal see: P. Musgrave, The Early
Modern European Economy (London, 1999), chapter 7; R. Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies
(London, 1973); C. Verlinden, 'From the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Aspects of an economic
shift', Journal of European Economic History, 1 (1972), pp. 625-46; R. H. Tawney, Religion and the
Rise of Capitalism (London, 1990); I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (London, 1971-80), 2
vols; K. Maxwell, 'Portugal, Europe, and the origins of the Atlantic commercial system, 1415-1520',
Portuguese Studies, 8 (1992), pp. 3-16.
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occupation of the Gulf. There then follows a short description of the Gulf's geography
to orientate readers unfamiliar with the region.
Chapter One is devoted to Portuguese expansion in the East, starting with the
historical background from the early foundation of the kingdom and the objectives of
the Portuguese discoveries. In addition, the chapter discusses commercial contacts
between India and the Gulf before the Portuguese arrived. Particular attention is paid to
the political and social structure of Hormuz and the relationships between the kingdom
and its neighbours in the Gulf, particularly with Kirmãn on the Persian mainland. The
rise to power of Hormuz during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is analysed. By
the early years of the sixteenth century, Hormuz had become one of the most important
commercial, political and intellectual centres of the East.
Chapter Two deals with the economic life and seaborne trade of the Gulf during
the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. This chapter examines the commercial
experience and influences that the Portuguese brought to the people of the Gulf during
their domination and the economic aspects of the regime, especially its interest in the
a(fándega (or 'customs house'). There is also a discussion of the cartaz system, the
famous licences issued by the Portuguese authorities to non-Portuguese shipping. This
chapter will attempt to find clear answers to a number of more specific questions. For
example, did the Portuguese establish new routes and markets and introduce new
products into the trade network of the Gulf? Did they have the experience to raise taxes
efficiently in support of their presence in the region? Did they increase the value of
internal trade between the Gulf ports? How did they treat other foreign powers in the
Gulf?
Chapter Three discusses the structure and effectiveness of Portuguese political
administration in the East in general and in the Gulf in particular, with some
comparative analysis between Goa and Hormuz: the Portuguese established a hierarchy
12
where Lisbon issued orders to the viceroy at Goa, and Goa controlled all the far-flung
outposts in the East. Consideration is given to relations between the Portuguese and the
local governors and the Arab tribes, who suffered from the Portuguese and Turks alike.
It will be seen that the Portuguese found it difficult to build a power base in the Gulf, as
they were unable to subvert the hereditary rule established by the Hormuzians in the
thirteenth century, long before their arrival. Some aspects of the situation, however, are
still unclear: more research needs to be carried out on the impact of the Portuguese on
the kings of Hormuz, and the political system that the Portuguese adopted from Hormuz
to rule the Gulf, as well as the real reasons for the decay of Portuguese policy there.
Chapter Four analyses the reactions of the inhabitants to the Portuguese and
local resistance against them in the Gulf, including an evaluation of the effects of this
resistance on Portuguese control in the first three decades of the sixteenth century. Here
we will deal, as well, with the arrival of the Ottomans in the Gulf after Basra came
under their control in 1546. From there, the Ottoman navy struggled to extend its
influence, which predictably brought the Turks into conflict with the Portuguese. The
chapter also discusses political relations with Persia during the reign of Shah Abbas,
and the problems of the Portuguese in the Gulf caused by the afándega in Hormuz and
Bahrain which led to war between the two powers.
Finally, Chapter Five concentrates on the decline of Portuguese control of the
Gulf and its effects on the region. It is not intended to discuss in depth the early
histories of the European India Companies in the East, because they are well-known.
Rather, the focus will be on the relationship between 'profit' and 'power' in European
conflicts to control the maritime routes, especially in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf.
This chapter also examines the end of Portugal's domination in the Gulf, and the
reasons for this. Was the decline of Portuguese power related to its structural, political,
economic and ideological weaknesses, and in what measure? Why did the royal-public
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sector of Portugal fail to administer the Gulf efficiently, while the English private
sector, in the form of the East India Company, was successful? Did local resistance in
the Gulf bring about the end of Portuguese supremacy? More specifically, why did the
inhabitants of Hormuz not join with their king and the Portuguese in defending their
island? These are some of the questions to be addressed in the chapter.
2. Review of Sources
A satisfactory historical approach has not yet been established in either Portugal or the
Gulf states6
 regarding the reality of Portugal's role in the Gulf. Conferences held about
the Portuguese in the Gulf region, 7
 some of which I have attended, have gone no further
than repeat what we know about Portuguese conquests in the Indian Ocean and the
Gulf, and the objectives of the Portuguese at the beginning of the sixteenth century.
Over the last twenty years, a few studies have been published in Portugal about
the Gulf, such as the work of Antonio Dias Farinha. 8
 He provides useful details
concerning the Portuguese presence there during the first half of the sixteenth century.
Farinha rightly notes the difficulties and vast scope of the subject, in view of Portugal's
extensive networks of commercial interchange, regional and international trade. An
article by Maria Cruz relates to the Portuguese-Ottoman struggle in Basra between 1557
and 1 568, and the information quoted from reports written by the Portuguese governors
in India. It is an important study, but it is focused on Portuguese-Ottoman diplomacy
more than anything else. As another example, Jean Aubin and his study group have
revealed through their Mare-Luso Indicum a wealth of Portuguese and other sources
The Gulf group (GCC), established in 1981, contains six Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Bahrain, Qatar, Emirates and Kuwait.
Conferences were held at Oman in 1980 (Nadwet AL-derasat Al Omaniah), at Bahrain in 1983
(Mua7amar Tarekh Al-Bahrain), and at Ras A1-khaimah (U.A.E.) in 1987 ('Nadwel Ras Al-khaimah
Al- Tarekheiah). None of them produced any really significant contributions.
8 A. D. Farinha, Os Portugueses no Golfo Pérsico, 1507-1538 (Lisbon, 1991).
M. Cruz, 'A < Questão de Bacorá > na menoridade de D. SebastiAo (1557-1568)', Revista da
Faculdade de Lettras, University of Lisbon, 6 (1986) pp.49-64.
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relating to the Indian Ocean.'° Aubin himself wrote a valuable study of the kingdom of
Hormuz, drawing on Portuguese, Arabic and Persian documents. His work is still the
best on the subject. Although he did not cover the whole period up to the fall of
Hormuz, there is important material about its economic and political activities before
and after the Portuguese arrival.
This handful of region-specific studies must be also used in conjunction with a
huge literature on Portuguese and European overseas expansion more generally. Works
by the late C.R. Boxer need little introduction," but his impressive lifetime of
scholarship is only part of an incredibly rich tradition of writing about the first
European overseas empires. Some of these works, though dealing with different regions
of the globe or even different sets of protagonists, provide helpful reference points for
understanding Portuguese activities in the Gulf. This is especially so in the light of the
experiences of other parts of the Estado da India. Notable contributors in this field
include Niels Streensgaard and Sanjay Subrahmanyam. 12
 Both authors concentrate on
the conflict between the Portuguese and the other European powers at the beginning of
the seventeenth century, and on the general economic activities of the Portuguese in the
East, with an emphasis on India.
Given the paucity of directly relevant scholarship on the Gulf, much depends on
the use and interpretation of a vast array of primary sources, both printed and
manuscript, narrative and administrative. It should be noted at this point that most of the
Portuguese documents have not been translated into English or Arabic, and many of
them are still unpublished. There was also difficulty in locating certain sources, because
some documents brought from India to Lisbon during the period in question were lost,
10 j Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz Au Debut du XVI' Siécle,' Mare Luso-Indicum vol. II, (Geneva,
1973), PP. 74-187. See also his work 'La Politique Iranienne d'Ormuz (1515-1540)', Stvdia, no. 53,
(Lisbon,1994), pp. 27-51.
"See E. Van Veen, Decay or Defeat? (Leiden, 2000).
12 N. Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies (Copenhagen, 1973); S. Subrahmanyam, The
Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500- 1700: A Political and Economic Hislo,y (New York, 1993).
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whether at sea or in fighting with other Europeans. For example, in 1592 when English
vessels captured a Portuguese carrack, they found in its cargo 'the notable register of the
whole government and trade of the Portuguese in the East',' 3 but we do not know what
happened to it later.'4
Many Portuguese documents relate to economic matters in India and the East.
However, not all of these sources concern the Gulf, and those that do present a picture
skewed towards one aspect of the Gulf's economy, namely external trade. Of the
remainder, we have only a few unclear indications. Nothing is known about the general
state of the economy of the Gulf in the Portuguese period. Data for the period 152 1-
1622 are very fragmentary, inevitably so because of the scanty materials now available
in manuscripts or in published works about Portuguese activities in the Gulf.
In spite of these problems, extant Portuguese sources are very valuable for
reconstructing the general history of the Gulf. However, there is a serious shortage of
Arabic and Persian sources on the economy and politics of the region in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. For instance, it is unclear why Arab and Persian chronicles
were silent when the Portuguese arrived in the Gulf from the south of Oman. We may
wonder why the Omani chroniclers immersed themselves in arguments about secondary
local events while Albuquerque's fleet was bombarding the towns on the shores of their
country. In fact, the Omani chronicles (including Kashf Al-Ghummha Al-jdmI Lii-
akhbdr Al-Ummha, written by Sarhan bin Saeed A1-azkwi; Tuhfat a!- 'a 'yãn Bi-Sirat
'A/il 'Umdn by Abdullah bin Hameed Al-Salmi; and Al Fat 'h a! Mubeen Li-Seerat Al
Sadah Al-Busaeediyeen of Hameed bin Muhammad bin Razeeq) do not disclose
anything about the Portuguese and the Ottomans in the Gulf. Yet they do provide
valuable material on the legends of the Omani Ibadhi Imáms of the Al-Yarubi dynasty
' G. Birdwood, Report on the Old Records of the India Office (London, 1890), P. 198.
14 Portuguese archives present several challenges. They are poorly catalogued and, in the case of
Lisbon, were damaged by the earthquake of 1755. Working in them induces a feeling of being
involved in a treasure hunt.
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in the seventeenth century, giving much information about Imám Nasir bin Murshid Al-
Yarubi and the end of the Portuguese presence in Oman in 1649. There are also many
contemporary books dealing with the history of Yemen written by Hadrami historians,
who describe in detail the military efforts of the Portuguese to enter the Red Sea and to
capture the port of Aden.'5
One may suggest several reasons why the Omani writers ignored the Portuguese.
Perhaps those who were engaged in the discussion of seemingly parochial events were
the Ibadhis who ruled internal territories of Oman rather than the coast. Most of the
towns on the Omani coast were subject to the king of Hormuz rather than the Ibadhi. In
addition, the people of Oman, as Al-Salmi points out, do not care to record historical
events for their own sake, but mention them in the context of the biographies of the
Imáms and discussion of religious issues.' 6
 Moreover, the Omani writers may have felt
that the Portuguese invasion and consequent domination of their ports was humiliating,
and hence deliberately avoided recording these events. They were proud of themselves
and the glory of their culture and historical legacy as the masters of the Islamic world,
and did not wish to tarnish this image by showing that they had been defeated by the
Portuguese. In this context, it is noticeable that Omani chronicles are noticeably more
forthcoming about the schemes of the Imáms to drive the Portuguese out of Oman in the
second quarter of the seventeenth century.'7
In the absence of indigenous sources, this work will mainly deal with foreign
source material, particularly Portuguese documents, which obviously are crucial to
understanding their invasion and domination of the Gulf For this purpose I spent
around eight months in Portugal in 200 1-2. After returning to the Gulf I also visited a
I discuss these materials in my first published work about Portuguese attempts to invade the Gulf and
the southern Arabian Peninsula in the period 1507-25. M. Al-Salman, Al Gazw Al Purtukali Le 'Al
Janub Al-A rabie wa Al-khalej fiAlfatrah ma baen 1507-1525(Al-Ain, 2000), pp. 337-38.
' A. H. Al-Salmi, Tuhfat a!- 'A yän Bi-Sirat 'Ahi 'Umãn (Muscat, 1995), vol. I, p. 353.
' For these events, see S. S. AI-azkwi, KashfAl-Ghummha Al-jãmI Lli-akhbãr Al-ummha, ed. Abdul-
Majid Al-Qaisi (Muscat, 1980); Al-Salmi, Tuhfat a!- 'a 'yãn Bi-Sirat 'A/il 'Umãn.
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number of historical centres in Iran, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia,
searching for any sources or information relating to the Portuguese in the Gulf during
the sixteenth century.
The most useful contemporary eyewitness sources from the discovery period are
in the Portuguese archives, especially the oldest and the most important of the
Portuguese collections, the Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (ANTI), which was
established in Lisbon in 1378.18 However, from thousands of documents in the
collection, only a small number relate to the sixteenth century, and there is no catalogue
guide for the Gulf or the Arabian Sea, such as is provided for Brazil, Angola, Timor,
China and India.
The ANTT has three main groups of relevant material. The first and largest, the
Corpo Cronológico (CC), contains 82,902 documents kept in Macos or bundles. Most of
the materials in CC relate to the sixteenth century. However, the problems with these
materials are that they are not original and most of them are not clear enough to read
because they were written by hand and the copies are poor. The second group of
material is the As Gavetas or 'drawers'. There are twenty-three Gavetas, published by
the Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos of Lisbon. This group contains some
documents referring to the Gulf, Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea during the
sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, including some correspondence. For example,
in Volume I there is a letter from Bernardim de Sousa to Joào III about an expected
Turkish attack against Hormuz, dated 20 November 1545, sent from Goa to Lisbon.' 9
 A
second example is part of a long letter in Volume X, sent by Cristóvâo de Mendonca,
the captain of Hormuz fortress (1528-30), to João III about hostilities in India and the
Portugese fortresses. This letter is dated 18 November 1529, and was sent from
Guia Geral dos Fundos da Torre do Tombo, ed. Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais / Torre do Tombo
(Lisbon, 1998), p. xxi.
ANTT, A. G., vol. I, Gay. ii, 10-17. Carta de Bernardim de Sousa a D. João Ill a respeito dos turcos e
da guerra de Ormuz, Goa, 1545, Novembro, 20. pp. 915-18. See Appendix II, Doc. 3.
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Hormuz.20
 The part which was used in this study was the second event in that carta,
without title,2 ' which concerns the Portuguese campaign against Bahrain in 1529.22 A
third letter, in Volume IV, from Reis Rukn Al-Din, the vizier of Hormuz, to Reis Sharaf
Al-Din, the exiled former vizier, deals with relations between Maneng Bin Rashid, the
king of Al-Hasa, and Reis Mohammed, the governor of Bahrain.23
At the ANTI there are also original documents which are still unpublished,
stored in a small handbook entitled 'Cartas dos Vice-Reis da india'. There are hundreds
of these letters. One of them which was used in this study is very important, as it is from
the vizier of Hormuz to the Turks, requesting their assistance to protect Hormuz.24
The third significant collection of the ANTT is 'Livros Das Moncoes ou
Documentos Remetidos do fndia' (The 'Monsoon Books' or 'Codices'). It contains
sixty-two codices. It is also the title of the chief collection still at the Goa Archives,
comprising some 240 volumes. 25 The documents cover the period 1605 to 1650 and
have been printed, originally under the direction of Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato.
He arranged the documents in chronological order. After the editor died in 1912, the
fifth volume, with documents from Books 11-12, was delayed until 1935.26 The Lisbon
20 ANTT, A. G., vol. X, Gay. xx, 2-27, 2. Cartade Cristóvão de Mendonca a el-rei D. João III, na qula
ihe conta os acontecimentos e inimizades da India e o Estado da fortaleza. Orrnuz, 1529, Novembro,
18. PP. 254-58. See Appendix II, Doc. 1.
21 Ahmed Bushrab, the Moroccan scholar, put a title to this part of the Portuguese letter in his attempt to
translate it into Arabic. He entitled it 'The Portuguese campaign against Bahrain from a letter to the
governor of Horrnuz in 1529'. See A. Bushrab, 'Musahamat Al-Masadir wa Al-Wathaiq Al-
Burtukãliyyah fi Kitabat Tarekh Al-Babrain Khilal Al-Nisf A1-Awwal Mian A1-Qam Al-Sades
Ashar', Al- WatheekaL4, (Bahrain, 1984), pp. 128-32.
22 See Chapter Four, below.
23 ANTI, A. G., vol. IV, Gay. xv, 11-2. Carta de Rei Rocarn Adirn, alguazil de Ormuz, para Rei Xarafo,
na qual lhe narrava o que se passava entre Maneng Bern Rasid, rei de Lacã, e Rei Mamed,
governador de Barérn. (1545), pp. 357-59. This letter was written in Arabic and after the Portuguese
officials discovered it they translated it for their king. See Appendix II, Doc. 2.
24 ANTT, Cartas dos Vice-Reis da India, no. 82. The original letter was written in Arabic and translated
into the Portuguese.
25 A. S. Rego, 'The Monsoon Codices at the National Archives of the Torre do Tombo', Indo-
Portuguese History: Sources and Problems, ed. John Correia-Afonso (London, 1981), p. 51.
26 Rego 'The Monsoon Codices at the National Archives of the Tone do Tornbo', p. 53.
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Academy of Science decided to continue this work. Antonio da Silva Rego was editor
of the last five volumes from VI to X. Altogether, ten volumes have been published.
The ANTT also has several smaller collections of documents which are
important for the events of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. One of them is 'Cartas de
Ormuz a Dom Joâo de Castro' - the letters from Hormuz to João de Castro, who was
viceroy of India in the period 1 54548.27 Recently, two Portuguese historians have
published a selection of these letters. 28
 They contain some important information about
the Ottoman occupation of Basra and relations between Hormuz and Basra during that
time.
In addition to all these manuscript administrative sources, there is also a rich
chronicle literature that relates, often in detail, the achievements of the Portuguese in
Asia and Africa. All of these works were written during the so-called Idade de Ouro or
'Golden Age' of Portugal in the sixteenth century. The principal chroniclers are Barros,
Couto, Castanheda, Correia, and Bocarro, who each held the position of 'Keeper of
Records'. Some of these historians were relatives of the royal household or under royal
patronage and direction in both Portugal and Spain.
The work of João de Barros, the first distinguished chronicler, 29 covers events
from the voyage of Vasco Da Gama to India in 1497 until the Ottoman siege of Diu in
1538.° It is worth nothing that Barros was the only major historian of the empire not to
visit India: he served (c.1533 to 1567) as a factor of the Casa da India at Lisbon. 3 ' To
enable him to write his history of the Portuguese discoveries, Barros was given all the
27 Guia Geral dos Fundos da Torre do Tombo, p. 95. These letters are still in the microfilm store under
the number AN/TT/0925 (Cota: Caiias Missivas no: 10. C.f 36).
28 L. Albuquerque, Cartas de D. Joâo III (Lisbon, 1989); D. F. Castro, Crônica do Vice-rei D. Joâo de
Castro, (Lisbon, 1995).
29 C. R. Boxer, 'Three Historians of Portuguese Asia - Barros, Couto and Bocarro', Boletim do Instituto
Portugueses de Honkong (Macau, 1948), vol. I, p. 6.
30 
• Barros Asia, ed. Hemani Cidade, (Lisbon, 1945, 46, 74), p. viii.
A. B. Coelho, 'João de Barros, feitor da Casa da fndia e Historiador da Asia (1496-1507) ',Sumário
dci Licâo-sintese para as Provas de Agregacão em História na Faculadae de Letras da Universidadae
de Lisboa (Lisbon, 1990).
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papers necessary - royal instructions, the letters of viceroys and proceedings of judicial
inquiries. In addition, he collected books, maps, and manuscripts from all over Asia.32
Barros also notes that he made use of two Arabic and three Persian geographers' works,
which officials in the service of the king and a slave translated for him.33
The second Década of Barros is particularly useful because it deals with events
from 1506 to 1515, which was the main period of the establishment of the Portuguese
empire in the East. 34
 The most important Livro of the second Década is the second,
which largely deals with Hormuz island - which was called Gerü or Gurun - and its
conquest by Albuquerque in 1507-8. Barros also provides a valuable description and
history of Hormuz and some other islands in the Gulf. 35 Also useful is the tenth book,
which deals with the final conquest of Hormuz by Albuquerque in 1515 and his death
on 16 December of the same year.
In chapter four of book VI in Década III, which covers the period 1516-25,
Barros includes a short description of the Gulf region, with a particular focus on
Bahrain, its pearl fishery, and Portugal's capture of the island in 1521.36 In addition,
book VII of the same Década is mainly about Portuguese activities in Hormuz and the
surrounding region, especially the revolution of 1521 following King Manuel's order to
bring the customs of Hormuz under direct Portuguese authority. The fourth Década was
published in 1615 after Barros's death. In book III of this volume we are provided with
information about the seventh governor of India, Nuno da Cunha (1529-38), and a
32 j B. Harrison, 'Five Portuguese Historians', Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, ed. C. H.
Philip, (London, 1961), p. 158.
He observes: '...em os livros de nossa Geografia se vera tirada de Geografia dos proprios Arabios, e
Parseas dos quaes nos temos cinco livros, dous em a lingua Arabia, e tres na Parsea'. Barros Asia,
Dec. III, Liv. 2, p. 39.
See Segunda Década, ed. Antonio Baiäo, (Lisbon, 1974).
The French scholar, Jean Aubin refers to this Década in his discussion of the history of Hormuz. See
Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz Au Debut du XVI' Siécle, vol. II, pp. 74-187.
36 See Terceira Década, ed. H. Cidade, (Lisbon, 1946).
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number of very important events that occurred in Muscat, Hormuz, Basra and Bahrain
in l529.
Diogo do Couto (l54216l6)38 continued the chronicle of Joäo de Barros after
Philip II appointed him as a court historian. Couto went to India in 1559 and remained
there for over fifty years. For the first ten years he was in service as a soldier. He
became the Keeper of the Records at Goa and made full use of them when he came to
write his continuation of Barros's Décadas. 39 He also drew some of his information
from other Portuguese officials and soldiers serving in India, and from Ottoman Turks
who were left in Gujarat after Suleyman Pasha's unsuccessful attempt to capture Diu in
1 538.°
The work of Couto contains twelve Décadas, covering the period 1580-1600. He
also ranged back to 1526, giving a fresh account of the period up to 1538. Briefly, his
most important Décadas relating to the Gulf are I to N, VII, and X. In addition, Couto
wrote the Dialogo do Soldado Prático, which provides a pungent personal commentary
upon the Portuguese administration in the East, and in particular in India.4'
Two other Portuguese historians who mention affairs in the Muslim world
around the India Ocean are Fernão Lopes de Castanheda and Gaspar Correia.
Castanheda, who was in India for ten years, 42 composed História do Descbrimentos e
Conquista da India pelos Portugueses, a work encompassing the period 1497-1538.
Unfortunately, his work was never finished. In the introduction to the first book, first
published in 1552, Castanheda suggested that his work would continue up to the death
See Quarta Década, ed. H. Cidade, (Lisbon, 1946), pp. ix-xix.
For full details about his life and education by the Jesuits in Lisbon, see the introduction of D. Couto
Décadas, ed. Antonio Baiào (Lisbon, 1947), vol. I, pp. ix-xiv.
Couto, Décadas, pp. xiv-xxii.
40 Harrison, 'Five Portuguese Historians', pp. 156, 159.
G. D. Winius, The Black Legend ofPortuguese India (New Delhi, 1985).
42 The year of his birth at Santarem in Portugal is unknown. See C. Wessels, Lopes de Castanheda
História do descobrimento e con quista da India pelos Portugueses (1552-1561), (The Hague, 1929),
p. ix.
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of João de Castro in 1548, and would consist of ten books. Nevertheless, after a lengthy
search and many enquiries, I have found only eight books, published in four volumes. In
the last volume, published in 1933, the eighth book was divided into 8 and 9, which
means that part of the ninth book and all of the tenth have disappeared. 43 The most
interesting sections of Castanheda's work are his accounts of people, their towns,
produce, and trade, which are discussed in relation to the Gulf in books II, III, V, VII,
and VIII.
The Lendas da India of Gaspar Correia (the dates of his birth and death are
uncertain) added ten years to Castanheda's account by relating events in the East from
1497 to 1548. Correia probably began to write his work during the governorship of
Albuquerque, since he was his secretary, and travelled to India in this capacity in
151	 Because of his position, Correia had access to letters and documents written by
Portuguese officials, and for this reason his depiction of towns and fortresses is very
useful, though he excludes general geographical surveys because others, like Duarte
Barbosa, had already attempted them in their works. Correia was more interested in the
mechanics of trade and the administration of Portuguese India. 46
 He, like Couto, was
also deeply disillusioned by the greed, despotism, selfishness and corruption of the
Portuguese in the East. However, the work of Correia sometimes lacks accuracy.47
Correia's work was printed for the first time in 1864.
u F. L. Castanheda, História do Descobrimentos e Con quista da lndia pelos Portugueses, ed. P. de
Azevedo and P. M. Laranjo Coelho (Coimbra, 1924). Harrison mentioned that according to Couto the
ninth and tenth books which carried his narrative onwards from 1538, were called in by João III in
order to suppress the truth about the lost siege of Diu. Harrison, 'Five Portuguese Historians', p. 163,
n. 8.
G. Correia, Lendas da India, ed. M. Lopes de Almeida (Porto, 1975), p. viii. For his life and
education see the introduction of his book, pp. viii-xii.
Ibid., pp. vi-vii, xiii.
46 Harrison, 'Five Portuguese Historians', p. 167.
" G. Correia, The Three Voyages of Vasco Da Gama and his Viceroyalty, trans. H. E. J. Stanley (New
York, 1869), p. V.
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Antonio Bocarro, the fifth of the official historians, was appointed as a
Chronicler and Keeper of the Records at Goa in 1631 until his death around 1649. His
Década 13 da Histôria da India, was not published until 1876.48 It covers the period in
office of Jerónimo de Azevedo as viceroy of India (1612-17). This means that there is
a gap in the official Portuguese chronicles between 1600 and 1612. This may be, as
Harrison suggests, because Bocarro expected Couto's final volume to extend to 1612.50
In his Década, Bocarro describes the diplomatic situation in the Gulf; especially the
arrival of the English and the activities of the Sherley brothers in Persia. 5 ' In addition,
Bocarro wrote 0 Livro Das Plantas de Todas as Fortalezas, Cidades e Povoaçôes do
Estado da India Oriental, but it only covers the period after 1632, when Philip III
ordered the compilation of a full account of Portuguese fortresses in the Indian Ocean,
triggered by the loss of Hormuz.52
When we examine these chronicles as a group, we find unfortunately that
important elements have been lost. Barros's works, for instance, apparently contained a
full account of the produce and commerce of the East. The work of Couto suffered
greatly from a series of thefts, losses, and disasters; indeed, in old age he was forced to
rewrite most of his books, with a consequent loss of literary design and effect.
Moreover, it may be doubted whether he was able to remember all the things he had
originally written. 53
 In addition, we should consider that none of the Portuguese
chronicles show clear signs of having had access to any source on the first voyage, other
A. Bocarro, Década 13 da Hisiória da India (Lisbon, 1876).
49 Jbid., vol. I, p. V. See also Appendix I of this study, below.
5°Harrison, 'Five Poiluguese Historians', p. 161.
Bocarro, Década 13, p. x..
Antonio Bocarro, 0 Livro Dos Planias de Todas as Fortalezas, Cidades e Povoaçôes do Estado da
India Oriental, ed. P. B. Resende (Lisbon, 1992), p. 13.
Antonio Baião, Documenios Inedizos sobre Joào de Barros (Coimbra, 1917), p. 14.
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than an anonymous text. Correia, in his description of da Gama's voyage, appears
closest to the idea of the traveller-chronicler.54
Of course, we should also be aware that the 'official' chronicles were written
merely to accomplish the main objectives of the Portuguese crown and court. Even if
the writers' own views sometimes emerge, their works collectively viewed history as a
series of great victories and momentous events involving their Christian European
heroes. They concentrated on the captains, their expeditions, fleets, warships, and
sometimes Muslims with whom they dealt to their benefit, or who took action against
the Portuguese authorities. In addition, though their writings are tinged more or less
deeply by religious sentiment and the zeal of Portuguese activity, they are secular
histories. They are extensions of the national chronicles. For example, João III sent
orders to Nuno da Cunha, the governor of India, to write to him in detail about events in
Asia, and then he gave these accounts to Barros. 55
 Therefore, it is necessary to check
carefully what they said, especially about Indians, and in the Gulf about Arabs, Turks,
and Persians, and about the names of places and persons.
In addition to original documents in Portuguese, other important published
sources have been used in this study. Firstly, The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Da
Albuquerque, second viceroy of India (1509-15), translated and edited from the
Portuguese edition of 1774 by Walter de Gray Birch. 56
 These Commentaries were not
written by Albuquerque in person, but compiled by his illegitimate son, Braz. 57
 The
important volumes of the Commentaries are the first (from 1503-8), which contains the
principal account of the first Portuguese invasion and military operations on the Omani
M. Kriegel and S. Subrahnianyam, 'The Unity of Opposites: Abraham Zacut, Vasco da Gama and the
Chronicler Gaspar Coneia' in Vasco da Gama and the linking ofEurope and Asia, ed. A. Disney and
E. Booth (Oxford, 2000), pp. 50-1, 54.
Harrison, 'Five Portuguese Historians', p. 157.
first edition of the Commentaries was in 1576 and the second in 1774.
' The Commenta,-ies of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, trans. and ed. W. de Gray Birch (London,
1875), vol. 1, p. iii.
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shore and against Hormuz itself; the second volume, which deals with events between
1508 and 1510; and the fourth volume, which relates events from the final two years of
Albuquerque's tenure. Obviously these Commentaries contain an exaggerated panegyric
of Portuguese deeds in the East. They describe sieges, battles and the slaughter of
'infidel enemies'. It is well-known that Albuquerque's treatment of the Omani coastal
towns was savage. In spite of all this, the Commentaries contain valuable information
about the Gulf, its residents, and the towns situated on the coast.
The Three Voyages of Vasco Da Gama and his Viceroyalty, part of Gaspar
Correia's Lendas da India, has already been mentioned above. 58 The Book of Duarte
Barbosa is a unique work from the first half of the sixteenth century, completed around
1514, because it contains a full description of the towns overlooking the Indian Ocean
and the Gulf, on both the Persian and the Arab coasts. Moreover, Barbosa describes the
course of the Portuguese invasion.59
 The narrative reflects the personal experience of
the author in the East and contains many credible observations. The great importance of
Barbosa's work is that it gives an intimate picture of each town in the Gulf at the
beginning of sixteenth century. However, difficulties occur regarding the Old
Portuguese place names, which need to be carefully compared with other geographical
sources in Persian or Arabic.
In addition to these memoirs and commentaries, there are some important
travelogues which are rich in information. The most important is The Travels of Pedro
Teixeira. 6° Teixeira was from a Portuguese-Jewish family in Lisbon, though nothing is
known about his occupation while he was in the East. He travelled to India around
58 G. Correia, The Three Voyages of Vasco Da Gama and his Viceroyalty, pp. i- lxxvii.
The Book of Duarte Barbosa, trans. M. L. Dames, 2 vols. (London, 1967). In addition, there is
another work of Barbosa entitled A description of the coasts of East Africa and Malabar in the
beginning of the sLrteenth century, translated from an early Spanish manuscript in the Barcelona
Library, ed. H. E. J. Stanley (London, 1866).
° The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, trans. W. F. Sinclair (NendelnlLiechstenstein, 1967).
26
1586, just a few years after the Dutch traveller Jan Huyghen Linschoten arrived, 6 ' and
remained in the East until 1605. This was a crucial moment in the history of the
Portuguese empire. Teixeira visited the Gulf twice, in 1587 and 1604, and in the latter
year he also visited Basra. 62
 For present purposes, his short narrative of the origin of the
kingdom of Hormuz is the most important part of his book, because he quotes from the
original Persian text Shahnamat, which has since disappeared.63
I have not yet alluded to the most important published Portuguese source dealing
with the first decades of the seventeenth century, namely the Commentaries of Ruy
Freire de Andrada, translated and edited by Boxer. 64
 Their importance lies in Ruy
Freire's appointment to a number of positions in the Portuguese fleet operating in the
Gulf from 1619. He was blamed personally for the fall of Hormuz. Freire established
his headquarters in Muscat after the fall of Hormuz and recovered Suhar, Duba and
Khtr Fakhãn on the Omani coast from the Persians. He also conducted a number of
raids on the Arab coast of the Gulf. 65
 Freire was known for his enthusiasm and his
military acumen, but he was also noted for his cruelty and oppression. His violence in
the Gulf spanned the period 1619-32 and permanently sullied his reputation. The
Commentaries give us detailed information about Portuguese military operations in the
Gulf in this time and, equally importantly, the attitude of the local powers towards the
Portuguese.
SI This traveller's work also contains some important material about the Portuguese in the East during
the last quarter of sixteenth century and their corruption. See The Voyage of John Huyghen Van
Linschoten to the East Indies, trans. A. C. Burnell, 2 vols. (London, 1885).
62 Jbjd pp. vii, xx-xxi.
See Appendix A in The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, pp. 153- 92.
Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, ed. C. R. Boxer (London, 1929).
65 N. Falsafi, Zendaané Shah 'Abbãs Awal (Tehran, 1371 S. D.), vol. 4, pp. 156 1-2; J. Qaemmaqmai,
'Qesmat as Ma'garaei Khalej Fars', Yad,arMagazine, 4 (1947), pp. 27-8.
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Other important travelogues include The Portuguese Asia by Fariya y de Sousa
and The Travels of Pietro Della Valle. 66 The former contains a detailed history of
Portuguese influence in the Gulf, Indian Ocean, southern Arabian Peninsula and the
Red Sea. Sousa demonstrates the utter Portuguese bigotry towards the resident Muslims.
Thus, he exaggerates Muslim casualties in the conflict against Portugal, and he
describes Portuguese acts of savagery and terrorism as acts of bravery and heroism. His
accounts, therefore, should be treated with a great deal of caution. The importance of
the Italian Pietro Della Valle's travelogue is that he visited Persia in 1616-17 while
Shah Abbas was fighting the Ottomans. Then, in 1621, he visited Shiraz and in the
following years the Persian coast near Hormuz, at which point Hormuz was under siege
by the English-Persian coalition. Della Valle remained in the Gulf until 1623.
Therefore, his account of the political and military events in the region is extremely
valuable and we can compare his comments with those of the Portuguese to see if the
latter had a tendency to exaggerate the scale of their victories.
This thesis also draws on a number of contemporary Arabic sources. Among
them is the famous navigation chronicle of Ibn Majid. 67
 Important information about the
Arab tribes who established a small kingdom and faced Hormuz on the west coast of the
Gulf can be found in an Egyptian source entitled Al- Daw' Al-lãmi' Li-Ahl Al-qarn Al-
tãsi' ('Spotlight on the people in the ninth century H.'), written by Shams Al-Din
Mohammed bin Abdull Rahman bin Mohammed A1-Sakhãwi, (142797).68 He visited
M. F. Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, trans. J. Stevens, 3 vols. (London, 1695); The Travels of Pietro
Della Valle in India, ed. E. Grey, 2 vols. (London, 1892).
67 S. A. Ibn Majid, Kitãb Al-Fawd 'idfi Usñl ilm Al-bahr wa 'Al-qawa 'd, ed. F. Khüri (Ras Al-khaimah,
1989). It is perhaps worth nothing that Ibn Majid was not the pilot who guided the first Portuguese
fleet to India in 1498. See M. Al-Salman, 'Who guided Vasco da Gama to India?', unpublished
seminar paper, University of Hull, 2001. Ibn Majid was a mu 'alum (navigation teacher) sailing
mainly in the Indian Ocean and, in particular, in the Red and Arabian Seas. Most of Ibn Majid's
account depended on the 'stars', and Al-Fawã 'id is the key work to the study of Ibn Majid's art if not
the whole science of Indian Ocean navigation. The works of Ibn Majid say little about the
Portuguese, but his knowledge of navigation at the time of their arrival is very important. G. R.
Tibbetts, Arab Navigation in the Indian Ocean before the coming of the Portuguese (London, 1971),
pp. 8-9.
68 M. A1-Sakhãwi,Al- Daw'Al-lämi'Li-A hlAl-qarnAl-tasi (Cairo, 1355 H.), vol.1.
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Mecca, Medina, and Syria, where he gathered material about the eastern Arabian
Peninsula. 69 Al-Daw' Al-lãmi' is considered to be one of the most important works on
the notable personalities of the period.
It is not only the Portuguese naval commanders such as Albuquerque and Ruy
Freire who left behind accounts of their campaigns in the Gulf. Similar histories have
also been handed down by Ottoman naval commanders, and among them is The Travels
and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral SeydI Au Reis. 7° This work contains an account
of the battles of Seydi Au Reis against the Portuguese fought to bring back the Turkish
fleet from Basra to Suez in 1553, and his subsequent adventures. This is considered the
greatest Turkish source, not only about the Ottoman-Portuguese conflict in the Gulf in
the mid-sixteenth century, but also on the efforts of the Ottoman navy in eastern waters.
Of no less importance is the Tohfat Al-Kkbar Fi Asfar Al-Bahar by Mustafa Bin
Abdullah Haji Khalifa. This was translated into English by James Mitchell and
published under a new title, The Histoiy of the Maritime Wars of the Turks. 7 ' The
importance of this work is that it throws light on Ottoman naval activities in the
Mediterranean, Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and in the Gulf in the sixteenth century.
As I mentioned at the beginning of this introduction, the surviving Omani
sources abstain from mentioning the Portuguese, except for incidental references to
them as 'oppressors'. 72
 They also refer to the occupation of Suhar by the Portuguese, for
the second time, in 161 However, only during the reigns of Imam Nasir bin Murshid
Al-Yarubi, from 1624, and Sultan bin Saif Al-Yarubi, from 1649, does significant
information about the Portuguese in Oman begin to appear, in a period which saw
Al-Sakhãwi, Al- Daw'Al-ldmi'Li-AhlAI-qarnAl-tãsi, vol. VIII.
° The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral SeydI Au Reis, trans. A. Vambery (Lahore,
1975). For personal details about SeydI All Reis see Chapter Four, section 2.
' M. Haji Khalifah, The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, trans. James Mitchell (London,
1831).
72 Al-Salmi, Tuhfat a!- 'A yãn Bi-Sirat 'Ahi 'Umãn , vol. I, p. 354.
Al-Azkawi, KashfAl-G/zummha al-jdmlLIi-akhbãrA/-ummha, p. 92.
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conflict between the Imams and the Portuguese until the latter's expulsion from Muscat
in 1650. The Omani Ketab Kashf Al-Ghummha al-jãmI Lli-akhbãr Al-ummha, deals
with the ejection of the Portuguese from Muscat in 1649-50. Most later Omani
accounts are based on KashfAl-Ghummha.
3. Historical-Geographical Background of Portugal
There is no doubt of the strength of the relationship between geography and historical
development. In the case of Portugal, geography and the environment affected its
development in important respects, as we shall see.75
Until the eleventh century Portugal was part of the Islamic kingdom of Al-
Andalus in the Iberian Peninsula. The original nucleus of Portugal was the area between
the Minho and Douro on the western littoral of the Iberian Peninsula. 76
 The geography
of Portugal was essentially maritime. It was a small, impoverished and compact country
with a land area of 34,216 square miles (88,684 sq.km.) and a population of around one
and a half million in the first quarter of the sixteenth century. 77
 The proportion of its
coastline to its area is three times the European average. The Portuguese part of the
Iberian Peninsula is about one-fifth of the whole. A rock-strewn waste separates
Portugal from Spain.78
The mountainous character of the interior and restricted agricultural economy
pushed the great majority of the people to live on the coastal areas close to the ocean.79
That gave the Portuguese, like all the Mediterranean and Atlantic peoples, long-standing
experience of the sea. No part of Portugal is very far from the sea. The Portuguese are in
74 A1-Azkawi, KashfAl-Ghummha al-jämI Lli-akhbãr Al-ummha, p. 111.
See, for example, Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, Civilizations (London, 2001).
76 See Map I, below.
A. H. 0. Marques, History of Portugal (New York, 1972), vol. I, p.271.
M. Oliveira, História de Portugal, p. 34; H.V. Livermore, A New Histo,y of Portugal, (Cambridge,
1976), pp. 1-2.
79 D. Arnold, The Age ofDiscoveiy (London, 1994), p. 22.
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particular an Atlantic, not a Mediterranean, people, and the most important frontier has
therefore been the open boundary of the ocean. 8° Moreover, the pattern of winds and
currents in the Atlantic shaped Portuguese ideas of departure and return for ships
trading with the islands or searching the ocean for fish.8'
However, the influence of the ocean is felt not only on the coast, but also
pervades the western half of the country. The distribution of population, concentrated
on the coast, not inland, was one of the most important factors in the political separation
of Portugal from Spain. 82
 The birth of Portugal dates from 1139, when Afonso I
Henriques for the first time confirmed the title King of Portugal. 83
 The revolution of
1385 brought to power the new royal house of Avis: JoAo I of Avis (1385-1433) was the
dynasty's founder and also, arguably, the father of a generation of princes who became
the main directors and organisers of Portuguese colonisation and maritime exploitation
at the beginning of fifteenth century. However, some recent studies of Portuguese
expansion also draw attention to the initiatives of King Dinis (l2791325).84 In 1317 he
appointed a Genoese merchant and mariner as admiral of the Portuguese fleet. 85 Thus, if
Portuguese influence grew after the capture of Ceuta in 1415, and its exploration of
West Africa accelerated,86
 then its origins went back much further and were partly
connected with the Genoese diaspora identified by Fernandez-Armesto. 87
 Appropriately
enough, given the pattern of Italian enterprise in the medieval Mediterranean, because
of the comparatively limited population resources in Portugal and the Avis dynasty's
80 S. Bradford, Portugal (London, 1973), pp. 9-10.
81 Arnold, The Age ofDiscovery, p. 22.
82 Bradford, Portugal, p. 21.
83 Historia da Expansâo Portuguesa no Moundo, ed. A. Baiào (Lisbon, 1937), vol. I, p. 19; Oliveira,
Histdria de Portugal, pp. 43-7.
84 J. B. Hattendorf, Maritime History: the Age ofDiscovery (Malabar, Florida, 1996), vol.!, pp. 53-4.
85 Hattendorf Maritime History, p. 54.
86 Oliveira, Historia de Portugal, p. 165.
87 F. Fernandez-Armesto, Before Columbus: Exploration and Colonization from the Mditerranean to
the Atlantic, 1229-1492 (Philadelphia, 1987), passim.
31
encouragement of commercial ventures the Portuguese ultimately created a commercial
maritime empire that did not include a vast number of peoples, cities, and territories.88
4. Geographical Background of the Gulf
Geography, especially the monsoon winds, has played a significant role in shaping the
trade of the Gulf. This part of the introduction therefore summarises the nature of the
coastal geography and the location of all the main trading centres in the Gulf which are
referred to in this thesis.
The Gulf is an arm of the Indian Ocean lying between the Arabian Peninsula and
Iran. It is almost an inland sea. The area of the Gulf is nearly 70,000 square miles. The
Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman lie between 22° and 300 North latitude, and 48° and
62° East longitude. The Gulf is bounded on the south and south-west by the coastal
districts of Arabian Peninsula, at the head of the Gulf by those of Iraq, and on the north-
east by the coastal regions of south-west Persia. 89
 The Gulf proper extends in a south-
easterly direction for 460 miles from the mouth of Shatt Al-Arab to the coast of the
promontory of Oman, with a width of about 180 miles from the eastern coast of Arabian
Peninsula to the coast of Persia.
The Strait of Hormuz separates the Gulf to the west, and the Gulf of Oman and
the Arabian Sea to the east, with a length of about 104 miles and a width of only 29
miles. 90
 The Strait is defined by a line drawn northward from Ras Al-Shaikh Masud on
the western side of the Musandam Peninsula to Jazireht Hengain south of the Iranian
coast, and in the Gulf of Oman by a line drawn from Ras Dabbah on the eastern side of
the Musandam Peninsula to Damagheh-ye Kuh on the Iranian coast. 9 ' The depths in the
88 Cortesão, 0 Império Porlugés no Oriente (Lisbon, 1968), PP. 31-48.
89 Historical Section of the Foreign Office. Persian Gu(f French and Portuguese Possessions, vol. XIII
(London, 1920), pp. 1-2.
9° C. G. Constable and A. W. Stiffe, The Persian GulfPilot (London, 1908), P. 1.
' See Map II, below.
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Strait are greater on the Arabian side than the Iranian side. 92
 The Strait of Hormuz has
long been, and still is, of great strategic importance as it is the only sea route through
the Gulf into the west. 93
 The head of the Gulf is formed, in the west, by the marshy
alluvial estuaries of rivers, principally the Euphrates, Tigris and Karün.94
The Gulf of Oman is an arm of Arabian Sea which forms the approach to the
Arabian Gulf proper. On the Persian side of the Gulf where the coast is mountainous,
the water is naturally deeper than on the flatter Arabian side, where reefs and shoals
extend into the Gulf for a distance of from 30 to 50 miles along almost its entire
length.95
The Arabian Gulf lacks good harbours, the anchorages being for the most part
shallow, exposed and difficult for navigation. This was one disadvantage of the region,
especially on the Arabian coast, for Portuguese ships when they entered the Gulf at the
beginning of sixteenth century: they had to move slowly and cautiously in their attempts
to find good harbours for their fleet, the notable exception being the port of Hormuz.96
In addition to the points already mentioned above, there are many factors which
make navigation along the Persian coast faster and safer than the Arabian coast. The
Persian coast is shorter, with fewer capes and indentations. Close to the Persian shore,
however, the seabed has a muddy bottom, making it very difficult for an anchor to hold.
Along every part of the Persian coast, ships could find anchorages in the different bays,
or in the islands lying offshore which gave shelter from storms. Moreover, along the
Persian coast there were many towns and villages where water and wood could be
obtained. On the other side, the Arabian coast from Shat Al-Arab North to Ras
92 Constable and Stiffe, The Persian Gulf Pilot, p. 2.
R. B. Sedeant, The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast (Oxford, 1963), p. 34.
R. K. Ramazani, The Persian Gulf and the Strait ofHormuz (Holland, 1979), pp. 1-2.
C. Beigrave, The Pirate Coast (Beirut, 1972), p. 1.
96 Ibid., p. 1.
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Musandam is mostly a white sand desett. 97
 For these reasons and others, the Portuguese
navy was attracted to the Persian coast more than to the Arabian coast.
On the Arabian Peninsula, the Province of Al-Hasa runs along the Gulf coast for
300 miles. QatIf and its oasis are situated on the coast north-east of the oasis of Al-
Hasa. Its length from north to south is 18 miles, with an average breadth of 3 miles.98
The coastline of the Gulf proper as far as the foot of the promontory of Oman is dotted
with a number of bays. This part of the coast is low and reefs and shoals extend from 30
to 50 miles offshore, making it difficult and dangerous to approach. In the period of this
study, only the island of Bahrain had good harbours in this region. This forms the centre
of the archipelago that constitutes the principality of Bahrain.99
Because of its important location, the Gulf has one 0f the longest histories of
navigation. It is mentioned in the history of ancient Dilmun settlements in the Bahrain
Islands as a trading centre as early as the third millennium.' 00 In the subsequent period,
ports grew up on the Gulf coast, chiefly with the development of Indian, African and
Chinese contacts.
Thus, the importance of the Gulf lies principally in its relation to international
communications. The head of the Gulf gave the best natural outlet to the shortest route
from central and southern Europe to India.' 0 ' All trade coming from centres in the
Indian Ocean and Persia passed through the Gulf, especially via Hormuz. Thereafter,
camel caravans carried goods overland via Persia and the Arabian Peninsula, or through
Constable and Stiffe, The Persian Gulf Pilot, p. 1.
Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Persian Gulf; p. 6.
Constable and Stiffe, The Persian Gulf Pilot, p. 3.
'°° A. K. Al-Kalifa, and A. Al-Hamar, Al-Bahrain Abr Al-Tareakh (Bahram, 1972), vol. 1, P
. 
28;
Beigrave, The Pirate Coast, p. 2.
'°' Historical Section of the Foreign Office. Persian Gulf; p.4.
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Iraq by river and land routes to Aleppo, the principal city of Syria, and from there to the
Mediterranean or to the ports of the Black Sea. 102
In the fifteenth century, seabome trade from India up the Gulf to Basra and
along the Red Sea to Suez was chiefly in the hands of the Hormuzian, Omani and
Yemeni Arabs, who had kept this profitable intercourse in their own hands for centuries.
They held a position somewhat similar to that previously held by the Venetians in
Europe. For European nations, the journey from Europe across Asia by land was long
and dangerous.
There are no statistics for the total population in the Gulf at the beginning of the
sixteenth century. It can be suggested that the Arabs were probably most numerous on
both the Arabian and Persian shores. On the other hand, very small numbers of Persians
could be found in some ports of the Arabian coast, such as Bahrain and along the Omani
shore, principally in the port belonging to the kingdom of Hormuz.'°3
Climate and wind systems place the Arabian Gulf proper, as well as the western parts of
the Gulf of Oman, at the outer rim of the monsoon regime that dominates the Arabian
Sea. The whole of the Gulf area is situated in a very hot and dry region of the earth.
Geographically, the Gulf lies almost outside the region of the south-west monsoon, and
its effect on the climate is for the most part indirect.' 04 The highest temperatures in the
Gulf rise to a range of 52° C, and the lowest reach 15° C. From the middle of July to the
middle of August, the heat is very oppressive, owing to the stillness of the winds and
the heavy humidity, so the weather is hot and tiring. One should remember that the
102 S. Al-Askare, Al-Tejarat wa Al-Melahafi Al-Khal/ Al- 'Arabi (Cairo, 1972), p.7.
103 Such as Qalhat, Quriyat, Suhar, Khür Fakhãn and the main city of Muscat. There is a settlement near
Ras Musandam called Kumazar, whose inhabitants, called Al-Shihuh, long preserved an original
dialect, a compound of Arabic and a vernacular Farsi. Some Omanis who I met mentioned that the
Al-Shihuh tribes know Portuguese as well. For more details about Kumazar and Al-Shihuh see
Travels in Oman, ed. P. Ward (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 454-69.
'° R. Klein, Trade in the Safavid port city Bandar Abbas and the Persian Gulf Area, PhD thesis,
University of London (London, 1994), p. 27.
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Portuguese launched their invasion on Babrain in 1521 in these extreme summer
conditions. Consequently, they suffered many navigational problems. In this campaign,
the Portuguese commander lost about 150 of his men in the Gulf before reaching his
target, and his soldiers were in a state of exhaustion during the battle on the island)°5
Because of the Gulrs modest size and the knowledge of the wind regime by the
inhabitants, local trade flourished in small vessels. However, navigation of the Gulf in a
sailing ship needs great care. As in most inland waters, the winds are very uncertain,
and blow occasionally with great force down the Gulf. These winds set in without much
warning. In the Arabian Sea at the mouth of the Gulf the wind pattern divided the year
into two halves.' 06 The north-east monsoon allowed voyages from east to west in
winter, from October to March, while the south-west monsoon permitted travel in the
opposite direction in summer, except for the period between June and August when
making port in India was rendered impossible due to the strong winds.' 07 Moreover, for
eight months of the year there is no rain. In winter, however, the rainfall on the Arabian
coast reaches nearly 10 cm, while the Persian coast with its higher relief receives up to
20 cm.108
These basic facts of temperature and winds are important to take on board
because they affected every aspect of life and commerce in the Gulf region. The winds,
in particular, were a factor of great importance in the Gulf: the wind, by turns, could
either facilitate the passage of seaborne trade or cause losses of both men and ships. The
local winds of the Gulf, including the sea and air currents all along its coast, flow from
the land to the sea during the night and turn onshore again during the day. Significant
local winds can be divided into three kinds. The shamál is a north-westerly that blows
105 M. Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. I, pp. 257-8.
'° Constable and Stiffe, The Persian Gulf Pilot, p. 5.See Plate VII, below.
107 Klein, Trade in the Safavid port city Bandar Abbas, p. 30.
'° S. M. Al-Qasimi, Power Struggles and Trade in the Gulf 1620-1820 (Exeter, 1999), p. 8.
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down the Gulf to the Persian coast in winter, especially towards Hormuz, bringing
clouds and rain. In the northern half of the Gulf the shamál blows about nine months
each year. This makes navigation very dangerous because it may set in at any time of
the day or night, and very suddenly. Given the importance of local knowledge, the
Portuguese and the Turks had to use local pilots on their ships.'° 9 The Kaus, a south-
easterly wind, is similar in effect to the shamál in that it blows from the east with great
force from December to April, with hard squalls and often much rain. The Suhaill
brings dust storms as it erupts from the south-west in winter, also bringing rain and
clouds rising from the south. It blows all over the Arabian Gulf and also in the Gulf of
Oman, and can cause significant damage."°
In addition to the winds, the currents in the Gulf also have many effects on
navigation. At the entrance to the Gulf the prevailing currents run inwards from May to
September, and outwards during the rest of the year. Within the Gulf itself, between the
entrance and the Shatt Al-Arab, the current sets down the middle of the Gulf. It is often
very weak and, at times, may set towards the north." This does not necessarily mean
that sailing to and from the Gulf is very difficult, but it needs specific navigational
experience.
There are several islands of various sizes strewn along the Gulf, just a few miles from
the coast. However, in this work I will focus on those that were of importance at the
time of the Portuguese invasion.
Across the Strait of Hormuz at the northern tip of Oman, stands an island of
circular shape like a gate-post, or a key of the Gulf. This is the tiny island of Hormuz or
109 The most experienced pilots in the Gulf were those from Muscat, Julfar, Babrain, Lingah, Rayshahr,
Shatt Al-Arab. See Constable and Stiffe, The Persian Gulf Pilot, p. 17.
I0 The Persian Gulf Pilot, pp. 5-7.
Al-Qasimi, Power Struggles and Trade in the Gulf 1 620-1820, p. 22; Constable and Stiffe, The
Persian Gulf Pilot, p. 15.
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Jarün which lies at latitude 27° North, about 10 miles from the Persian mainland and
about 34 miles from the Arabian coast." 2 It is about six miles in length and three miles
in width. The island of Hormuz is of old volcanic rock, with a range of hills running
east to west from sea to sea." 3 The island is mostly occupied by salt hills about 300 feet
in height." 4 It is covered in cliffs and rocks, and is altogether barren." 5 Hormuz has
two good natural harbours, one on the east side, and the other on the west. It was at that
point that the Portuguese chose to build their great fort in the Gulf.
Hormuz occupied a position which was in many respects comparable with Aden.
The population at the beginning of the sixteenth century was about 40,000.116 The island
of Hormuz was a kingdom which had controlled the Gulf for 200 years before the
arrival of the Portuguese at the beginning of the sixteenth century." 7
 The importance of
this kingdom lay mainly in the geographical position of Hormuz island at the mouth of
the Gulf, which gave it complete control of trade coming in from the Indian Ocean to
the ports in the Gulf, and the link with the land routes around the region.
The islands of Bahrain, of which there are over thirty, lie in an archipelago with
an area of 706 square km. It looks like a 'chessboard' floating on the Gulf. The longest
of these islands is Bahrain itself, or Awal. It is 30 miles in length from north to south,
and merely 10 miles in breadth." 8 Its shores are low; and along the northern shore there
is a green belt of well-watered land two to three miles wide, covered with date groves
and other agriculture. The important city on the island, Manamah, is in the north-east. It
112 A. Tenreiro and M. Afonso, Viagenspor Terra da India a Portugal (Lisbon, 1991), p. 23.
' The Travels ofPedro Teixeira, pp. 164-65.
" See Plate IV.
115 Constable and Stiffe, The Persian Gulf Pilot, p. 2; The Voyage of John Huyghen Van Linschoten to
the East Indies, vol. I, p. 47; The Encyclopedia of Islam, ed. B. Lewis et al, New ed. (Leiden and
London, 197 1-76), vol. III, p. 585.
IS G. Schweizer, 'Bandar Abbãs und Hormoz', Beihefte Zum Tübinger Atlas Des Vorderen Orients, no.
2. (Wiesbaden, 1972), p.12; Barros states that in 1515 there were about 30,000 people in the city of
Hormuz. Asia, Década II, p. 5.
117 See Chapter One, below.
118 M. Barrault, Regards Bahrain, trans. A. Sarda (Paris, 1996), p. 6.
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was mentioned as an important trade centre in the fifteenth century." 9 Water at most
points on the island was plentiful at the time when the Portuguese arrived, and, as a
result, the north-east and the west were characterised by green fields with a good
number of cattle.' 2° From Ras Al-Ruman in the north to the shore of Bar Bar village in
the west, there is a slight bay, near which the first battle between the inhabitants and the
Portuguese occurred in 1521, and there the Portuguese erected their fort in Bahrain on
the foundations of the Islamic fortress. From Babrain extended a sea route to the interior
of the Arabian Peninsula, via the minor ports of the Peninsula coast, notably Okwair
(Ojair) and Qatif) 2 ' From these ports there were caravan routes to Hofuf,. the principal
town of Al-Hasa oasis, and then across Nejd to Al-Hejaz province. 122
 However, bandits
from the desert tribes sometimes jeopardized this land route. The distance between
Hormuz and Bahrain was about four or five days' sailing with favourable winds.'23
Moreover, Bahrain was an important point on the sea route between Hormuz and Basra,
and the bridgehead of the trade route between Hormuz and Hejaz on the Red Sea coast.
Bahrain was also the centre of the pearl fishery in the Gulf. For this reason,
however, the island often attracted the attention of its strongest neighbours, especially
Hormuz, for at the beginning of the sixteenth century the most important element of
commerce in the eastern world was pearl fishing.'24
The main pearl fishery in the Gulf stretched from Ras Musandam to the island of
Bahrain and QatIf, and also included several islands on the Persian side of the Gulf,
"9 The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, p. 188.
120 Constable and Stiffe, The Persian GulfPilot, pp. 93-5.
121 The port of Okwair is situated on the coast of the Arabian Peninsula about 24 miles south-west of
the southern extremity of the Bahrain islands. Historical Section of the Foreign Office. Persian Gulf
p.8.
122 Historical Section of the Foreign Office. Persian Gulf p. 8.
123 T. Pires, The Suma Oriental (London, 1944), vol. I, p. 19.
124 N. Khesro, Safar Namdh, trans. Y. A1-Khashab, (Cairo, n.d.), p. 144; D. Potache, 'The Commercial
Relations between Basrah and Goa in the Sixteenth Century', Stvdia, no. 48 (Lisbon, 1989), pp. 146-
47.
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among them Sheikh Shuaib and Kharg.'25 The pearl divers throughout the Gulf were
Arabs who lived on the coast, and it has been suggested that about 4,500 ships and more
than 30,000 people worked in the fishery.'26 Nearly all the ports on the Arabian coast,
and many on the Persian, were involved in the industry. The fishery took place between
mid-May and the end of September. The pearls were sold on board, at the pearl banks,
or at Bahrain, Qatif and other towns on the Arabian coast and Flormuz.'27
The principal island on the Persian littoral is Qishm. 128 It is the largest one in the
Gulf. The island of Qishm is 60 miles long and 90 miles across, and lies parallel to the
coast. It is situated in the Strait of Hormuz, and stretches along the Persian coast from
Kung and Lengeh almost to Bandar Abbas. It is separated from the mainland by a
channel which is navigable for ships, and its coast is generally rocky. It has several
ports, but is mostly very shallow.' 29 It has plenty of palms, gardens, and wells, which
supplied Hormuz with water. This island was important in the conflicts between the
Persians and the Portuguese before the fall of Hormuz in 1622. Off the southern flank of
Qishm are the islands of Larak and Hengam;' 3° both are barren and hilly.'3'
Basra or Al-Basra (Al-Ubulla) is not an island, but it was and still is the most
important trade gate of Mesopotamia. It had great importance, both economically and
politically, in the period with which this thesis is concerned. It is situated on the west
125 Between Bandar Dilam and the outlet through the Straits of Honnuz are the islands of Kharg, Shaikh
Shuaib, and Qays, which are all small, low, rocky, and fringed by reefs. The Travels of Pedro
Teixeira, p. 24.
126 Khesro, Safar Namãh, p.144-45; The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, pp. 175-77.
127 Al-Qasimi, Power Struggles and Trade in the Gulf p. 25; F. Adamiyat, Bahrein Islands (New York,
1955), p. 3.
128 Queixime or Broct in Portuguese or Qishm in English. The native Arabs called it JezIrat Al Tawila
('the long island'). Its fall into Persian hands was a serious blow for Hormuz. For more details about
its geographical situation see The Book of Duarte Barbosa, vol. 1, p. 75; Constable and Stiffe, The
Persian GulfPilot, p. 152.
129 Terileiro and Afonso, Viagenspor Terra da India a Portugal, p. 25; The Persian Gulf Pilot, p. 152.
130 Later in the nineteenth century a British coaling station and also a telegraph station were established
on the island of Hengam.
131 The Travels ofPedro Teixeira, p. 24.
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bank of the Shatt Al-Arab, and about 67 miles from the bar, like a bridgehead
overlooking barren stretches linking the Gulf and the Mediterranean.
5. The Meeting of Civilisations
The clash of cultures that occurred in the Indian Ocean after 1497 is a common theme in
writing about the Portuguese. It is often symbolised by the misunderstandings of da
Gama's pathbreaking voyage to India in 1497, and the suspicion that then became
embedded in Portuguese policy as it became clear that the rim of the Indian Ocean was
populated by significant numbers of Muslims. All of this is set against a tendency to
measure 'advanced' against 'backward' in the Portuguese-Asian encounters of the
1 500s: advanced European weaponry against medieval South Asian technology; or the
focused aggression of the Portuguese state against the disparate and disconnected
interests of the Indian Ocean potentates. More recent historiography has tended to
emphasise the weaknesses that the Portuguese brought with them to the Indian Ocean
rather than the triumph of European arms: Portugal's fragile economy has been
emphasised for example, and the lack of interest that Portugese trade goods generated
on the Malabar Coast has reminded scholars of the wealth and scale of the Indian
Ocean's trading networks. These are important correctives; but they should not in the
end disguise the fact that the encounters of the 'discovery period' set the tone for
Portuguese attitudes and administration for much of the sixteenth century, and that, in
the Gulf at least, the economic success of the Estado da India depended more on
accommodating existing forms and patterns of commerce rather than building
something new. Here, at least, through the unlikely lens of a puppet regime propped up
by Portuguese force, we can see something of how the protangonists benefited in certain
respects from the European occupation.
In Hormuz we can find plenty of evidence of hatred, distrust, and mutual
miscomprehension - indeed, it will be argued in the end that a lack of Portuguese
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understanding of regional politics contributed to their demise as an occupying force.'32
However, the rationale for the Portuguese presence was economic, and in the conduct of
trade we can find evidence of the accommodation and adjustment referred to above.
The Gulf, in comparison with India or Southeast Asia, was culturally
homogenous. Most of the people were Muslims with tiny minorities of Christians, Jews
and others. Most people spoke Arabic, even the Persians and the Turks since it was the
main language of Quran, and was used as a lingua franca in the markets of the Middle
East. In addition, the region was mostly uniform in its hostile reaction to the arrival of
the Portuguese in the 1500s.' 33 However, Hormuz occupied a unique position within the
Estado da India, and even within the Gulf. There were no villages or villagers in
Hormuz, because it was barren and salty. There were no agricultural areas in Hormuz,
and no local water supplies for the inhabitants to use.' It was a town on an island
without any real historical pedigree, without any deep civilization or cultural identity. It
was not notable for its social, cultural or religious activities.' 35 It was merely a trans-
trade post, limited in everything. Most of its people were local or foreign merchants.
Even though many travellers and chronicles passed through Hormuz on their travels
through the Gulf, none of them stayed there more than one or two seasons before
moving on. Hormuz was almost an artificial settlement; created out of nothing to serve
the interests of trade and its ruling dynasty.
Hormuz bore the hallmarks of a centre of 'trade diaspora' as defined by Curtin,
where two or more cultures existed side by side.' 36 It was a centre of cross-cultural
trade. Prior to the Portuguese occupation the most frequent contacts were between
Arabs and Persians, though the city did attract a much more cosmopolitan group of
132 See Chapter 5, below.
See Chapter Four (especially 4.1, 4.3).
' The Travels of Ibn Battuta, trans. H. A. R. Gibb (Cambridge, 1962), vol. H, p. 400.
Ibid., p. 401.
136 
p Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge, 1984), p. 11.
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merchants from the eastern rim of the Indian Ocean. The arrival of the Portuguese
exaggerated the existing situation by adding new variables to it. However, this thesis,
though much concerned with trade, is really the history of a cross-cultural encounter
between the peoples of the Gulf and the first sustained European presence.
When we speak of cross-cultural exchange we should be aware that Hormuz
posed different problems to other zones of Portuguese influence, whether in India,
Southeast Asia, Africa, or Brazil. In Hormuz, the Portuguese had a small native
population to deal with, and in fact most of their dealings were with the royal family
and its officials. The distinction, or gulf in some instances, between specialist merchants
and society at large noted by Curtin was not so pronounced in Hormuz, though it could
be found elsewhere in the kingdom and the region.' 37
 The policies enforced after
Hormuz was occupied concentrated almost exclusively on trade, with the revenues of
A'fándega at their centre. After the city was conquered, it was left to the Portuguese to
re-establish Hormuz as the commercial hub of the Gulf, and in this they were
reasonably successful, especially in their dealings with the Persians. Much of what had
been threatened by the military occupation of Hormuz was salvaged; but in all of this
the Portuguese were primarily following established precedent and rebuilding or
renewing partnerships established by the viziers of Hormuz and the city's commercial
party.
When the Portuguese arrived in the Indian Ocean at the end of the fifteenth
century, they quickly acquired knowledge of the winds, currents, routes, and ports in
their search for a pattern of strong points that would give command over the sea-lanes.
As a result, as Curtin states, the 'trading-post empire' that emerged took the shape of
earlier Asian trade networks.' 38 Over time, Portuguese culture 'reached deeply into the
Cm-tin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, p. 5.
' 38 Ibid., p. 140.
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ecumenical patterns of Asian commerce, just as other new trade diasporas had
influenced it in the past'.'39
For example, conmiunication was one of the initial practical problems of
Portugal's trade diaspora. In the Gulf, from their first arrival the Portuguese needed
interpreters (linguas). Albuquerque got the help of some Hormuzian merchants in 1507
in his negotiations with the king and the vizier of Hormuz. 14° In 1517, in addition to the
Portuguese and the local linguas, Hormuz had two Indian interpreters, one Gujarati, the
other a Christian from Malabar.' 4 ' Gradually a form of Portuguese became important in
the Gulf and in the Indian Ocean - it was perhaps the dominant lingua franca in Asian
maritime trade, and it held that position until it was supplanted by English at the end of
the eighteenth century.' 42 This new language was an amalgam of native borrowings
(Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Malayan, etc) and Portuguese, and it was conscious as much
as organic in its development: by recruiting people from heterogeneous origins and
cultures in the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese hoped to embrace a wide range of
languages. For example, a Jew of Ashkenazi origin came to India as an interpreter for
Vasco da Gama.'43
The experiences of some of the linguas inform us about another form of cultural
cross-fertilisation, namely the conversion to Christianity of Muslims. Hormuz was an
obligatory port of call for the new Christians of Arabian origin that went to India.
Castanheda observed that there was some Muslims who became Christian, including
three linguas called Caspar Martins, Gaspar Rodrigues, and Salvador Rodrigues. It
seems likely that they remained at Hormuz to assist the Portuguese officials in the
' Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, p. 143.
140 The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. I, pp. 107-1 1, 121-2.
" See Farinha, Os Portugueses no Golfo Pèrsico, 150 7-1538, p. 30.
142 Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, p. 143.
' D. Couto, 'The Role of Interpreters, or Linguas, in the Portuguese Empire during the sixteenth
Century', e-JPH, Vol.1, no. 2 (2003), p. 2.
44
a(fandega there.' Later, Martins was appointed as interpreter for the delegation of
Femão Gomes de Lemos to Shah Ismail, and he received one hundred and fifty
cruzados for his services. t45 In fact most of linguas in the Gulf earned good wages: one
who translated between the king of Hormuz and the Portuguese received over 129,000
reis a year; but the interpreter of the judge of Hormuz received a salary of 7.200 reis
each year, about 600 reis per month. 146
Ultimately, then, communication across the Gulf became easier and this would
have facilitated both the establishment of the Portuguese regime in Hormuz and the
revival of trade passing through the city. Regarding the conduct of trade in Hormuz,
before the arrival of the Portuguese matters were settled between the society of
merchants, the royal family and the viziers. Transactions were made either by money or
by exchange. For all goods, with the exception of gold and silver, there was a ten per
cent duty. The king and the royal family were not directly involved in trade, but they
shared in the revenue of the customs-house. The balance of authority between the king
and the vizier and the merchants contributed to the stability of Hormuz, even though
there were internecine sruggles from time to time. Out of necessity, the Portuguese
employed not only the system of tax organisation they found in Hormuz, but also the
whole machinery of revenue collection and administration. However, under Portuguese
rule foreign administrators dominated the city's institutions, particularly after 1521, and
therefore merchants were unlikely to develop formal political and economic relations
with other merchant communities without first passing through the Portuguese
authorities.
144 F. Castanheda, História do Descobrimentos e Con quista da India pelos Portugueses, vols. I, III, pp.
326, 845.
'45Ibid.
See T. 0. Matos, Estado da India nos anos de 1581-1588 (Ponta Delgada, 1982), Pp. 24, 27;
V. M. Godinho, Les finances de l'éfat Portugais des Indes Orientales (15 17-1635) (Paris, 1982), p.
167.
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Before the Europeans arrived in the Indian Ocean, business and the shape of
trade depended on open markets and the trust that developed between the merchants, the
brokers, and the buyers, notwithstanding the time and distances involved. Trust
extended to payments due after one year or more. In the Gulf there was a system of
trading called dallãl. This existed with the advent of Muslims in India; the brokers were
generally termed dallãl, an Arabic word.'41 This suggests the key role that brokers
played in trade in the Islamic world at that tune. Commercial agencies orfeitorias seem
to have been a European introduction. 148 The feitor was the pivot of Portuguese
commerce. His primary function was to store, buy and sell merchandise, but he often
fulfilled other day-to-day tasks connected with navigation and mediating with the local
authorities. 149 On the other hand, the Portuguese evidently borrowed the system of
Shah-bander (rei do porto) from the East. There was a Shah-bander in Hormuz.' 5° In
addition, the Portuguese initiated changes in the recording of transations through the use
of conhecimentos and mandados. All expenditures, excepting petty and out-of-pocket
expenses, had to be supported by a receipt, voucher or bill of lading (conhecimento),
signed by the receiver, even in the case of an extraordinary expense authorized by a
warrant mandado from the higher authority.' 5 ' Thus, the routine of business in the Gulf
saw a great deal of continuity before and after the arrival of the Portuguese, but with a
number of European refinements. Practical experience would have caused the
mechanics of trade to evolve further during the sixteenth century.
' A. J. Qaisar, 'The Role of Brokers in Medieval India', Indian Historical Review, vol. I, no. 2, (1974),
p. 220.
148 j Villiers, 'The Estado da India in South Asia', in The First Portuguese Colonial Empire, ed. M.
Newitt (Exeter, 1986), p. 38.
' 49tThomaz, 'Portuguese Sources on Sixteenth Century Indian Economic History', Indo-Portuguese
History: Sources and Problems, ed. John Correia-Afonso, p. 104.
150 A.T. de Matos, (ed.), 0 Orcamento do Estado da India 1571, (Lisbon, 1999), p. 24.
'' Thomaz, 'Portuguese Sources on Sixteenth Century Indian Economic History', p. 108.
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In the related field of shipbuilding, there is clear evidence for cultural and
technological cross-fertilisation. Muslim shipbuilders quickly emulated European
construction techniques, and, according to Almeida, ships and galleys were being built
in northern India in 1508 that were equivalent to those of the Portuguese.' 52 It is known
that Arab vessels of the fifteenth century were sewn, and that sewn boats made long
passages.' 53 The ships in the Gulf, like those in the Indian Ocean, were made without
iron fastenings, the planks being held together by cords made from the husk of
coconuts. 154 It seems that the use of iron fastenings was introduced to the Gulf by the
Portuguese at the beginning of the sixteenth century. In fact, linguistic evidence
suggests some of this cross-cultural trade in the Gulf during the Portuguese period,
which affected that region more than most others. For example, the Arabs in the Gulf
used a number of Portuguese expressions belonging to the discovery period, such as,
kawiya, karwa, yuwar kabirt, durmait, kaif at and kilJt. 155 All of these words, as
Johnston and Muir point out, refer to what might be called the basic techniques of
shipbuilding which the people in the Gulf quoted from the Portuguese. It is only to be
expected that local shipbuilders in the Gulf should imitate the methods of their rivals,
and with the new methods they would also borrow words for objects that they
themselves did not already have. The word kina, still in use in the Gulf, is probably
derived from the Portuguese cana and it means 'tiller'. 156 However, this does not mean
that Arab ships were badly built. Much like other aspects of the Portuguese-Arab
152 G. Scammell, 'Indigenous Assistance in the Establishment of Portuguese power in the Indian Ocean',
Indo-Portuguese History: Sources and Problems, ed. John Correia-Afonso, p. 165.
T. M., Johnston, and J. Muir, 'Portuguese influences on Shipbuilding in the Persian Gulf', The
Mariner's Mirror, vol. 48, no.1 (1962), p.59.
' 54 HasadNaduatAl-DerasatAl-Omanieah, (Oman, 1980), vol.4, p. 111; Gaspar, Correia, The Three
Voyages of Vasco da Gama, p. 242; J. Muir, 'Reminiscências Portuguesas na Arabia Oriental', in
Separata do Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa (Lisbon, 1961), pp. 44-45.
155 The existence of words like: käwiya from cavilha (pegs), karwa from curva (knee), uwar kabirt
from coberta (deck-beams), durmait from dormente (sleeping stinger), kalafaät and kilft from
calaféto (caulking the ship).
156 Johnston, and Muir, 'Portuguese influences on Shipbuilding in the Persian Gulf, p. 23.
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An existing economy that worked well, much like an Arab bagalah, had the
potential to work even more efficiently with a few modifications; but the experience of
the Gulf seems to show that success in this process of hybridisation and exchange came
more easily when the modifications were complementary rather than indiscriminate.
The 'curious' decision of the Portuguese, which could never be reversed, to protect their
own trade in the Indian Ocean through force and to sell protection to others,
underpinned by the threat of violence, was quite alien to the peoples of the Gulf.' 57
 This
shock, allied with the military occupation of Hormuz, inevitably did some damage in
the short-term. Ultimately, however, the Portuguese presence mellowed and there is
evidence of adjustment and accommodation on both sides, even if European cultural
forms were unlikely to become deeply rooted in the kingdom of Hormuz. The whole
issue of understanding and cultural integration between Arabs and Portuguese, some
glimpses of which have been examined above, would benefit from more research.
Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, p. 137. He points to the real enigma of Portugal's
disovery of the East - 'Portuguese shipping could have joined in free competition with existing
traders'.
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Chapter One: The Discovery and Conquest of the Arabian Gulf
One of the most famous Portuguese explorers and captains, Afonso de Albuquerque,
reported that the three key strong points of Goa, Hormuz and Malacca would ensure
Portuguese control of the major spice routes in the Indian Ocean.' Albuquerque, of
course, implemented this strategy of establishing Portuguese nodes around the rim of
the Indian Ocean during his governorship in the early sixteenth century. Control of
shipping - the economic lifeblood of the region - was the clear intention, and in
Hormuz, already a significant commercial and political centre, Albuquerque chose an
appropriate and valuable objective.
1.1. A Gulf 'Power': Hormuz before the arrival of the Portuguese
If the stories of Sindbãd show us the level of commercial contact reached between the
Gulf and India in the Islamic period, ancient history also tells us that India had been in
direct contact with the seamen of the Gulf. 2
 Indian ships sailed across the Gulf and also
to the Arabian Sea up to the Red Sea and maintained intimate cultural and commercial
connections with Egypt, Palestine, the Arabian Peninsula and other countries of the
Near East.
The Gulf and its strait was the natural route between India, Mesopotamia and
Egypt in Hellenistic times. Commercial contact between India and the Gulf depended
on the arrival of the monsoon winds, and the amount of rain they brought with them,
because the monsoon was the governing factor controlling shipping in this region.3
Thus, Indian and Arab navigators had long been familiar with the monsoon winds in the
The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. I , pp. xii-xiii, xxxix-xl.
2 The Book qf Thousand Nights and One Night, trans. P. Mathers, (London, 1951), see 'The voyages of
Sindbãd the sailor', pp. 249-329.
M. N. Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat (California, 1976), p. 9.
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Indian Ocean that blow from south-west to the north-east between April and August,
and then in the reverse direction from December to March.
Arabian contact with India concentrated on the western Malabar Coast. From the
beginning of the eighth century, the western trade of Malabar passed into the hands of
Muslims, most of them from the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. The good commercial
relationships between Malabar and the ports of the Gulf helped them to establish close
connections with cities in the Mediterranean such as Cairo, Alexandria, Tunis, and
Aleppo. Malabar also played a part in trans-shipment; its ports provided passage
between Gujarat, a textile producing region in northern India, and the far distant spice
islands of South-East Asia. The most significant port in Gujarat before the arrival of the
Portuguese was Cambay, which also had important links with Hormuz.
Goa, much further south, also had connections with the Gulf. According to
Barbosa it was 'a great place of trade in merchandise'. 4
 It was between twenty-four to
fifty days from Goa to Hormuz by sea, depending on the winds. Because of its strategic
position, after 1510 Goa became the Portuguese governor's official residence.5
During the fifteenth century there were a number of international routes across
the Indian Ocean, one of them from Gujarat to Honnuz. Cargoes dispatched from
Gujarat to the Gulf destined for Syria were generally trans-shipped at Hormuz, Qays or
Balirain into smaller vessels bound for Basra. 6
 Gujarati vessels called at Hormuz and
Muscat, and some of their merchants settled on the Gulf littoral, much as they did in the
Red Sea. Abdul Razzaq, an Indian traveller in the mid-fifteenth century, observed that
the merchants of Gujarat went to Hormuz to trade there. 7
 As the Gujarati merchants
"Cited by T. Albuquerque, Goa: The Rachol Legacy (Mumbai, 1997), P. 4. For the pre-Portuguese
period aee also R.P. Rao, Portuguese Rule in Goa 1510-1961 (Bombay, 1963), p.22.
C. J. Borges, 'The Portuguese and their Hormuz-centred Gulf Policy', A1-Awatheekah, 18 (Bahrain,
1991), p. 190.
6 The Cambridge Economic Histo,y of India, ed. T. Raychaudhuri, and Irfan Habib (Cambridge, 1982),
vol. I, p. 146.
in the Ffieenth Century, ed. R.H. Major (New York, 1867), p. 6.
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traded and settled freely in the Gulf region, similarly Gulf merchants were welcomed all
along the coast of Gujarat by the Muzaffarids. 8
 What is more important is the fact that
Gujarat imported bullion from the Gulf. It was one of the Gulf markets that the
Muzaffarids depended on for much-needed currency. 9
 It is therefore clear that Gujarat
stood in commercial interdependence with the Gulf.
Muslims not only largely monopolised seaborne traffic in the Indian Ocean, but
in southern India they also distributed the merchandise they brought. The Muslims were
keen traders but never attempted to acquire political independence, except when it was
essential for the conservation of their own community, in spite of Portuguese assertions
to the contrary. On the Indian coast they accepted the conditions and policies that they
found there.'°
Merchant fleets from the Gulf traded freely in all the Indian ports, and launched
their operations all over the Indian Ocean, reaching as far as Mozambique, South
Africa, and the South China Sea.' The main stops on the way were Cambay and
Calicut. After the ninth century they seem to have entered into effective competition
with Gujerati merchants for the spice trade of the Indonesian islands, for when
Albuquerque arrived on the Malayan coast he noticed Arab, Hindu and Chinese
merchants competing openly in the markets of that area.' 2
 During the twelfth century
the Chinese were in commercial contact with Sri Lanka, Quilon on the Malabar Coast
and Hormuz in the Gulf. In 1433 the Chinese famously withdrew from these ventures.
8 Muzaffarid Gujarat had become a powerful maritime kingdom and emporium of commerce in the
Indian subcontinent. See S. A. Tirmizi, 'Gujarat-Guif Relations 1405- 1573 AD', Al-Watheeka, 14
(Bahrain, 1993), PP. 223-24.
9 lbid., p. 224; The Cambridge Economic Histoiy of India, pp. 412, 417.
'°R. S. Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in India (1497-1550) (Westminster, 1899), p. 3.
M. N. Pearson, The Indian Ocean (London, 2003), PP
.
 60-4, 78; G. F. Hourani, Arab Seafaring
(Princeton, expanded edition 1995) chapter 2 passim.
12 The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. III, pp. xvii-xviii, 80; L. F. Thomaz,
Early Portuguese Malacca, trans. M. J. Pintado and M. P. M. Silveira (Lisbon, 2000), pp. 23-4.
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The Arabs, Persians and Turks traded across the Arabian Sea to Cambay, Calicut, and
China to Malacca.'3
From the above, it is apparent that there was a huge and complex commercial
network in the Indian Ocean before the Portuguese arrived. The Portuguese contribution
to this economic network was the diversion of trade and goods direct to Lisbon. To this
end they set up factories along the Indian Ocean coasts, built military installations and
naval bases. Moreover, they took control of many of the strategic entries to the ocean,
such as the Cape of Good Hope, Socotra at the entrance of the Red Sea, Bahrain and
Hormuz in the Gulf, as well as Malacca at the entrance to the South China Sea. At the
same time, the Portuguese used force to prevent the export of Malabar spices along the
traditional Muslim sea routes to the Mediterranean, in particular through the Red Sea -
but they were unable to control it.
***
Salgur Shah, a king of Hormuz, once observed:
Dele uzman bara man Kabab hast
Ke Aguerd man dariah hast14
('Mine enemy's heart is within him,
because he sees me live saved by the sea')
This view was absolutely correct, because the position of Hormuz at the mouth of the
Gulf gave it a great strategic position in world trade in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. Hormuz was a cosmopolitan trading centre and the heart of a maritime empire
- if it can be called such - in the Gulf when the Portuguese arrived in Asian waters.
Apart from Hormuz itself, the 'empire' included some of the neighbouring territories
and islands off both the Arabian and Persian shores. However, it is necessary to
distinguish between Old Hormuz on the mainland and Hormuz the island.
' C. Borges, 'The Portuguese and their Hormuz-centred Gulf Policy', p. 184.
' J. Qaemmaqmai, Hormuz dar Rawabut Iran wa Portugal (Tehran, 1947), p. 2.
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Old Hormuz was the name given to a small port located on the mainland of
Persia on the east side of the entrance to the Gulf at the head of the KhUr Minäb River,
opposite the island to which it later moved.' 5
 The city was founded in the third century
by Ardashir Papakan 1(224-41 AD), the founder of the Sasanian dynasty of Persia, who
ruled until the Muslim conquest of Persia.' 6
 The small port evolved into a state, and
between the fourth and tenth centuries Hormuz grew to be the principal port for the
provinces of Kirmän, SistTn and Khuräsãn.' 7
 To protect their trade routes and territory,
the Sultans paid tribute to the kings of Lãr and Kirmãn, and for some time remained a
vassal of those kings.' 8
 According to TUrãn Shah, from about 1100 AD (493 H) Old
Hormuz had its own dynasty of Arab The first and founder of the dynasty was
Muhammad Dirhem-Ku or Kub, who was probably from Yemen or Oman where most
of the later rulers and viziers of Hormuz originated.20
 In the twelfth century (sixth
century H), Old Hormuz was described by famous Arab historians and geographers,
including Idrisi, Istakhri, Yaquet Al Hamawi and Muqaddasi, as rising in importance to
become the dominant city of Kirmãn. Yaquet Al Hamawi, for example, concluded that
'Hormuz is the main port of the Persian coast and Kirmãn. All the ships and merchants
as well come there, all the commercial barges arrive, and from this city India's
commerce moves to Kirmãn, Sistin and Khurãsän.'2'
15 The name of Hormuz has changed many times since it transferred from the mainland in Persia; it has
been variously known as Annüz, Armuza, Harmüz, Hurmuz, Urmüz, Harãmiz, Aramuz, Agramuz,
Garamuz, Ormuz, Harmuz. See El, New ed., vol. III, p.584; J. Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz au
Debut du XVIe Siécle', p. 80. In addition, the name Ormus or Ormuz is the usual spelling adopted by
Portuguese travellers for the celebrated trading town of Hormuz. See GEPB, volume, XIX, (Lisbon
and Rio de Janeiro, 1945), p. 639; Qäemmaqmai, Hormuz darRawabut Iran wa Portugal, p. 7.
Beigrave, The Pirate C'oast, p. 5.
' See El, New ed., vol. III, p. 584.
18 The Travels of Marco Polo, trans. A. Ricci (London, 1931), p. 45.
19 Torunxa in Portuguese. Türãn Shah's work is entitled Al- Shâhnamat (Xa noma), 'The History of the
Kings'. He began with Adam at the beginning of the world. An abstract of this book is given by
Teixeira in The Travels of Pedro Teixeira.
20 The Travels ofPedro Teixeira, pp. 153-54.
21 Y. Al Hamawi, Muajam Al-Buldan (Beirut, 1990), pp.459-60.
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At the beginning of the thirteenth century, Old Hormuz was the centre of the
commerce between Persia, India, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Gulf. In this it
supplanted the position previously held by Qays Island, another port on the Persian
coast.22
 Marco Polo, the famous Venetian traveller, visited Old Hormuz in 1272 and
again in 1293, describing it as a large and noble city of considerable trade. 23
 However,
its situation on the mainland left Old Hormuz vulnerable to attack. In 1300-1 (699-700
H) the Tartar tribes attacked and destroyed the city, which led the king and all the
inhabitants to abandon the site and move to another island, called Jarün. 24 The barren
island of JarUn became 'New Hormuz', which between the fourteenth and sixteenth
centuries developed as an important port of trans-shipment for goods from India and the
Far East. The city of Hormuz was built on the plain, on the northern side of the island,
which had the best anchorage for ships. The Portuguese fort was built near the small
bay on the eastern side of Hormuz, a quiet shelter from most winds, with sufficient
depth of water for ocean-going vessels.25
The earliest account by an Arab writer of New Hormuz was that by Ibn Buttuta.
During his travels in the Gulf in the first half of the fourteenth century he described the
city as large and wealthy, with busy markets where merchandise from India and Sind
was despatched to Iraq and Persia. Ibn Buttuta also drew attention to the local pearls,
which the king used in his rosary, and described them as the best in all the East Indies.26
The Russian traveller Afanasii Nikitin, who visited Hormuz in 1472, confirmed that it
was a vast emporium where peoples and goods of every description from all parts of the
22 In 1229 the Sultan of Qays was killed and his island fell into the hands of the Sultan of Old Hormuz.
See A. Faroughy, The Bahrain Islands (750-1951) (New York, 1951), p. 60.
23 The Travels ofMarco Polo, pp. 44, 58.
24 
j Barros, Asia de Joâo de Barros, vol. II, Liv. II; and D. Couto, Décadas, vol. v, Liv. x, both
describe the founding of the kingdom of Hormuz on the island of Jarün. See also El, New ed., vol.
III, p. 585.
25 C. Constable and A. Stiffe, The Persian Gulf Pilot, pp. 149-50. See PlateVil.
26 The Travels of Ibn Battuta, trans. H. A. R. Gibb, vol. II (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 230, 408-09. For
more details about pearl fishing in the Gulf see Chapter Two in this study.
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world were gathered. 27
 Such was its splendour and wealth that Hormuz was described
as the 'Jewel of the world's ring' (Pedra do Anel do Mundo) by European travellers and
writers. These included Ludovico di Varthema, who visited Hormuz in 1503, just five
years before the arrival of the Portuguese. From his very timely description, it seems
that the city was at the height of its development and commercial prosperity, and the
region's chief port. Varthema gives a good account of the ships and merchants of the
city. 28
 Tome Pires, who visited Hormuz on his way to China in 1513, described the
kingdom as 'rich and noble, it is the key to Persia. The people of Hormuz are civilized
and domestic men; they are warlike and have good arms and horses'. 29
 The best
descriptions of Hormuz just before and during the Portuguese period can be found in
The Book of Duarte Barbosa and The Travels of Pedro Teixeira. Both preserve
extensive knowledge about the city, the island, its weather, merchants and merchandise,
people, language, food and drink, and the trade in horses and pearls, especially that from
Bahrain and QatIf.3°
Without its port, however, Hormuz would have been worth nothing. All of its
supplies, even daily necessities, came from outside, mostly from Gombroon in mainland
Persia and from the neighbouring islands of Qishm and Qays. From Basra came local
products such as butter, sugar, corn and rice, in addition to other supplies from Sind,
Bangalore and Bhatkal in India. 31 All travellers who visited Hormuz mention that the
city suffered from shortages of fresh water. This had predictable consequences when the
city was besieged, and doubtless contributed to its fall in 1622.
27 El, New ed., vol. III, p. 585.
28 The Travels of Ludovico di Varthema, trans. J. W. Jones (New York, 1863), pp. 94 -9; Barros, Asia,
vol. II, Liv. II, pp. 48-9.
29 T. Pires, The Suma Oriental, vol. I, p. 19.
30 The Book of Duarte Barbosa, vol. I, pp. 90-4; The Travels of Pedro Teixejra, pp. 164-68.
' ANTT, Cart. Ormuz Cota: Cartas Missivas no. 10, pp. 126-28.
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The ruling dynasty in Hormuz was Arab and Sunnite. The residents spoke
Persian and most of them were Muslims. Besides the Persian and Arab merchants, there
were Christians from Spain, Russia, Georgia and Germany, and some Jews who came
via Venice. This cosmopolitan mixture of residents also included pagans and Banyans
from India, and a significant community of Armenians who assimilated with the local
Muslims through their dress and language. These Armenian merchants played an
important part in the kingdom's economic life.32
At the beginning of the fourteenth century, quite soon after its establishment,
New Hormuz became more colonial in outlook, with the aim of exerting control over
the Gulfs trade. During the reign of Shah Qutb Al-Din Tahamtan 11(1318-46), Hormuz
became embroiled in a war against Qays and Bahrain, sparked off by commercial
rivalry and disputed ownership of the local pearl fishery and fresh water springs. The
Shah of Hormuz captured QatIf, Kharg island, and Derab (an island near the Shatt Al-
Arab) and subjected both the Persian and Arabian shores to an annual tribute. 33 Hormuz
later expanded beyond the Gulf region. During the first half of the fourteenth century
the cities of Quriyat,34 Khür Fakhãn, Shabã, Kalbã, 35 and Suhãr36 were under the control
of Hormuz.37
In the midst of this expansionism, however, the real territorial extent of the
kingdom remains somewhat uncertain. From Portuguese and some Persian sources it
32 E. Michael, Ralph Fitch Elizabethan in the Indies (London, 1972), PP. 26-7.
The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, pp. 173-81. See also Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', pp. 103-05;
Adamiyat, Bahrein Islands, p. 16; A. Faroughy, The Bahrain Islands, pp. 59-60.
Curayyat (or Curiate) is situated on the Omani shore. Barbosa provides a good description of this
commercial centre: 'The people there are on a thriving trade in merchandize. It has a great store of
food, and many very excellent horses bred in that same land and the Moors of Hormuz come there to
buy these and take them or send them to India'. The Book ofDuarte Barbosa, vol. I. p. 70.
Kalbã (or Calba, Culba) is also in the Southern part of the Musandam peninsula with a fortress,
which the King of Hormuz maintained there for the defence of his lands. The Book of Duarte
Barbosa, vol. I. p. 74.
Suhãr (or Sohar) was one of the oldest and richest towns in Oman. It was the starting-point of a well-
marked route from the coast into the interior of Oman through the mountains. It remained in
Portuguese hands until 1643. The Book ofDuarte Barbosa, vol. I. p. 71.
The Travels of Ibn Battuta, p. 399.
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might seem that by the early fifteenth century the king or shah of Hormuz exercised his
authority as far west as Kharg island, as far east as Ras al-Had (Cabo de Rocal-gate) in
southern Oman and to Makran on the Persian mainland. 38
 Also under his rule was the
province of Muscat, 39
 several ports on the coast of Oman, including Qalhat, 4° Julfar,4'
Dibba, and Lima, and other cities mentioned by ll,n Buttuta. Hormuz's authority also
extended to the main entrepôts, harbours and islands of the Gulf, such as Bahrain, Qays,
QatIf, Qishm Nabandé, Lengah, Carmon,42Shaikh Shuaib, 43
 Kharg, Kangun,45
 as well
as Mughistan and the district on the Persian mainland east of the Strait of Hormuz.46
Also, Hormuz controlled a 70 km wide strip between the kingdom of Lãr and the Gulf,47
38 See Maps II, III, below.
Muscat (or Masqate): a large town on the Omani coast, with a good harbour and anchorage, shaped
like a horseshoe. It had prosperous trade and a substantial fishery; fish were exported to many
countries. Albuquerque in his commentaries said it was an important centre of commerce and the
principal port of the country at the time when the Portuguese arrived. The Commentaries of the Great
Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. I, p. 83.
40 Qalhat, (or Calaiate) situated on the south coast of Oman. It is now just a little village on the Ras-al-
Had, the eastern point of Arabia. At that time it was a large town, dating back to the fourteenth
century. It has been said that Khwaja Attar, the vizier of Hormuz, was a native of this city. In
addition, the princes of Hormuz, according to the Shâhnamat of Turan Shah, came from Qalhat. Ibn
Battuta describes Qalhat as a city which had fine bazaars and one of most beautiful mosques. Most of
the people there were traders, and made a livelihood by what come to them over the Indian Ocean.
See The Travels of Ibn Battuta, vol. II, pp. 396-97; The Travels of Pedro Taxeira, pp.155-58; Aubin,
'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', pp. 97-9.
41 Julrar is situated beyond the Straits of Hormuz, west of Ras Musandam and was used as a pearl
fishing station. The traders of Hormuz came to buy the large pearls for export to India and elsewhere.
Julfär's trade brought great revenue to the king of Hormuz. The Travels of Ludovico di Varthema, pp.
93-4.
42 Armam or Camron in Portuguese.Cambroon in English. A large town on the Straits of Hormuz north-
west of Hormuz Island, which was the English trading settlement from the early part of the
seventeenth century, when Shah Abbas renamed it Bandar Abbas (the port of Abbas). See The Book
of Duarte Barbosa, vol. I, p. 75; Constable, and Stiffe, The Persian Gulf pilot, pp. 150-5 1.
' See Introduction above, footnote 125, p. 40.
' Kharg (or Khark; Portuguese Corgo). This rocky limestone island is unique because it is one of the
few islands in the Gulf with fresh water. Its position has given it importance from time to time until it
became an important trading centre under the Dutch after they were expelled from Basra in 1748. See
The Book of Duarte Barbosa, vol. I, p. 76.
Congo in Portuguese, this port was occupied by the Portuguese at the beginning of sixteenth century.
See G. N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian question, vol. II (London, New York, 1892), p. 406.
46 The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. I, pp. 83-4; F. Adamiyat, Bahrein
Islands, p. 16.
At that time Persia did not yet extend to the Gulf.
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and most ports of the northern coast of the Gulf between Bandar Rig and the island of
Hormuz.48
By the end of the fourteenth century, then, Hormuz had influence over the entire
coast, both on the Arabian and Persian sides; its neighbours could not threaten it by sea
because they lacked the necessary naval forces in the Gulf and Arabian Sea. However, it
does not necessarily follow that Hormuz was a strong naval power: indeed, the kingdom
was rather weak in this respect; sufficient forces were available to exert local control,
but they were certainly insufficient to withstand the Portuguese at the beginning of the
sixteenth century. The security of the city, as well as its wealth, lay in its natural
position.
In analysing the political structure of the kingdom, which of course affected its
policy in the Gulf, it can be seen that its administration was organised as follows:
the governor [vizier] and customs-master at the head of the administration;
a permanent garrison with full military supplies;
a tax collector reporting to the governor;49
officials working as assistants to the governor, some of whom were Arabs.
Under certain circumstances the separation between economics and politics in Hormuz
could be more marked than, for example, in the Indian Muslim kingdoms. The shah of
Hormuz, more than the rulers of Malacca, appeared to have run a semi-tributary, semi-
commercial state. 5° Administration was shared between the hereditary king and the
vizier ('governor' or 'prime minister'), who was the leader of the Commercial Council
of the kingdom. Official correspondence was written in two forms; one in the name of
the king, and another in the name of the vizier. Few sources survive to illustrate
precisely the division of authority in Hormuz, but, as Barbosa mentions, at the
48 Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', pp. 104-2 1.
49 Ibid,pp. 146-7.
° S. Subrahmanyam, The Career and Legend of Vasco Da Gama (Cambridge, 1997), P. 103.
58
beginning of the sixteenth century the 'governor' (or vizier) ruled the city and
maintained very strictly the commercial law of Hormuz. As an example, it was laid
down that 'any person who gives short weight or departs from the fixed rate and the
orders given to him, is punished with great severity. 5 ' Economic matters and two thirds
of the kingdom's officials - collectors of customs and the like - came under the vizier's
authority. Merchant families often contended for the role of vizier, since the holder of
this position played an important part in formulating policy. 52 The king, assuming he
was strong enough to exert his personal rule, controlled military and diplomatic affairs.
He also appointed the chief officials and collectors of revenue at trade centres outside
Hormuz - on the Persian mainland, Arabian Peninsula, and the islands in the Gulf that
were subject to him - but once in office these men were responsible to the vizier. 53
 If
kings were young, weak or otherwise vulnerable then the vizier could, and sometimes
did, assume sole executive control of the kingdom. Barbosa implied very strongly that
kings could be little more than puppets, kept under virtual arrest in the palace, and
discouraged from taking an active interest in the business of the kingdom. 54
 Saif Al-din,
for example, 'a youth of no great age', was 'so oppressed by the dominion of the
governor [vizier Noor Al-din, and his relative Rais Hameed], that he dared not do
anything of himself'
Thus, in effect, authority was split between the king and a council representing
the city's elite composed of military commanders and religious dignitaries and notables.
Frequently they supported the royal family.56
51 l7ie Book of Duarte Barbosa, vol. I. p. 97.
52 Ibid., pp. 98-9.
53 Thid., p.98.
Ibid. See below, pp. 62-3 and 80-1 for the example of Khwaja Attar.
The Book of Duarte Barbosa, vol. 1, p. 102.
Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', p. 146.
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Who were the kings of Hormuz during the Portuguese period? Chroniclers such
as Correia, Couto, and Castanheda give different names and dates for the reigns of the
kings. However, after comparing their works with the Shâhnamat of Turan Shah, and
with the works of Jahãngir Qaemmaqãmi and Jean Aubin, it is possible to compile a list
of kings as shown in Appendix I. Just as it is difficult to draw an accurate picture of the
kings of Hormuz, it is also possible to find no more than about eighty per cent of the
Portuguese captains of Hormuz in the same period, as shown in the same Appendix.
When Hormuz was only the power controlling the trade routes of the Gulf, no
one could sail and conduct business without a permit from the kingdom. 57
 Perhaps the
Portuguese copied these 'trade licences' in their Cartaz system. Hormuz was in a
position to make it illegal for anyone without a licence to engage in trade in the region,
especially the Arabs of Oman. The least attempt to open a new outlet was promptly
curbed. 58 Moreover, all of the boats engaged in pearl fishing were compelled to go to
Hormuz to register for passes, which contributed some 1,500 ashrafi per year to the
royal treasury. 59 All of the annual taxes - even those of the customs house - went to the
palace treasury; 6° the only state expenditure was on salaries for the garrison and
government officials.
Such close supervision and regulation of Gulf commerce produced opposition.
For instance, it led the shaikhs of Oman to use the internal routes over the Arabian
desert where they developed a thriving trade in horses with stock brought from inside
Arabia and Persia. On the back of this success, Omani traders established new ports in
Dofar and Mirbat on the south-west coast of Oman.6'
ANTT, Cart. Ormuz, pp. 30-5.
58 Ibid., pp. 34-5.
Borges, 'The Portuguese and their Hormuz-centred Gulf Policy', p. 193.
° The Book of Duarte Barbosa, vol. I, pp. 98-9; Pires, The Suma Oriental, vol. I, p. 20.
61 Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', p. 141.
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More generally, the Arabs of the Omani interior profited less from Hormuzian
rule than the Persians. They, the Omanis, wanted a greater share of the whole trade of
the region. The vizier and most important officials in the Omani ports were Honnuzian
natives sent by the kings every year, 62
 or else Persians who had settled on the Omani
coast. In addition, the Persian language, not Arabic, was used in official correspondence
between the royal government in Hormuz and the ports on the Gulf and Omani shores.
For this reason, and others, they rebelled against Hormuz in the fifteenth century.
1.2 Political Conditions in the Gulf
Affairs in the eastern Islamic world at the beginning of the sixteenth century were
controlled by three main powers whose governors were not Arabs. These polities
occupied great areas of the modern 'Middle East'. They were the Safavids in most of
Persia and some areas of Iraq; the Ottomans in Turkey and some parts of Eastern
Central Europe; and the Mamluks in Egypt, Syria, Hejaz and part of Yemen. Of the
three, only the Safavids were present in the Gulf and wielded political and economic
influence there. Because of this, as I have already implied, the economic and political
character of the Gulf during the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries revolved very
much around the kingdom of Hormuz.
The profits of eastern commerce made Hormuz economically strong and enabled
it to raise limited and poorly-equipped maritime forces - sufficient to protect the island
and its interests. Because of this basic naval capability and economic buoyancy, perhaps
against the odds, the government of Hormuz was able to maintain its scattered
territories. More important still, the kingdom kept that free navigation of the Gulf which
was its maritime lifeline. Yet the power of Hormuz was limited, and seemingly in
decline by the early sixteenth century. Its control extended over most of the western
62 The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. I, pp. 66-7.
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coast of the Gulf and the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula. This means that
although the kingdom of Hormuz was close to the Persian side of the Gulf, its political
and economic power was derived mainly from its settlements on the Arabian side. On
that basis we can understand the impact on Hormuz of the loss of the Bahrain islands in
1602. When Bahrain was lost, the first wall of defence of the kingdom collapsed63
Yet the situation in the Gulf was changing even before the arrival of the
Portuguese. Politically, the Gulf became more fragmented. New powers emerged: the
Safavid Persians, ruled by Shah Ismail, the founder of the dynasty; 64 the kings of Lãr in
southern Persia; and the Al-Juboor dynasty in Al- Hasa and the Bahrain islands.
Hormuz found it difficult to hold its position in the face of these emergent Gulf powers,
especially Persia. The kingdom ultimately fell under the influence of the governor of
Lãr and Kirmãn district, who in turn owed allegiance to Safavid Persia. Hormuz
therefore resorted to buying a measure of freedom through aimual tributes. At the
beginning of the sixteenth century the Persians received 2,000 ashrafi in
Muqarrariyas65 in addition to other gifts. 66 The vizier of Hormuz, Khwaja Attar,
organised these payments in the name of the king, Saif Al-Din Abu Nadar, who was a
boy of twelve. Attar was the effective ruler of Hormuz when Albuquerque arrived in the
Gulf in 1507. Up to this point, his achievements had been to maintain the kingdom's
nominal independence and to open commerce with India.67
Matters were compounded by the political frailty of Hormuz. Because of feuds
between members of the royal family, the kings were like puppets in the hands of their
respective viziers, who placed children on the throne in order to be able to rule alone.
63 See Chapter Four, 4.3, below.
64 The Book of Duarte Barbosa, vol. I, p. 83.
65 Tenreiro and Afonso, Viagens por Terra da India a Portugal, p. 25. For muqarrariya see Chapter
Two, p. 91.
66 Faroughy, The Bahrain Islands, p. 62.
67 Qaemmaqmái, Hormuz dar Rawabut Iran wa Portugal, p. 10; Adamiyat, Bahrein Islands, p. 16.
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The importance of the monarch was even reduced to the point where, although he
appeared to guarantee the unity of the kingdom, he was in fact no more than a
figurehead.68
From the beginning of the fifteenth century, the kingdom of Hormuz was
weakened from within by disputes among the ruling family, and threatened from
without by fear of attack by Persian mainland tribes. 69
 The bloody war that erupted
between factions of the Hormuzian royal family destroyed the monarchy's dignity. This
dispute encouraged the Arab tribes along the shores of the Arabian Peninsula to move
against Hormuz, to obtain their freedom and independence. In addition, this war brought
to the throne Saif Al-Din Abu Nadar, who could do nothing about the kingdom's
administration and could not control the trade and territories under his authority, both
inside and outside the Gulf Because of his youth and inexperience, he took no
measures against Albuquerque's fleet when it first arrived in 1507. All the preparations
for facing the Portuguese expedition were made by Khwaja Attar. In spite of this,
Albuquerque was unable to complete his conquest of Hormuz.7'
On the other side of the Gulf, a second political power was at its height in the
early sixteenth century. The kingdom of Al-Juboor - founded in the mid-fourteenth
century in Nejd by a group sometimes known as the Arabs of Bahrain or the 'Arabs of
the East' - comprised of Al-Hasa oasis and the Bahrain islands, in addition to some
districts on the mainland of the Arabian Peninsula, as Albuquerque mentions in his
commentaries. 72
 Their rule extended ultimately to Al-Hasa, Qatif, and parts of Oman
68 Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', pp.139-40.
69 A. N. Al-Humaidãn, 'Al-Tarekh A1-Siãsi Li Al-Juboor', Mujalt Ku/ate Al- 'Adab, Jameat Al-Basra,
16 (Basra, 1980), p. 51.
70 The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. I, p. 127, vol. iv, p.1 09; Castanheda,
História do Descobrimentos, vol. II, pp. 339-41; Qaemmaqmai, Hormuz dar Rawabut Iran wa
Portugal, pp. 8-9.
71 The C'ommentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. I, p. 108.
72Ibid., vol. I, pp. 83-4.
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and the Bahrain islands. The Al-Juboor tribe was related to the Aqail, the people of Bani
Amer Bin Abdul-Qais. The tribe of Bani Amer belonged originally to Nejd, and, like
most tribes of the Arabian Peninsula, they were Arab migrants.73
The expansion of Al-Juboor brought it into conflict with Honnuz. By the 13 50s
Al-Hasa and Qatif were under the subordination of Hormuz, while the Bahrain islands
were ruled directly by it. 74
 According to A1-Sakhawi, Saif bin Zamil bin Jubr, the
second ruler we know of, was able to establish control over Bahrain around the middle
of the fifteenth century. 75
 He ruled it justly and the people were loyal to him. 76
 During
the reign of his successor, Ajwad bin Zamil, the borders of Al-Juboor were pushed
further; his influence spread far and wide, and wealth poured into the kingdom from
more than one source. Zamil's authority extended until he could claim to control a great
part of the coastline of the Gulf. He also established good relations with the Indian
Bahmani kingdom. 77
 In 1506 Ajwad abdicated in favour of his son Mohammed, and
Mohammed bin Ajwad was evidently given the title of king of Bahrain between 1506
and 1507. In turn, Mohammed was succeeded by his brother, Muqrin bin Ajwad bin
Zamil, although we do not have a definite date for his accession. Perhaps it was in the
first quarter of the sixteenth century as Ibn Ayas, a contemporary historian, referred to
Muqrin as 'an Arab prince from Bani Jubr who owned from Bahrain to Upper
Hormuz' 78
A. Ibn Basarn, (Manuscript) 'Tohfat Al-Mushtaq fi Akhbar Najid wa Al-hejaz wa Al-Iraq', Mujalt
Al-Darah,1 I 4, (Riyadh, 1975), pp. 66-7 1; Bahrain through the Ages, ed. A. K. Al-Khalifa and A.
Abahussain (Bahrain,1995), vol. 2, p. 92.
Al-Humaidan, 'Al-Tarekh Al-Siãsi Li Al-Juboor', p. 38.
S. M. Al-SakhAwi,Al-Daw'aAl-Lãmi'afi li-Ah1A1-qarnAl-tãsi',vol.Ip. 190.
A1-Flumaidãn, 'Al- Tarekh Al-S iãsi Li Al-Juboor', p. 42.
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These details concerning the gradual rise of Al-Juboor are not merely incidental.
They are crucial to our understanding of relations between Al-Juboor and the kings of
Hormuz prior to the invasion of Bahrain in 1521 by a combined Portuguese-Hormuzian
force.
Back in Hormuz itself, a series of events occurred in 1417 which resulted in the
rebellion of Saif Al-Din Mahar against his father, Qutb Al-Din Tahmtan III Firuz Shah,
forcing the latter to abdicate the throne. In the same year, as described by the
Hormuzian chronicler Nimdihi, the Arabs of Bahrain rose in revolt on the Arabian coast
and captured Al-Hasa oasis. Later, in 1440, they also took QatIf in the wake of another
dispute which arose between the two brothers, Saif Al-Din and Fakhru Al-Din Turan
Shah JI. 79 These events left the ruler of Al-Juboor as king of Al-Hasa and QatIf.8°
After the death of Turan Shah II, a tragic civil war broke out in Hormuz among
his four sons. This struggle left three brothers dead, and resulted in the blinding of all
the relatives of the royal house who might have been dangerous as pretenders to the
throne. 8 ' The fourth brother, Salgur, sought the assistance of his wife's father, who was
the ruler of Oman. The Omanis were not in a position to help, so, in agreement with
Ajwad bin Zamil, Salgur instead gave up his rights to the island of Balirain and Qatif in
return for military aid and regular tribute payments from Al-Juboor. 82 Portuguese and
Arab sources agree that both Bahrain and Qatif were actually under the subjection of
Al-Juboor when the Portuguese entered the Gulf. As a result of these negotiations, Al-
Juboor sent an army and ships to the assistance of Salgur, which accompanied him to
Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', p. 124, note 290.
80 Ibn Basam, 'Tohfat A1-Mushtaq fi Akhbar Najid wa Al-Hejaz wa Al-Iraq', pp. 67-8, Aubin, 'Le
Royaume d'Ormuz', said that Al-Juboor occupied Al-Hasa in 1460, but this is not consistent with the
local Arabic sources.
81 In 1515 Albuquerque sent around fifteen of these blind princes from Hormuz to Goa, where he gave
orders for them to be maintained at his expense, so that they might end their days there, and not cause
any disturbance to the king in Hormuz. Barbosa, A description of the coasts of East Africa and
Malabar in the beginning of the sixteenth centuly, p. 49.
82 A. thin Majid, Al-Fawáid Fi Ausül Al-Bahr Wa Al-Qawa 'd, p. 302; The Travels of Pedro Teixeira,
pp. 180, 189; Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', pp. 134-38.
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Hormuz and restored his authority over it. The influence of Ajwad grew in
consequence, and the position of Salgur was made secure. 83
 Al-Juboor's support of
Hormuz provided an opportunity for the Arabs to increase their influence in the Gulf
region at the beginning of the sixteenth century.
Salgur Shah, however, had a short memory. After he came to power, he ignored
his agreement with Ajwad and demanded tribute from Bahrain, which Ajwad refused to
pay. There followed a number of failed Hormuzian assaults on Bahrain. A second
agreement, giving up Bahrain to Al-Juboor in return for an annual payment, also failed
to resolve the conflict. 84 In 1511, directly after the death of Ajwad, Khwaja Attar, the
vizier of Hormuz, launched a successful attack on Bahrain; but this merely brought
retaliatory attacks on Hormuzian settlements in the Omani interior, and in 1511 Attar
was eventually forced to withdraw his forces from Bahrain, restoring it to Al- Juboor.85
The political and diplomatic character of the Gulf was further complicated by a
third regional power, Safavid Persia which was founded by Shah Ismail Safawi (1499-
1524) in Azerbaijan in around 1500. By 1510 the rest of Persia and Iraq Al-Arab had
been brought under Ismail's control, after ten years of hard fighting. 86 The Safavid
conquest of Iraq was the first stage in the bloody hostility between the Shiite Persians
and the Sunnite Ottomans. As a result, it appears that when the Portuguese arrived in the
Gulf, the fundamental problem of both domestic and foreign policy for Persia was her
conflict with the Ottoman Empire, which overshadowed her relations with all other
powers. 87 What began as a difference in religious beliefs developed into a very
A. Abahusain, 'Al-Juboor- Arab A1-Bahrain', Al-Watheeka, 3 (Bahrain, 1983), p. 92.
A1-Humaidãn, 'Makanat Al-Sultan Ajwad Bin Zamil Al-Jubri fi Al-Jazirat A1-Arbiah', p. 62.
A. 0. Almulah, Tarekh Hajir (Al-Hasa, 1991), vol. 2, P
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86 P. M. Sykes, History of Persia (London, 1951), pp. 159-60; P. M. Savor, Studies on the History of
Safawid Iran (London, 1987), pp. 81-2.
87 Adamiyat, Bahrein Islands, p. 19.
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prolonged, destructive struggle between the two powers during the lifetime of Sultan
Selim I (1511_1520).88
Such divisions within the Islamic world at the turn of the sixteenth century were
extremely advantageous to the Portuguese. They undoubtedly exploited the hostility
between the two major Muslim powers of the Gulf by aligning themselves with Hormuz
against Al-Jaboor. Forces were dispatched to Bahrain to help restore Hormuzian control
of the island: this was simply an element in their plan to capture Bahrain, oust the
resident Arabs, and then consolidate their control of the region. Similarly, though the
struggle between the Safavids and the Ottomans ended with Persian defeat at the battle
of Chãldirãn in 1514, Sultan Selim still feared an alliance between Europeans and the
Persians. In this at least his anxiety was justified. Shah Ismail actively searched for a
strong ally against the Turks, and the only European presence in Gulf waters was
Portuguese. This proved significant for later events in the region. Furthermore, in 1516,
while the Mamluks were preparing a third campaign to drive the Portuguese from the
Indian Ocean, Selim attacked and subjugated Egypt, deposing its ruler and obviously
destroying any opportunity for action against the Portuguese. 89
 It is important to note
here that the Ottomans exploited the conflict between the Portuguese and the Mamluks
to their own advantage, knowing that the latter were compelled to commit resources
against the new European threat to their traditional commercial network. 9° Why Selim
afterwards failed to engage the Portuguese is a different, and difficult, question. The
Ottoman fleet which took part in the conquest of Egypt, along with the surviving
88A. Mutawalli, Al Fath Al Osmani L 'a Al-Sham wa Mesr (Cairo, 1995), pp. 48-9.
89 Ibn Ayas, Bad 'a Al-Zuhurfi w 'aqi Al-Duhur, vol. 5, pp. 307-09.
°° Mutawalli, Al Fath Al-Osmani L 'a Al-Sham wa Mesr, p. 258.
67
Mamluk vessels and their Kapudan, was ordered back to Istanbul rather than being
trans-shipped across Suez for use against the Portuguese.9'
Thus, it may be said that the destruction of the Middle Eastern Islamic world
came from within as much as without: the internal conflicts and the Portuguese invasion
were a double blow against the Islamic Arabic entity.
1. 3 The European Context: The Objectives of Portuguese Exploration
Prince Henry the Navigator, 92 the third son of João I, is the man traditionally associated
with the foundation of Portuguese maritime strength, ambition and expertise in the
African Atlantic. He captured Ceuta in August 1415, and then continued his work until
his death in l46O. Some works of discovery were carried out under Prince Henry's
aegis yet there is still healthy debate among historians about this central aspect of his
life.
In Portugal the Prince's high reputation is unimpaired today, as appears from
much of the recent output on the period. 94 In fact, this thesis is not directly concerned
with the truth or otherwise of Henry's achievements, and whether he was the real
Portuguese hero, both of science and action. It is enough to recall Russell's point that
Henry was not the first prince in the Iberian Peninsula to interest himself in geography
and navigation. 95 Rather, I am more concerned with Prince Henry's motives insofar as
they are emblematic for Portuguese activity on a broader front. Simple judgements on
'' A. F. Mutawalli, 'Al-Bahriyya Al-Othmanyya wa A1-Burtughaliyya Fil Al-Qarn Al-Aashir Al-Hijjri
(Al-Sadis Aashir Al-Miladi) ala Dau Al-Wathaig Al-Turkiah.', Meg/at kuleat Al-alum Al-ejtemayh,
Jameat Al-Imám Mohammed bin Saudi Al-Islameah, no. 4 (Riyadh, 1980), PP. 384-85.
92 This common label, as Charles Verlinden points out, dated only from 1868, after the English writer
R. H. Major published his work entitled Lfe of Prince Henry surnamed the Navigator. See
Hattendorf, Maritime History, vol.1, 53.
Baião, História da Expansâo Portuguesa no Mundo, vol. I, pp. 131-36.
' See for example, J. M. Braga, Hong Kong and Macao. A Tribute to the Memory of Prince Henry
"The navigator" (Hong Kong, 1960); J. Cortesäo, Os Descobrimentos Portugueses (Lisbon, 1981).
In this regard, reference may be made to Russell's important collection Portugal, Spain and the
African Atlantic, 1343-1490 (Aldershot, 1995). See also his more recent biography Prince Henry "(lie
Navigator" (New Haven, 2000).
68
the relative importance of religion - not forgetting that Henry was the leader of the
Order of Christ96 - and economic gain seem to be as inevitable as they are unhelpful. It
is perhaps enough to recognise that the two were not incompatible, as is suggested in
the documents signed and sealed by the prince before his death in 1460. These
documents 'make it clear that there was no conflict between his [Henry's] religiosity
and his mundane concerns, whether as a sponsor of oceanic exploration or as a
traditional medieval great territorial lord.' 97 Incidentally, Henry's fortune was founded
on piracy and control of the monopoly of soap.98
Thus, leading from the example of Henry, in the historiography of Portuguese
exploration two parallel elements may be considered as the basis for their enterprise.
These will be discussed in turn.
The first is economic. This is the conventional explanation for Portuguese
interest in long distance maritime enterprise. Economic histories of Portugal in the
fifteenth century show that its kings had financial problems. No evidence of a general
crisis in Portugal is available before the middle of the fourteenth century, but the
debasement of coins was a common phenomenon after the Black Death in 1 348.
Therefore, there was a great demand for gold and silver - a 'Currency Crisis'. There had
been no gold currency in Portugal since 1383, and it was one of the few European
kingdoms in this position)°° The devaluation of money continued from the 13 SOs until
1435 when African gold arrived in Lisbon after the capture of Ceuta. 10 ' In addition, the
Portuguese sought to improve their economic life through eastern trade, which had
become such an obvious source of prosperity to the Islamic countries and Italian
% F. Fernandez-Armesto, Before Columbus, p. 187.
' Russell, Portugal, Spain and the African Atlantic, XVII, p. 13.
98 Fernandez-Arrnesto, Before Columbus, p. 186.
Marques, Histoiy of Portugal, vol. I, pp. 97, 108-10.
°° C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825 (London, 1977), p. 19.
'°' Marques, Histoiy of Portugal, vol. I, pp. 113-14.
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maritime republics. This merchandise, most notably spices, was profitable because it
passed through several monopolistic agencies from the East to Europe and Portugal
therefore sought direct contact with traders in the Orient or even with producers. It was
not willing to be the consumer at the end of a long chain of trade controlled by
Muslims. The obvious precondition of this strategy was a sea route that could link
Europe with India and the eastern territories, and therefore circumvent or even replace
the ancient trade routes that passed through Asia and East Africa to Europe.'° 2 The
understandable motive was economic efficiency - to cut out the middleman and trade
directly, and more profitably, with the producer.
In so doing they would also intrude upon the 'Muslim lake'.'° 3 In the fifteenth
century much of the Indian Ocean traffic was handled by Muslims, though they did not
monopolise eastern trade. Jams, Jews, Hindus, Armenians, Chinese and others also
played a major role. Nonetheless, the visibility of Muslim shipping in the Ocean merely
confirms how economic motives intertwined with others which are more difficult to
assess in material terms. As Albuquerque clearly explained to his soldiers at Malacca,
control over the spice trade was an attack on the financial prosperity of the Muslim
nations, the significance of which both the Muslim powers and Portugal fully
comprehended.'°4
 Manuel I (1495-1521), during whose reign the first seaborne
expedition to the Indian Ocean was mounted, clearly stated its main objective in his
letters to the king and queen of Castile: 'the principal motive of this enterprise has been
the service of God our Lord, and our own advantage'.' 05 He also enumerated the spices,
woods and other produce with which to equate 'advantage'. After da Gama's second
102 Serjeant, The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast, p. 20.
03 Pearson, Indian Ocean, p. 62.
104 The 'ommentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. I, p. 170.
105 A Journal of the first Voyage of Vasco da Gama 1497-1499, trans. and ed. E. G. Ravenstein (New
Delhi, 1995), pp. 113-15.
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voyage, Manuel was more pleased by the tribute received from the Sultan of Kilwa than
any advances in the Christian faith)°6
In this respect, I cannot agree with those Portuguese writers who argue that the
early voyages had no economic motives and no real intention of securing control or
preferential treatment for Portuguese traders in the East. The alternative is to suggest
that, very simply, the Portuguese Crown wanted to discover the linking route between
Europe and Asia and to enter into commercial arrangements like those enjoyed by the
Venetians at this time. 107 On the contrary, the theory of Portuguese monopoly was
developed during the reign of Afonso V as is mentioned below. Surely, João II's claim
of monopoly in the Gulf of Guinea, with coastal installations to dominate the gold trade
and forceful measures to exclude interlopers, must serve as a precedent not far removed
in time, space or intent. Removal by force of competitors was also a characteristic of
Portugal's early campaigns in the Indian Ocean - no pity was shown, and exclusive
trading rights were defended with vigour, quite simply because it made economic sense.
However, it is going too far to claim that the Portuguese were compelled to
embark on their 'campaign of discovery', as Padfield called it, because of the high spice
prices that prevailed during the Mamluk ascendancy over eastern trade.'° 8 There is more
than one source of evidence to demonstrate the opposite of what is usually regarded as
one of the main factors behind Portuguese discovery. In the period preceding Vasco da
Gama's voyage, the price of pepper in Egypt fell to 40-60 ducats per qintar,° having
been about 85 ducats in the first decade of the fifteenth century."° Ashtor's important
research demonstrates that in the middle of the fifteenth century the price of pepper was
'°6 A Journal ofthefirst Voyage of Vasco da Gama 1497-1499, P. 226.
107 Magalhaes, The Portuguese in the Sixteenth Centuiy (Lisbon, 1998), p. 18.
108 E. Ashtor, 'Spice Price in the Near East in the fifteenth century', in Spices in the Indian Ocean
World, ed. M. N. Pearson (Aldershot, 1996), vol. 11, p. 77.
'° Worth 185 kg.
° Ashtor, 'Spice Price in the Near East in the fifteenth century', pp. 70-3.
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lower than in the Fatimid period." Similarly, the prices of pepper and ginger in Venice
at the end of the fifteenth century were about 13.5-14 ducats per 100 pounds,"2
compared with about 26 ducats in 1404. Thus, pepper and other spices became cheaper
everywhere in the second half of the fifteenth century, and according to the various lists
of spice prices at the time da Gama's voyage to the east, the price of pepper on the
markets of the Near East was very low. Yet, after the Portuguese established their
factories in the Indian Ocean ports at the beginning of the sixteenth century, pepper was
sold in Lisbon to other European merchants at forty times its original price in India.113
The price of pepper carried by the Portuguese increased thereafter by between fifty and
one hundred per cent in the first sixty years, and by 150 to 233 per cent in about seventy
years after the Portuguese reached India and the Spice Islands.'14
This shows clearly that an increase in the price of spices in Europe was not the
real reason that led the Portuguese to the East; rather the motive was to break into this
lucrative trade in order to support the weak Portuguese domestic economy.
Indeed, the crown itself showed the real purpose of the discoveries when it
began to fight against the private sector - which was in the hands of Prince Henry - for
control of the project. After Henry's death in 1460, his brother, Fernando, inherited the
business of discovery, and he also refused to come under the crown sector. However,
after Fernando's death in 1470, Afonso V succeeded in his attempts to exert control
over West African and Atlantic enterprise, and from that point onwards exploration,
discovery and exploitation were rooted in the public sector." 5 Nonetheless, merchants
and monarchs alike became wealthy in and around the African Atlantic." 6 Economic
Ashtor, 'Spice Price in the Near East in the fifteenth century', p. 77.
112 Worth 30 kg.
113 Ashtor, 'Spice Price in the Near East in the fifteenth century', p. 77.
114 Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, pp. 155-58.
115 j Cortesào, Os Descobrimentos Porlugueses, vol. III, p. 819.
116 Maxwell, 'Portugal, Europe, and the origins of the Atlantic commercial system, 1415-1520', p.4.
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potential and actual returns encouraged further exploration of Africa in the well-known
story of how Dias and then da Gama entered the Indian Ocean towards the end of the
fifteenth century. But it is worth noting that the forms of economic activity that made
the African Atlantic a success for Portugal - whether factories engaged in the trade for
gold, slaves, ivory and other exotica or the beginnings of permanent settlement and
sugar cultivation in Madeira, the Azores and elsewhere - though not costless, or even
necessarily cheap, were arguably based on unequal exchanges. We may therefore ask if
the early Atlantic phase of Portuguese enterprise was a useful or even relevant practical
preparation for the commercial opportunities and realities of the Indian Ocean system.
Africans gave raw materials and human resources, as slaves, in exchange for little that
Africa did not already produce, and this is one of the most interesting facets of early
Atlantic trade noted by John Thomton. 7
 Early African manufacturing was in many
ways quite capable of providing for the continent's needs.' 18 Such favourable terms did
not prevail in the Asian trade networks. The Indian Ocean world in its culture and
economy was very different.
Moving from the economic underpinnings of Portuguese activity, religion is also
considered to have had an important bearing on Portuguese exploration, driven by the
simple desire to eliminate the Muslim presence in the East with papal suppor1" This
hostility, of course, derived from the Christian-Muslim conflict in the Iberian Peninsula
and from the Crusades.' 2° To be sure, Portuguese efforts received encouragement from
Pope Nicholas V, who described Islam as a plague. The Papacy's support was expressed
in a decree which was sent to Prince Henry in 1454: 'Ourjoy is immense to know that
"7 John Thornton. Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1680 (Cambridge,
1992), p. 44.
IS For further discussion of terms of trade between Afiicans and Europeans in the early period See
Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World; W. Rodney, A history of the
Upper Guinea Coast 1545-1800 (Oxford, 1970); idem, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa
(Washington, 1981); R. Austen, African Economic History (London, 1987).
"9 Marques, History of Portugal, vol. 1, pp. 162-63.
120 Arnold, The Age of Discovery, p. 23.
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our dear son Henry, the Prince of Portugal, marching in the footsteps of his father of
illustrious memory, King John, inspired with a zeal for souls like an intrepid soldier of
Christ, has carried into the most distant and unknown countries the name of God and
has brought into the Catholic fold the perfidious enemies of God and Christ, such as the
Saracens and the infidel Muslims." 2 ' The Portuguese believed that only Christians had
any civic rights, and Portuguese policy in the East, from their first entry until the very
end of their supremacy, is intelligible only in light of this belief.'22
Evidence of Portuguese religious objectives can be found in Manuel's letters to
the kings of Europe after the successful voyage of da Gama. He asserted that 'the people
we found there are not as yet strong in the faith [Christianity] and when they shall have
thus been fortified in the faith there will be an opportunity for destroying the Moors of
those parts."23
The use of religious emblems and the conscious destruction of Muslim
commerce led some Arab historians to describe Portuguese exploration in the east as an
extension of the Crusades.' 24 Evidence cited in support of this view includes the
symbolic use of the cross, with the full blessing of the Pope.' 25 If Portugal had become
heir to the Genoese tradition of exploration, as Marques points out, it had also become
the champion of Christianity against Islam.' 26 The spirit of the Crusades flourished in
the liberian Peninsula in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. While in other regions of
Western Europe Islam was a distant menace, to the people of the liberian Peninsula it
121 Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. I, pp. 2-3.
122 K. M. Panikkar, Malabar and the Portuguese (Bombay, 1929), PP. 26-7.
123 Ravenstein, A Journal ofihe fIrst Voyage of Vasco da Gama 1497-1499, p. 114.
124 A. Al Batreekh, Tarehk Oruba Al Handeth (Beirut-1977), p. 47; N. H. Al-Serafi, Al-nufud Al-
Fortukalif1 Al-Klzal Al- 'Arabifi Al-qaren Al-sadas Asliar (Riyadh, 1983), p. 73.
125 Y. A. Al-Thaqafi, 'Mawqef Al-Mamalek wa Dual A1-Khalij A1-'Arabi men Al-Portukaleen fi Al-
qaren Al-sadas Ashar', Nadeat Ras Al- Khaimah Al-Taraikhia (Ras Al- Khaimah, 1978), vol. I, pp.
146-47.
126 Marques, History of Portugal, vol. 1, pp. 73-4.
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was something that threatened them in their homes.' 27 The Iberians - unlike other
Western Europeans - were crusaders by necessity, for even in the fifteenth century
Muslim kingdoms existed in the Peninsula itself. Quite simply the fight against Islam
was an imperative, and I am inclined to agree with Panikkar that much of the
Portuguese conquest in Asia was motivated by this fact.'28
1. 4 The Portuguese Conquest of the Gulf
The history and progress of early Portuguese navigation in the African Atlantic and the
Indian Ocean is well known.' 29
 More important than the story of da Gama's arrival at
Calicut in May 1498 - a demonstration of audacity rather than ability in Fernández-
Armesto's VieW 130
 - are the results of this meeting of cjvjljsations.' 31
 Though not
presenting a detailed narrative of Portuguese discovery and conquest, this section will
nonetheless investigate several specific issues arising out of Portugal's initial
expeditions to the Indian Ocean. The most important of these issues is the process by
which the Portuguese established themselves around the rim of the Indian Ocean, and
especially on the coast and islands of the Arabian Gulf at the beginning of the sixteenth
century. Portuguese supremacy resulted from conquest on the sea, not on land; and that
is what also happened in the Gulf during the early sixteenth century.
Da Gama's first contact with the Gulf occurred during his second expedition to
India in 1502. The first Portuguese captain to attack the Omani coast was Vicente
127 Fernandez-Armesto, Felipe, Before Columbus, in particular 'The Conquest of Upper Andalusia' pp.
45-69.
128 Panikkar, Malabar and the Portuguese, pp. 27-8.
129 For full general discussions of the voyages to West Africa and the Indian Ocean see C. R. Boxer,
The Portuguese Seaborne Empire; B. W. Diffie and G. D. Winius, Foundation of the Portuguese
Empire, 1415-1580 (Minneapolis, 1977); J. B. Hattendorf, Maritime History, vol. 1: The Age of
Discovery (Malabar, 1996); A. J. Russell-Wood, The Portuguese Empire, 1415-1808 (Baltimore and
London, 1998).
130 Fernández-Armesto, 'The Indian Ocean in World History', in Vasco da Gama and the Linking of
Europe and Asia, p. 12.
131 A stimulating series of papers on the 'myths' and realities of da Gama's voyage can be found in
Vasco da Gama and the Linking of Europe and Asia.
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Sodré, in 1503. He was da Gama's nephew and an important commander in his own
right, having led part of the fleet as the first capitäo do mar. Sodré was in line to
succeed da Gama in the event that anything happened to him during the Indian
expedition, and he was entrusted with several dangerous military tasks.' 32 In 1503,
between July and August according to Correia, Sodré sailed towards the south Arabian
Peninsula coast with orders to close the Red Sea and destroy any Muslim trading ships
there. With three nauios and three caravellas, guided by Indian pilots, he attempted to
capture Socotra island.' 33 Because of his failure, however, Correia offers little
information about Sodré's activities. It seems that he decided to start his mission on the
Omani coast until the wind was suitable to sail towards Socotra and the Red Sea.
Sodré's fleet anchored off the Curia Muria islands. The Omani people usually
welcomed all travellers, but Sodré was wary of them as they were 'Mouros'. They
advised him to be careful of the wind, though the Portuguese commander did not heed
their advice and was wrecked and drowned in the Arabian Sea. The ships of his brother,
Bras, were also wrecked, but he and his crew escaped to land.'34
In 1505, under the first viceroy in India, Francisco da Almeida, there was a
tangible change in Portuguese policy towards the Indian Ocean.' 35 Having rejected the
passive commercial policy of the initial contacts, Almeida was sent out with an army to
demonstrate Portuguese strength to the local rulers. Significantly, Almeida was also
ordered to plant military settlements at six strategic points around the rim of the Indian
Ocean.'36
Within this overall strategy for controlling and monitoring the trade of the
Indian Ocean - a strategy of establishing 'choke points' - Hormuz was one of the first
t32 G. Correia, Lendas da India, vol. I, p. 340.
Castanheda, História do Descobrimentos, vol. I, pp. 114-15.
Correia, Lendas da India, vol. I, pp. 365-70.
35 Baião, História da Expansâo Portuguesa no Moundo, vol. II, p. 102.
136 Magalhão, The Portuguese in the sixteenth centu,y, pp. 5 1-55.
76
locations to attract the attention of the Portuguese. Almeida ordered two fleets to the
Arabian Sea to control traffic there, and to prevent the movement of shipping from the
Gulf to the Red Sea and, from there, to the Mediterranean.' 37 In effect, this naval
deployment would disrupt the activities of Arabic Muslim merchants more than any
other group.
From these beginnings, however, the Portuguese very quickly moved on to the
establishment of an 'empire', planned, built and sustained by brute force and violence.
The transition from conspicuous military presence to full occupation in the Gulf was
probably driven by a number of factors. First, the Portuguese obviously comprehended
the region's great strategic importance, with Hormuz island at its entrance. The control
of maritime trade surely required narrow seas to patrol and market centres to exploit.
The Gulf offered both.' 38
 Second, the city enjoyed substantial customs revenue. At the
beginning of the sixteenth century the annual tax yield of Hormuz was about 150,000-
198,000 Xerafin.'39
The man charged with laying the foundations of the Portuguese empire in the
East was Afonso da Albuquerque.' 4° Almeida, the first viceroy, had contemplated only
the establishment of factories for the maintenance of purely commercial relations.' 4 ' We
can understand his position from a letter written to the crown in December 1508: 'The
greater the number of fortresses you hold, the weaker will be your power. Let all your
force be on the sea, because if we should not be powerful at sea, everything will at once
Magalhão, The Portuguese in the sixteenth century, pp. 55-8.
' J. Z. Qasim, Al-Khalj/Al- 'Arabi Fi 'AsrAl-Tawasu Al-Uurobbi Al-A wwal 1507-1840 (Cairo, 1985),
pp 45-6.
139 Barros, Asia, vol. II, pp. 50-65; S. B. Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf (London,
1966), p. 155. Xerafins or xarafims was the Portuguese term for the ashrafi. For further discussion
ee Chapter Two, section 1, below.
'° Afonso da Albuquerque never gained the title of Viceroy, in spite of his hard work to build and
establish the Portuguese empire in the Indian Ocean in the beginning of the sixteenth century when
he captured Goa, Malacca, and Hormuz. The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol.
I, pp. xii-xiii, 11-19; Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol. I, p. 97.
" Baião, História dci Expansào Portuguesa no Mundo, vol. II, p. 102.
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be against us. As long as you are powerful at sea, you will hold India as yours, and if
you do not possess this power, a fortress on shore will avail you little'.' 42 In contrast,
Albuquerque believed that Portugal required permanent coastal bases, without which
the navy could not maintain command of the sea. Albuquerque's emphasis was
therefore on fortresses, believing that if strongly built and adequately garrisoned, they
ran no risk of being taken. Perhaps he was right. Because of the monsoons, ships were
useless for several months each year, and command of the sea was unfeasible.
Albuquerque relied mainly on military installations for a more tangible and permanent
form of dominion. ' This view was evidently given careful consideration by the
Portuguese crown, and it later became the main tenet of Portuguese strategy in the
region)'
From 1509 Albuquerque laid the foundations of the Estado da India, based on
the fortresses of Goa, Malacca and Hormuz. After Albuquerque's death the Estado was
expanded and linked together with a series of lesser fortified factories, such as
Mozambique, Mombassa, Diu and Ternate in the Moluccas, which extended from the
East African coast to the China Sea. 145 Given Albuquerque's outlook, it is hardly
surprising that his objective in the Gulf was to erect one or more fortresses, not only for
the protection of trade on shore, but also to enable him to coerce the native rulers into
acknowledging Portuguese power. This principle guided all his later actions in the
East.'46
The Gulf's place in this system can be traced back to the expedition of Tristäo
142 Baiäo, História da Expansâo Portuguesa no Mundo, vol. II, p. 103; Correia, The three voyages of
Vasco Da Gama and his Viceroyalty, pp. lxvi- lxvii.
" E. Prestage, Afonso de Albuquerque, Governor ofIndia (Watford, 1929), p. 40.
'' M. Al-Salman, Al Gazw Al Purtukali Le 'Al Janub Al-A rabie wa Al-khalej fi ma baen 150 7-1521, p.
148.
G. R. Crone, The Discovery of the East (London, 1972), p. 58.
146 F. Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. 1, p. 127; A. Wilson, The Persian Gulf (Oxford, 1928), p. 112;
Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf p. 140.
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and a squadron of four vessels under Albuquerque:' 47 Albuquerque was to fortify
Socotra and then go to Hormuz, thus closing, it was hoped, the mouths of both the Red
Sea and the Gulf.' 48 After the capture of Socotra, Albuquerque parted company with da
Cunha and proceeded to Hormuz as planned. En route he attacked several ports on the
south Arabian coast which belonged to Hormuz, including Ras Al-Had, Qalhãt, Quriyat,
Muscat, Suhãr and Khiir Fakhn, committing the additional atrocity of mutilating
defenceless	 As a result of his behaviour, Albuquerque rapidly earned a
reputation for savage cruelty against the Muslim inhabitants of southern Arabia.
Hormuz presented the Portuguese with a much sterner
	
On reaching
the island at the end of September 1507, Albuquerque demanded that its adolescent
king, Shah Saif Al-Din Abu Nadar, should surrender to the Portuguese. After the king
refused, Albuquerque destroyed Hormuzian trade ships in the harbour and landed his
men.' 5 ' Al-Juboor set aside its dispute with the king of Hormuz and sent a relief fleet
from Bahrain with men and supplies; but the Portuguese met the Bahraini ships near
Qishm and scattered them.'52
With little hope of further support, Saif Al-Din was obliged to allow the
Portuguese to build and garrison a fort at one end of the island.' 53
 The shah also agreed
to pay an annual tribute, and granted the Portuguese certain customs concessions.154
147 ANTT,A. G., vol. X, Gay. xx, 2-28, p. 371.
148 The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. I, p. 20; Sousa, The Portuguese Asia,
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These early impositions formed the core of Portuguese economic policy in the Gulf.
The king was obliged to pay 5,000 ashrafi towards the expenses of the fleet, and an
annual tribute of 15,000 ashrafi to the Portuguese crown. 155 In addition, a treaty was
signed in 1507 which did a lot to define the relationship between the Portuguese
administration and the kings of Hormuz for the remainder of the occupation. The most
important clause was that imports coming into Hormuz from Portugal should be free of
duty, while merchandise bought by the Portuguese in Hormuz and its vassal ports
should be liable to the same rates paid by natives. 156 The Portuguese further asserted
their supremacy in the Gulf by forbidding native vessels to trade without a pass
(cartaz).' 57 Thus were laid the foundations for their naval and commercial domination
of the Gulf, the specific dimensions of which will be explored in later chapters. These
concessions from the king of Hormuz were later revised until, finally, complete control
of customs passed into the hands of the Portuguese. Incidentally, in 1507 the king of
Hormuz refused to pay tribute to Shah Ismail, having transferred his allegiance to
Portugal.'58
On this occasion, the Portuguese presence in Hormuz was short-lived. Poor
discipline and morale negated Albuquerque's efforts. A quarrel arose between the
commander and some of his captains over the distribution of plunder, bearing in mind
that most of the Portuguese captains and seamen had come into the Indian Ocean
hoping to find wealth. Taking advantage of the dispute, vizier Attar refused to ratify the
recently negotiated treaty; and when Albuquerque bombarded the town and attempted to
blockade it, his captains opened direct negotiations with Hormuz and retired to India,
despite his offer to refer the dispute to the viceroy. Albuquerque was forced to end the
l3arros, Asia, vol.111, Liv. vii, p. 351.
' The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. I, pp. 130-31.
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blockade.159
Having been frustrated the previous year, Albuquerque returned to complete the
occupation of Hormuz in 1508. However, he was not strong enough to take the city,
especially after his captains left him for India; therefore he again left Hormuz and
returned to India having become governor-general in succession to Almeida.
Seven years later, in February 1515, Albuquerque returned to the Gulf for the
third and final time to settle the question of Hormuz. Rather than thinking in terms of
grand strategy, it is quite likely that Albuquerque's immediate concern was financial:
the treasury in Goa was exhausted. In order to pay his men, he needed the king of
Hormuz's annual tribute, and, perhaps, an injection of portable wealth from the
conquest of the city. A second, broader objective was to ensure that Hormuz did not fall
into the hands of the Persian Shah, which was a possibility under the new vizier, Reis
Hameed, who took over the administration of Hormuz in the chaotic family feud that
followed Attar's death in 15 14.160 Albuquerque dealt with this particular problem by
killing Hameed, by a trick according to Correia and Sousa.' 6 ' A new settlement was
then negotiated with Turan Shah IV (15 15-1522), the successor of Saif Al-Din, under
which the island was handed over to the Portuguese and their garrison was installed in
the fortress. Actually, only a few details are known about this second treaty between
Turan Shah and his vizier Nur Al-Din Fäli on one side and Albuquerque on the other.
We know that Turan Shah had to pay 20,000 ashrafi in reparation for goods that
Albuquerque claimed had been stolen from the Portuguese factory in Hormuz. In
addition, the king continued paying the tribute of 15,000 ashrafi each year to meet the
expenses of the Portuguese fortress and garrison which were entrusted to a
C. D. Beigrave, 'The Portuguese in the Bahrain Islands', Al- Watheekah, 31 (Bahram, 1997), P. 226.
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'Governador'.' 62 After the capture of Hormuz the Portuguese established the High
Straits Fleet (Frota elevada dos Estreitos) which remained on station to protect the
Gulf)63
Shah Ismail, who in 1514 was preoccupied with his struggle against the Turks,
could do nothing except protest at this violation of his territory.'
Albuquerque died on board ship near Goa in 1515, leaving his nephew, Pero, at
Hon-nuz. He was succeeded as viceroy by Lopo Soarez (15 15-18), who tried to expand
Portuguese influence in the Gulf by occupying Bahrain. To this end, a familiar
Portuguese method was employed - the intervention in, and exploitation of, existing
political divisions. On this occasion the opportunity was provided by the long dispute
between Hormuz and Al-Juboor over the Balirain islands. Claiming that Muqrin, the
chief of Al-Juboor at that time, had incorporated Bahrain and Qatif into his domains,
had refused to pay agreed revenues to Hormuz, and had molested merchant traffic
sailing between Hormuz and Basra,' 65 Turan Shah IV in 1521 invited the Portuguese to
occupy Bahrain in order to solve the problem at its source. These particular flash-point
motives were above and beyond the enviable wealth of Bahrain in agricultural produce,
fresh water and pearls. For his part, Muqrin seems to have had ambitions to dominate
the Strait of Hormuz. According to Barros, 'The king travelled to Mecca in pursuit of
his objective to bring Turkish craftsmen to build fustas', 166 which were small oared
162 The Book of Duarte Barbosa, vol. I, p. 103; Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. I, p. 204; Danvers, The
Portuguese in India, vol. I, p. 318.
" Al-Salman, Al Gazw Al Purtukali Le 'Al Janub Al-A rabie wa Al-khalejfi ma baen 1507-1521, p.
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165 Barros, Asia, vol. III, Liv. vi, p. 27. According to Barros, Muqrin had obtained vessels with oars
made for him by 'Turcos'.
166 Barros, Asia, vol. III, Liv. vi, p. 27. 'El Rey Mocrim, trabaihava também por se fazer senhor
daquelle estreito, corn trazer muitos navios no mar, e desta vez que veio de Meca trouxesse alguns
Turcos officiAes de fazer fustas, e outros que andassem nellas.'
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ships like the Italian galleys of fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but more slender and
faster.'67
With the sanction of Diego Lopes Sequeira, governor of India (1518-22), the
Portuguese captain of Hormuz, Garcia Coutinho, agreed to help the king of Hormuz by
sending an expedition of seven ships against Bahrain to enforce the payment of tribute.
Command of the expedition was given to Antonio Correia, the captain's nephew. It
consisted of 400 Portuguese troops, filled out with 3,000 Hormuzian and Arab
mercenaries who were transported in a fleet of 200 boats from Hormuz under the
command of Sharaf Al-Din. This armada set sail from Hormuz on 15 June, but owing to
bad weather the ships were scattered en route, so that when Correia reached Bahrain he
had with him only part of his force.'68
The only description of the taking of Bahrain comes from Portuguese sources,
and the numerical strength of the forces involved is unlikely to be accurate - but in any
case the defenders must have far outnumbered the Portuguese and their Hormuzian
allies. Muqrin had prepared defences and built earthworks along the shore in
anticipation of an assault, but his main force remained inside the fort. He had a mixed
force of Arab horsemen, Persian archers, a few Turkish musketeers, and about 11,000
Arabs armed with various weapons.' 69 His troops were led by experienced commanders,
but they had never before faced an attack by well armed European forces. Wading
ashore, the Portuguese led the attack and stormed the Arab trenches, which were
vigorously defended by Bahraini troops under the command of the king. The walls of
the fort were breached with cannon. Muqrin died in the assault. The balance of
167 A History of Seafaring Based on Underwater Archaeology, ed. G. F. Bass (London, 1972), p. 206-
07.
168 Barros, Asia, vol. III, Liv. vi, pp. 311-15.
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Muqrin's troops, now commanded by his nephew, Shaikh Hameed, withdrew to QatIf,
which subsequently came under Portuguese control with the installation of a garrison.'70
In this manner the Portuguese won a decisive victory at Babrain in 1521. The
king of Hormuz had seemingly protected his own interests and stamped out rebellion
through the skilful deployment of his European 'allies'; but for almost a century the city
came under the nominal control of the Portuguese, who relied on Persian officials for
local government.' 7 ' With the exception of Basra, by the end of 1521 the Portuguese
controlled the main ports in the Gulf. They remained the only European nation in the
Gulf, and their commerce prospered in the region. They were not, however, undisputed
masters. Portuguese forces in the Gulf were frequently at war against the Turks who
pressed southwards from their bases at Basra and Muscat.
Nevertheless, after the occupation Portuguese of Hormuz, the Gulf entered a
new era, even as change came over the traditional balance of power which had affected
the strategies of the local powers there. Thereafter, confrontation would manifest itself
in the markets as much as the battlefield.
There are various reasons for the initial success of the Portuguese in the East - not least
the political fragmentation of the region discussed above - but most scholars still lay
emphasis on European maritime technology and its deployment by the Portuguese in the
Indian Ocean.
At sea, the establishment and organisation of the technical frameworks for war
and violence changed between 1500 and 1650. On that basis, the Portuguese controlled
the sea by carrying heavy guns on their new caravels and naos, which they had
170 For more details see Castanheda, História do Descobrimentos, vol. v, pp. 112-13; Correia, Lendas
da India, vol. II, pp. 650-51; Barros, Asia, vol. III, Liv. vi, pp. 319-23. Later, in 1551, the Arabs of
QatIf delivered up the fort of the city to the Turks.
'' Ozbaran, 'Bahrain in the sixteenth century', p. 229.
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developed from Italian models.' 72 Thus, the Portuguese arrived in the Indian Ocean with
their sturdy round ships, bristling with guns, slow, but devastating. The Venetians said
that in their day the Portuguese caravels were the best sailing ships afloat.' 73
 The
diffusion of cannon and naval techniques coincided with the rise and growth of
European capitalism, which was represented by Antwerp, the economic capital of the
Netherlands. Antwerp was the first city to tap the wealth, not just of an Inland Sea, but
of the ocean. Until 1549, the Portuguese government made it the depot of the eastern
spice trade.'74
Together, therefore, these were the sources of sea-power in Europe in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This new reality was demonstrated clearly in the
Indian Ocean by da Gama's expeditions. The deficiencies of local vessels were such
that only the Portuguese could have succeeded in winning a battle at sea. In fact, the
great states in India at that time had been founded from the inside by armies marching
overland, not by armies carried by ships over the sea. Calicut's fleet or other Arab and
Muslim fleets (that of the kingdom of Hormuz, for example) had the advantage of
speed, but did not possess the firepower of the Portuguese ships. The 'navies' of Calicut
and the Arab Muslim states in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf were not high seas fleets,
and were at best able to fight only in coastal waters. 175 At the battle off Hormuz in 1507,
the Portuguese discovered this and later exploited it to the fullest advantage.
The only non-European power which had gunnery at sea was the Mamluk State
in the Red Sea. At Chaul in 1508 the Muslims challenged the Portuguese and defeated
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them in Indian waters,' 76 but the Mamluks failed to follow up their victory. By the time
the Ottomans - the other potential gunpowder naval power - awoke to this menace,
Portugal had not only gained a foothold, but was in a position to continuously reinforce
her fleet. Naturally enough, the Ottoman navy had its chief strength in the
Mediterranean, not in the Indian Ocean.'77
Initially, when the Portuguese arrived in the Indian Ocean the region's
flourishing economy and vast population were subject to no single authority. This was
as true of the Subcontinent as it was elsewhere.' 78 The Portuguese came to the Indian
Ocean not as decisive conquerors but rather as small but important players who
disturbed the peace and stability of these waters. Given that their presence was often
unwelcome, though not always so, the empire they established was largely dependent
upon naval power structures. The Portuguese imported valuable Asian goods from port
cities in the Indian Ocean and exported to them violence. As Glete observed, Europeans
used violence to get monopoly rights to trade; and so the Portuguese introduced the
European idea of using seabome violence and protection as an export commodity.' 79 As
Pearson noted, the Portuguese introduced state controlled violence into the Indian
Ocean.' 8° The ideological reason was perhaps rooted in Roman claims to Mare
Nostrum, and a 'general tendency toward s thalassocracy'.' 8 ' This does not mean that
there was no violence in the Indian Ocean before the Portuguese arrived: there was
176 z A1-Mbari, Tuhfat Al-Mujahidin ft Ba 'd Ahwal Al-Portugaliyeen, ed. Mohammed Saeed Al-
Twrehi, (Beirut, N.D.), p. 253; Ibn Ayas, Bad'aAl-Zuhurfi w'aqiAl-DuhUr, vol. 5, p. 156.
177 A. C. Hess, 'The Evolution of The Ottoman Seabome Empire in the Age of Ocean Discoveries',
AHR, vol. 75, no.5 (1970), pp. 1912-18.
178 See M. Pearson, The Indian Ocean; Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1700; F.
Femãndez-Armesto, 'The Indian Ocean in World History', in Vasco da Gama and the linking qf
Europe and Asia; R. B. Seijeant, The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast; Panikkar, Asia and
Western Dominance; M. Al-Salman, Al Gazw Al Purtukali Le 'Al Janub Al-A rabie wa Al-khalejfi ma
baen 1507-1521; J. De Baros, 'Aspects of Historical Relations between the Arab Gulf and India
before the Portuguese Arrival', Al-Watheekah, 21 (Bahrain, 1992), pp.164-191; S. A. I. Tirmizi,
'Gujarat-Gulf Relations, 1405-1573', pp. 218-29.
J. Glete, Warfare at Sea 1500-1650, pp. 72, 77.
180 Pearson, The Indian Ocean, p. 123.
181 Ibid., p. 122.
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piracy and violence against merchant shipping, but there was no systematic or policy-
driven use of sea power. The polities around the rim of the Indian Ocean employed their
navies only as auxiliaries to their armies. Asians were less accustomed than Europeans
to using violence at sea.' 82
 They well knew that the maritime trade did not live with
violence.
182 See Glete, Waifare at Sea 1500-1650, pp. 77- 84; and Pearson, The Indian Ocean, pp. 122-28.
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Chapter Two: Shipping and Trade in the Arabian Gulf during the
Portuguese Occupation
Any study of the Portuguese in the Gulf must take into account three facts that brought
great change to the region at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The first reality was
the arrival of a new foreign power; a power which rapidly captured the kingdom of
Hormuz and exercised its grip on the Strait. European technology, and the mindset to
use it, gave Portugal the capacity to control trade in the Gulf. The second reality was
that after the establishment of the Estado da India, a great part of the proceeds of the
exchange of goods in the Gulf, between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, was
transferred to the Portuguese treasury. The third reality was that Portugal came to the
Gulf with plans to stay as a permanent economic colonial power. Supported by their
ships and substantial batteries of artillery, they constructed a series of trading feitorias
and fortalezas, and about fifteen fortresses in the Gulf during the sixteenth century.' Yet
in the Gulf, as in other parts of Asia, the Portuguese did not add any new structures to
Asian trade. According to Steensgaard, Portuguese shipping - the famous Carreira da
India - did not attain great economic significance as a connecting link between Europe
and Asia. 2 For the Gulf at least, the persistence and importance of overland trade into
the Portuguese period offers some support for this view, though the novelty and impact
of the direct sea route should not be overlooked. Ultimately, however, the Estado
became a territorial power more than a commercial network. 3 This transition from trade
treaties to direct control came at the very beginning of the Portuguese contacts with the
East.
A. Bocarro, 0 Livro das Plantas de Todas as Fortalezas, p. 20. See Map V below.
2 N. Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and C'ompanies, p. 154.
P. Musgrave, The Early Modern European Economy, (Basingstoke, 1999), p. 170. Musgrave misreads
Carriera for Estado in his comments about the growth of territorial power.
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There was a triangle of three economic centres in the Gulf: Hormuz, Babrain,
and Basra. Any power that could hold these centres might have been able to control the
region, economically and perhaps politically. The question remains one of assessing the
extent to which the Portuguese achieved this during their occupation. All that the
Portuguese were able to do, as we shall see in this chapter, was to collect profits from
trade in the Gulf by control of afándega at the port of Hormuz and by plundering those
Muslim vessels that lacked letters of safe-conduct.
2.1 The Maritime Economy of the Gulf in the Sixteenth Century
The Gulf at the time of the Portuguese arrival was extremely cosmopolitan. Its ports,
sited as they were in a hostile environment, were largely dependent for their existence
on goods exchanged between India and local merchants. Hormuz lay at the heart of this
commercial network as a small maritime 'empire' at the beginning of the sixteenth
century.4
The gradual relocation of the main emporia from the inner Gulf to its mouth
seems to have triggered two changes in the spatial organisation of markets in Oman and
Persia. It caused the decline in importance of Oman's chief medieval ports, such as
Suhar,5 and raised that of other ports on the Omani coastline in the fifteenth century
through to the sixteenth century. These ports were closely linked to events centred upon
Hormuz.
The kings of Hormuz did not directly control all the market centres in their
hands. Rather, their kingdom seems to have been run along semi-tributary and semi-
commercial lines. Over 98 per cent of the total revenues of the kingdom of Hormuz
came from trade and customs revenue, especially on trade with India which yielded
See Chapter One, section 1.
T. J. Wilkinson, 'The Hinterland of Sohar', JOS, 9 (Muscat, 1987), pp. 68-70.
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about 45 per cent of that revenue. 6 Again, in this context it is important to reiterate the
relationship between the region's climate and its economy. No one in the commercial
council of Hormuz could predict the duration of the trade season or the level of customs
revenue. In Basra, for example, the imminent departure of long distance caravans to
Aleppo would set the markets in motion, as the merchants needed ships to catch the last
monsoon winds back to India via Hormuz.7 That would terminally depress prices for
those goods not yet sold, unless a local shopkeeper or resident agent took upon himself
the task of selling them, piece by piece. 8 In addition, the pearl fishery season usually
occupied the summer months.
Not only the monsoon winds affected the annual revenue of Hormuz; economic
relations between Hormuz and Persia were also very influential, perhaps more so than
the climate. It was from the direction of Mughistan, Minab, Manujan and Vashkird,9
that the major overland caravans came and went, linking Hormuz to the cities of Persia
and from there to the Levantine ports and markets. These four Persian districts together
yielded about a third of Hormuz's revenue, 1 ° as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1. Customs Revenues of Hormuz in the 1540s
Source of Revenue	 Amount (in ashrafi)
Trade from Gujarat 	 35,000
Trade from Persia	 35,000
Trade to and from Basra 	 9,000
Trade from Sind	 8,000
Duties paid by Portuguese 	 10,000
Total	 97,000
Source: Boteiho, Cartas Tombo, if. 76.
Note: in this table there is no mention of the pearl trade of Bahrain, QatIf and Julfar
6 See Tables 2.1 and 2.2, below.
See Introduction, section 4.
Klein, Trade in the Safavid port city Bandar Abbas and the Persian GulfArea, p. 30.
See Map VI.
Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', p. 141.
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The rich pickings from Hormuz's customs house had always been coveted by
rulers on the mainland, and to maintain freedom of movement in these strategically and
commercially important districts Hormuz paid a fixed sum, called Muqarrariya, to the
dynasties that ruled fifteenth-century Persia." This ensured that the caravan links
remained unbroken. Without safe passage for the caravans, the prosperity of Hormuz
would have collapsed.' 2
 This nexus was highlighted in a letter from Martim Afonso de
Castro, viceroy of India, to Philip jjj13 Muqarrariya was, in fact, a traditional financial
system in the East and it was very important to the prosperity of Hormuz. This at least
the Portuguese understood when they arrived. Nevertheless, Albuquerque forced the
king of Hormuz to submit to the Portuguese tribute system of Párea.'4 These actions
had profound short-term consequences for the trade and commercial relationships of
Hormuz, for they not only upset Hormuz, but also brought hostility from trading
partners such as Lãr.
We can catch a glimpse of economic life in Hormuz from the accounts of a few
travellers. They include two Muslims, one from North Africa and the other from India.
Ibn BattUta visited Hormuz in the 1330s during the reign of Sha Qutb Al-din Tahamtan.
He described the city as follows:
'Hurmuz is an island whose city is called Jarawn (Jerfin). It is a fine large city, with
magnificent bazaars, as it is the port of India and Sind, from which the wares of
India are exported to two Iraqs, Fãrs and Khurãsãn. Most of it is salt marshes and
hills of salt. Their food os fish and dried dates exported to them from al-Basra and
Oman. On this island water is an article of price; it has water-springs and artificial
Muqarrariya was rendered annually by the kings of Hormuz for more than two hundred years.
Muqarrariya or mocarraria is derived from the Arabic moqarr, which means something settled or
fixed, not to be confused with moqarrart which means decisions or decrees. See R. Baalbaki, Al-
Mawrid, Arabic-English Dictionaiy, (Beirut 13 th edn., 2000), P. 1090. In the Persian language there is
a similar word, moqarrart, which means a fixed amount or quantity. See A. K. S. Lambton, Persian
Vocabulary (Cambridge, 1969), p. 155. However, Couto explained muqarrariya or mocarrarias as a
Persian expression for a fixed tribute or revenue. D. Couto, Décadas, vol. I, liv. Ix, p. 81.
12 A. Bocarro, Décadas 13, part I, p. 346.
' 3Documentos Remetidos da India ou Livro das Moncdes, ed. Raymundo A. B. Pato, (Lisbon, 1880-
1893), vol, I, pp. 2 18-2. Earlier letters suggest that cessation of these payments was considered
whenever passage of Hormuz bound caravans was obstructed by Lär. See Archivo Portuguez-
Oriental, ed. J. H. C. Rivara (New Delhi-Madras, 1992), fasc. III, p. 137 (dated 1 March 1588).
14 See the Glossary.
91
cisterns in which rain-water is collected, at some distance from the city. At that time
the island was in the grip of famine."5
Around the middle of the fifteenth century an Indian traveler, Abd-Al-Razzak, also
visited Hormuz and made some interesting, and rather poetic, observations about the
place:
'Ormuze, is a port situated in the middle of the sea, and which has not its equal on
the surface of the globe. The merchants of seven climates, from Egypt, Syria, the
country of Roum, Azerbijan, Irak-Arab, and Irak-Adjemi, the provinces of Fãrs,
Khorassan, Ma-wara-amahar, Turkistan, the kingdom of Deschti-Kapt-chack, the
cuntries inhabited by the Kalmucks, the whole of the kingdom of China, and
Matchin, and the city of Khanbâlik, and others from all Indian ocean areas all make
their way to this port. They bring hither those rare and precious articles which the
sun, the moon, and the rain have combined to bring to perfection, and which are
capable of being transported by sea. Travellers from all countries resort hither, and,
in exchange for the commodities which they bring, they can without trouble or
difficulty obtains all that they desire. Bargains are made either by money or by
exchange. For all objects, with the exception of gold and silver, a tenth of their value
is paid by way of duty. Persons of all religions, and even idolatrous, are found in
great numbers in this city, and no injustice is permitted towards any person
whatever. The inhabitants unite the flattering character of the people of Iraq with the
profound cunning of the Indians."6
From the early sixteenth century we also have an account from Varthema of the
ships, trade and merchants of Hormuz: 'There is seen sometimes almost three hundred
ships and other kinds of vessels, which come thither from many places and countries.
There are about four hundred merchants and factors that remain here continually for the
traffic of merchandise.' 17
 Van Linschoten, although writing long afer the arrival of the
Portuguese, describes the groups of caravans that travelled to Hormuz overland from the
Mediterranean via Aleppo. These companies of people came twice every year, in April
and September. He also describes the large market held every year in Hormuz, between
April and September, during which about five or six thousand merchants, all massed in
order, as if for battle, bought and sold everything in the world.' 8
 This cycle of
The Travels ofIbn Bait uta, vol. II, pp. 400-2.
16 India in the Fifleenth Centuty, ed. R. H. Major, pp. 5-7.
' The Travels of Ludovico di Varthema, pp. 94-9.
18 The Travels of Van Linschoten, pp. 48-9.
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production and markets is unlikely to have been much different in the later fifteenth
century. All of this shows the importance of Hormuz as a trade centre before the onset
of the Portuguese.
The goods that were imported into the Gulf and Hormuz from the Indian Ocean
included all sorts of spices: cloves from the Moluccas; nutmeg and mace from Banda;
sandalwood from Timor; camphor from Borneo; benzoin from Sumatra; ginger,
cardamoms and pepper from Sumatra and Java. All these goods came to the Gulf via
Malacca and Calicut.' 9 From there they were conveyed across the land route, via Basra,
up to the Mediterranean. 2° In addition, there was rice and copper, tamarind from
Cannanore and Cochin, indigo, wax, iron, sugar, drugs, and cocoa-nuts, coconut oil,
silk, steel, luxury cloth and black cloths, coarse cotton cloth which the Portuguese
called roupa preta de Cambaia, 2 ' which came from Cambay, Coromandel, Bengal and
Dabhul and elsewhere,22 cloth of silk and benzoic from China and gold from Africa.23
All of this trade was carried by vessels which, according to the monsoon, usually
left India for Hormuz in October to March and returned to India in the summer.24
Incidentally, the kings of Hormuz owned no ships, and did not participate directly in
trade. Consequently, they could be said to have led a rather insecure existence. Hormuz
was an entrepôt, not a maritime power.
When the Portuguese arrived, the revenues of Hormuz stood at around 198,000
ashrqfi, as broken down in Table 2.2, below. Most of this came from taxes. For
19 L. Thomaz, Early Portuguese Malacca, p. 20
20 Simão da Costa provided a list of these spices in his letter, see ANTT, A. G. vol. V, Gay. xv, 17-40,
Carta de Simão da Costa a el-rei D. Sebastião na qual lhe participava achegada de urn embaixador do
turco ao vice-rei da India, para pedir pax. Goa, 1563, Dezembro, 11, p. 141.
21 ANTF, A. G. vol. V, Gay. xv, 17-40, Carta de Simão da Costa a el-rei D. Sebastião, p. 141. This
'roupa preta' was sold in the marshland region of southern Iraq to people from Al- Muntafiq tribes.
22 The Book of Duarte Barbosa, vol. I, p. 92-3
23 The Travels ofLudovico di Varthema, pp. 94-9.
24 K. S. Mathew, Portuguese Trade with India in the Sixteenth Century (Delhi, Manohar, 1983), pp. 4,
24. See Plate VII, below.
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example, in 1500 the Persian historian Nimdihi suggested that the tax for goods arriving
in the kingdom of Hormuz by sea was 10 per cent of their value, except for gold and
coins which were taxed at a higher rate, and all goods from the provinces of Khurãsãn
which paid a preferential rate of 5 per cent.25
 The chronicler did not specify which
goods came from Khurãsãn. Similar taxes, called ushur,26 were also collected in the port
of Aden, from which the tax system of Hormuz appears to have evolved. The
Portuguese themselves adopted the system already in force.
Table 2.2. The Kingdom of Hormuz's Revenues in 1500
Source: Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf p. 155; Aubin,
'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', pp. 233-37.
Taxes payable at Hormuz were in return for benefits provided by the port and
the kingdom, such as the securing of merchandise and the use of storage facilities on the
island. As we know, Hormuz was just a transit trade centre: the city was given the
official title of Dãr Al-Amdn, or Baldat Al-Amãn as Ibn Majid called it, meaning 'the
place of safety' 27
It is interesting to note, as Subrahmanyam points out, that the bulk of customs
duties were collected on imports rather than exports.28
 Neither of the major exports in
the eastward direction, namely horses and bullion, seems to have been taxed. An
estimated 1,500 to 2,000 horses were exported from the Gulf and the coast of Oman to
25 Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', pp. 171-72.
26 A. A. Abu Makhramah, Tarekh ThagrAden (Cairo, 1881), vol. I, p. 14; J. thin Al-Mujawar, Tarekh
Al-Mustabser (Holand, 1951), vol. I, pp. 141-2. See the Glossary.
27 S. Ibn Majid, Ai-Fawã 'idfi Usüi jim Ai-bahr wa 'Ai-qawa 'd, p. 300.
28 Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500- 1700, p. 16.
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India each year, in particular to the ports of Honavar, Bhatkal (Baticala) and Goa.
Sometimes the number rose to between 3,000 and 4,000.29 The concentration of tax on
imports in the port of Hormuz is not difficult to comprehend, for the bulk of Hormuz's
trade was re-exporting, and to tax both imports and exports would have been
tantamount to a double tax on the same commodity.3°
When the Portuguese arrived the kingdom of Hormuz did not have its own
coinage because it lacked the requisite metals, despite being engaged in such extensive
international commercial activity. Turan Shah's Chronicle mentions that the original
founder of Hormuz was named Dirham-kUb, from his having been the first to strike
coins.3 ' However, such ancient coinage and its value are not subsequently discussed in
histories of Hormuz. By the beginning of the sixteenth century the ashrafi was in
common use, as observed by Barbosa: 'in the city of Hormuz there is one coin of very
good gold, round with Arabic letters on both sides, which are called ashrafi (xerafins)
and are worth 300 Portuguese reis, more or less.' 32 That ashrafi was, in later times,
identical with the Indian gold currency, and gold coins of this type weighing about 170
grains were struck in Gujarat in the early part of the sixteenth century. 33 There were, in
addition, some coins brought from Chaul and Dabhul to Hormuz in the course of trade.
When the Portuguese arrived they introduced their own coins - the reis, pardau
and cruzado34 - alongside those which were already in circulation (see Table 2.3,
below). However, the Portuguese were aware that the purchasing power of the existing
29 Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat, p. 13. See below, p. 115 for further discussion of the
horse trade during the Portuguese period.
30 Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', pp. 171-75; Subrahmanyam The, Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-
J700,p. 16.
31 The Travels of Pedro Tei,xeira, p. 155.
32 The Book of Duarte Barbosa, vol. I, pp. 99-101; The Suma Oriental of Tome Fires, vol. I, p. 20.
The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, p. 158.
Pardau or pardao were gold and silver Portuguese coins worth between 300-360 reis. The cruzado
was an ancient Portuguese gold coin worth 360 Reis in the fifteenth century, and 400 reis or 2
ashrqfis in the sixteenth century. During the seventeenth century the cruzado was roughly valued at 4
English shillings. See C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p. 387; Subrahmanyam, The,
Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500- 1700, pp. 279,281. See Table 2.3 below and the Glossary.
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coinage used in Hormuz was much higher than their own, especially the ashrafi which
circulated right across the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese therefore had to use
indigenous coinage during their early commercial dealings in the Gulf and India, until
they gradually introduced their own coins. In the second half of the sixteenth century
Portuguese coins appear in the surviving revenue accounts of the customs of Hormuz,
Bahrain, and Muscat.35
However, the ashrafi can be a confusing cunency for historians to work with.
Two other types of ashrafi were used in Aden in the sixteenth century, worth about 360
Portuguese reis or three Portuguese cruzados. 36 It is also necessary to mention here that
the gold ashrafi was used in Egypt and Syria under the Mamluk State from December
1425. Egypt's role in the commerce between Europe and the East ensured that this
coin was widely disseminated, even after the Portuguese impinged on the trade in
pepper and other goods in the Indian Ocean. This remained the case even after the fall
of the Mamluks.
On the other side of the Gulf, no gold coins were struck by Timur and his
successors in Persia, but Persian Mongols struck dinãrs and half dinãrs in gold, which
were used in the Islamic Abbasid period. They had mints at Baghdad, Basra, Shiraz and
Kirmãn, from which Hormuz might have drawn its supplies.
In addition to all of these high denomination coins, there were other types in
circulation at Hormuz when the Portuguese arrived. Larins, for example, were made
from silver and copper, and were coined at Lãr on the Persian mainland, not far from
Hormuz. These coins were afterwards known to Europe as larins or laris.38 Trade was
conducted with the larin all along the Gulf; eighty larins were worth one Persian
T. Matos, 0 Estado da India nos anos de 1581-1588 (Ponta Delgada, 1982), pp. 51-91;V. V. M.
Godinho, Les finances de l'étatportugais des Indes Orientales (1517-1635) (Paris, 1982), p. 48.
36 The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, vol. I, p. 20.
Ashtor, 'Spices Prices in the Near East in the fifteenth century', p. 69.
38 Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', p. 142; Godinho, Les finances de l'état portugais des hides
Orientales, p. 49.
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tümãn. 39 Linschoten described these larins (which he called larynen) during his voyage
to Hormuz as the trade currency of the time. He adds, 'these coins were brought to
Hormuz in great quantities, whereby there is great dealing with them, as with other
merchandises, because of the great gain that is gotten by them and in India they go very
high'.4° This coinage was used in all places on the Indian Ocean coast. It was used in
Iraq also, especially in Basra, in the sixteenth century, alongside a coin called the sha his
(xays).41
Tanga was a general name for a silver coin, with varying value, from the Indo-
Muslim tan/ca. At that time the tanga of Goa was worth 60 Portuguese reis; that of
Hormuz was about 62 or 69 reis.42
All of this demonstrates that the value of the Portuguese reis was not the same in
all eastern territories. It also indicates that the financial situation was more stable in
Hormuz than other Indian Ocean countries, and that the purchasing power of the
coinage was high.
Table 2.3. Coins in the Gulf during the Portuguese Period
Coin	 Equivalent
Ashrafi/Xerafins	 300 reis
Larin	 60 reis (one-sixth of an ashrafl)
Cruzado	 2 ashrafi
Pardo	 1.55 ashrafl (360 reis)
Pataca	 1.22 ashrafl
Tanga	 62-69 reis at Hormuz.
Spanish Real	 3.25 Abbasi
Tümãn	 200 sháhis (10,000 silver dinärs)
Sháhis	 50 dinãrs
50 Abbasis	 1 tümãn
MahmUdi	 1 Abbasi
El, New ed., vol. VI, p. 790; J. B. Tavemier, Travels in India (London, 1889), vol. I, pp. 23-4, 414-
15. During the period of Safavid rule, the Persian currency system was based on the tümãn, a unit of
account whose value was fixed at the currently established weight of 10,000 silver dinãrs.
40 The Voyage ofJohn Huyghen Van Linschoten. vol. I, p. 47-8.
' Tavernier, Travels in India, vol. I, pp. 23-4, 414. See also The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, p. 30;
Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', p. 142.
42 The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, vol. I, p. 20; The Book ofDuarte Barbosa, vol. I, p. 94.
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***
On the other side of the Gulf, we know from Portuguese sources that Bahrain (Awãl)
was the most significant port for the kingdom of Hormuz, especially for the king as it
was one of his fiefs, and his commercial interests there were considerable.43
From early Islamic times, Bahrain's prosperity depended on its harbour - this
was the base of the pearl fleet - and on the excellent shelter and the abundance of fresh
water and food on the island. All of these recommended it as a convenient staging post
for ships bound from Iraq for India. Bahrain itself was also a natural terminus for
maritime trade from Malacca and the Indonesian archipelago, because it was near the
mainland province of Hajar on the Arabian Peninsula coast, which at that time was
well irrigated and accessible to trade routes from Nejd, Hejaz and the Mediterranean.45
In addition, Bahrain had long been, and still remained, a leading centre of shipbuilding
and seabome commerce. Indeed, it outlasted some of its early rivals like Al-Ubullah and
Sirãf.46
Albuquerque, in a letter to Manuel I of October 1514, summarized the most
important economic aspects in the islands. He wrote that he was very keen to occupy
the islands 'Because Babren [sic] is a great power and an area of great fortune, for it is
rich in pearls.' 47
 He added in another letter, dated September 1515, that 'Bahrain is as
important as it could possibly be, for a great number of craft set forth thence for India
loaded with a great number of horses and considerable quantities of pearls'. 48 Because
Barros, Asia, vol. III, Liv. vi, pp. 311-12.
In pre-Islamic and early Islamic times all the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula was called Al-
Bahrain district with Hajar as its capital.
A. K. Al-Shamlan, Al-Melahafi Meyah Al-Bahrain wa Al-Khlej Al-A rabi, (Bahrain, 1995), p. 22.
46 Bahrain Through the Ages the History, ed. A. Al-Kalifa and M. Rise (London and New York, 1993),
p. 135.
Busharb, 'Musahamat Al-Masadir wa A1-Wathaiq Al-Burtukãliyyah fi Kitabat Tarekh A1-Bahrain
Kheilal Al-NisfAl-Awwal Mian Al-Qarn Al-Sades Ashar', p. 121.
48 Ibid., p. 122.
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of its high revenues and trade with India, the Portuguese quickly sought to control
Bahrain, as Albuquerque had promised his king.49
In view of its wealth and the revenues it guaranteed them, the kings of Hormuz
regarded Bahrain with the utmost importance. In 1530 the vizier of Hormuz, Rashid Al-
Muscati, estimated the yield of the islands at 15,000 ashraJI, while the king,
Mohammed Shah II, estimated it at 40,000 ashrafi. 5° It seems that the king's estimate
was the more accurate of the two. According to Table 2.2 above, Babrain and QatIf's
pearl fishery alone in 1500 was worth 28,200 ashrafI.
Beyond its importance as a market centre, Bahrain also derived revenue from the
export of two local commodities: excellent dates, which represented the island's
principal wealth, and pearls, which were fished there in quantity. 5 ' Bahrain was indeed
'rich in pearls', as Albuquerque noted. Not only that, but Bahrain was famous for the
quality of its pearls which were generally whiter and rounder than those from anywhere
else. 52 The value of the islands' yearly trade, in pearls and seed pearls was 'five hundred
thousand cruzados; to say nothing of a hundred thousand more which may represent
those smuggled away, for fear of the vizier's extortions.' 53 For these reasons, Bahrain
often attracted the attention of its strongest neighbors, and especially Hormuz.54
The chief pearl markets for a long time, and even in the Portuguese period, were
Al-Manama, on Bahrain island, for the Arabian part of the Gulf, and Honnuz for the
Persian part. En route to the markets of India, nearly all of the pearls passed through the
hands of wealthy Arab merchants residing on Hormuz Island or Lengah and Qays on
See above, Section 1.4.
Correia, Lendas da India, vol. II, p. 325, vol. IV, p. 158.
The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, vol. I, p. 20; The Travels of Pedro TeLveira, p. 177.
52 The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, vol. I, p. 20.
The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, p. 177.
D. Potache, 'The Commercial Relations between Basrah and Goa in the Sixteenth Century', Stvdia,
48 (1989), pp. 146-47.
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the Persian side. 55
 Ceylon pearls were also traded on the Indian market, especially at
Calicut.56
If pearls were the most important source of revenue in the Gulf, the horse trade
came a close second. The horses exported from the Gulf to India and brought from the
Arabian Peninsula and Persia were of three types. The first were 'pure gems' and sold
for gold pardoas; the second were those that collapsed on the journey; 57 the third were
for ceremonial purposes. Barbosa provides an account of the horse trade during the
early period of Portuguese contact in the Gulf. He reports that 'Every year they used to
take one or two thousand horses, and each one of these is worth in India three or four
hundred cruzados'. 58 When the ruler of Al-Juboor extended his rule to Al-Hasa and
Qatif, his control of the horse and camel trades had serious repercussions for the
economy of Hormuz.59
Portuguese sources mention that there were several places in Oman and Bahrain
notable for horse breeding and their preparation for export to India,60
 where, because of
local wars, there was high demand and good prices. 6 ' Inevitably, this valuable trade
attracted the attention of the Portuguese - and control of it was one motivation for their
drive towards the domination of Bahrain and the destruction of Al-Juboor.62
Constable and Stiffe, The Persian Gulf Pilot, pp. 19-20.
56 
• H. Ryley, Ralph Fitch England's Pioneer to India and Burma (London, 1899), p. 54.
Documentacão Ultramarina Portuguesa, vol. I, ed. A. S. Rego (Lisbon, 1962), pp. 92-3, 214-15.
Horses suffered greatly on the voyage to India, because of the cramped conditions on board ship and
because they were often underfed and insufficiently watered. See F. Danvers, The Portuguese in
India, vol. I, p. 363.
58 The Book of Duarte Barbosa, vol. I, p. 92.
A. Ibn Basam, 'Tohfat Al-Mushtaq fi Akhbar Najid wa Al-hejaz wa Al-Iraq', pp. 67-8. See Section
1.2, above.
60 The Deccan was the most important purchaser of horses of the Gulf, especially the Muslim kingdom
of Gujarat. Some of these horses came from Baghdad. Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', pp. 168-69.
61 The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. I, pp. 83, 86; The Book of Duarte Barbos,
vol. I, p. 70.
62 Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', pp. 117-18, 121.
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Other goods traded in Bahrain were fruit, such as pomegranates, peaches and
figs, and various kinds of vegetables. Barros likened Bahrain in this respect to the
Iberian Peninsula, a prolific producer of such produce. 63 Bahrain's revenue from
agriculture was very high in the sixteenth century, as we know from Teixeira's
Travels.64
In view of its commercial importance, the commander of the first Portuguese
campaign against Bahrain in 1521 permitted his soldiers to sack the town, but forbade
them to touch the goods of the traders who had fled to Qatif. He did this in order to
encourage merchants to return to Bahrain and restore the island to its former
commercial importance. 65
 This incident demonstrates very clearly that rule of the island
was never an end in itself to the Portuguese; stripped of its commercial activity,
Bahrain, like any other trade centre in the Gulf, would have been worth nothing to them.
To get the most out of Balirain, the Portuguese captain of Hormuz, on his own initiative
it seems, sent a commercial representative to supervise transactions there for the benefit
of the Portuguese. 66 In view of the island's strategic and commercial importance, after
their invasion in 1521 the Portuguese strove to ensure that Bahrain did not fall into
hostile hands, especially the tribes of Al-Hasa.
The importance of QatIf in this period was similar to that of the Bahrain
islands.67
 This was because Qatif was the best bridge between the Gulf and Hejaz on the
Red Sea coast. Any power that took Bahrain could capture Qatif.
During Al-Juboor's domination of Bahrain and QatIf, which lasted more than
fifty years, trade in the two ports reached a peak, as recorded in many contemporary
63 Barros, A'sia, vol. III, liv. vi, pp. 3 16-17.
The Travels of Pedro TeL'eira, p. 177.
65 Cornea, Lendas da India, vol. II, pp. 648-49.
Ibid.
67 Qatif was at that time a notable centre for the manufacture of cotton fabrics. Aubin, 'Le Royaurne
d'Ormuz', p. 100.
101
sources. 68 Their prosperity continued until the Portuguese entered the Gulf - in 1514
Albuquerque himself noted that 'the islands are very rich' 69 - and Al-Juboor's
successful stewardship of the islands earned them the enmity of Hormuz as potential
rivals. Hormuz tried on several occasions to prevent Al-Juboor trade from passing
through the Strait of Hormuz, causing Al-Juboor to transport horses for Indian markets
through Dofar on the south coast of Oman. 7° This also damaged the horse trade through
the port of Hormuz.
Other islands in the Gulf had a more clearly strategic function. Kharg, for
example, guarded the entrance to the Shaft-Al-Arab waterway in the Gulfs interior.
Qishm was the major supplier of agricultural products to feed Hormuz itself. Therefore
when it was occupied by the Persians at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Hormuz
suffered accordingly.7'
Basra, a river port at the head of the Gulf, was also notable for its commerce. It was an
important meeting point of the overland caravan trade between the Mediterranean and
the Gulf. 72 Indeed, the Basra-Baghdad route was one of the main alternatives to the
Portuguese Carreira. From Basra, merchandise went to Baghdad, and from there to
Turkey and Kirmãn in Persia because it was the main route of the silk trade. 73 In the
early sixteenth century Basra enjoyed considerable trade with India. Numerous goods
converged there, such as dates from the oases of Al-Hasa or QatIf, 74
 and Bahraini
68 The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, p. 188; S. Ibn Majid, Al-Fawã 'idfi Usül jim Al-bahr wa' Al-qawa 'd,
pp. 30 1-02.
The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. IV, p. 187.
70 A. A1-Humaidãn 'A1-Tarekh Al-S iãsi Li Al-Juboor', p. 61. See Map II.
' Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1 700, p. 15.
72 F. G. Hourani, Arab Seafaring (New Jersey, 1995), p. 64.
F. Castro, Crdnica do Vice-reiD. Joào de Castro, pp. 365-67.
Basra was one of the largest producers of dates. The best kinds, which were well known, were the
Khuias and Mirziban. These were exported to India, Egypt and Europe. Dates were grown in Basra
from Kurna to Fão along both sides of Shat-Al-Arab, as described in 1563 in the carta of Simão da
Costa, the Governor of Goa. ANTT, A. G. vol. V, Gay. xv, 17-40, pp.140-41.
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pearls. In addition, bows and hooks were brought along by the Shiraz and Lâr
caravans, 75
 as well as silk, rugs, woollen cloth, wool, gold and silver-woven materials,
taffeta and damask from Damascus and Aleppo, and European textiles. 76
 Also, salt from
the salt-works operating near the city, rice, wheat, barley, rye, butter and cloths made
out of wool and of camel hair, soap and iron were all brought by the Bedouins.77
In common with Hormuz, among the diverse goods exported from Basra were
horses. About 600 to 800 horses each year were conveyed directly from Basra to Goa.78
The Portuguese realised that horses, as well as other goods, accounted for a large share
of Basra's customs, so they attempted several times to reach the port. The first military
attempt was made by Behchior Tavares de Sousa in 1529, but he was not the first
Portuguese to reach Basra.79
It is necessary here to discuss those taxes levied in Basra during the sixteenth
century which are mentioned in Portuguese documents. To take 1563 as an example, 10
per cent was levied on spices and fabrics which came into the city, and 11 per cent on
goods which were re-exported from Basra to Baghdad. The authorities in Baghdad
levied 21 per cent on the goods exported from Baghdad to Aleppo. 8° Taxes were
increasing on these routes, mainly because the political position was not stable in the
territories between Basra and Baghdad during Turkish rule, in particular to the south of
Basra where the resident Arabs often carried out actions against the Ottoman army. 8 ' In
addition, bandits were a serious danger to caravans operating between Baghdad and
Aleppo. This situation raised prices in parts of the Mediterranean which were supplied
1 The Persian goods were conveyed from Persian harbours in small local ships called markab to Basra.
76 H. Inalcik, 'The Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspect of the Ottoman Economy', SEHME (London,
1970), pp. 209-13.
Potache, 'The Commercial Relations between Basrah and Goa in the Sixteenth Century', p. 148.
78 ANTT, Cart. Ormuz, June 23 1547, fi. 88, carta D. Manuel de Lima to D. João de Castro.
See Chapter Three, section 2.
80 ANTT,A.G. vol. V, Gay. xv, 17-40, p. 141.
81 A. Al-Humaidãn 'Al-Tarekh Al-Siãsi Li Al-Juboor', p. 62.
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by this route. As part of the traditional networks that operated between Basra and Goa,
most of the trade carried out with Hormuz was brought from Basra by tarrdda,
especially wheat and butter. 82
2.2 Portuguese Shipping and 'Monopoly' in the Gulf
By now it should be clear that most trade routes of the Gulf converged at Hormuz, and a
great many others began there. During their initial contacts with the East, the
Portuguese had little sound information about the Gulf's commerce, or that of the
Indian Ocean. Portugal obtained some intelligence indirectly from its contacts with the
Italian trading cities; 83
 and the report of Pêro Covilhã demonstrates a certain practical
curiosity about the East, reflected also in the anecdotal evidence that could be garnered
from accounts current in late medieval Europe. Specific details, however, were sparse.
Hormuz and the extent of its trade links must have come as something of a surprise to
the Portuguese. Indeed, the highly developed state of trade in the Indian Ocean might
have been equally remarkable, far removed as it was from Portugal's recent experience
of West Africa.84
It remains to be seen, however, if the Portuguese derived the full benefit from
their conquest after 1515. Quite simply, did Hormuz continue to dominate the trade of
the Gulf under Portuguese rule?
In discussing the Portuguese impact on the thriving, cosmopolitan and
prosperous network of caravans and seaborne commerce in the East, we must first be
aware of one simple fact. The trade of any port that came under Portuguese control was
82ANTT, Cart. Qrmuz, fi. 102, 126. Besides horses sent from Basra to Hormuz, the ruler of Basra had
as a custom to send three horses each year: one for the king of Hormuz, the other two for the
Portuguese captain of the fortress and for the vizier of Hormuz. Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', p.
164; Potache, 'The Commercial Relations between Basrah and Goa in the Sixteenth
Century', p. 150.
83 Musgrave, The Early Modern European Economy, p. 170.
84 Magalhaes, The Portuguese in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 19, 29.
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notionally treated as a crown monopoly, pursued for its benefit or the benefit of its
nominees. 85
 A twenty per cent share, or quinto, of revenues was reserved for the king.86
However, it must be emphasised that the gradual withdrawal of the crown from direct
economic exploitation, accelerated after the Spanish Union of 1580, increasingly left the
conduct of long-distance and intra-Asian trade in the hands of officials and private
traders. The concession voyages allowed to captains were a manifestation of this
transition, but, unlike Malacca and Bengal, little evidence survives for Hormuz and the
Gulf. 87 Concession voyages (viagens dos lugares) were granted to private individuals
and relatives of officers through royal licence to help compensate for the lack of
tonnage available to the Portuguese crown to ship merchandise around the Indian
Ocean. 88 In return for a licence, the grantee paid to the crown customs duties on his
cargo and a percentage of his profits. In the second half of the sixteenth century the
practice grew up of selling these voyages by auction. The chief profit from these
voyages usually gained by charging freight on the goods that the ships carried and from
the return on capital that they invested. 89 These voyages were quite distinct and
organised separately from the Carreira da India, which provided the commercial link
between the Estado da India and Portugal via Goa and Cochin, and more rarely,
Malacca.9°
Having searched extensively in Matos and elsewhere, there is little evidence for
concession voyages in Hormuz or the Gulf at large. Perhaps the Gulf routes were not
85 Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p. 48, 57.
86 Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1700, p. 62.
87 1b1d pp. 88, 97, 114-5, 213, 232.
88 Such as the voyage to Damão sold to Bernardo Francisco da Gama in 1599. See Matos, 0 Estado da
India, p. 35, n. 104.
89 For the system of viagens dos lugares see Matos, 0 Estado da India, pp. 30-40; Bocarro, 0 Livro
Das Plantas de Todas as Fortalezas, Cidades e Povoacdes do Estado da India Oriental; Thomaz,
Early Portuguese Malacca.
° Villiers, 'The Estado da India in South Asia', in The First Portuguese Colonial Empire, p. 65.
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suited to this type of investment, since one voyage in 1599 cost 20,500 ashrafi. 91 Other
voyages, or rather circuits, however, were well known: from Mozambique to Sofala,
Ceylon, the Moluccas, the Coromandel coast, and Malacca; from Pegu to Bengal; from
Macau to Japan, Sunda, Patane and Timor; and from Malacca to Macau, Timor,
Tenassarim, Cambodia, Sunda, Borneo, Macassar and Timor.92
In addition to securing its wealth, the other main objective of the Portuguese in
occupying Hormuz was to be in a position to observe Arab navigation in the Gulf and
the Red Sea. Moreover, the two harbours of Hormuz were secure and easily
accessible, one for small vessels, the other for large ones. Strategically, Hormuz's
situation at the gate of the Gulf corresponded to that of Gibraltar at the entrance to the
Mediterranean; both held the key to the waters of the interior. Like Gibraltar, however,
Hormuz was powerless in itself to prevent the passage of enemy ships because the
width of the Strait was too great to be commanded by onshore guns. Only a fleet could
properly close it off. 94 Perhaps Albuquerque realised at an early stage the need for naval
forces and bases at strategic points. 95
 Thus, several different squadrons patrolled the
waters of the East, one of which was the high-seas fleet of the Straits of Hormuz and the
Red Sea (Armada de Alto Bordo). This fleet was based in Muscat and served to prevent
Arab attacks on the Indian coast and to keep the lines of communication open between
India and the Gulf. 96 The Portuguese also equipped the fortress of Hormuz with around
sixty cannon to defend the island.97
' Matos, 0 Estado da India nos anos de 1581-1588, P. 35. See below, p. 150 n. 60 for possible
reference to such voyages in the Gulf.
92 Ibid., pp. 32-40.
Baiao, História da Expansao Portuguesa no Mundo, vol. II, p. 83.
94 G. A., Ballard, 'The War of the Arabian Sea', The Mariner's Mirror, 11 (January 1925), p. 31.
Compare with Lewis, 'Northern European Sea Power and the Strait of Gibraltar, 1031-1350', pp.
140-4 1.
See Chapter One, section 4.
96 C. Borges, 'The Portuguese and their Hormuz-entered Gulf Policy', p. 186.
Ballard, 'The War of the Arabian Sea', p. 31.
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Muscat, though outside of the Gulf proper, is worthy of further discussion.
When the Portuguese arrived at the beginning of the sixteenth century Muscat had a
measure of independence from Hormuz, but its tax revenues were remitted to the
kingdom's treasury. The rebellion of 1521 was a signal to transfer the port to the Arab
chieftain Rashid Al-Muscati, who had sided with the Portuguese. 98
 However, the real
project to detach Muscat from Hormuz began in 1543 when a fándega was granted to
the king of Portugal. 99 Portugal's main motive in using and ultimately fortifying Muscat
was to observe traffic passing the mouth of the Red Sea and to exert an influence on
trade moving between there and the Sultanate of Atchen (or Atjeh).'°° Control of narrow
straits was a key feature of Portuguese strategy, whether the Strait of Malacca or that of
Bab Al-Mandab in the Red Sea: the latter became a priority after the rise of Atchen
which increased Portuguese awareness of the potential economic threat from Muslim
states in the Indian Ocean.'° 1 Any Portuguese squadron dispatched to the Gulf or to
intercept and capture ships without cartazes needed a rest station en route, and Muscat
was the ideal location.' 02 By the mid-1530s, Muscat also served as a much more
convenient base than Hormuz for countering the Ottoman threat in the Red Sea. Muscat
therefore operated in conjunction with Hormuz and its satellite stations, to which we
must now return.
Despite these measures, it seems that after Albuquerque's death the Portuguese
neglected the simple requirement for regular patrols of the Strait of Hormuz. They can
count themselves fortunate that the first real breach of these lax defences occurred only
98 See below, pp. 15 1-2 180.
Couto, Décadas, vol. V, liv. x, p. 126.
'°° See below, p. 188.
101 For more details about these events, see C. Boxer, 'A note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of
the Red Sea Spice trade and the Rise of Atjeh, 1540-1600' in M.Pearson, ed., Spices in the Indian
Ocean World, pp. 269-82.
102 See the importance of the port of Muscat in The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque,
vol. 1. p. 83; and for the struggle between Atchens and the Portuguese on the trade route from
Malacca and the Red Sea, Couto, Décadas, vols. IV,VI,VII,VIII,IX,X.
107
in 1552 when Turkish vessels entered the Gulf. Neither Portuguese warships on station
at Hormuz nor gunfire from the fortress could prevent them from attacking the island.'°3
Not only, on occasion, was Portuguese seapower poorly deployed, but in their
initial forays into the Indian Ocean they also showed a lack of foresight by stealing
almost as much as they traded. For example, the Hormuzian merchants never forgot that
in April 1504 the Portuguese stole a ship belonging to them near the Malabar Coast. In
September 1505 they attacked and destroyed some fishing boats near the Gulf of Oman,
and looted all the goods they were carrying. They also attacked trade ships carrying
Arab horses to India near the Gulf. Lorenzo, the son of Almeida, attacked seven ships
belonging to Hormuz in the waters near Chaul, stole all the horses and burnt the
vessels.' 04 In 1509, the Portuguese looted a ship belonging to Al-Juboor in Gulf waters,
which was sailing from Bahrain on its way to India carrying a large and valuable cargo
of pearls.' 05 Such early encounters were an unlikely prelude to the peaceful insertion of
Portugal jtO the commerce of the Indian Ocean.
Heavy-handed behaviour of this type had several different effects. Many vessels
that had customarily loaded at Hormuz stopped going there out of fear, especially
during Albuquerque's governorship.' 06 Consequently, Hormuz lost much of the revenue
from which its king paid the Portuguese their tribute.' 07 From Hormuz the Portuguese
used force to control the flow of Muslim shipping, the restriction, by license, of
maritime traffic to India being an obvious example. Merchants from Iraq or Persia were
compelled as a result to travel over land through Qandhãr in Afghanistan,'° 8 which was
hardly in the best interests of Portuguese revenues. At the same time, however, the
103 See Chapter Four, section 2.
104 Qaemmaqmai, Hormuz dar Rawabut Iran wa Portugal, pp. 10-11.
105 Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. I, pp. 126-28.
106 The revenue of the customs of Hormuz in 1515 was only 100,000 ashrafi. See Table 2.3., above.
07 Castanheda, História do Descobrimentos, vol. II, liv. iv, pp. 378-79.
08 Tavemier, Travels in India, vol. I, p. 193.
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Portuguese authorities could not completely close the Gulf to Muslim traders, even if
they had wanted to. Control of the western side of the Gulf was always weaker than the
eastern side, largely because the Portuguese inherited the existing political weaknesses
of Hormuz. The regulation of traffic was also influenced by the need to keep on good
terms with Persia as a counterbalance to the Turks.
Efforts to control the flow of shipping through the Gulf were not the only
obstacles to commercial growth. The 11 per cent tax on most goods travelling through
Hormuz was considered a dear price to pay. This levy, which can be traced back to the
fifteenth century, was still in operation in the sixteenth century and the Portuguese did
nothing to change it.'°9 Therefore, the direct route was the most profitable for the
conveyance of goods, namely horses and spices.
These, then, were some of the factors which initially retarded the prosperity of
Hormuz after its occupation by the Portuguese. More important still was the continued
leakage of spices through the Red Sea route, which was never entirely closed by the
Portuguese for any length of time. After an initial decline in the volume of spices
shipped by this traditional route (though even in 15 10-1 1 the Egyptian chronicler Ibn
Ayas noted the arrival of about ten cargo ships at Suez from India' 10), from the early
1 530s shipments to Venice from Alexandria, Istanbul, and the Anatolian ports increased
sharply again.' 1 ' By the 1 540s it must have been clear that the cartaz system could
neither prevent pilgrimage - itself an economic activity' 12
 - nor Indian trade, especially
from Gujarat, with around sixty vessels making the voyage in 1547 alone. Indian traffic
109 The tax varied from one port to another. The small ships of Basra which brought in butter and
cereals paid 11 per cent while those of Raysahr, the principal port of the Safavids, paid just 5 per
cent, ANTT, Cart. Ormuz, fi. 126; Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', p. 172.
"° Ibn Ayas, Bad'aAl-Zuhurfi W'aqiAl-Duhur, vol.4, p. 185.
H. V. Der Wee, 'Structural change in Europe long-distance trade, and particularly in the re-export
trade from south to north, 1350-1750', in J. Tracy, (ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empire (Cambridge,
1990), p. 30.
112 See M.N. Pearson, 'The Estado da fndia and the Hajj', Indica (March-September, 1989), pp. 105-15.
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was still passing through the Bab-Al Mandeb in the first quarter of the seventeenth
century."3
It could therefore be argued that the discovery of the Cape route did not affect
the trade of Hormuz or the Gulf routes to the Indian Ocean, as much as it affected
Mamluk trade and the decline and final disappearance of the Kãrimi trade in the Red
Sea. 114
Portugal's operations in the Gulf, as elsewhere, were also hampered by the two
related shortages of shipping and manpower. The tonnage available to the Portuguese in
the Gulf was modest. In 1525 there were just over eighty Portuguese vessels of various
descriptions working in Asia, eleven of which were private ships deployed on the Cape
route. Only three naus of the eleven serviced Hormuz in carrying cargoes which arrived
there." 5 This was a sad decline from the busy harbour noted by Varthema in the early
sixteenth century." 6 The city's Portuguese authorities routinely turned a blind eye to
vessels coming from India and passing through the Gulf. They realised that it was not
practicable to transfer all commerce to the Cape; on the contrary, the Gulf routes were
still held to have a useful purpose. For these reasons, the Portuguese at Hormuz had to
negotiate their transactions through Muslim merchants and allow Muslim ships to carry
on their business as before, albeit under the supervision and inspection of officials in the
ports of the Gulf and the coast of Oman, and with the cartaz system."7
Governing the pattern of trade in the Gulf was a central feature of Portuguese
policy there. The reverse side of this coin was the attempt to tighten up procedures and
revenue producing levies in Hormuz itself. The first important step in this direction was
113 Steensgaard, Carracks, C'aravans and Companies, pp. 90-1.
"4 W. J. Fisehel, 'The Spices trade in the Mamluk Egypt' in M. Pearson, (ed.), Spices in the Indian
Ocean World, p. 67.
I Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1700, p. 75.
116 See above p.55.
Borges, 'The Portuguese and their Hormuz centred Gulf Policy', p. 175.
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taken in 1521 with the replacement of all native personnel in the customs house with
European officials, an act which gave rise to the first rebellion against the Portuguese
presence in the region. 118 The next step on the path to strict monopoly of Hormuz's
commercial activities was the seizure, in 1543, of the a(fándega on the pretext that the
king had defaulted on the payment of tribute. The afándega were fully and directly
integrated into the tax system of Portugal." 9 In effect, the Portuguese forced the king to
hand over all of his customs income for the year 1543.120 It seems that with this
increasing emphasis on the taxation of transit trade the Portuguese were less concerned
with projecting their naval power across the Strait of Hormuz. This might seem an odd
shift of policy in the face of mounting Ottoman pressure around the Gulf yet in spite of
the superficial hostility between the Portuguese and the Turks, the former took
advantage of the situation by turning Hormuz into a staple market for oriental goods
intended for the Ottoman territories.'2'
The short-sightedness of this policy was revealed by the Turkish occupation of
Basra in 1546. With direct trade to India as an objective, and Hormuz as the principal
obstacle, conflict between the Turks and the Portuguese was almost inevitable. Tribes
friendly to the Portuguese informed them that the Turks intended to build a fortress at
the mouth of Basra, in Kurna (Carná).' 22 The occupation of Basra and the possibility for
direct Turkish commerce with India became matters of increasing concern to the
Portuguese in 154 1.123 Not only that, but the important horse trade between Basra and
Hormuz began to slow down. This is probably because the Turks absorbed much of the
available stock for their own use, and perhaps exported the remainder by the mainland
118 See below, section 2.3 and Chapter Four, section 1.
"9 Godinho, Les Finances deL' état Portugais, pp. 44-7.
' 20 DUP, vol. I, pp. 201, 215.
121 Van der Wee, 'Structural change in Europe long-distance trade', pp. 31-2.
122 For the letter from bin Ulyaan to the captain of Hormuz, see D. Castro, Crönica do Vice-rei D. Joâo
de C'astro, pp. 359-60.
123 Danvers, The Portuguese in India, p. 450.
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route to Al-Hasa and Oman. Bastião Lopez Lobato, the factor at Hormuz in the period
1545-47, advised the viceroy that if he wanted horses he should let Portuguese ships go
to do business with merchants of Basra.' 24 He was not saying this on his own account,
but because circumstances sometimes forced the Turks and the Portuguese to forget
their differences and do business with each other. On the one hand, the Turks wanted
access to the products of India and the Far East, and the trade routes to remain open. On
the other hand, the Portuguese needed food, in particular grain from southern Iraq, to
feed their troops in Hormuz.' 25
 Annually the Portuguese delivered 3,000 yards of
pepper to Basra, in exchange for which the Turks supplied 1,000 quintals of wheat.' 26
 In
addition, Portuguese officials at Hormuz usually ignored trade bound for Basra in
exchange for the payment of bribes.'27
Such agreements demonstrate that the rift between the two powers was not
insurmountable. For several reasons the Turks seem to have been more willing to
compromise than the Portuguese after the campaign of 1559.128 The occupation of Basra
was costly; there were problems with the neighbouring Arab tribes; and there was the
strategic reality that Portuguese Hormuz ultimately controlled seaborne trade through
the Gulf.' 29 Judging from the impact of Turkish diplomatic overtures to officials in
Hormuz and India, the Portuguese were less willing to negotiate. Already well
established in the Gulf's traditional networks, they were loathe to sign an agreement
124 Potache, 'The Commercial Relations between Basrah and Goa in the Sixteenth Century', p. 149.
125 Suleyman the Magnjflcent and his Age, ed. M. Kunt and C. Woodhead (London and New York,
1995), p. 62; Castro, Crônica do Vice-rei D. João de Castro, p. 368.
126 v Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, vol. 2, p. 162.
127 Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, p. 196. Luis Falcâo, captain of Hormuz in the
period 1545-47, gave permission for certain terradas to go with their merchandise to Basra when it
was under Turkish authority. Cart. Ormuz, fis. 88r-92r.
128 See Chapter Four, section 2.
129 L. Albuquerque, C'artas de D. Joo de Gastro a D. III, p. 121.
112
with their enemies, especially as they knew that the Turks needed wood from India to
use in their shipbuilding yard in
In reality, at least in the short term, vessels carrying pepper and other goods
from India still reached Basra without being stopped in Hormuz, confirming that
Portuguese control of the Strait of Hormuz was incomplete.' 3 ' The Portuguese
continued to struggle against their chronic shortage of money, because a sizeable
proportion of the revenue from the commerce between Basra and Goa slipped away
from them. As for the Turks, political instability in southern Iraq and the resumption of
hostilities against the Persians, as well as their campaigns in the Mediterranean, did not
allow them to launch a major offensive in the Gulf. Turkish objectives being modest,
they were prepared initially to put up with Portuguese policy.'32
During the last quarter of the sixteenth century Portugal's main preoccupation in
the Gulf was Persia, first as ally, then as enemy. Both guises had economic implications
for Hormuz. In the early 1 580s Philip II perceived that a revival of the trade route via
Persia to India would have a negative impact on the horse trade and perhaps on the trade
in other Indian goods in the future. Therefore in 1581 he ordered the viceroy, Francisco
de Gama, to instruct Antonio de Lima, as ambassador to Hormuz, to sabotage the close
ties between Shah Abbas, the Turks and the Moguls.' 33 Philip also wanted him [de
Lima] to bring peace between the king of Hormuz and his own finance auditor, and to
prevent the Armenians and the Venetians from gaining a foothold in Hormuz. There
was need for a corrector-mor ('chief corrector') for horses at Hormuz, a man competent
and faithful, but not a Muslim or a vassal of the king of Hormuz because he trusted
' 30 ANTT,A.G. vol. V, Gay. xv, l7-4O,p. 142.
B ANTT, Cart. Ormuz, 2 February 1546 fi. 50. Letter of Rafael Lobo to Joào de Castro. He notes that
a number of naos which went to Qatif, Bahrain and Basra did not stop at Hormuz.
132 Potache, 'The Commercial Relations between Basrah and Goa in the Sixteenth Century', pp. 160-61.
DRI, vol. I, p. 55.
113
neither.' 34 In 1595 Viceroy Mathias de Albuquerque was still keeping an eye on
Hormuz in response to the threat posed by Shah Abbas. Moreover, for some years there
had been a fall in income from the horse trade between Hormuz and Canara and
Cochin.'35
In the early 1600s Philip III tackled the same problems rather differently. Rather
than suppressing the activities of Armenian traders, he decreed that they should pay
customs dues at Hormuz if they acted as intermediaries between the Turks and the
Persians. More than that, he sent a royal decree to the viceroy of India indicating his
acceptance of Shah Abbas's suggestion that the silk trade of his kingdom should pass
through Hormuz. At least trade passing through Hormuz could be taxed.
The fall of Bahrain to Persia in 1602 escalated the economic crisis in the Gulf
and severely compromised Portugal's strategic position there. If the capture of Basra in
1546 by the Turks affected part of Portugal's Gulf income, then in comparison the loss
of Bahrain reduced by a third the trade and revenues of the region. The king of the
Union realised this. In 1605 he ordered Viceroy Martim Afonso de Castro to use
peaceful means to persuade the Shah of Persia to relinquish Bahrain. He recommended
that the viceroy should keep in touch with Luis Pereira de Lacerda, the envoy to Persia,
and instruct him to exert pressure on the Shah to send an ambassador to Goa. Such was
the effect of losing Bahrain on the Portuguese position that the king again wrote to
Abbas, asking him to order the Sultan of Shiraz to hand over the island to the king of
Hormuz.' 36 In the event these efforts were unsuccessful, as we will see in Chapters Four
and Five.
' 34 Livro dasMoncôes, vol. I, pp. 56, 171.
135 Borges, 'The Portuguese and their I-Iormuz-entered Gulf Policy', p. 177.
' 36 Livro dasMoncöes, vol. I, pp. 105-06.
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2.3. Economic Aspects of the Gulf during the Portuguese Domination
After the initial disruption of the Portuguese conquests described above, more peaceful
conditions in the region brought renewed prosperity. Lopo Soares de Albergaria,
governor of India in the period 1515-18, moved away from the policy of armed violence
so characteristic of Albuquerque's time, and for a while commercial activity in the Gulf
increased as a result. The trade in horses is a good example. The Arabian and Persian
horse trade with India was lucrative before the Portuguese arrived in the Gulf, but
expanded further after 1521. Animals traded between India and Persia, Basra, and the
Arabian Peninsula were exported mainly through Hormuz,' 37 though small-scale trade
could also be found in other ports such as Dohfar, on the south coast of the Arabian
Peninsula. These other outlets flourished when Arab tribes such as Al-Juboor extended
their political and economic authority over the inland caravan routes. Nonetheless, large
numbers of Gulf horses were shipped from Hormuz to Gujarat, for example.' 38
 The
Portuguese re-exported some of these animals from Dabhol in India to South Asia, as
Muslim merchants had done before them.'39
In spite of Portugal's important role as an exporter of horses from the Gulf after
1521, the control of supply remained firmly in the hands of dealers, brokers and
merchants in Persia, southern Iraq and on the Arabian Peninsula. It must not be
forgotten that the balance of power rested largely with the suppliers. What the
Portuguese did to demonstrate their 'control' of the trade was to increase taxes and the
price of horses on the Indian markets. According to Meilink-Roelofez, the Portuguese
used Hormuz to trans-ship 'strategic commodities' like horses - and firearms - to
southern India, and in particular to the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar which was
usually in conflict with the Muslim kings and sultans of the Malabar coast and
137 Boxer, The Portuguese seaborne Empire 1415-1 825, pp. 40-4 1. For the carriage of horses by sea,
see V. Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society, pp. 78, 336-37 n. 173.
138 Pires, Suma Oriental, vol. I, p. 43, vol. II, p. 270.
139 Leur, Indonesian trade and society, p. 381.
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Deccan.' 4° Under Soares and his successor Sequeira, by 1523 the customs receipts in
Goa from the horse trade stood at 36,000 ashrafi, and by 1540 had increased again to
126,000 ashrafi.' 4 ' Indeed, Lopo Soares himself came to rely on the profits of trade -
'the authority of the state loosens, and private trade is widely tolerated'.'42
In pitting central authority so squarely against private initiative, and implying
that one prospered at the expense of the other, this observation misreads the commercial
administration of the Portuguese Gulf. The contradiction between private trade and fee
farming is illusory.' 43 Revenue collection was institutionalised in the farming out of
captaincies by the crown. Usually the importance and wealth of each fortress
determined the recipient. The conditions under which captaincies were granted and the
size of their emoluments likewise varied considerably from one fortress to another, to
the extent that there were waiting lists for the most lucrative positions. ' Presumably
Hormuz was no exception. In 1614, when Philip III explicitly ordered the sale of offices
by alvará,' 45 the city-kingdom was valued at 145,000 ashrafi for a three-year term,
presumably because of the volume of trade that passed through it, and the associated
potential for tax income. This price tag made Hormuz by far the most expensive
captaincy in the region, some way ahead of Diu, Daman, Chaul, and Malacca, which
ranged between 30,000 and 50,000 ashrafi.
140 Meilink-Roelofez, Asian Trade and European influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between
1500 and about 1630, p. 357 n. 22; Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-1 825, pp. 46, 62.
It is recorded that in 1520 three horses from Hormuz were sold in Goa for 1,550 ashrafi. Shortly
before 1600 every horse exported to India via 1-Iormuz cost the exporter 13,333 ashraJl, of which
6,500 was custom for the king. See DUP, vol. II, p. 113; B. S. Shastry, 'A century of Sea Trade
between Portuguese Goa and Hormuz', Al-watheekah, 22 (Bahrain, 1993), p. 216.
142 Thomaz, Early Portuguese Malacca, p. 104.
143 See R. F. Barendse, The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean World of the Seventeeth Century (New
York, 2002), p. 361.
144 Matos, 0 Estado da India, pp. 17-8. Boxer cites the example of Mombassa as related by Couto. The
Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-1825 (London, 1969), pp. 298-299.
145 AP0 no. 353, fasc. 6 (Goa, 1875), as cited in The Voyage ofFran cois Pyrard, trans. A. Gray
(London, 1888), vol. I, p. xxxii.
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The feitoria of Hormuz likewise cost more to farm than any other in the
Portuguese East (11,550 ashrafi in l614).146 The post offeitor was generally given, like
the captaincy, to those already employed by the crown or in active service. The
importance of this position came from the large number of duties connected with
navigation and shipping, such as the provision of naval stores and equipment, victuals
and armaments, arranging for caulking and minor repairs to ships, furnishing vessels for
the loading and unloading of cargo, and supplying boxes and bags for the packing of
goods. 147
The privatisation of the major captaincies, a process most conspicuous in the
seventeenth century, had important implications for the formation and execution of
policy at local level. Given the large sums required to purchase a captaincy, especially
Hormuz, we must assume that recovering the investment was the incumbent's chief
priority, whether by exercising crown monopolies or other less scrutable means. With
the promise of a healthy financial return came some latitude for handling affairs as
captains saw fit, and this surely explains some of the different strategies of commercial
administration that we can glimpse or imply in the Gulf.
In the case of an important staple like Hormuz, the encouragement of peaceful
trade was, theoretically, the most obvious method of raising and increasing revenue.
Success depended on numerous variables, however, many of which were beyond local
control. It will be seen below that political instability elsewhere in the Gulf could
damage Hormuz's trade.' 48 One quite understandable response to uncertain earnings
was to increase the taxes on transit trade, and this evidently happened at Hormuz on a
number of occasions. Direct Portuguese control of the kingdom's customs system from
146 Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1 700, P. 155.
Matos, 0 Estado da India, p. 20.
148 See below, pp. 127-8.
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1543 brought with it a proliferation of duties) 49 By the early seventeenth century, the
unprecedented annual customs revenues of Horrriuz were in part due to higher taxes -
indeed, the burdens of taxation increased not only in Hormuz but also in other ports
which were subject to Portuguese authority. Taxes were levied even on collectors of
cow	 In 1608, a one per cent tax was collected for the captain Garcia de
Melo.'5'
Yet rapacity in the form of excessive taxation might have discouraged merchants
from passing through Hormuz, and led to the haemorrhaging of goods via alternative
routes. In December 1566, viceroy Antao de Noronha wrote from Goa to the crown
stating that 20-25,000 quintals of pepper were reaching the Red Sea annually in
Atjehnese and other Muslim ships, whereas Portuguese Indiamen were carrying only
10-12,000 on the Cape route back to Lisbon.' 52 Thirty years later a Turkish merchant by
the name of Khwaja Rayoan observed that the mainland route from Venice and the
Mediterranean via Persia and Kandahar continued uninterrupted in spite of the threat
contrived by the Portuguese.' 53 In this event, the stricter enforcement of cartazes might
have brought back some of the recalcitrant, but at the cost of more frequent naval
patrols and a souring of relations with the Gulf's merchants. The overland routes, of
course, were beyond the Portuguese orbit. These hypothetical situations, requiring very
fine judgements, must have been played out in practice by those men who took on the
burden of a captaincy.
Matters were exacerbated by the ever-present spectre of administrative
malpractice. Here arose cultural differences between Arabs and Europeans in the
'' See below, pp. 129-30.
'° G. W. F. Stripling, The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs 1511-1574 (Philadelphia, 1977), p. 15.
'' BNL-FG, codice no. 1975, Carta de Ruy Lourenco de Távora para Filipe 11(1610), fis. 366-66v.
152 Cited by Boxer in 'A note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice trade and the
Rise of Atjeh, 1540-1600' P. 273, no. 18, from A. da Silva Rego, ed. Documentacaopara a Historia
das missoes do Padroado Portugues do Oriente India, vol. X, 1566-1568, pp. 57-58, 160,163.
Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society, pp. 162, 391 n. 21.
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conduct of business. From a local, native perspective the authority ceded to the
European captains and their subordinates, who were often relatives, was thought to be
the source of much abuse. Economic activities in the kingdom of Hormuz had been very
strictly regulated before the Portuguese arrived. Any cheating with scales and
measurements, or any violation of royal orders was severely punished. Under the
Portuguese, cheating, waste and falsification of information about the income from
afandega were widespread. Indeed, it is revealing that one captain of Hormuz, to cover
his own corruption, complained to his own sovereign that the king of Hormuz did not
pay the tribute due.' 54 However, 'corruption' is a rather loaded word to use in this
context.' 55 Undoubtedly some Portuguese officials, perhaps the majority, pushed the
possibilities of office beyond what was legally acceptable. Simão de Mello is both
unsavoury and revealing in this respect: having been appointed captain of Hormuz a
year before the city's fall, de Mello demanded of the English besiegers that he be
allowed to leave the city unmolested with six chests full of loot.' 56 Boxer recounts a
claim made by Alvaro de Noronha, captain of Hormuz in 1551, that as a matter of
family pride he would surpass the 140,000 pardaus made by his predecessor (Manuel
de Lima) during his term. Boxer was surely correct in concluding that 'rigidly honest
[officials] were few and far between';' 57 but some attempt should be made to
distinguish between officials who were successful entrepreneurs and those who abused
their authority systematically.
Most of the malpractice that occurred in the port and customs house under
Portuguese control was petty, usually perquisites demanded by officials from merchants
ANTT, A.G. vol. X, Gay. xx, 2-27, Carta de Cristóvão de Mendonca a el-rei ID. João III, na qula ihe
conta os acontecimentos e inimizades da India e o Estado da fortaleza, pp. 255-57.
155 For interesting discussion see R.J. Barendse, The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean World of the
Seventeenth Centu#y (New York, 2002), pp. 299-301.
156 Another example was Manuel de Sousa in 1592. The Commentaries of Ruy Freyre de Andrada, p.
168; The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, p. 70.
157 Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p. 323.
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and shippers.' 58 For example, the ruler of Basra had to send a horse each year to the
captain of the Portuguese fortress in Hormuz as a gift (or bribe). 159
 In 1596 it was
reported that horse exporters were forced to use boats that were too small, and to trade
with the captain before any other.' 6° As a royal monopoly, the horse trade was
something of a special case. Elsewhere it was alleged that the captain compelled
merchants from Basra to purchase 200 ashrafi worth of goods from his own factory at
prices 15 per cent above the market price for every 2,000 ashrafi they invested. The
captain also claimed 450 reis for every bale of indigo or quintal of cloves or other drugs
that were exported.' 61
 By 1603 corruption had reached such proportions that even the
guardians of the royal interests converted themselves into thieves of crown property.
The Portuguese alcaide of the sea, who had been appointed to prevent such robberies in
Hormuz, merely joined hands with the shahbandar' 62 to share in the spoils.'63
Finally, Linschoten describes very clearly how Portuguese officials and private
traders employed all possible means to get the most out of the Persian, Turkish, Arab,
Armenian and Venetian merchants who visited Hormuz to buy spices. The captain's
private commercial interests were satisfied first because, as Linschoten observed, 'the
king is farre from them, to commuand the contrarie'.'64
More serious, perhaps, were instances of abuse involving the kings of Hormuz.
Over the whole period of the occupation, the kings and viziers of Hormuz complained
158 See also R. Whiteway, The Rise ofPortuguese Power in India, p. 174.
159 Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz', p. 164; Potache, 'The Commercial Relations between Basrah and
Goa in the Sixteenth Century', p. 150.
' 60 AP0, fasc. III, pp. 711-14.
DUP, vol. II, pp. 43-4.
162 See the Glossary.
163 Shastry, 'A century of Sea Trade between Portuguese Goa and Hormu.z', p. 207.
' The Voyage of Van Linschoten, vol. I, pp. 40-1. He did concede that the captain alone could send
horses out to India.
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to the king of Portugal on numerous occasions 165
 - even a vizier who had been installed
by them, the Arab Rashid bin Zarkam Al-Muscati (15291536) . 166
 Horses and other
commodities were taken from them at very low prices, and taxes or debts due to the
king were not paid) 67
 These letters of complaint still remain in the ANTT in Lisbon,
some of them in Arabic and others in Persian. But were those missives which arrived at
Lisbon ever read and considered by the king? The answer may well be in the negative
because little, if anything, was done to alleviate the situation in Hormuz.
There is a letter from Turan Shah IV to Manuel I after the death of Albuquerque
in which he complains about the intervention of Portuguese officials in the kingdom's
internal affairs. 168
 Towards the very end of Portuguese rule, in February 1621,
Mohammed Shah IV made a similar complaint about the captains of Hormuz, and
advised the king of the Union that if he wanted Hormuz to be safe and wealthy he
should send 'such captains as are not merchants, because the mariners, which might
serve in your Majesties Navies to keep this Strait are all employed in the captain's ship
and frigates'.'69
Corruption in the early seventeenth century met with the fierce disapproval of
Philip III. This is apparent in his recommendation that fines should be imposed on all
those who traded in pepper to Hormuz and Muscat illegally, both of which were small
ports where control should have been tight) 7° Yet for all of Philip's bluster, the crown
dragged its feet in dealing with abuse. Gradually, and somewhat belatedly, orders were
165 De Sousa, Documentos Arabicos para a História Portugueza, pp. 48-53, 59-60, 162-64, 166-7 1,
178-80, 188-90. One of these letters sent and signed by Mohammed Shah II was very important as it
contains information about the captain Martim Afonso de Mello. See Appendix II, Doc. 4.
166 De Sousa, DocumentosArabicospara a História Portugueza, p.48.
167 Diogo de Melo, captain of Hormuz from 1524-28, was an important example of this behaviour as his
successor Cristóvão de Mendonca mentioned in the letter to King João III. ANIT, A. G. vol. X, Gay.
xx, 2-27, Carta de CristóvAo de Mendonca a el-rei D. João Ill, p. 255. See Appendix II, Doc. 1.
168 j de Sousa, Documentos Arabicos para a História Portugueza (Lisbon, 1790), p. 59.
169 P. Samuel, Hakluytusposthumus, orPurchas his pilgrims (Glasgow, 1905), pp. 365-67.
170 Ibid.
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issued to all the viceroys and governors in Goa not to give cartazes too freely to
merchants, to carry cinnamon and ginger to Mecca, Hormuz or Diu.' 7 ' In 1609 the king
instructed Viceroy Rui Lourenco de Tavora to entrust a competent person to inquire into
the excesses committed in the renting of the customs at Hormuz, to carry out
instructions for collection of the custom rents at Hormuz and Muscat, and to prohibit the
captains from forwarding goods belonging to other merchants. When the captains of
Hormuz monopolised the horse trade, the king tried to break it by permitting them only
a fourth share of the trade, leaving the rest for sale.' 72 The viceroy warned all, including
the fidalgos, of the danger of carrying contraband from India to sell to Muslims in the
Gulf and Persia.' 73 The crown wanted the viceroy to open the way for silks, carpets and
velvets coming from Basra and Persia to Hormuz, to prevent the diminution of the
a(fándega, and to watch all the exits through which goods came.
None of this would have helped relations between the Arabs and the Portuguese
around Hormuz. The very worst abuses were incendiary in the short-term; and in the
long-term, the combination of perceived corruption and prohibitive rates of duty
chipped away at Portuguese authority in the Gulf, encouraging resistance to it.'74
However, it is very doubtful that the behaviour of the Portuguese in Hormuz damaged
the kingdom's external trade. Their stewardship of afándega was politically
unpalatable for all sorts of reasons - but, if customs revenues are a reliable guide, their
exploitation of Hormuz's commercial potential was on the whole successful, and
increasingly so as the century progressed. Thus, on paper at least, the captains of
Hormuz were competent merchants and financial administrators. In the 1540s, the
captains of Hormuz fortress had been satisfied with earning about 5,000 cruzados in
A. B. Sousa, Subsidiospara a história MilitarMaritima da India, vol. II (Lisbon, 1953), P. 640.
172 DUP, vol. I, p. 231.
ibid., p. 232
174 See, for example, Document 4 in Appendix II.
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their three years of office in the city, but later they were not satisfied with 200,000
cruzados. By 1619 the captain's income had increased to 300,000 cruzados for a three-
year tenure.' 75
 During the first quarter of the seventeenth century, for which we have
reasonable data on income and expenses, an initial outlay of 145,000 ashrafi would
have been recouped very quickly. Indeed, for the first half of 1618 alone the customs
revenue of Hormuz was 105,500 ashrafi.' 76 In 1620 it was over 200,000. 177
 The flow of
money in and out of the Portuguese treasury was not quite so straightforward as this, but
it is still clear that captains stood to benefit by the end of their tenures. If Hormuz
proved to be a lucrative posting, then it was up to individual captains to ensure this
remained so, and the instances of petty extortion and the conduct of business at
preferential rates must be understood in this light. The captains of Hormuz, more than
elsewhere by virtue of their investment, had a very real stake in the success of the
kingdom and the Gulf, and their actions were shaped by the twin influences of distant
authority and devolved responsibility.
There were also institutional changes in Hormuz. In 1521 Manuel I ordered Portuguese
officials to be placed in the customs house to replace the native Hormuzian officials,
which led to rebellion in the Gulf in November of that year. By this order Mohammed
Shah II was forced to hand over the office to Duarte de Meneses in 1522178 Soon after
he arrived in Goa, Meneses sent reinforcements to Hormuz under his brother LuIz.
Another treaty was signed in Hormuz on 15 July 1523 , 179
 between LuIz de Meneses and
the king, similar to that signed between Albuquerque and Turan Shah IV in 1515. One
of the conditions was that the king of Hormuz and his successors should not collect any
175 Steensgaard, Carrack.s, Caravans and Companies, p. 199.
176 Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1700, p. 157.
177 See Table 2.5., below.
178 He assumed the office of Governor of India in January 1522.
179 Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol. I, p. 358.
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tax on goods brought by Portuguese vessels to Hormuz from Portugal, suggesting that
the crown saw Hormuz as one of the markets where it could sell European goods
exported via the Cape route. Another clause stated that every year the king of Hormuz
would pay to the king of Portugal a tribute in gold, silver and pearls worth 60,000
ashrafi, at the rate of 5,000 ashrafi each month. The increase was justified on the
grounds that the city's customs receipts and security had improved. In addition, all other
conditions agreed with Albuquerque in 1515 were to remain in force. Thus, local
Hormuzian ships were to be allowed freedom of navigation, but no ship was to sail into
the Straits of Bab-Al-Mandeb or to the coast of Sofala, since both were beyond
Portuguese control. All foreign vessels bringing merchandise to Hormuz and those
foreign ships chartered by Hormuzian merchants to transport goods would also be free,
provided the relevant documents were shown. Caravans on land were also guaranteed
their safety. Another clause, linked with the first one, provided that whenever
Portuguese vessels arrived at the port of Hormuz nothing was to be taken away from
them except on payment, and the Portuguese too were to purchase whatever they
required.' 8° An important provision in the treaty mentioned that the Muslims of Hormuz
who brought goods on board Portuguese vessels were not exempt from customs dues, as
were the commodities brought by Portuguese Christian nationals. We can see that the
word 'Christian' was included because there were Portuguese nationals who had
become Muslims' 8 ' and these were debarred from exemption. If any Portuguese
180 Qaemmaqmäi, Hormuz dar Rawabut Iran wa Portugal, p. 30.
181 This issue raises several interesting points. First, why did those Portuguese become Muslims, instead
of the Muslims becoming Christians in line with the Portuguese religious policy when they arrived in
the East? Where did they live in Hormuz, in the fortress or in the city? Second, did they marry
Muslim women? Who supported those Portuguese in Hormuz? These matters are still unknown. It
seems likely that some of those Portuguese who became Muslims were, in fact, Moors from
Andalusia, who had hidden their faith for fear of being killed at that time. And some of them were
Arab Muslims who not considered as citizens in the full sense in Portugal. The Portuguese used them
in their fleet's expeditions because they were good artisans, such as blacksmiths, carpenters, and so
on. When they came to the Gulf as part of the crew of Albuquerque's ships, they escaped and joined
the Muslims in the city of Hormuz. In 1515, when Albuquerque was in Hormuz and signed the
second treaty with the king, he asked the king to return all those Portuguese who had escaped from
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Christian national tried to cheat by taking goods belonging to Muslims into Hormuz, he
was subject to the payment of double the amount of duty, as well as being punished as a
criminal by the captain of the fortress.
The Portuguese did not remain content for long with this treaty. After only six
years, in 1529, the annual tribute was raised again to 100,000 ashrafi.' 82 This increase
was an economic trap for Hormuz. The Portuguese knew the demand was excessive and
could not be met - in 1530 the crucially important customs revenues of Hormuz did not
exceed 93,000 ashrafi) 83 As a result the king's debts to the Portuguese crown steadily
mounted, exceeding 500,000 ashraJI by 1542.184 This gave the Portuguese government
additional leverage. Most notably, it provided an excuse to fully incorporate the
afándega of Hormuz into the Portuguese state in January 1543.185 Viceroy Martim
Afonso, having satisfied himself of the inability of the king to pay, agreed to waive all
claims to back dues on condition that the king conceded to the Portuguese the entire
customs duties of the port from that point onwards. Owing to his difficult position, the
king was obliged to submit.' 86 For his acquiescence the king was 'rewarded' with
various crumbs from the table - some small allowances, including 1,800 ashrafi a year
for his personal maintenance, and 10,000 ashrafi for his household expenses.
After they took over responsibility for the a(fándega, the captains of Hormuz
introduced a far more complex and variable system of customs dues, for reasons that
have already been suggested above. It is recorded that Oman had rates that differed
his vessels and hidden in the city. See The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. I,
p. 129, vol. IV, pp. 153-54, 176; Marques, History of Portugal, vol. I, pp. 97-102.
182 Godinho, Les finances de l'état portugais des Indes Orientales, pp. 44-7; Faroughy, The Bahrain
Islands (750-1951), p. 61.
183 See Table 2.4, below.
184 Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol. I, p. 450.
185 S. Botelho, Cartas de Simdo Boteiho, Tombo do Eastado da India, pp. 86, 90. In this cartas can be
found the revenue of the a(fándega of Hormuz from 1523 to 1550; Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a
Economia Mundial, vol. 2, p. 162.
186 Correia, Lendas da India, vol. IV, pp. 247-45.
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from those of Hormuz. On some goods unloaded in Muscat, for example white fabrics,
the usual Hormuzian levy of 11 per cent was paid. However, on bonnets, belts and
indigo from Cambay, pepper and nutmeg, tin and sugar from south India and Gujarat,
the rate was 7.5 per cent.' 87 On some other Indian goods like raw cotton, rice and butter,
the rate was no more than 5 per cent, and on textiles 10 per cent; but textiles imported to
Hormuz from Malacca were taxed at 16 per cent and textiles exported to Hormuz from
Persian workshops were only taxed at 5 per cent. 188 The superintendent of the royal
finances in Hormuz believed that a 6 per cent duty on drugs like indigo, cloves,
cinnamon, nutmeg, ginger, long pepper and sugar exported by Arabian merchants to
Basra, would be able to fetch 25,000 cruzados per annum.'89
Table 2.4. Hormuz: Customs Revenues, 15 15-1588 (in ashrafi)
_________	 Actual Revenues
Year	 Amount	 Year	 Amount
15l5'°	 100,000 1539	 67,595
1524	 95,774 1540
	 93,512
1525	 83,318 1541	 111,779
1526	 101,677 1542	 87,882
1527	 77,269 1543	 108,930
1528	 87,066 1544	 93,603
1529	 90,332 1545	 70,280
1530	 92,378 1546	 79,881
1531	 81,001 1547	 62,269
1532	 98,771 1548	 61,646
1533	 76,876 1549	 90,782
1534	 87,938 1550	 135,000
1535	 83,294 1551	 95,000
1536	 79, 961 1568	 83, 333?
1537	 75,255 1574
	 170,000?
1538	 101,822 1588	 180,000?
Source. Boteiho, Cartas Tombo, if. 76- 9; Godinho, Les finances de
l'étatportugais des Indes Orientales, pp. 47-8.
' 87 AP0 fasc. 5-3-936, Doação de metade da a1fndega de Muscate a Filipe I, 22/v/1589, pp. 1247-5 1.
188 Godinho, Les finances de l'étatportugais des Indes Orientales, p. 49.
89 Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, p. 199.
'° This figure is according to Barros, Asia, vol. II, Liv. x, p. 418.
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The proceeds of this emerging system are difficult to calculate. Some indication
can be had from a detailed account of the revenues and expenditures of Hormuz during
the first quarter of the sixteenth century. Revenue collected for Hormuz from Qalhãt on
the south coast of Oman to Julfar in the Ras Musandam was about 28,000 ashrafi,
broken down as follows: Qalhãt 1,100 ashrafi; Muscat, 4,000; Suhar, 1,500; Khür
Fakhãn, 1,500; Dibba, 500; Lima, 700; and Julfar district, 7,500. In addition, 1,500
ashrafi was usually taken by the authorities in Hormuz for each annual pearl fishing
voyage.'9'
A longer run of data can be found in Table 2.4 (above) which gives customs
revenues in Hormuz for selected years before and after the Portuguese assumption of
a(fándega. After the first year of the new regime the customs yield was low, not more
than 93,603 ashrafi in 1544 compared with 111,779 in 1541.192 After 1543, however,
the question of arrears of tribute no longer arose because the Portuguese satisfied their
claims themselves; and by this compulsory appropriation, they became the real
proprietors of the afándega of Hormuz.'93
A number of points can be discerned from the figures in Table 2.4. First, for
sixty years beginning in 1515, the customs revenue of Hormuz rarely exceeded its pre-
occupation level. On only two occasions before the Portuguese assumed control of
afándega in 1543 (1526 and 1538) did revenue match or exceed 100,000 ashrafi. After
1543 the average customs income was around 75,000 ashrafi per annum, and, with odd
exceptions (1550 for example), this remained the case until revenues began to increase
very sharply during the last quarter of the sixteenth century.
Also apparent is the fluctuation of revenues, although it must be noted that after
1551 there are few reliable data in the Portuguese sources. Subrahmanyam located
Barros, Asia, vol. II, liv. II, pp. 50-55.
192 P. S. S. Pissurlencar, Regimentos dasfortalezas da India (Goa, 1951), p. 180. See also Table 2.4,
above.
' Boteiho, Tombo do Eastado da India, pp. 76-8.
127
Hormuz's poor mid-century performance in a larger economic downturn, also
noticeable in Malacca.' 94 The vulnerability of Portuguese shipping to wreck or capture
partly explains some of the fluctuations, as happened to the largest nao Madre de Deus
which was taken by the English in 1592.195 Other fluctuations stemmed from the
condition of eastern trade more generally. Gaspar Correia, for example, mentioned
'much hunger' on the Coromandel coast in East India and 'a lack of food in the ports of
the Straits of Bab-Al-Mandeb'.' 96 Several local causes can also be suggested, however.
The confused state of Basra and its trade from 1536, when the Ottomans occupied
Baghdad, to 1546, when Basra also fell, had a strong effect on Hormuz. Trade to and
from Basra had been worth about 9,000 ashrafi yearly.' 97 Moreover, the war between
the Ottomans and the Persians during the reign of Shah Tahmasp (1524-76) brought
Turkish troops towards Lãristan and Shiraz and led to the capture of Tabriz and
Isfahan.' 98 The main land route between Hormuz and Persia passed through Lãristan,
which brought to the a(fándega about 35,000 ashrafi yearly. As a result of all these
events, the revenue of Hormuz declined until the last quarter of the century.
Table 2.4 also shows an improvement in afándega revenue during the last
quarter of the century. This can be attributed in part to more stable relations in the Gulf
between the Portuguese authorities and the Persians, especially during the first part of
Shah Abbas's reign. This encouraged the silk trade via Hormuz, for example. Turkish
commercial activity may also have been increasing in the Gulf to fund their war against
the Safavids. In addition, there seems to have been a general expansion in Portuguese
194 Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700, pp. 94-5.
G. V. Scammell, Seafaring, Sailors and Trade, 1450-1 750 (Aldershot, 2003), X, p. 181; J. T.
Lanman, 'Life on a Portuguese nao: Linschoten's Voyage to India, 1583', Revista da Universidade
de Coimbra (Coimbra, 1985), vol. 32, P. 281. The English found in Madre de Deus correspondence,
maps, an account of China and its riches, and the Portuguese register of the East Indies.
Correia, Lendas da India, vol. iv, pp. 13 1-32.
' 97Biblioteca de Ajuda, Cod. 42-51, pp. 293, 331: 'Pareceres sobre os Turcos que estão em Bassorá',
1547.
198 P. Sykes, A History ofPersia, vol. II, p. 164.
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traffic on the Gulf route via Hormuz and Basra. The balance between those European
imports from Asia that were shipped via the Cape and those that were carried by
caravan implies that more traffic was passing through Hormuz at the end of the
sixteenth century. 199
 While annual arrivals at Lisbon via the Cape declined from 39
ships in 1580 to 28 in 1610, arrivals at Hormuz stood at 54 ships before 1622.200 Boxer
pointed out some time ago that the last quarter of the sixteenth century saw a decline in
the volume of Indonesian spices sent around the Cape to Europe. Instead, most of the
spices secured by the Portuguese were sold to Asian traders at Malacca, Goa and
Hormuz. Cloves are a good case in point. By the end of the century the Portuguese had
abandoned efforts to enforce their monopoly of the clove trade by which a third of the
total export crop was reserved for the crown. As a result, cloves were sold to Muslim
merchants from all over Asia, and at Hormuz Persian, Turkish, Arab, Armenian and
Venetian merchants congregated to trade with officials and private traders. 20 ' As
Steensgaard has pointed out, though we know little about the private Portuguese trade,
what we do know indicates the importance of officials as entrepreneurs.202
Perhaps there was also a more positive dimension to Portuguese management of
Hormuz as a market. In 1567 the city's mosques were specifically excepted from
Portugal's anti-Muslim provisions; for, as Boxer claims, even if the local Shah was a
Portuguese puppet, the population was Muslim, and some regard had to be paid to the
susceptibilities of the neighbouring and increasingly powerful Persians.203
As noted above, increased taxation also bolstered Portuguese revenues. Officials
at Hormuz imposed various new taxes, for example a levy of one per cent notionally
199 Steensgaard, C'arracks, Caravans and Companies, p. 168.
200 Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700, pp. 86, 142. For Hormuz see Table 2.6,
below. See Barendse, The Arabian Seas, p. 309 for departures in the seventeenth century.
201 Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, pp. 6 1-2.
202 Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, p. 93. The volume of Portuguese trade through
J-Iormuz can be implied from the figures in Table 2.1, above.
203 Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p. 69.
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intended for the maintenance of the fleet. 204 In 1580, for Jews, Armenians and Muslims
at Hormuz there was an extra duty added equal to three per cent, and in the years 1618-
19 there is reference to a fourteen per cent duty in Hormuz.205
Yet expenses were outpacing revenues, as shown in Table 2.5 (below). In
addition, these statistics do not show that Goa still needed financial support from
Hormuz, perhaps right up to the island's fall in 1622. As mentioned in Ruy Lourenço de
Távora's letter to Philip III in 1610, from the total balance of Hormuz's revenues in that
year (154,500 ashraJI) about 45,000 ashrafi were remitted to Goa.206
Table 2.5. The Expenses and Balance of Afándega at
Hormuz in the Seventeenth Century
Year	 Amount (in ashrafis) Expenses	 Balance
1607	 192,000	 76,098	 + 115,902
1609	 229,000	 56,649	 + 172,351
1610	 244,500	 90,000	 + 154,500
1620	 200,684	 130,284	 + 70,400
Source: BNL-FG 1975 fis. 364-365v; 1978 fis. I, 28v, 52v, 77, 107v-109v, 132.
The known values of the afándega after its grant to João III varied
considerably. In 1568 the total income was about 83,333 ashrafi (25,000,000 reis), but
Portuguese expenses exceeded this by some margin. The total revenue in 1607, as
shown in Table 2.5, had risen to 192,000 ashrafi (57,600,000 reis), and just before the
fall of Hormuz had gone up again to 200,684 ashrafi (60,205,000 reis).207 It should be
noted that the major part of the total expenditure in 1607 (76,098 ashrafi) went on the
payment of salaries (38,157 ashrafi or 11,447,000 reis), and the remainder was spent on
supporting the navy (13,598 ashrafi or 4,079,100 reis) and on general maintenance
204 I4PO, vol. III, p. 89.
205 Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, p. 198.
206 BNL-FG, codice no. 1975, Carta de Ruy Lourenço de Távora para Filipe 11(1610), pp. 364-65;
Carta de Filipe II para D. Jerónimo de Azevedo (1612), pp . 143-44.
207 M. S. Blanco, '0 Estado Português da fndia', Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Lisbon, 1992,
p. 222.
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(14,213 ashrafi or 4,263,840 reis).208 From 1581 to 1590, the balance of trade was low,
but not the gross income; the reduction came from the increase in expenditure. 209 In the
same table, we can see that there were surpluses in the Hormuz budget under
Portuguese control. In 1620, just two years before the fall of Hormuz, the receipts were
high (200,684 ashrafi) but the expenses consumed two thirds of the budget (130,284
ashrafi). It does not seem likely that these sums were spent on maintaining the fortress
and the ships stationed there. Ruy Freire, in his complaint about the condition of
Hormuz, claimed that the town lacked everything by way of defence. The captain and
his officials used the ships for trading, and nobody cared about defence.21°
Table 2.6. Annual Arrivals at Hormuz from the East c.1620
Port	 Ships Port
	 Ships
Sind	 8	 Dabhol	 4
Nagana	 3	 Goa	 12
Diu	 5	 Cochin	 2
Daman	 3	 Malacca 2
Bassein	 3	 Bengal	 2
Chaul	 8	 Malindi	 2
Source: Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, p. 197
At the beginning of seventeenth century, then, Hormuz remained a valuable prize. The
yield of the a(fándega after the 1 570s was substantial, and grew until the fall of the city
in 1622 . 211
 Its port stood on the trade routes via Basra and Baghdad, and Persia in the
reign of Shah Abbas, especially the route between Isfahan and northern India.
Steensgaard points out that in the early seventeenth century Hormuz still had a
considerable eastward trade, as set out in Table 2.6, above.
208 Pissurlencar, Regimentos das fortalezas, pp. 528-30.
209 Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, vol. 2, PP. 157, 346.
210 DUP, vol. II, p. 274.
211 BNL-FG,codiceno. ll4lOfls. 107v-109v, 132.
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2.4. The Cartaz System
Cartaz was a term used by the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean from their arrival in the
region. It was an important element of Portugal's commercial organisation in the Asian
part of their empire. Cartaz is derived from the Arabic quirtas212 and means 'paper' or
something important written on a specific paper. In the Portuguese system the cartaz
was a safe conduct certificate or licence which allowed vessels, especially those of
Muslims, to carry goods and sail safely across the Indian Ocean. The cartaz was issued
on payment of a specific amount of money. In Gujerat the price was fixed at one tanga,
and in the Gulf and other places it was five pardãos per cartaz.213 Cartazes were used
for the first time in 1502, after Manuel I declared the whole of the maritime region of
the Estado da India to be a closed sea.214 The Portuguese government also declared that
any unlicensed ship in the Indian Ocean near Goa, Hormuz, Malacca or elsewhere was
liable to be seized or sunk if it met Portuguese ships, particularly if it belonged to
Muslim traders. 215 Nevertheless, sometimes no ship was safe from the cupidity of the
Portuguese - even vessels that held a licence were seized or sunk, whether friendly or
hostile.2t6
In the Gulf, the Portuguese stipulated that all ships from Hormuz trading with
the Malabar coast should carry cartazes, in practice amounting to ten or more vessels a
year coming from Cannanore and Cochin.217
 The Arab tribes living in the north of
Bander Rig218
 on the Persian coast were also obliged to buy the licenses to ensure
212 See Correia, The Three voyages of Vasco da Gama, vol. I, p. 298.
213 K. S. Mathew, 'Trade in the Indian Ocean and the Portuguese System of Cartazes' in M. D. Newitt,
(ed.), The First Portuguese Colonial Empire, Exeter Studies in History, no. 11 (Exeter, 1986), PP. 42,
74, 76. Every ship had to pay its dues at the fortaleza orfeitoria where the carta.z was issued and to
leave a sum as security for the payment of similar dues on its return. APO, fasco. V, parte I.
214 Mathew, 'Trade in the Indian Ocean and the Portuguese System of Cartazes', pp. 42, 73.
215 Boxer, The Portuguese Sea-borne Empire, p. 48.
216 Correia, The Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama, p. xxix; Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power
in India, p. 180.
217 Mathew, 'Trade in the Indian Ocean and the Portuguese System of Cartazes', p. 75.
218 Meaning 'Sandy Bay' in Persian.
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protection for their sailing boats from the Portuguese fustas, which often cruised the
narrow seas. 219 It was known among the merchants in the Gulf; that anyone trying to
escape this risked being robbed by the Portuguese, who went out seeking prey, an
activity which was more profitable than the sale of the cartaz itself.
Cartazes served several purposes. They obliged ships to call at Portuguese ports
to pay customs dues. They emphasised Portuguese claims of monopoly of the trade in
certain commodities. 22° Clauses relating to the carriage of arms and ammunition were
security measures against native power in the region. Symbolically for the Portuguese,
cartazes were proof of their possession and occupation of the sea. To make their
presence effectively felt, safe conducts were backed up by naval patrols, further
supported and given foundation by the network of forts and factories around the Indian
Ocean rim. 221
 In reality they were a tacit acknowledgement that Portuguese shipping
could not monopolise the ocean, and that it was neither feasible nor profitable to keep
trade out of local hands. This rationale even extended to the tender of contracts to local
shippers to carry Portuguese cargoes. Much work of this kind could be found around the
city's fortress.222
From the begiiming, the cartaz system was totally disregarded by some local
merchants in the Indian Ocean. In 1513 twelve or thirteen ships carrying pepper and
other goods left the Malabar coast for Arabia without cartazes. K.S. Mathew, in his
work on this system, points out that in 1547 merchants sent vessels loaded with pepper
to Mecca without troubling to collect cartazes from the Portuguese officials.223
 In the
Gulf also, the cartaz system faced problems after the Turks occupied Basra, as we learn
219 The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, p. 24.
220 Newitt, Tue First Portuguese Colonial Empire, p. 7.
221 J Magalhao, The Portuguese in the Sixteenth C'entuiy, p. 52. For the most recent treatment see M.
pearson, The hidian Ocean.
222 Boteiho, Cartas Tombo, pp. 86-90.
223 Mathew, 'Trade in the Indian Ocean and the Portuguese System of Cartazes', pp. 77-8.
133
from a letter from Hormuz to João de Castro in Goa in 1546, in which it is noted that
some vessels sailing to QatIf, Bahrain and Basra did not stop in Hormuz to get
cartazes.224
It must also be recognized that the unilateral declaration of sea rights and
enforcement of cartaz could encourage plunder and piracy. In fact, the dividing line
between piracy and the Portuguese concept of legal confiscation was very thin. Even
assuming its legal validity, it was a dangerous weapon in the hands of Portugal's navies,
as it was difficult to judge cases of interception at sea due to lack of evidence. Later, the
cartaz became little more than a device for taxing Asiatic shipping and obtaining
revenue for the Portuguese crown. Cartazes became a key factor in Portugal's ability to
claim a sea empire, as in the seventeenth century they imposed the licenses cartazes on
all the European powers.225
Historians have argued about the broad impact of Portugal's entry into the Indian Ocean
system in the sixteenth century. For some, notably van Leur and Steensgaard, the
impact was negligible because of the 'traditional' commercial techniques that Portugal
introduced to a highly compatible system in Asia. Others, most notably Subrabmanyam,
have challenged this view by arguing for wide-ranging social and cultural change in the
commerce of the Indian Ocean after the European penetration, and for evolution within
those structures of 'empire' that were established there after 1497.226 Insofar as the Gulf
was inextricably connected with the Indian Ocean through commerce, and because
Hormuz was part of a much larger integrated Portuguese presence in Asia, these
contrasting views must be engaged with in the present study.
224 ANTT, Cart. Ormuz, 2 Fabruary 1546 f. 50.
225 Barros, Asia, vol. I, liv. vi, p. 75.
226	 a perceptive and fair-minded summary see the conclusion to Subrahmanyam's The Portuguese
Empire in Asia, 1500-1700, pp. 270-77.
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One thing at least is certain. It is hardly to be expected that the Portuguese could
suddenly change a system of commerce that had been in place for more than two
hundred years. The flow of goods remained largely unchanged. 227 In certain areas,
private commercial activity seems to have surpassed that of the Portuguese crown, but it
was closely associated with the traditional native system rather than any superimposed
template. Indeed, according to Thomaz's reading of the surviving evidence, Portuguese
private traders habitually engaged in coastal trading in order to evade monopolistic
restrictions imposed by the crown.228
By necessity Portuguese shipping followed the old routes in the Indian Ocean
because the winds of the tropical seasons dictated their movement. It would be wrong,
however, to focus only on seaborne trade and communication. According to Disney,
land-based revenues and overland trade routes tended to become more important to the
Portuguese over time, and, in addition, they were used for the conveyance of mail and
intelligence.229 Still less did the emergence of the Cape route alter the established
patterns of trade. Evidence has already been presented to this effect, 23° but we might
also consider the comments of Thomaz. The Portuguese never exported to Europe more
than 12.5 per cent of the total production of the Moluccas, while the rest was distributed
to Asian consumers in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf and Persia. 23 ' Moreover, the
Carreira da India could yield a net annual profit of about 33,000 cruzados, whereas
voyages within the region starting from Macau yielded 10,000, and those from Malacca
92,000. For Thomaz, these figures are sufficient to demonstrate that Portuguese
227 Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society, pp. 162, 390-91 n.17. Compare with Subrahmanyam, pp. 213.
There seems to be consensus on this point.
228 L. F. Thomaz, 'Portuguese Sources on Sixteenth Century Indian Economic History', in John
Correia-Afonso, ed. Indo-Portuguese History: Sources and Problems, pp. 100-1.
229 A. Disney, 'The Portuguese Empire in India c. 1550-1650' in John Correia-Afonso, ed. Indo-
Portuguese History: Sources and Problems, p. 151.
230 See above, pp. 128-9
231 Thomaz, 'Portuguese Sources on Sixteenth Century Indian Economic History', p. 103.
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commerce in the sixteenth century developed predominantly in the Indian Ocean over a
network of short and medium range routes which actually encompassed almost every
coast of Asia, and thereby was closely interlinked with the local condition of supply and
demand. 232 Thomaz continues:
In addition to this question of geographical bounds, there was another factor which
made Portuguese commercial activity in the Indian Ocean dependent on, and
complementary to, the native production system, namely, that the Portuguese were
neither able to impose their own products upon the Asian markets nor to introduce
alternative production system on Asian soil or to control the existing ones. As a
matter of fact the main reason which drove the Portuguese to apply themselves to
the local trade seems to be that the Cape route to Portugal was often a loser.233
The Portuguese, then, were one of many players in the commerce of the Indian Ocean.
Like the Dutch, they provided freight services to Asian merchants on the 'intense'
routes between India and the Gulf and Red Sea. 234 The persistence of these routes and
market centers ensured the contiuned importance of the Gulf and of Hormuz as its
distributive hub.
Yet, within a framework partly conditioned by nature and the environment, it is
nonetheless clear from the Gulf that the character of the Portuguese presence changed
over time. In a conclusion that has some sympathy with Subrahmanyam's view, there is
evidence of occasional changes in how the Portuguese managed the economy - and by
extension the society - of the Gulf.
It is clear that the Portuguese were careful to establish their own privileges and
their own commercial predominance in the Gulf in the years after 1515. Indications of
this can be found in the first treaty concluded between Albuquerque and the king of
Hormuz. Second, Portuguese methods of sea control - whether military in the form of
patrols, or economic in the form of cartazes - had an initially adverse effect on local
shipping, but the signs of recovery were rapid. Afandega revenue increased towards the
232 Thomaz, 'Portuguese Sources on Sixteenth Century Indian Economic History', p. 103.
233 Ibid., p. 101.
234 Subrahmayam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1 700, P. 213.
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end of the century, but captains and officials absorbed most of the profits, and little
seems to have been redistributed into the Gulf economy. This leads naturally to a third
point: as the Portuguese profited from controlling the Gulf's commerce, so, according to
Stripling, the local people were commensurately impoverished.235 It is easy for the
present writer to sympathise with this view; but it is also hard to square
'impoverishment' with the volume of traffic passing through Hormuz and the Gulf at
the close of the sixteenth century. Perhaps it would be more accurate to conclude that
the merchant elites of Hormuz and some of its nearby trading partners learnt to prosper
under the Portuguese, even if there were periods of tense relations and friction. During
the crisis of the city in April 1622, the crown prince of Hormuz tried to slip out with
jewels and money estimated to be worth around a million ashrafi.236 The 'people' who
suffered most were almost certainly the same people who had suffered under the old
regime, and whose grievances are easier to uncover in the later seventeenth century.237
Higher taxes may have eaten into the profit margins of merchants and peddlers and
eroded their incentives to remain in trade - all the more galling without any apparent
Portuguese investment in local infrastructure or institutions. However, the fortunes of
merchants operating in the sixteenth-century Gulf are still very poorly understood, and
one must be pessimistic that the sources have survived to allow detailed analysis of their
operations.
235 Stripling, The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs 1511-1574, p. 80.
236 Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, p. xxxviii.
237 Omani resistance to Hormuz in the fifteenth century points to discontent in at least one of the
kingdom's territories. See pp. 60-1, 176.
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Chapter Three: Political Aspects of Portuguese Rule in the Gulf
From the evidence discussed in the previous chapter, it is difficult to tell just how much
the growth of trade in the Gulf can be linked to active policies on the part of the
Portuguese, as the Estado da India never became a body of lands and peoples
effectively controlled by a single authority. It was more a network of trading posts,
linked, as G. V. Scammell points out, 'by sea and with the influence of the mother
country spread less by glorious feats of arms than by the zeal of missionaries and the
enterprise of traders commonly living and working far beyond even the most tenuous
jurisdiction of the Portuguese crown'.1
Economy and authority were inextricably linked; and every political movement
made by the Portuguese in the establishment of their seaborne empire depended on
relationships not between the land and the ports which they occupied, but between the
ports and the sea. In the light of this tendency, we can analyse Portuguese policy in the
Gulf. The so-called Portuguese empire in the East was supported, therefore, by
numerous fortresses, sometimes with the ownership of the intermediate stretch of coast,
but rarely extending to the interior. 2 This is because the Portuguese were unable to
conquer large areas of land. The Estado da India received fifteen times more revenue
from maritime trade than from overland trade. 3 Neither, arguably, were they especially
interested in colonisation as an element of their strategy in the East.4
Throughout the sixteenth century, the Portuguese held supreme, though not
unchallenged, control in the Gulf region. 5 Until the fall of Hormuz, the political
'G. V. Scammell, The First ImperialAge (London, 1989), p. 15.
2 R. Goertz, 'From territorial borders to an <inner frontier>: the first century of the Estado da fndia',
Stvdia, 53 (Lisbon, 1994), p. 95
M. Pearson, The Indian Ocean, p. 121.
See Chapter Two, above.
See Chapter Four, section 1, below.
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administration of the Gulf was a part of the government of the Estado da India. That
Estado, as the settlements were collectively designated, continued within the rigid frame
imposed by Manuel I. After Manuel appointed the first viceroy in India (visorey das
India) in 1505, supreme authority was usually delegated to noblemen from the royal
entourage, serving in general for three years.6
The viceroy or governor general, resident at Goa, was responsible for all the
fortresses and their establishments from the Indian Ocean to the China Sea, subject to
directives from Lisbon. 7
 Nominally responsible to him were the captains at
Mozambique, Muscat, Hormuz, Colombo and Malacca; 8
 these officers, however, were
given virtually a free hand in dealing with neighbouring rulers, even in making
decisions to wage war. In the Portuguese settlements local councils composed of the
captain, chief factor and other officers controlled the purchase and sale of all goods and
collected customs revenues.9
In theory, the viceroy was authorised to remove all or any commanders of
fortresses, warships, and soldiers, as well as any legal or bureaucratic officials who
failed to give satisfaction in their positions. He had sweeping judicial powers. He was
also empowered to approve or prevent all disbursements, claims, and financial
transactions made by or on behalf of the royal exchequer. In practice, however, the
viceroy's power was circumscribed in a number of respects.'° For example, with their
tenures limited to three years, viceroys found it difficult to exercise firm control over
their staff. Moreover, any charges deriving from indiscipline or abuse had to be brought
6 Marques, History of Portugal, vol. 1, p. 250-51; Scammell, The First Imperial Age, p. 151.
J. Marinho dos Santos, 'Honra e Primor na Expansão Portuguesa (Século XVI)' Estudos e Ensaios em
Homenagem a Vitorino Magalhdes Godinho. la. (Lisbon, 1988), P. 151.
S After that, the Portuguese divided the Asian part of their empire into two sections and Malacca came
under the second one which was ruled by another viceroy. Santos, 'Honra e Primor na Expansão
Portuguesa (Século XVI)', pp. 15 1-52.
Baião, Histôria da Expansào Portuguesa no Moundo, vol. II, pp. 10 1-2.
'° C. R. Boxer, Portuguese India in the Mid-Seventeenth Century (Delhi, 1980), pp. 9-10.
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by the Crown from the courts in Lisbon.' As the voyage home often took over six
months, little progress could be made during the period of one vice-regency. Therefore,
ambitious or dissident officers were prone to dispute the viceroy's authority or intrigue
against him with the king and court. 12
 The same slowness of communication often
forced viceroys to take action on urgent matters without waiting for a response from
Lisbon, or else encouraged inertia.
Financial support for the Estado da India derived largely from the sea. It came
from maritime commerce - from trade between Asia and Europe - from taxation and, to
a lesser extent, from the cartaz system and from plundering indigenous merchants.'3
The Casa da India and Casa da Mina e India were established by Manuel I and handled
all aspects of trade and navigation between Portugal and the East. They were agencies
of the government who only had authority to sell goods at a fixed price. 14
 Thus, the
afándega of Hormuz belonged to the Casa da India.
It has often been noted that Portuguese policy changed to an extent in the
transition from one reign to another, owing both to the character and theories of each
sovereign, and to the process by which his entourage was formed.' 5
 Before the 1480s,
the Portuguese Crown was characterised by a preoccupation with military adventurism
in North Africa, rather than the direct control of maritime trade. The phenomenon of
Portuguese royal mercantilism reached its apogee in the period from the 1480s to the
1520s, under the reigns of King João II and his successor Manuel 1.16 During the reign
of Manuel I in particular, policy was concentrated on the foundation of the new empire,
Baião, História da Expansào Portuguesa no Moundo, vol. II, p. 102.
12 Crone, The Discovery of the East, pp. 60-2.
Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1 700, Pp. 62-3, 78; Scammell, The First
ImperialAge, P
.
 15; Pearson, The Indian Ocean, p. 121.
14 Baião, História da Expansdo Portuguesa no Moundo, vol. III, P. 80; A. Russell-Wood, 'Government
and governance of European empires, 1450-1800', in An Expanding World, vol. 21, part I, ed. A. J.
R. Russell-Wood (Aldershot, 2000), p. xxvi; A. Marques, Histoiy ofPortugal, vol.1, P
.
 258.
L. F. Thomas, 'Factions, interests and messianism', IESHR, 28/2 (1991), P. 98.
16 Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1 700, p. 47.
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while João III attended to the system of revenue collection in the East and to the
Europeanisation of Portugal's intellectual life. 17 Sebastião, in contrast, focused on
internal affairs in Portugal and with the Moroccan question, which brought about his
death in the battle of Al-Qser Al-Kebir in 1578.18
3.1. Hormuz: The Centre of Portuguese Rule in the Gulf
Having briefly outlined Portuguese political structures and authority in the East, we
must now turn our attention to their character and operation in the Gulf. This
immediately raises the issue of Portuguese intentions in the region. Given the wide
dispersion of Portugal's interests, they came to rule each part of their empire separately
from the others. The administration of Hormuz was still a reflection of that in Goa,' 9 but
not in the style of rule. As we have seen, in Hormuz most of the commercial assets
belonging to the local ruler were placed under direct Portuguese control, including the
collection of afándega. Systems were also set up to stop the growth of Arab trade in
regions of the Gulf outside Portugal's direct control. On the other hand, much of
Hormuz's day-to-day political administration was left in the hands of the king, arguably
as an exercise in public relations.
In reassessing the Portuguese presence in the Gulf, there is a fact which should
be closely considered here. It was observed above that the Portuguese did not enlarge
the kingdom of Hormuz - not even by taking Basra, the main port at the head of the
Gulf.2° One of their few offensive campaigns was the attempt to secure sources of fresh
water for Hormuz by controlling Gambroon and Qishm, and this ended in failure. Thus,
the kingdom remained as it had been in the early fifteenth century.
17 See M. L. G. da Cruz, A Governacäo de D. João III: A Fazenda Real e os seus Vedores (Lisbon,
2001).
The Lusiads of Camöens, trans and ed. J. J. Aubertin, (London, 1878) vol. I, p.xv; Subrahmanyam,
The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1700, p. 81.
19 Pearson, The Indian Ocean, p. 120.
20 Refer to Chapter One, section 4, pp. 79-8 1.
141
Why, then, did the Portuguese not extend the kingdom of Hormuz, while they
were able to occupy Goa, Malacca and other places further East? Perhaps the
Portuguese were initially constrained by poor intelligence about the Gulfs politics and
economy. When Al-Hasa and QatIf fell into the hands of Rashid bin Mugamis (or Ale
Mageme) in 1525, the Portuguese did nothing because they were not ruled by Hormuz,
but had only occasionally been under its authority. It also seems that they consciously
wanted to avoid becoming embroiled in peripheral problems, particularly those
concerning the Arab tribes. Bin Mugamis defeated the last ruler of Al-Juboor in the
eastern Arabian Peninsula, which eventually facilitated the passing of the lands to
Ottoman domination between 1550 and 1552.21 Likewise, when the Safavids occupied
territory in the northern Gulf in 1508 and installed governors there, 22 the Portuguese did
little except through diplomatic channels, resulting in a treaty with Shah Ismail in 1515
guaranteeing the security of Hormuz.23 The peoples of KhUzistãn and southern Iraq
subsequently threw off Persian rule with little intervention from the Portuguese.
Here, in laying bare the essential character of Portuguese Hormuz, three points
should be considered. First, that with the takeover of the a(fándega, real political and
economic power in Hormuz and the Gulf transferred to the Portuguese Crown's
representatives on the spot. The king of Hormuz derived his authority from the viceroy
in Goa, both symbolically and practically. 24
 It is telling, for example, that the king was
not allowed to go out with his retinue without first obtaining permission from the
captain of Hormuz.25
 The viceroy allowed the appointment of a new king, and the
21 A. N. Al-Humaidan, The Social and Political History of the Provinces of Baghdad and Basra from
1688 to 1749, PhD. Thesis (Manchester, 1975), pp. 6, 10-15.
22 R. Q
. 
M. Merkhund, Tareakh RawdetAl-safa Nasri (Tehran, 1339 H.), vol. 8, p. 23.
23 The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. IV, pp.153-54; Danvers, The
Portuguese in India, vol. I, pp. 3 12-14.
24 Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, vol. 2, p. 162; Sousa, The Portuguese Asia,
vol. 2, pp. 74-5; Boteiho, Estado de Tombo, pp. 76-8.
25 Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, p. 194.
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nominee had to travel to Goa to have political authority conferred on him in a ceremony
at the viceroy's court. 26
 In a variation of this system, sometimes the Portuguese captain
in the fortress of Hormuz conferred authority on a relative of the deceased king at a
ceremony in the Portuguese fortress. The new king swore allegiance to the king of
Portugal and received the royal insignia from the hands of the Portuguese captain.27
Second, the main purpose of the Portuguese in capturing Hormuz was not to
create a new Portuguese city in the Gulf, as happened in Goa. 28
 The object was to
acquire an urban base from which to wrest control of the sea routes and the trade which
passed along them from their Asian competitors.
Third, Portuguese colonisation in the Gulf was unlike that in West Africa and
India, or in Malacca and Macao. The Gulf saw merely conquest, not colonisation simple
control and domination. Hormuz, which exercised authority over most parts of the Gulf,
was not like Goa. Almost from the begirming of Portugal's contact with the Indian
Ocean, Goa was the formal centre of empire in the region. Its sixteenth-century
prosperity was a result of Portuguese policies,29
 while Hormuz was thriving
economically before the Portuguese arrived.
Taking these points together, we can see that Hormuz was dissimilar to Goa and
Malacca. The former cities were directly ruled by Portuguese colonists after they had
driven out the local rulers and replaced them by force with military governors.30
Hormuz, in contrast, possessed political, strategic and economic advantages of great
importance, and the implications of its place at the hub of the Gulf and its expansive
26 Qäemmaqame, I-Iormuz dar Rawabut Iran wa Portugal, p. 32.
27 Botelho, Estado de Tombo, p. 78.
28 When Albuquerque attacked Goa in November 1510, he killed about 6,000 of its Muslim inhabitants.
He opened a slave market in Goa to sell captives. Through this process of 'cleansing' he desired to
create a new Portuguese city without Muslims. See R. P. Rao, Portuguese Rule in Goa 1510-1961
(Bombay, 1963), p. 31.
29 Pearson, The Indian Ocean, p. 135.
30 Rao, Portuguese Rule in Goa 1510-1961, p. 32.
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trade networks either compelled or convinced the Portuguese to exercise authority
through native rulers. It is true that most of the commercial activities belonging to the
local ruler were placed in the hands of the king of Portugal, and from 1507 the
Portuguese required the king of Hormuz to recognize the authority of the Portuguese
throne over him and his kingdom; but they did not substantially alter the kingdom's
political system, or even its economic organisation. 3 ' The direction of foreign policy in
Hormuz and command of its military forces remained in the hands of the Portuguese
captains. No attempt was made to reorganise the society and economy they encountered.
They made influential Muslims and others in Hormuz responsible for religious affairs.
Hormuz itself gave the Portuguese control of the Straits, and with that the Portuguese
were content.32
It is within this context that we should consider the political situation in the Gulf
in the period covered by this study. The Portuguese realised at the time of their arrival
that they could avoid direct occupation, which might only lead to the ruin of Hormuz
and the collapse of its trade. For this reason under the guidance of Albuquerque a policy
of indirect rule was preferred. 33 Interestingly, there is no evidence of rebellion in
Hormuz after the first important outbreak of 1521. Thereafter, the only complaints came
from merchants in the city or from the kings and their viziers. Most of the citizens in the
city of Hormuz were traders or officials of the afandega, and it seems that most of the
time they were content under Portuguese authority.
Thus far it has been established that the Portuguese presence in the Gulf was geared
towards economic domination more than anything else, reflecting early assessments of
31 Danvers, Report on the India Office Records Related to Persia and the Persian Gulf (London, n.d.),
p.9.
32 Couto, Décadas, vol. I, liv. ix, pp. 81-4.
Rego, Documentacào pal-a a História das Missöes do Padroado Portugués do Oriente , vol. IV, pp.
39 1-92.
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the value and costs of occupying Hormuz. At the same time, the practice of Portuguese
government in Honnuz, as elsewhere in the Estado da India, remained essentially
military, to support the economic infrastructure. As a consequence the majority of the
Portuguese in the Gulf, and particularly in Hormuz, were registered as soldiers, 34 and
were paid, as shown in Table 3.1 (below), when they were paid at all, by the Portuguese
Crown.35 There was no fixed or permanent military organisation and the soldiers had no
alternative but to attach themselves to individual fidalgos, who thus acquired their own
armed retinues. In the Portuguese navy in the Gulf, as in India, there were two
commanders responsible for the ports and fortresses. The first was the captido da
fortaleza (captain of the fortress). The second was the captain of the armada of Honnuz.
The authority of the captain of the fortress was limited to the area where he ruled, in this
case to the troops stationed at Hormuz. In practice, however, because Portuguese
officers were so few in number, most of the time the captain had authority from Goa to
secure the entire Gulf against rebellion, often with assistance from the captain of the
armada of Hormuz. A second category of commander was the captido-mór (chief
captain), like Albuquerque and other Portuguese governors in the East. The third
category consisted of capitâo-mór do mar (captains of the sea) who were responsible
for maritime security, whether around Hormuz, Arabia or Malacca. 36 In addition, the
crown sometimes conferred new military titles on commanders by royal grant, like that
which was given to Ruy Freyre de Andrada in 1618 - de geral mar de Ormuz e costa da
In the fortress of Hormuz there were about 400 soldiers, 30 guards and 40 relatives of the captain, as
well as 10 ships with 350 soldiers and 440 sailors under the commander of the Portuguese armada in
the Gulf. See A. B. de Sousa, Subsidios para a história Militar Maritima da India ( Lisbon, 1953),
vol. III, p. 637.
" The Corpo Coronológico lists the payments made to administrators in Hormuz between 1515 and
1517. There were about 160 persons, 154 of them called homem de armas (men at arms) or captains.
Most of the Portuguese officials in the Gulf were soldiers, not civilians. See ANTT, CC, III, maço 6,
doc. 24, 54, 63.
36 For more details see G. Correia, Lendas da India, vol. II, p. 463; Rego, Documentacâo para a
História das Missôes do Padroado Português do Oriente India, vol. I, p. 282. It should be noted that
cap itào-mor was sometimes synonymous with cap itão-mór do mar.
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Persia e Arabia - ' if he took care of its organisation and equipment'. 37 Such titles were
not part of the regular command structure, but were given to reward and encourage
commanders like Ruy Freyre, whose strong leadership, the crown believed, would
overcome the weakness of the Portuguese position in the Gulf.
The number of Portuguese captains and officials in Hormuz, especially in its
fortress, increased after Manuel I decided to put Portuguese officials in the afandega to
control the island's imports and exports. By the reign of João III they outnumbered
Hormuzian officials. Appointment depended on status. Captaincies were given to
members of the Portuguese nobility, factor positions to 'knights', and places in the
secretariat to members of the royal household.38
Table 3.1. Pay Scales at the Fortress of Hormuz (c.1571-1581)
Position	 Reis per year
Captain	 600,000
Alcaid (commander) 	 100,000
Judge	 50,000
Factor	 100,000
Clerks	 50,000
Administrator of the royal warehouse 	 30,000
Clerk of the cells	 20,000
Bailiff of fortress	 24,000
Chief constable	 46,000
Master of the arsenal	 40,000
Master of the smithy	 27,000
Bailiff of the treasury 	 25,000
Sources: DRI, tomo I, pp. 55-6; 0 Orcamento do Estado da India 1571, ed. A.T. de
Matos (Lisbon, 1999); idem, ed., 0 Estado da India non anos de 1581-1588 (Ponta
Delgada, 1982).
The table above shows that there were definite pay scales marked out for the
officials at the fortress. The fortress also had physicians, surgeons and apothecaries.
A. Sousa, Subsidios para a História Militar Maritima da India, vol. III, p. 76.
Rego, Documentacâo para a História das Missôes do Padroado Portugués do Oriente, vol. IX, pp.
583-84; DRI, tomo I, pp. 55-6.
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After the treaty of 1523, the kings of Hormuz were forbidden to raise any troops beyond
a bodyguard in the royal place.39
Thus, Hormuz had its captain, Ouvidor,4° Ouvidor Geral 4 ' and Provedor mor.42
Unlike Goa or other colonial cities, however, there was no high court or Senado da
Câmara. 43 The Portuguese in Hormuz therefore established a protectorate, permitting
the king to remain in place, even though they gradually encroached on his revenue-
base.44
Further differences can be identified between Hormuz and other Portuguese
settlements. Whereas the mixed marriage policy in Goa committed the Portuguese to the
city and helped to ensure their presence there for centuries, 45 it was difficult to carry out
a similar policy in the Gulf region. Albuquerque tried, but found it impossible, since
most of the inhabitants were Muslims in contrast to Goa's largely Hindu population.46
Thus, single Portuguese soldiers could not stay for a long time in Hormuz or Bahrain or
any part of the Gulf, simply because they could not marry native Muslim women,
Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. I, p. 266.
40 Ouvidor: One who acts as the king's eyes and ears; an intelligence agent. See Rego, Documentacão
para a História das Missôes do Padroado Portugués do Oriente, vol. IV, p. 391.
41 
'General listener' - a superior judge. Russell-Wood, Government and governance of European
empires, 1450-1800, p. pxli.
42 The 'main supplier'.
' Municipal or town council. In Hormuz there was a local council before the Portuguese arrived. For
the system of Portuguese Senado da Cámra see: G. B. Sousa, 'Portuguese Country Traders in the
Indian Ocean and the South China Sea', Moyen Orient & Ocean Indien, Middle East & Indian Ocean
XVI' - XIX' s., no.1 (Paris, 1984), pp. 118-19; A. Sousa, Subsidios para a história Militar Maritima
dalndia, vol. II, p.7.
S. Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500- 1700, p. 78.
' Official intermarriages began in Goa in 1510 according to Albuquerque's strategy. During
Albuquerque's rule, more than five hundred marriages took place between Portuguese soldiers and
Hindu women in Goa. See Rao, Portuguese Rule in Goa 1510-1961, p. 31. In the sixteenth century
there were about 2,000 casados, including former Portuguese or Eurasian Portuguese soldiers who
married Hindu women. For more about marriage policy see Goertz, 'From territorial borders to an
<inner frontier>', p. 95; Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p. 296; Whiteway, The Rise of
Portuguese Power in India, pp. 176-77; A. Marques, History of Portugal, vol. 1, p. 250.
46 Only one marriage is mentioned between a Portuguese captain and a woman from Hormuz. She was
a Hormuzian princess. This occurred during Matias de Albuquerque's tenure as captain of Hormuz
(1584-87). See J. Wicki, 'Matias de Albuquerque, 16.° vice-rei da India 1591-1597' Stvdia, 48
(1989), pp. 85-6. The princess in question ran away to Goa and married the Portuguese captain there.
This event was mentioned by Van Linschoten. See The Travels of Van Linschoten, vol. I, pp. 187-88.
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although there were one or two cases of such liaisons. In contrast, in Goa and Malacca
Portuguese casados with the native women increased to hundreds by 1 58O.
A second feature of Portuguese conquests elsewhere was the process by which
they tried to Europeanize them and convert them into replicas of the places they knew at
home.48 Hormuz, however, was an exception. The Portuguese did not dispossess its
rulers, and they had no intention of extending its size and power. They regarded the city
and kingdom as a 'milk cow' to support the Estado da India. As we have seen, as late as
1610 Hormuz was providing financial support to Goa to the tune of 45,000 ashrafi
(30,000 pardaus).49
3.2. Rulers and Ruled in Hormuz
Portuguese policy towards the Gulf can be divided into two stages. The first phase was
from 1515 to 1580 under Portuguese control, and the second from 1580 until the fall of
Hormuz in 1622, under the Spanish-Portuguese Union.
In the first phase, Portuguese treatment of the people in the Gulf was determined
largely by Albuquerque's attitude towards them. His influence extended long beyond
his death in 1515. It is well known that Albuquerque's attitude against the people always
took the form of a terrible revenge. The Commentaries, though oddly not Muslim
accounts, describe Albuquerque's bombardment of the rich and prosperous ports from
south Oman to Hormuz island, the firing of houses, plundering of warehouses, slaughter
of inhabitants, and the mutilation of men, women and children. 50
 He also butchered
crews of captured Arab and Muslim vessels. 51
 Albuquerque himself, in his letters to
Portuguese Asia: aspects in history and economic history 'sixteenth and seventeenth centuries' ed. R.
Ptak, (Stuttgart, 1987), PP. 37-57.
48 Marques, Histoiy of Portugal, vol. 1, p. 250.
' BNL-FG, codice no. 1975, Carta de Ruy Lourenço de Távora para Filipe 11(1610), pp. 364-65.
50 The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. I, pp. 71, 79-80. He also did similar thing
in the Indian cities like Goa in 1512. See Pearson, The Indian Ocean, p. 125.
51 Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. I, p. 126.
148
Manuel, expressed his refusal to be a tax-gatherer. 52
 His predominant motive was that of
conquest, which, as he understood it, was 'defeating the enemy'. 53 We can only guess if
the literary image of Albuquerque's actions was a true reflection or an embroidered
projection for an audience with a penchant for the heroic and the fervent. However,
exaggeration or not, the behaviour attributed to Albuquerque - neither ordered nor
sanctioned by the Portuguese government in Lisbon - nonetheless set a stamp on the
Portuguese empire in the East.
Albuquerque died in 1515, but Portuguese policy in the Gulf, and even in the
Indian Ocean, remained the same as it had been during his period of command. 54 The
Portuguese presence depended on the traditional military system which was based on
the army, commanded by the nobility. However, that system showed itself to be
unsuitable for Albuquerque's purposes, as he discovered in Hormuz in 1508. He
therefore endeavoured to create organised and professionally-led bodies of troops.55
Having confidence in his nephew Pero, Albuquerque appointed him as the first cap itdo
da fortaleza de Ormuz (1515-18) to implement his strategic policy in the Gulf. 56 This
policy seemed to be a simple one: to control the ports and their trade by naval power
and bases at strategic points, and, where expedient, to contract alliances with rulers of
important coastal areas. The territory surrounding the fortresses was dominated by
means of the artillery and troops in them.
The main problem with Portuguese policy after the discoveries was that it
mainly depended on use of the force in dealing with events and people, not on peaceful
co-operation. This was so in the Gulf, as well as in the East. That policy derived, in part,
from the Iberian background of armed conflict and the practice of fanatical Christianity
52 Sousa, The PortugueseAsia, vol. I,pp. 97, 101.
Crone, The Discovery of the East, pp. 50-2.
K. M. Panikkar, A Survey of Indian History (London, 1971), pp. 198-99.
Thomas, 'Factions, interests and messianism', p. 104.
56 Barros, Asia, vol. II, liv. x, p. 419; Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, p. 165.
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during the Reconquista, an example being commander Ruy Goncalves's action in
sending vessels to attack Nakhelu on the Persian coast in 1585. In addition, between
1620 and 1622 Ruy Freire attacked Bandar Kung, Khasab and Sir on the Persian coast,
and Julfar on the Arabian coast, killed the Arabs there, and plundered the places.58
From the revolt of 1521 until 1580, the kings of Hormuz suffered greatly from
the treatment of local Portuguese captains, and also the viceroys and governors in Goa.
Moreover, every trace of civic influence disappeared under Portuguese rule. Although
the economic position of Hormuz was mostly healthy, the Portuguese in their dealings
with the kings and people were unreasonable, as will be demonstrated elsewhere in this
thesis.
However, it should be kept in mind that in Portuguese settlements, private
merchants and crown officials were often the same people. 59 This aspect of Portuguese
policy can be observed in the Gulf. Instead of the officials effectively administering the
kingdom of Hormuz, the captains and soldiers turned to trading for their own interest. In
this case, staple rights, right of pre-emption, and the sole right of transport along certain
routes reverted to the captains.60 For this reason, for instance, the Portuguese in Hormuz
refused to help the king when he asked them to restore several rebellious trade centres,
despite the knowledge that they owed allegiance to the kingdom. Captains often gave as
their reason for refusal the lack of resources in the Gulf 61
Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol. II, pp. 6 1-2.
58 C. R. Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada (London, 1929), PP. 47-9.
Thomas, 'Factions, interests and messianism', p. 106.
60 DUP, vol. II, p. 333. This is perhaps one of the few glimpses of concession voyages in the Gulf. See
above, pp. 105-6 for an outline of this practice.
61 ANTT, A G., vol. I, Gay. ii, 10-17- Carta de Bernardim de Sousa a D. João III a respeito dos turcos e
da guerra de Ormuz, Goa, 1545, Novembro, 20. p. 916.
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Both political and economic factors, then, were routinely fused together in the
Portuguese Gulf. This can be demonstrated by events that took place in Hormuz during
the long governorship of Nuno da Cunha.62
In May 1529 da Cunha was in Muscat on his way to India to take up his office.
From Muscat he was accompanied to Hormuz by Shaikh Rashid Al-Muscati, a good
friend to the Portuguese there. 63 Rashid had complained to da Curiha that the vizier of
Hormuz, Reis Sharaf Al-Din Al-Fãli, 64 had demanded 20,000 ashrafi as an outstanding
tax on goods that he had exported to him from Hormuz. He added that Sharaf Al-Din
had encouraged his brother, Delawar Shah, to revolt against the Portuguese in 1521 on
the coast of Oman. 65 The viceroy, who was aware of Rashid's loyalty, accepted this
story. Some Iranian writers have criticised Al-Muscati because he came to Hormuz on a
warship under Portuguese protection and claimed that he had a right to Hormuz's
ministry. 66 It would appear that viceroy da Cunha was playing a very dangerous game in
Hormuz at this time by trying to inflame the chronic struggle between the Arabs and the
Persians.
Da Cunha arrested Sharaf Al-Din just after he arrived at Hormuz, with the
excuse that he had acted as a tyrant over the king of Hormuz, Mohammed Shah jj67 He
did not offer any proof to support this accusation; but the reality was that Sharaf Al-Din
was acting against Portuguese authority in Honnuz by seeking to pursue a more
independent policy for his country. In this he stood against the captain of Hormuz,
Diogo de Melo (1524-1528), who was appointed to his position just after the declaration
62 Son of Tristoâo da Cunha, one of the first wave of important Portuguese commanders during the
discoveries.
63 Couto, Décadas, vol. IV, liv. vi, p. 61.
In Portuguese, Rais Xarafo guazil de afándega.
65 Couto, Décadas, vol. IV, liv.iv, pp. 31-2; Qaemmaqami, Hormuz dar Rawabut Iran wa Portugal, p.
34.
66 E. Abaas, Mutalati Derbab Bahrain Wa Jazair Khaleej Fãrs (Tehran, 1939), PP. 64, 67;
Qãemmaqami, Hormuz dar Rawa but h-an wa Portugal, p. 34.
67 Couto, Décadas, vol. IV, liv. vi, pp. 17-8; Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol. I, p. 396.
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of 1521 to install Portuguese officials in the afándega. 68 Sharaf Al-Din aroused further
hostility by accusing de Melo of shipping goods in royal vessels on his own account - a
common enough form of petty abuse among officials. 69
 When Sharaf Al-Din
complained about de Melo's attitude the captain responded in kind, and, as a result, in
1529 da Cunha sent the vizier out to Goa and then to Lisbon as a prisoner. The ministry
of Hormuz was given to Rashid Al-Muscati in 153O.° We may note this as the point
when ministerial authority in Hormuz passed into Arab hands: Al-Muscati was the first
Arab vizier in the political history of the kingdom.7'
It may be wondered why the Portuguese installed Al-Muscati, in spite of their
espoused intention of displacing Arabs from their political and economic positions in
the East. Perhaps the answer can be found in the new 'policy' of Portuguese governors,
such as Lopo Soares and Diogo Lopos de Sequeira, who wanted to trade with and fight
against the Muslims simultaneously. In addition, they hoped to encourage other Arabs
like Al-Muscati to work as their agents. 72 Their actions suggest a shift away from the
rather one-dimensional relationship of Albuquerque's time between the Portuguese and
the Muslims. Pragmatism, perhaps fostered by self-interest, began to exert a greater
influence on Portugal's position in the region. This was most obvious in her dealings
with the Persians. In this case, however, the intervention in local politics provoked a
68 ANTT, A.G., vol. IV, Gay. xv, 1-60, Carta de João Arrais a el-rei na qual Ihe dava conta dos
rendimentos das alrandegas em Ormuz, 1528, Juiho 10, pp. 80-84; Documentacäo para a História
das Missdes do Padroado portugués do Oriente, vol. IV, pp. 389-90, 396.
69 Evidence can be found in the letter from Cristóvão de Mendonca to João III about this matter. See
ANTT, AG., vol. X, Gay. xx, 2-27, Cartade Cristóvão de Mendonca a el-rei D. João III na qual lhe
conta os acontecimentos e inimizades da Inida e o estado da fortaleza, p. 255; See also, De Sousa,
Documentos Arabicos para a História Portugueza, pp. 166-67, 169-70, and Appendix II, below.
70 A. Farinha, Os Portugueses no Golfo Pérsico, p. 32.
ANTT, A.G, vol. X, Gay. xx, 2-27, p. 256. Shaikh Rashid's son, Ahmed, took the position after him,
and after that it returned to the Hormuzians. Qaemmaqami, Hormuz dar Rawabut Iran wa Portugal,
p.41.
72 There is a letter that shows the success of this project. It was sent by Al-Muscati and includes
information about Turkish movements against the Portuguese navy in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.
This letter was sent to João III, not to Manuel I as stated in the Portuguese translation. From internal
evidence the letter can be dated to 937 H (1532) when Al-Muscati was in office in Hormuz. See De
Sousa, Documentos Arabicospara a História Portugueza, letter no. xi, pp. 48-53.
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rebellion in Bahrain in 1529. Da Cunha sent his brother to put down the revolt, but he
was unsuccessful. 73 The governor then retired to India, leaving the political situation in
Hormuz at best unresolved and arguably more awkward.
These events also highlight the use of 'hostages' in the Gulf. Following his
deposition as vizier, Sharaf Al-Din was sent to Portugal as a political prisoner. 74 He was
kept away from Hormuz for about fifteen years from 1530 to l545. The Portuguese
also seized all of his assets, leaving his family in great hardship, as is clear from extant
letters between him and his son. 76 This shows the importance of Sharaf Al-Din in the
politics of Hormuz and the fear that the Portuguese authorities had of his influence
there. Indeed, events in Hormuz - including the arrest of Sharaf Al-Din - had the
potential to influence other parts of the Gulf; the revolution of 1521 and the Bahrain
rebellion in 1529 are evidence of that.
There is another possible explanation for the arrest of Sharaf Al-Din which
sheds further light on the relationship between politics and the local economy.
Mohammed Shah II and Sharaf Al-Din made several complaints about economic
matters in Hormuz - especially after the annual tribute payable by the Shah was
increased to 100,000 ashrafi77
 - but received no response from the Portuguese
See Chapter Four, section 1, for details of this revolt.
De Sousa, Documentos Arabicos para a História Portugueza, p. 165.
' Carats de D. Joâo de Castro a D. Jodo III, ed. L. De Albuquerque, (Lisbon, 1989), pp. 52-53;
Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol. I, p. 397. More than one letter was sent by Sharaf Al-Din Sons
to João III, requesting him to release their father, and also another letter to their father personally. See
Qaemmaqami, Hormuz dar Rawabut Iran wa Portugal, p. 35.
76 It seems that JoAo de Castro, governor of India (1545-1548), made some attempts to liberate Sharaf
Al-Din from his prison in Lisbon and return him to Goa and Hormuz. Ultimately when de Castro left
Lisbon in the middle of March 1545 Sharaf Al-Din was with him. There are also two letters from
Sharaf Al-Din to Luis Falcão, captain of Hormuz, mentioning the hospitality that Joào de Castro gave
to him in Lisbon and of the help that he received to return to Goa. These letters were written in
October 1545. Perhaps the disgraced vizier was returned to Hormuz in November 1546, as suggested
in the Regulamento dci vida indigena em Ormuz (Regulation of native life in Hormuz). See ANTT,
A.G., vol. X, Gay. xx, 7-11, 12, Carta de Reis Xarafo ao infante D. Luis respeito do born acolhimento
que lhe fizera D. JoAo de Castro, 1545, Outubro, 8, pp. 592-93; Rego, Documentacào para a História
das Missdes do Padroado Portugués do Oriente, vol. IV, pp. 389-92; Whiteway, The Rise of
Portuguese Power in India, p. 302.
For more details see Cornea, Lendas da India, vol. IV, p. 274; Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese
Power in India, p. 223.
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authorities.78 In 1528 this prompted the king and his vizier to seek assistance (socorro)
from Istanbul, 79 however the written appeal was intercepted before it left Hormuz by
Mir Mahmud Shah and the port officials. 8° The Portuguese authorities naturally viewed
this as a treasonable act. For his dealings with the Turks Mohammad Shah II was
arrested and sent out to India, but later returned to Hormuz. Some time later, in 1532,
Mohammed wrote to Joâo III complaining of the behaviour of Portuguese officials in
Hormuz, especially the captain Martim Afonso de Mello, 8 ' as well as officials in Goa.82
In fact, the Portuguese regime, whether in Portugal or in India, did not respect the
people in their empire, regardless of their status, whether they were kings or peasants.
Whatever their cause, these events in Hormuz between 1529 and 1530 were
extremely important, as the arrest of Sharaf Al-Din and the ill treatment of Mohammed
Shah II had a serious impact on Portugal's political position in the Gulf. For a further
fifteen years, especially when occupied by the sons of Sharaf Al-Din and Rashid Al-
Muscati, the position of the vizier of Hormuz was troubled by a continuing rift between
the Arabs and the Hormuzians.83
From 1529 there are significant gaps in the political history of Hormuz. For information
about local events we are mostly dependent on Portuguese sources and historians.
78 This complaint letter exists now in AN1T under the title of 'Documentos Orientais Arabes Docs.
Golfo Pérsico, maco I, microfilm, no. 457, h-° 28. There are other letters from the kings of Hormuz.
Some are in Arabic and others in Persian. This is evidence that such letters had been written more
than once and did not get any reply from Lisbon, perhaps because they took a long time to arrive in
Portugal via Goa, or because they were received but ignored by Portuguese clerks.
A translation of this letter into Portuguese is extant in the ANTT; Cartas dos Vice-Reis da India, no.
82.
80 ANTT, Cartas dos Vice-Reis da India, no. 82, 3-a.
81 Martim Afonso de Mello Jusarte. He served as captain of Hormuz twice, first from 1535 to 1537, and
then from 1538 to 1545.
82 De Sousa, Documentos Arabicos para a História Portugueza, letter no. XLVIII, pp. 162-64. 'Não
obltante isto, levantárão-se os inimigos contra mim o mais que podérão. E me fizerão sahir do paiz, e
me mandárão para Goa, desattendêräo a minha propria pessoa e vilipendiárão o meu respeito, e
decOro publicamente'.
83 ANTT, A.G, vol. X, Gay. xx, 2-27, p. 256; vol. I, Gay. ii, 10-17, Carta do Bernardim de Sousa a D.
Joào III a respeito dos turcos e da guerra de Ormuz, p. 916.
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In this respect, there is some confusion about events in the period from 1530 to
1545, especially during the reigns of the Arab viziers Rashid Al-Muscati and his son
Ahmed. In general it seems that the king of Hormuz and the commercial party refused
to deal with the Arabs. As Cristóväo de Mendonca stated in this matter, 'this Muslim -
Rashid Al-Muscati - was not born in these islands so he is unable to govern this
kingdom, because he is very diffident and afraid'. 84 There seems to have been a
realisation by the Portuguese that they should return the ministry of Hormuz to a native.
On that basis, in 1545, in a rather ironic voile face, they appointed Nor Al-Din Al-Fãli,
the son of the exiled Sharaf Al-Din, as vizier. 85 Perhaps this family had professional
experience in ruling the kingdom, and as leaders of the Persian commercial party in
Hormuz they had extensive contacts with both sides of the Gulf and mainland Persia. In
addition, the Portuguese must have sought to placate local opinion in the city.
Yet such instances of discretion and reconciliation were few in number. More
typically the European rulers in the Gulf acted without any apparent diplomatic
planning or knowledge of local affairs. Evidence can be found in a letter of 1545 from
Reis Rukn Al-Din, 86 vizier of Hormuz, to Sharaf Al-Din concerning attempts by the
king of Al-Hasa to gain control of Bahrain, Qatif and Basra. 87 King Turan Shah IV and
Rukn Al-Din appraised captain Martim Afonso de Mello of the threat and asked him to
send a fleet to protect Bahrain, or to build a fortress at Qatif to ensure Bahrain's safety.
De Mello claimed in response to have insufficient funds to mount such an expedition.
He instead suggested that the best way for the governor of Bahrain to equip a defence
fleet would be to confiscate the revenues and profits of the Persian merchants who lived
84 ANTT, A. G, vol. X, Gay. xx, 2-27, P. 256.
85 Couto, Décadas, vol. II, liv. iv, pp. 164-65; Documentacão para a História das Missôes do Padroado
portugués do Oriente, vol. IV, p. 389.
In Portuguese, de Rei Rocan Adim..
87 ANTT, A.G., vol. IV, Gay. xv, 11-2, Carta (traslado da) de Rei Rocan Adim, Alguazil de Ormuz,
para Rei Xarafo, 1545?, pp. 357-59.
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there. 88
 That such an insensitive solution was offered to the governor of Bahrain by the
chief Portuguese captain in the Gulf tells us much about the mentality of Portuguese
officials. 89 Consequently, Turan Shah had to undertake to bear the costs of the
campaign.9°
The unpredictable treatment of Hormuz's rulers was mirrored in Portuguese
dealings with other groups around the Gulf. Sometimes, as noted in the case of Nor Al-
Din, the captains of Hormuz could be very diplomatic in their actions. During the vice-
regency of João de Castro, for instance,_LuIs Falcao kept up good relations with the
Arab tribes in Basra who stood with the Portuguese against the Turks. Their chieftain,
Au bin Ulyaan, regarded the Portuguese as 'friends' (ha muitos tempos que tivemos
amizade). 91 Then again, there were occasions when the Arabs were treated with
contempt and met the arbitrary face of Portuguese rule, as when Belchior Tavares de
Sousa arrived in southern Iraq in 1529. Also, the Portuguese were similarly harsh with
Persian rulers in Lär and Shiraz, especially in relation to the annual muqarrariya which
the former had to pay to protect the caravan routes via Persia. They refused to pay
several times, which contributed to the crisis of Hormuz in 1622.92
Such inconsistencies, compounded by lack of evidence, make it difficult to
understand Portuguese policy in this period. The captains are important as a gauge of
policy because they were the men on the ground and had some discretion in their
dealings with local leaders.
For the most part, it seems that the captains involved themselves in the political
game for their personal benefit. They deposed kings and elected the sons of other kings
88 ANTT, AG., vol. IV, Gay. xv, 11-2, P. 359.
89 See the letter in Appendix II, translated from the Portuguese, and also translated from the Persian
original. This is the translation which was sent to the king of Portugal. At this time we do not know
the whereabouts of the original; I could not find it in the ANTr.
° ANTT, A.G., vol. I, Gay. ii, 10-17, p. 916.
' Cart. Ormuz, f. 115 v. A1-Clyaan in Basra was from the Al- Muntafiq tribe.
92 Ljvro das Moncôes, pp. 2 18-19.
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and placed them on the throne. This happened more than once, in 1534 and 1563.
However, there was one positive political result of Portuguese rule in Hormuz. Decades
of blood feud inside the royal family had weakened the power of the state in the Gulf
and on the coast of Oman; the arrival of the Portuguese ended this instability and
prevented the kingdom from falling into the hands of its neighbours, whether Lãr or
Safavid Persia. 94 Still, the presence of the Portuguese was not the only reason for this.
After the occupation, the crown of Hormuz was worth little after its revenues had been
channelled into the Portuguese treasury. But even if their power was nominal, and they
were forced to be vassals to a distant king, at least the succession of the Hormuzian
kings was preserved during the Portuguese occupation.
3. 3. Portuguese Diplomacy in the Gulf: Relations with the Local Powers
Whether measured in territory or revenues, to a large extent the success of Portugal's
'Hormuz-centred policy' depended on local knowledge and the uses to which it was put.
The practical implications of this were considerable. The Portuguese not only had to
build and maintain fortresses in the city itself, but they also had to take responsibility
for the management of the kingdom. Furthermore, their physically tenuous presence in
the Gulf was also dependent on the alignment of other forces outside of Hormuz. Within
the kingdom, high-handedness, miscomprehension, corruption and complacency could
all be borne by the dominant military power there; yet when these weaknesses exhibited
The first king appointed by the Portuguese was Salgur Shah II, the son of Mohammed Shah II after
the latter's death in 1534. The captain of Hormuz, Antonio da Silveira, elected his son in his place.
Pedro de Sousa, captain from 1562, appointed Ferrug Shah to the throne, probably in the years 1563-
64, see A P0, fasc. 5, part I, pp. 693, 758-60.
In 1582 Hormuz faced enmity from the king of Lãr who had resolved to take Mughistãn on the
Persian coast near the seaboard of Hormuz. Having entered Mughistãn, close investment prevented
any supplies from being taken into Hormuz. Goncalo de Meneses, the captain of Hormuz at that time,
gave assistance to Turan Shah VI. He took effective military action against the assault and took over
Xamel fort in Lãr. The king of Lär died during the bombardment of the fort. The Safavid rulers tried
several times to capture or destroy Hormuz island in the sixteenth century. See A. Sousa, Subsidios
para a história Militar Maritima da India. vol. I, pp. 105-6; Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol.
II, pp. 45-7.
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themselves in the Gulf at large, and affected Portuguese diplomacy there, the
vulnerability of Portugal's position became all too apparent. Outside the kingdom of
Hormuz, difficulties came from the extent of the rivalry between the Ottomans, who
were sometimes aided by Arab Muslims in the Gulf region, and the Persians, who had
ambitions to become a maritime-commercial power.95
The most important of Portugal's relationships was with the rulers of Safavid
Persia. Persia could be counted as Portugal's first ally among the region's Islamic
powers. Just a few days after Albuquerque attacked Hormuz and obliged the king to
sign the first treaty, the envoy of Shah Ismail reached the city to obtain the annual
tribute due to Persia. Quite naturally, Albuquerque refused to pay because the kingdom
of Hormuz had become a Portuguese depdendency.96 Because of this first hostile
contact, in 1508 Ismail altered his plans: 'Shah Ismail sent an Embassy to the Captain-
in-Chief of the king our lord with many presents, offering him alliance and peace, who
received it very graciously, and sent in return another embassy and present.' 97 This
event shows how relations began between the Portuguese and the Persian Shah after
Albuquerque launched his second Hormuz campaign in 1508. This is described in
Albuquerque's Commentaries, but a fuller account was given by Barros.98
The second occasion on which Albuquerque came into contact with the Shah
was in 1510, after he had taken Goa. In that year, relations between Persia and the
Portuguese made real progress with the arrival of the first of the Shah's envoys in
India. 99 Albuquerque gave a warm welcome to the envoy and suggested that the
Persians needed his support against the Turks and the Mamluk Sultan. In this case it
See Chapter Four, below.
The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. I, p. 145.
" The Book of Duarte Barbosa, pp. 86-7.
98 Barros, Asia, vol. II, liv. ii, pp. 33-4; The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. I, p.
145.
The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. II, p. 107.
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seems that Albuquerque, as was common among Portuguese captains, lacked up-to-date
knowledge about the progress of relations between the Mamluks and Safavid Persia,
which reached a peak of friendship at the beginning of the sixteenth century.'°° He
added that the king of Portugal was at war with these powers, not only in the Indian
Ocean but also in the Levant, and that he intended to send an embassy to Persia to
propose an alliance. This he did in the person of Ruy Gomez.' 0 ' The importance that the
Portuguese attached to their relations with the S afavids can be seen in Albuquerque's
letter to the Shah. Quite simply, they depended on Persia for assistance against the other
major Islamic powers in the East, the Ottomans and Mamluks.102
Albuquerque's uncertainty about the alliance between himself and the Shah can
be traced to the conflict of interests between Persia and Portugal. This was highlighted
in the Portuguese occupation of Hormuz, which had paid a valuable muqarrariya to
Persia each year)°3 Nonetheless, the trajectory of the relationship was positive in the
third contact with the Safavids, in 1513, after Albuquerque had returned to Goa from an
unsuccessful expedition in the Red Sea.'° 4 Another exchange of envoys occurred.'°5
Good relations between the Portuguese and Persians led to the establishment of
a military alliance between them, principally as a result of Ismail's defeat by the
Ottomans at the battle of Gäldirãn (Jaldiran) in 15 14.106 This alliance was the product of
'°° 0. Al-Eskandri and S. Hassan, Tarekh Maser men A1-fatah Al-Osmani ela qbeel al-wqet al-hader
(Cairo, 1990), p. 37.
101 Rego, Documentacão para a História das Missôes do Padroado portugués do Oriente, vol. I, pp.
81-2.
102 BNL, FG, codice no. 297. fi. 17r, 171v; Rego, Documentacâo para a História das Missöes do
Padroadoportugués do Oriente , vol. I, p. 261.
103 See Chapter Two, section 1.
104 R. Serjeant, The Portuguese of the South Arabian C'oast, p. 46.
105 For more details see Correia, Lendas da India,vol. II, pp. 4 10-22 and The Commentaries of the
Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. IV, p. 86. Both accounts focus on the valuable gifts he received
from Shah Ismail. Barros gives only a short account of Miguel's embassy. See Barros, Asia,vol. II,
liv. x, p. 220.
106 R. Jaffariyãn Safivah as Duhwr ta Zawal 950-1135 HD. (Tehran, 1378 S.), pp. 137-38; P. Sykes, A
History of Persia, pp. 162-63; P. M. Savory, Studies on the Histo,y of Safawid Iran, pp. 74-5. The
single most important factor in the Safavid defeat was the Ottoman artillery, supported by handguns.
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a fourth contact, in 1515, following the permanent Portuguese occupation of Hormuz.'°7
It seems that the Persians were willing to ally themselves fully with the Portuguese, as
they promised to pay tribute to Manuel 1.108 A full account is given by Barros.'° 9 He
mentions that in the year after the negotiations, the Persians made certain preliminary
demands concerning trading rights, free passage to the Bahrain islands and to QatIf, and
the surrender of the trade dues of Hormuz. Albuquerque rejected the package as a whole
but allowed free passage to Bahrain and QatIf."° He also agreed to assist the Shah's
governor in Makran in recovering possession of the port of Gwadar from the Nodhaki
who had defied the Shah's agents there. With the offer came a dictate that all Persian
trade with India must come via Hormuz, and not Gwadar. Though driving a hard
bargain, Albuquerque was still anxious to sign a treaty with the Shah. For that purpose
he sent Fernäo Gomez de Lemos to offer Portuguese support against the Ottomans.' 1 ' In
the end negotiations broke down with the sudden death of Albuquerque. The Project
was dropped by his successor, Lopo Soares."2
One Arab writer notes that the agreement between Albuquerque and Ismail, even
though it was not carried out, opened the way for the PerSialls to stay in Basra from
1508 until 1546, when it was conquered by the Turks." 3 He does not, however, give
any evidence for his belief that the Safavid regime in Basra was in alliance with the
As a consequence the Safavids looked for an alliance with the Portuguese to help them acquire
artillery.
107 Rego, Documentacâo para a História das Missôes do Padroado portugués do Oriente. vol. I, pp.
261-62, Embaixada ao Xeque Ismael, 1515; The Book of Duarte Barbosa, p. 87.
108 BNL - FG, codice no. 7638, fi 59v.
Barros,, Asia, vol. II, liv. x, pp. 222-23.
110 The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. N, pp. 176-77.
Correia, Lendas da lndia,vol. II, pp. 437-42.
112 For more details see: Correia, Lendas da India,vol. II, pp. 442-44; The Commentaries of the Great
Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. N, pp. 150-59, 175-78; Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in
India, p. 162; K. Jayne, Vasco Da Gama and his Successors, pp. 94-6.
113 A. Al-Anani, 'The Portuguese in Bahrain and its environs during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries', in Bahrain through the Ages the History, ed. A. K. Al-Khalifa and M. Rice (London and
New York, 1993), p. 49.
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Portuguese. It does seem, though, that Ismail painfully accepted the Portuguese
occupation of Hormuz for two reasons: his lack of military power, especially a navy;
and to bring the Portuguese into the Mediterranean conflict against the Turks. Therefore
contact between the two powers continued, as in 1524 when Baltezar Pessoa arrived as
ambassador from Portugal and met Ismail at
The death of Ismail in the same year brought a temporary halt to the negotiations
between them. Ismail's son and heir Tahmasb did not meet with Pessoa, who had
remained in Persia." 5 However, the Portuguese did not cease their efforts to draw the
Safavids into an alliance against the other Muslim powers. Several potential clashes
with Persia were avoided, especially in matters where the two powers' commercial
interests overlapped. Portugal generally accommodated Persian claims for commercial
facilities in the Gulf, but there remained matters of dispute. For example, both were
aware of the importance of the Safavid port of Rayshahr which played a significant role
in the regional economy. Its wealth and importance were rooted in the horse trade."6
The Portuguese were concerned about competition to Hormuz and so they encouraged
Persian merchants to deal with Hormuz and Goa to reduce Rayshahr's traffic.' 17
 The
Portuguese were unwilling to allow a commercial dispute to jeopardize their alliance
with the Persians, especially after the Turks reached the head of the Gulf in 1546 and
Qatif in 1550 from where Portuguese control could be challenged. However, Portuguese
Castanheda, História do Descobrimentos e Con quista da India pelos Portugueses, liv. vi, pp. 223-
25.
115 Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol. I, p. 396. For relations during the reign of Tahmasb see also
JaffariyAn SajSvah as Duhwr ta Zawal 950-1135 H.D., p. 138;Qãemmaqame, Hormuz dar Rawabut
Iran wa Portugal, p. 30.
116 L. Ribeiro, 'A viagem da India a Portugal por terra feita por Antonio Tenreiro', Stvdia, 3 (1959), p.
117.
" ANTT, A G., vol. V, Gay. xv, 16-25, Carta de Tome Serrào ao D. JoAo III, Hormu.z, 24 November
1550, pp. 39-40.
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concerns over Rayshahr were not completely allayed until 1568 when the port lost its
importance with the disappearance of its ruling family."8
The lesson of Rayshahr was that trade within the Gulf could prove divisive, but
external threats to both Portuguese and Persian interests reinforced the importance of
co-operation. The Turkish occupation of Basra in 1546 not only made the captain of
Hormuz aware of further Turkish plans in the Gulf," 9
 but also prompted the Safavids to
remain closely involved with the Portuguese until the beginning of seventeenth century.
During the reign of Shah Abbas the Great, who succeeded Shah Hamza Merza
in 1587,120 the king of the Spanish-Portuguese Union tried on several occasions to move
relations with Persia forward, especially after the first Englishmen appeared on the
Persian scene in 1598, and their influence on Persian policy became clear. 12 ' Therefore,
in 1603 another ambassador arrived from Madrid at the court of Abbas with the task of
building a church in Persia.' 22 In 1606 Philip III wrote to the Shah, ostensibly about the
satisfaction that he felt at the victories obtained over the Turks, and offered to help him
in the war. In fact, Philip knew very well that the Shah had overcome the Turks alone
and without the help of the Spanish or any other Christian rulers. The main reason for
Philip's letter was to remind the Shah that the Portuguese had not forgotten their claim
on Bahrain: the Shah was asked to instruct the sultan of Shiraz to hand Bahrain over to
the king of Hormuz.' 23 Moreover, in 1617, having expressed a desire to develop the silk
trade, Shah Abbas requested that the Spanish should send him no more friars as
118 j Aubin, 'La Politique iranienne d'Ormuz (15 15-1540)', pp. 41-3.
" L. Albuquerque, Cartas de D. Joâo de Castro a D. III, pp. 12 1-22.
120 Jaffariyan Safwah as Duhwr Ia Zawal 950-1135 H.D., pp. 180-83.
121 D. W. Davies, Elizabethans Errant: The Strange Fortune of Sir Thomas Sherley and his Three Sons
(Ithaca, 1967), pp. 95-113.
122 A. Sousa, Subsidiospara a história Militar Maritima da India. Vol. I, p. 44.
123 Livro das Moncôes, tomo IV, p. 151. The loss of Bahrain still exercised the Portuguese and until
1617 they reminded Shah Abbas about restoring the island. For example, in the letter sent from Philip
III to the viceroy of India dated 21 March 1617, he said 'e antes de se firmar a paz podesseis
recuperar Barem'.
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ambassadors, but rather gentleman of note, 'for he would better know how to treat with
such any one, and his Majesty would be better served, because a religious man out of
his cell was like a fish out of water'.' 24 The Spaniard Garcia da Silva e Figueroa was
sent in accordance with this request) 25 At the same time, the Shah dispatched Robert
Sherley as an ambassador to Spain. 126 In spite of all this renewed contact, war broke out
between the Persians and the Portuguese for reasons including the high tax that the
Portuguese levied on the Gulf silk trade.' 27 Abbas knew that as long as the Portuguese
controlled Hormuz and its Strait, he could not take any action over trade routes in the
Gulf. Soon afterwards the Shah came to terms with the Ottomans, and at the beginning
of the seventeenth century the crisis of the Portuguese in the Gulf emerged and then
escalated. Interestingly, tensions between Persia and Portugal had little to do with
religion - more mundane or worldly matters seem to have strained their relationship.
The other principal axis of Portuguese diplomacy in the Gulf was with Lärestãn.
This relationship revolved around a fixed annual tribute payable by Hormuz to the
rulers of Lr, the muqarrariya.' 28 After the Safavids occupied Lãrestan, the Portuguese
administration ceased to comply with this time-honoured payment, because Lãr became
a part of Shiraz; but the Persians still argued that the muqarrarTya rightfully belonged to
the Khãn of Shiraz. It seems that whenever the Portuguese demanded Bahrain, the
Persians laid emphasis on the muqarrariya, to remind the Portuguese, their 'enemy-
friend', that they were invaders with little rightful claim to territories in the Gulf. Quite
frankly the Portuguese, with their inept diplomacy, failed to comprehend the
significance of muqarrariya and certainly never respected this traditional financial
124 Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, p. xxii; Sykes, A Histoiy of Persia, p.
177.
125 Livro das Moncôes, tomo IV, pp. 153-54.
126 Davies, Elizabethans Errant, pp. 228-29; Sykes, A Histoiy ofPersia, p. 177.
127 M. A. Samnane, Shah Abbas Kaber, (Tehran, 1373 S.), p. 111.
128 See Chapter Two, section 1. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the muqarrariya was worth
2,000 cruzados or about 4,500 ashrafi. See Table 2.3, and the Glossary.
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arrangement, even though it represented a fairly modest sum. In 1606 the demand for
muqarrariya was raised again by the Khãn of Shiraz, and it was repeated in 1607 with
great vehemence, and again in 1608 . 129 The Portuguese refused to pay; and this refusal
opened a rift with Lãr.' 3° This sparked off the first series of pre-emptive military
engagements with the Safavids, which contributed to the fall of Hormuz.'3'
Moving on from Persia and Lãr, we might profitably consider if Portugal's
dealings with smaller, less powerful and less organised polities in the Gulf differed in
approach. Most Arabs in the Gulf area lived in tribal units under the rule of shaikhs. The
pattern of these tribes was not entirely without structure. Some multi-tribal states were
taking shape, but not before the first half of the seventeenth century. The authority of
the shaikhs was based on consent in each tribe rather than absolute rule by divine right,
the nominees being the most prestigious in ability or wealth in their tribe.' 32
 During the
period covered by this study, the Arab tribes in the Gulf were not serious players, as
they were to become at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth
centuries. Nevertheless, the Portuguese had contact with the Arab tribes of the Omani
coast during Albuquerque's governorship, in particular when they attacked Muscat in
1507. Further contact came with the conquest of Bahrain, when the Portuguese faced
the forces of Al-Juboor.' 33
 Early relations between the Portuguese and the Arab tribes
were hostile, and remained so until the fall of Hormuz. Indeed, during the final crisis of
Hormuz some Arab tribes in the Gulf, especially on the Persian coast, like the Nakhelu,
acted against the Europeans.' 34
 The picture was not entirely negative, however.
' 29 Livro dasMoncôes, tomo I, pp. 218-19.
' 30 DUP, vol. I, f. 197, f. 208.
131 Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, pp. 249-51.
132 B. J. Solt, The Arabs of the Gulf 1602-1 784, pp. 61-2.
133 See Chapter One, section 4.
134 The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, p. 22.
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Portuguese relations with the Arab tribes of Mesopotamia made greater progress than
those in the southern and western Gulf.'35
Actually, dealing with the Arab tribes in southern Iraq was not easy for the
Portuguese, but they were at least successful in establishing contact with them.'36
Sometimes the extent of relations deepened, particularly with tribes in the region of
Basra. But they remained unpredictable. According to Portuguese sources, direct
Portuguese contact with Basra began after 15lO.' Moreover, in 1529, when Nuno da
Cunha was in Hormuz, Behchior Tavarez de Sousa arrived there from Basra. This was
the first occasion when the Portuguese actively intervened to defend the interests of
Shaikh Rashid bin Mugamis, the ruler of Basra.' 38 Against him stood the Arab chieftain
who dominated the region of Al-Jezayir in southern Iraq.' 39 He was in dispute with bin
Mugamis about the tribute of Basra, and it was for this reason that Shaikh Rashid
appealed to Honnuz for assistance.' 4° In response, the captain, Cristóvào de Mendonca,
sent de Sousa to Basra with a small force. Afterwards Bin Mugamis refused to deliver
up seven Turkish vessels (fustas) or to prohibit the Turks from trading again in Basra,
135 Arab tribes who lived, and still live, in the north-western part of the Gulf and on the western coast of
Persia comprised four groups, which played a very important role in events in the Gulf: the Banu
Lam of the south-western haqi desert; the Muntafiq, a federation of tribes upstream of Basra; the
Kaab, downstream from Basra; and the Mushasha, a Shia dynasty which ruled in the area of
Huwayza or Arabistan (Khuzistãn) on the east coast of the Gulf. For more details about the relations
between Mushasha and Safavid Persia see El, New ed., vol. VII, pp. 672-75; Al-Humaidan, The
Social and Political History of the Provinces ofBaghdad and Basra, pp. 10-17, 40-41.
136 It is still not easy for those tribes to be ruled by any foreign power and it is difficult to control them.
' BNL - FG, codice no. 7638, fi. 60v. 'Carta el Rey de Bacera a Afonso da Alburquerque'.
138 Behchior Tavarez de Sousa was not the first Portuguese to visit Basra, but he was the first one from
the Portuguese military to reach it. In fact, the first Portuguese voyage to the city was made by João
de Meira when he departed from Hormuz for Basra in June 1517 as captain of the navio Silo Jorge
with Antonio Gil as factor in order to secure wheat for Hormuz fortress. By September 1517 de
Meira had returned and wheat duly arrived in Hormuz. See R. B. Smith, Joâo de Meira. Being
Portuguese texts ... relative to Joao de Meira little known voyage to Basra in 1517 and 1521
(Lisbon, 1973), pp. 7-9.
' Al-Jezayir (Gizara in Portuguese) consisted of about two hundred small islands, with their forts and
villages, situated in the waters of the Tigris, the Euphrates and in the delta region of the Shatt Al-
Arab.
'° Barros, Asia, vol. IV, liv. iii, pp. 160-61.
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which were the conditions of Portugal's assistance. As a punitive measure de Sousa
burnt two villages on the coast and returned to Horrnuz.'4'
Other Basran shaikhs asked the Portuguese to assist them against the Turks.
Among them, in 1546, was Au bin Ulyaan (Ali-Benalion in Portuguese). Following the
fall of the city, bin Ulyaan wrote to Luls Falcâo at Hormuz expressing goodwill and
encouraging the Portuguese to prevent any further Turkish advance. 142 At the same time
he volunteered important information that he had received from the Pasha of Baghdad,
including the Turks' project to build a fortress in Basra 'para dali poder conquistar
Ormuz e a India, pelejando corn os desencaminhados Portugueses'. It was also reported
that the Turks still called the Portuguese 'astray people', and that they wanted to drive
them out of the Muslim regions.' 43
 One must assume that LuIs Falcâo considered this
information, but the Portuguese took no serious action until 1550, thus giving the Turks
the opportunity to build their fortress, set up their arsenal in Basra, and initiate their first
campaign against the Portuguese in the Gulf in 1552, as discussed below in Chapter
Four.
The unsuccessful and inept policy that the Portuguese followed toward the
peoples and local rulers in the Gulf during the sixteenth century weakened their position
in the region and directly led to the loss of some important strategic points, like Bahrain
in 1602. The Portuguese were expelled from Bahrain by the Persians, and after this
reverse the Gulf seems already to have deteriorated into a permanent state of war.'44
This was the first real military-strategic disaster that befell the Portuguese in the Gulf. It
is very revealing that the enemy in question, the force that set in motion the collapse of
Portuguese influence, had been one of Portugal's strongest allies in the region for most
141 Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol. I, p. 397.
142 F. de Castro, C'rônica do Vice-rei D. Joâo de Castro, p. 359.
'" Ibid., pp. 358-61.
See Chapter Four, section 3.
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of the sixteenth century - until, that is, the pieces of the Gulf's diplomatic puzzle began
to shift towards its end.
3.4. The Reality of Portuguese Political Power in the Gulf
The Portuguese experience in the Gulf demonstrates emphatically the difference
between military victory, which was relatively easy, and a capacity to control the land,
its people, and to exercise effective and successful administration. The authority of the
Portuguese in the Gulf never extended beyond a few miles of their naval base at
Hormuz; it did not extend to mainland Persia or the coast of Arabia, partly out of
diplomatic convenience. However, what of the acceptance of Portugal's presence in the
Gulf? To speak of winning 'hearts and minds' might stretch the colonial analogy too far
and in inappropriate directions, but the question does arise whether the natives of the
Gulf accepted Portuguese authority. If acceptance was found in some relationships with
the local rulers and merchants, then the rebellions of 1521 and 1529 provide alternative
perspectives. We can see signs of the corruption and decline of the Portuguese
administration directly after the third treaty was signed between governor Duarte de
Meneses and Mohammed Shah II in July 1523. A clause in that treaty decreed that 'any
Portuguese obtaining goods from Moorish vessels for the purpose of avoiding the
payment of dues [cartaz] should be liable to a penalty'.' 45 However, the Portuguese
governor was the first person to ignore this clause before the ink on the treaty was dry.
He accumulated wealth for himself from traffic passing through the port of Hormuz,
before returning to India in April 1524.146 The maimer of de Menses whilst in
administration was extremely unsatisfactory to João III, and it was for this reason that
the king sent da Gama to succeed him as viceroy. 147 Significantly, with the exception of
145 Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. I, p. 266.
146 Cornea, Lendas da India, vol. II, pp. 8 15-16.
See Appendix I, no. 2.
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Cornea, the Portuguese historians are silent about events that occurred during the tenure
of de Meneses.
As noted in the previous chapter, from a native standpoint the Portuguese
administration in Hormuz was capricious, if not corrupt. This is not a groundless
accusation. 148 One may recall, for example, the first resistance in Hormuz to Portuguese
rule in 1521, for which the Portuguese blamed the king and vizier. Yet when Reis
Sharaf Al-Din returned to the city from Qishm he was reappointed as vizier, having paid
120,000 ashrafi to governor de Menezes. The ultimate destination of this payment is not
known, but Sharaf Al-Din was nonetheless satisfied that money was the lever to
influence the Portuguese. Money could deflect or subvert Portuguese policy.'49
Moreover, nothing in the nature of a financial or administrative system was
developed by the Portuguese in the Gulf. Under such circumstances it is little wonder
that corruption and profiteering were rife at all levels, from the selling of offices by the
viceroys and governors to piracy and private trading in royal ships by captains, and
desertion, theft and murder by the soldiery.' 5° During the crisis of 1622 the captain of
Hormuz used only part of the money in the treasury for the defence of the island, as he
desired to keep the remainder for himself, and that was clear when he took with him six
heavy boxes containing money and valuable gifts after the city's fall in 1622.'' It
seems that there was little sense of loyalty among Portuguese officials, even when
facing enemies.
Portugal's administration in the Gulf, in fact, was very makeshift and
rudimentary. There was generally no clear distinction between merchants and
government officials, since everybody, officials, soldiers, even clergy, was associated
148 See Chapter Two, section 3.
'' Castanheda, História do Descobrimentos, vol. VI, p. 182; Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power
in India, p. 203.
150 Empire in Transition: The Portuguese World in the time of Camôes, ed. A. Hower and R. A. Preto-
Rodas (Florida, 1985), p. 111.
151 Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, p. 168.
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with trade in one way or another. In mitigation, the main reason for speculation amongst
Portuguese officials was poor remuneration. As the pay of officials was a matter of
indifference, it remained unchanged, in spite of the depreciation of money. In
Albuquerque's time the captain of Hormuz received 1,806 ashrafi a year and 650
ashrafi for his guard. This scale of payment did not change until 1612. Owing to the fall
in the value of money, the captain's pay had sunk to 1,204 ashrafi a year; but the pay of
his guard had risen to 1,625 ashrafi, and he was also allowed 2,588 ashrafi to pay forty
hangers-on supported out of public funds.'52
However, though the political and military fabric of Portuguese rule decayed
during the sixteenth century, the economy of Hormuz still prospered, and this must be
seen as a remarkable achievement. Either way, in the apportionment of blame or praise,
in the identification of heroes and villains, the men at the centre of the picture were the
captains of Hormuz and their subordinates. Although under the administrative system
the captain of a fortress was not allowed to hold his office for more than three years, this
measure did not prevent corruption. On their first arrival in the Gulf, Portuguese
commanders generally depended on their arms and not on their wealth. After
Albuquerque's death the balance between the two changed. From the appointment of
Lopo Soarez, in 1515, the Portuguese became more dependent on their wealth; and even
the king himself became the greatest of all merchants.' In Hormuz this was reflected
in the actions of the captains. They were appointed to manipulate the economy to their
own advantage, and to the advantage of relatives who were installed in office, and as a
consequence they prevented revenues from reaching the royal treasuries of Portugal and
Hormuz, with direct political consequences. On several occasions, captains of Hormuz
employed their troops in what amounted to
	
bery. lM The garrison in the fortress
152 Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, p. 73.
153 Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, p. 84.
' 54 AP0, fasc. HI, p.711.
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usually numbered 200 men rather than the prescribed 500, it being to the commander's
advantage to take the wages of a full complement.' 55 On the other hand, if we consult
Table 3.2 which lists the officers and domestic servants in the fortress of Hormuz after
Portugal lost its independence, we can observe that the number of soldiers increased
from 339 in 1581 to 451 in 1610, and the total complement there was 580.
Table 3.2. Officers and Dependents of I-Iormuz Fortress, 1581 and 1610
____________________ ____________________________ 1581 1610
Soldiers	 _________ 339	 451
Men	 50	 60Captain of the	 Dependents	
LServants	 8	 8
Fortress
Officials	 __________ 3	 4
	
en --	 -Riverside Shipyard	 Dependents	
I_Servants	 10	 11
(Ribeira)
Officials	 __________ 6	 8
Officials of the
	 Dependents	 Men	 10	 10factory	
Servants	 10	 8
Officials	 __________	 2	 1
Men	 --	 --Justice	 Dependents	
[	 1	 1
Customs House	 Officials	 8	 9
(Afándega)	 Dependents	 Men	 4	 --
___________________	 Servants	 --	 --
Church	 9	 9
Total	 460	 580
Source: BNL - FG, codice no.11410, fis. 107v-109; Matos, 0 Estado da India nos anos de 1581-
1588, pp. 60-67.
Moreover, in spite of the assistance rendered to the Portuguese by Hormuzian
officials,' 56 they treated them and their kings badly. The use of LuIs Falcão as an
'escort' to Mohammad Shah II on the advice of Nuno da Cunha is just one example. He
did his job effectively.' 57 In 1542 Salgur Shah II was removed to Goa for the nominal
155 Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, p. 202.
156 For example, in the words of Reis Rukan Al-Din c.1540-1544: 'at the beginning of each year and at
my own expense I send people to Cairo, Aden and elsewhere to fmd out how things are with the
Turkish Sultan and his officers. I will quickly tell the garrison commander of all the news I receive'.
ANTI, A G., vol. IV, Gay. xv, 11-2, Carta (traslado da) de Rei Rocam Adim, alguazil de Orrnuz,
para Rei Xarafo, pp. 357-59.
Falcão was appointed as captain of Hormuz during the governorship of João de Castro. Castro,
Crônica do Vice-rei D. Joâo de Castro, p. 359; Qaenimaqame, Hormuz dar Rawabut Iran wa
Portugal, p. 36.
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reason that he was mad. Unconvincing proof was given in support of this diagnosis. In
reality, Salgur had tried to acquaint himself with the true state of his finances, for
between his own vizier and the captain of Hormuz, little income reached either himself
or the king of Portugal.' 58 Martim Affonso de Sousa (governor of India 1542-45)
appointed Salgur's son Turan as regent in his stead.' 59 In Goa, the king complained to
the governor of the abuses meted out to him, yet for two years the governor turned a
deaf ear to these	 60 Eventually the governor sent his secretary to Hormuz to
find out the facts of the case and settle the issue. The secretary produced a report
satisfactory to the captain of Hormuz, who bribed not only its author but also the
governor in Goa and others in his court. With hindsight, the tenure of de Sousa in India
was a nadir in the quality and honesty of Portuguese administration. The government, as
Whiteway points out, became little more than an organisation for robbery.' 6 ' In
February 1543 a fresh treaty was imposed on Salgur Shah II after he returned as king to
Hormuz, and the afándega of Hormuz was granted to the king of Portugal.' 62 In effect,
Salgur lost all authority in his kingdom, and consented to receive a pittance in return.
Perhaps his death, in November 1543, was related to his despair at the way that the
Portuguese had treated him.'63
At a more general level it was not possible to control political developments in
the Gulf adequately through the royal letters which were sent from Lisbon to the
viceroy and governor in Goa; and it was difficult to make realistic decisions in the
Spanish-Portuguese council in view of the unclear information available about the
political situation there. As Steensgaard notes, several extant documents show that the
158 Cornea, Lendas da India, vol. IV, pp. 271-75; The Travels ofPedro Teixeira, p. 193.
' Couto, Décadas, vol. V, liv. x, pp. 121, 126-27.
° Ibid., vol. I, liv. viii, p. 121; Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol. I, p. 467.
Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, p. 279.
162 Couto, Décadas, vol. V, liv. x, p. 126.
"° According to Teixeira he died by poisoning. The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, p. 193.
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council of the Spanish-Portuguese state really thought it was not possible to control
political developments in Asia by this distant and indirect means.'
The tyranny of distance was compounded by other problems of communication
arising from the system of winds and currents in the Atlantic and the monsoon system in
the Indian Ocean. Letters and dispatches sent to Portugal round the Cape of Good Hope
required anything from eighteen months to three years before an answer was
received.' 65 This meant that many royal orders or viceregal replies were hopelessly out
of date when they reached their destinations, having been overtaken by other
developments. For this reason, in times of crisis, urgent dispatches could be sent via the
Gulf and overland to Aleppo. Somewhat problematically, the overland route passed
through Muslim territory for most of the way, whether Persian, Arab, or Turkish.'66
In consequence, many complaints made by Portuguese governors in India and
other functionaries in the Indian Ocean regions did not reach Lisbon in time for an
adequate response. Even the governors of India who were appointed by the crown could
not reach India quickly. For example, viceroy Mathias de Albuquerque left Lisbon in
May 1590 and did not arrive at Goa until May 1591.' 67 Matters were further
exacerbated by factionalism and intrigue at court. Afonso da Albuquerque's last days as
governor of India were dogged by a partisan group of nobles in Lisbon.' 68 Another
victim was Pedro Coutinho, a captain of Hormuz who was both diligent and prudent,
and who without doubt would have recovered Bahrain after its occupation by the
164 Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, p. 82.
165 See Magalhães, The Portuguese in the Sixteenth C'entury, pp. 61-2 for comment on the speed of
communications. Fleets left Lisbon in March-April, so as to be able to reach Malabar by November.
The return voyage had to leave no later than January. Any delay in Lisbon or slowness in the Atlantic
meant that the fleet got to the Indian Ocean late and it was then impossible to cross the Arabian Sea
at the right time of year. When this happened, they were forced to winter in Mozambique and wait for
good weather to make the crossing to India.
166 Boxer, Portuguese India in the Mid-Seventeenth Century, p. 6.
167 The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, p. xv.
168 ANTT,A.G., vol. V, Gay. xv, 17-33, Carta de Afonso de Albuquerque a el-rei D. Manuel, pp. 132-
33.
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Persians in 1602. Nevertheless, he was suddenly dismissed from his command by order
of Aires de Saldanha, viceroy of India, without even being given an opportunity to
defend himself.169
169 Borges, 'The Portuguese and their Hormuz centred Gulf Policy', p. 210.
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Chapter Four: Conflict between Portuguese and Islamic forces in the
Gulf during the Sixteenth Century
The second half of the sixteenth century saw significant changes in the balance of power
within the Arabian Gulf The Turkish advance to Baghdad in 1534 and then Basra in
1546, and the Safavid occupations of Lãr and Bahrain in 1601-2 had repercussions for
the region that go well beyond the scope of this study. Inevitably, however, these
developments encroached on Portugal's presence in the Gulf The dispersion of its
interests, with Honnuz island at their heart,' helped to stimulate violence and local
resistance against its domination. The distances involved made it difficult for the
Portuguese to call on reinforcements to suppress trouble spots.
Local resistance to claims of overarching political authority in the Gulf was
neither new nor extraordinary. Even before the arrival of the Portuguese, there had been
obvious hostility towards Hormuz and its commercial policies, particularly in Bahrain
and Oman at the beginning of the sixteenth century. We may recall that Hormuz was
consequently in a rather vulnerable condition when Portuguese warships entered the
Gulf in 1507.2 The resistance that arose in Balirain against the authority of Hormuz
allowed the island to fall into the hands of Al-Juboor. Meanwhile, the Gulf became an
increasingly attractive supply route for the expanding Ottoman and Safavid empires.
4.1. Local Resistance in the Gulf against the Portuguese
Having conquered the kingdom of Hormuz between 1507 and 1521, the Portuguese
faced the twin problems of security and consolidation. Generally speaking, history
judges any colonial power in its motives to control a new territory by the degree of
success in its dealings and relations with the people of the territory concerned.
See Introduction, section 4.
2 See Chapter One, section 1.
174
Successful occupation depends largely on the reaction of the people living there against
the colonial power. Any colonial power needs to be very aware of existing internal
factions which may create difficulties for it. In Hormuz, the Portuguese were not
sufficiently aware of these political issues, a deficiency compounded by their lack of
understanding of the role of local bodies such as the commercial party and the other
merchants in Hormuz. 3 The Portuguese failed to consider that, without the profits of the
customs house, the council of merchants and the king of Hormuz would not be able to
live in peace and security.
In assessing the stance of the Gulfs inhabitants towards the Portuguese, the
latter's inability to subject the region must be considered. The foundations of their
position were never stable. From the first invasion in 1507, the Portuguese situation in
the Gulf was uneasy. Moreover, this situation did not substantially improve, even after
the strategic points of Hormuz and Bahrain fell under Portuguese control in 1515 and
1521 respectively. It is true that the Portuguese were successful in entering the Gulf and
occupying a few significant ports; but in response, the people of the Gulf were not
inactive - they were simply at a military disadvantage. It is important to understand that
the Gulfs inhabitants were realistic from the outset in facing the Portuguese. They
knew very well that there was no equivalence in military capability between themselves
and the Europeans. Regional conflicts must inevitably involve a maritime dimension,
and in this respect indigenous technology was simply inadequate to challenge
Portuguese shipping, until perhaps the mid-seventeenth century. 4 Most subjects in the
kingdom of Hormuz were Arabs, excepting the rulers and garrison, who were
Hormuzian. Lacking leadership, initiative and a tradition of being armed, the people of
that area could not take any action against the Portuguese by themselves. Matters were
See Chapter Two, section 2.
G. J. Ames, 'The Straits of Hormuz Fleets: Omani-Portuguese Naval Rivalry and Encounters, 1660-
1680', The Mariner's Mirror, 83 (1997), pp. 399-400.
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further exacerbated by overlapping rivalries. The Omanis, for example, regarded the
Hormuzians on the coast of Oman as 'invaders', like the Portuguese, rather than native
inhabitants. This reflected a more general weakness in Portugal's presence on the
western side of the Gulf, for if the Portuguese seized Hormuz's commercial strengths in
the early sixteenth century then they also inherited the kingdom's political frailties.5
Irrespective of the obstacles to organised and effective resistance in the Gulf, the
fact remains that the Portuguese were sitting on top of an active volcano. This volcano
erupted only seven years after the occupation of Hormuz in anti-Portuguese revolts led
by leaders from the Gulf and Omani coast. The first notable rebellion was in 1519 in
Qalhãt in Oman. 6 More serious still was the revolution of November 1521 led by the
king of Hormuz, Turan Shah IV, which engulfed all the territories of the kingdom. In
this context, as already implied elsewhere in this thesis, it is very important to reiterate
the significance of Hormuz's customs revenue which served to divide the king and the
city's commercial party from the Portuguese. Responsibility for this revenue had
emerged as an issue of great importance.7
In 1520 it was left to governor Diogo Lopes de Sequeira (1518-1521) to
implement the reorganisation of the customs house. Lopes was hesitant at first, but at
the end of the same year (1520) a ship arrived from Lisbon bringing not only reiterated
orders but also a whole staff of officials on the scale of the Casa da India. The governor
therefore had no choice but to comply. It is not surprising that the administrative
takeover excited strong feeling internally among Hormuzian officials, but the events of
1520 also shook external opinion because of the city's regional importance. 8 Matters
were exacerbated by the overbearing conduct of the new incumbents, and this seems to
See Chapter One, section 4.
6 S. Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf p. 156.
See Chapter Two, section 2.
8 Barros, Asia, vol. III, Liv. vii, pp. 353-54.
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have been an important cause of the 1521 revolution. This is suggested in a letter from
Turan Shah IV to Manuel I just before the revolt began.
Horrnuz today is a vassal of your Majesty, but your officials involved themselves
in our internal affairs. Your Majesty should consider this matter, because the state
of the kingdom is not so good at this time because of the disorganised and unsettled
situation in Persia, which has a bad influence on the trade routes and caffilas. In
addition, not as many goods are coming from India. Trade ships now come from
only three seaports, whereas they arrived from all the Indian ports in the past. In
spite of these problems, simply, your officials come every year and they stay here
in Hormuz, and spend lavishly from the treasury of Hormuz. In addition, AntOnio
de Saldanha9
 came to me on his way to Basra and he ordered me to prepare for
three hundred men for war. I refused because it was not possible to do it, as I have
not enough money. He obliged me to pay about 25,000 ashrajI.'° Therefore, this
weighty matter needs Your Majesty to take action and solve it before our state
becomes worse and worse."
Several letters like this were sent to the king of Portugal, without receiving any clear
response.'2
Eventually there seemed no hope left for the king of Hormuz save in an armed
rising, not only to retake the customs house, but for additional reasons mentioned
above.' 3
 The situation was not acceptable to the young king; therefore he ignited the
revolution because of his desire to shake off Portuguese rule. The revolt had been
brewing for a long time, and proposals to attack the Portuguese were openly discussed
in the Hormuz bazaar - but the Portuguese, either ignorant or careless, took no
precautions.' 4
 According to Barros, a large proportion of the Portuguese soldiers
Sequeira dispatched Saldanha from Goa early in 1519 with a fleet to cruise along the coast of Arabia,
and from there to winter in Hormuz. Since the summer season in the Arabian Sea is betveen May and
August, it was undoubtedly then that Saldanha departed for Basra from Hormuz. See R. Smith, Joâo
de Meira. Being Portuguese Texts, pp. 14-15.
10 See also Barros, Asia, vol. III, Liv. vii, pp. 352-53.
Translated by the author. ANTT, Documentos Orientais, Cartas missives de e para o Rei maco I,
microfilm, no. 457.
2 Complaints to the king of Portugal about the offences of governors during their visits to Hormuz
were made by locals and also by Portuguese captains in the city. In 1529, for example, CristOvão de
Mendonca observed: 'I have already told Your Excellency of the harm that is done by governors
coming here. I would remind Your Excellency once more that there is nothing so damaging to your
interests as this, for their coming here means emptying Hormuz of all its inhabitants, because these
people take over the houses'. See the full text of this letter in Appendix II, Doc. 1.
' Barros, Asia, vol. III, Liv. vii, p. 351
" Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, pp. 200-1.
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continued to sleep in the city; the artillery was not mounted on the walls of the fort; and
one of the cisterns was filled with wood rather than water.'5
The scheme of the revolution was an elaborate one, conceived and carried out by
Turan Shah and his vizier Sharaf Al-Din. Letters were dispatched to the Hormuzian
governors along the Omani coast and in Bahrain. The plan was that all of the governors
should rise against the Portuguese in their cities on the appointed day, 30 November
1521.16 On the night of 30 November a series of concerted attacks began at midnight
against the Portuguese in Hormuz, Muscat, Qalhãt, Suhar along the Arabian coast and
in the Bahrain jslands.' 7
 These attacks were made by sea, which is important evidence
that the inhabitants of the Gulf tried to use their local ships against the Portuguese for
the first time since their arrival. The plan was faithfully executed by the governors. In
Bahrain, all posts were attacked and destroyed. The Portuguese garrisons were so
completely taken by surprise, that out of 400 Portuguese in Hormuz about 120 were
killed.' 8
 In Hormuz the Portuguese survivors escaped to the fort where munitions were
scarce, and where the cannon, even if on the walls, could not be used in case the nearby
water tanks burst.' 9
 Reinforcements arrived from Muscat in time to save the besieged
Portuguese fortress. 2° Only in Muscat did the Portuguese find friends and protection; for
according to Adamiyat, in scheming to cast off his allegiance to the king of Hormuz, the
Arab chief, Shaik Rashid Al-Muscati, failed to obey the king's orders. 2 ' Al-Muscati
attacked and defeated the Hormuzian troops, whose commander, Reis Dalawar Shah Al-
Barros, Asia, vol.111, Liv. vii, pp. 356-57.
M. Salman, 'The Revolution in the Arabian Gulf against the Portuguese in 1521', Bahrain Cultural
Journal, 20 (1998), p. 52.
Barros, Asia, vol.111, Liv. vii, p. 358.
18 Ibid., pp. 3 57-58.
' Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, p. 201.
20 Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf p. 160.
21 F. Adamiyat, Bahrain Islands, p. 22.
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Fãli,22 was killed in the fighting. According to Portuguese sources the mind behind the
insurrection on the Omani coast was Reis Dalawar, a brother of the Hormuzian vizier.
He had been appointed vizier of Qalhat to lead operations on the Omani coast before the
revolt began.23
Having failed in his attempt to oust the Portuguese, on 19 January 1522 Turan
Shah fled with his followers to the island of Qishm to found a new settlement, a course
which showed their despair and bitter hatred of the Portuguese. 24 Turan Shah was
subsequently poisoned by his own followers. 25 It is still a matter of argument who killed
him. Some historians suggest that Sharaf Al-Din assassinated the king and appointed
another young prince, Mohammed Shah, as his successor. 26
 However, Qaemmaqami
questions why Sharaf Al-Din should have done this: he was Turan Shah's closest friend
and his vizier in their long struggle against the Portuguese. Qaemmaqmi adds that this
event is still obscure and we lack the sources to prove any claim. 27 The Portuguese
historian de Sousa offers another point of view which may clarify the matter. He
attributes the murder of Turan Shah to a chieftain of the Al-Juboor tribe, Shaik Husain
bin Saeed, who ruled a sizeable part of Oman at that time. 28 Perhaps he hired one of the
Arabs of Qishm to poison the king? Wilson is of this view; he writes that Turan Shah
was killed in Qishm by his own people. 29 It seems for this reason in 1522 the
22 Delamixar in Portuguese. See Barros, Asia, vol. III, Liv. vii, p. 354.
23 Barros, Asia, vol.111, Liv. vii, pp. 370-7 1.
24 Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, pp. 200-1.
25 M. Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. I, pp. 263-66.
26 G. Correia, vol. II, p. 744; Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, p. 200; E. Abbas,
Mutalate Der Bab Bahrain Wa Jazair Khaleej Fãrs, p. 65.
27 Qaemmaqmai, Hormuz dar Rawabut Iran wa Portugal, p. 28.
28 Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. I, p. 266. Shaik Husain, who had with him 500 horsemen and 4,000
infantry, obtained some aid from LuIz de Menezes in Oman. He captured Suhar and ousted the
Hormuzians. See Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf pp. 162-63.
29 A. Wilson, The Persian Gulf p. 123.
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Portuguese appointed Shaik Husain as governor of Suhar on their behalf without
consulting the king of Hormuz.3°
This important event shows the chronic struggle between the Arabs and the
Persians, which Nuno da Cunha tried to use when he installed Rashid Al-Muscati in the
ministry of Hormuz, as discussed in the previous chapter. 31
 This kind of strife affected
the kingdom of Hormuz throughout its history.
However, to better understand this matter, we should analyse the motives of Al-
Juboor for murdering Turan Shah. We could perhaps argue that the Arabs decided to
take revenge on the Persians of Hormuz, who had encouraged and helped the
Portuguese to invade Bahrain in the same year. Did the Al-Juboor seek revenge on all
those who had the blood of Muqrin Al-Jaubre on their hands, especially the leaders of
Hormuz? If so, it is possible that Shaik Husain sent one of his followers to Qishm to
serve with Turan Shah's men until he got a chance to kill him. This explanation, in fact,
is the one upheld by several Iranian writers, like Eqbal, Admyait and Farugy. They
condemn the Al-Juboor for their role in the revolt, and argue that this was the main
reason why it failed. Moreover, they brand the Arab tribes of Oman as 'traitors'.
Certainly from a local perspective the behaviour of Rashid Al-Muscati in 1521 was
regrettable, but these writers disregard the attitude of Shah Ismail towards the
Portuguese invasion of Hormuz and his alliance with them, and also the silence of the
kings of Lãr and Fãrs, at least during the initial Portuguese incursions. Moreover, the
Iranian scholars do not mention in their works the sacrifices made by the Arab tribes,
including the Al-Juboor, through their resistance to the Portuguese after 1507.
Albuquerque noted in his Commentaries that they sent about 10,000 mounted troops to
help Muscat against the invaders.32
° Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf p. 163.
See Chapter Three, section 1.
32 The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, vol, I, pp. 74-5.
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This is not a trial with the aim of defending the Arab tribes on the west coast of
the Gulf against the Persians in Hormuz or on the mainland. Yet an attempt must be
made to establish a more balanced view of these events. Both peoples in the Gulf, Arabs
and Persians alike, made mistakes when the Portuguese arrived which affected any
plans to undermine their influence while it was still being built up in the early sixteenth
century. Both suffered from an outlook that stressed divisions rather than common
ground.
After the failed revolution of 1521 and the death of Turan Shah, it seems that the
return of Sharaf Al-Din to Hormuz and its puppet king was arranged in secret between
himself and the Portuguese. Knowing nothing of this secret diplomacy, the captain of
Hormuz imprisoned him on his return. 33
 In February 1523 Sharaf Al-Din was released
by Duarte de Meneses. 34
 In the following July a fresh treaty was made with the new
king of Hormuz, Mohammed Shah II, stipulating that the kingdom's annual tribute
should be raised to 60,000 ashrafi a year, an increase of 150 per cent. 35 The treaty also
stated that the Portuguese should not interfere in the affairs of the government of
Hormuz.36
 It contained a number of other regulations through which the Portuguese
sought to consolidate their own position at Hormuz and also to control, to their own
advantage, the flow of traffic to and from the city. There was also a clause limiting the
use and practice of arms amongst the Muslims of Hormuz.37
With or without the treaty, the Portuguese did not find it difficult to maintain
control over Hormuz itself after 1521.38 Anti-Portuguese activities in the Gulf at large
continued, however. In 1526 resistance arose in Qalhãt and Muscat, triggered by the
Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, p. 202.
34 Seep. 168.
See Chapter Three, section 3, p. 153.
Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. I, p. 266.
Ibid.
38 For the policies of Manuel and JoAo III, and the latter's reaction to the events of 1521, see J. Aubin,
'Le Royaume d'Ormuz Au Debut du XVI' Siécle', p. 138.
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actions of Diogo de Mello (1524-1528), the fourth captain of Hormuz and brother of the
governor of India, Lopo Vaz de Sampaio. 39
 Once again, as in 1521, Qalhàt was the main
focus of the revolt by virtue of its economic importance. 4° On this occasion the neglect
of the Portuguese administration is clear. Though news of the rebellion reached Goa in
February 1526, Sampaio did not set out with a relief force until May. Having first
anchored at Qalhât, he pacified the revolt leaders there by promising to redress their
grievances and punish de Mello, thus restoring confidence without recourse to
coercion. 4 ' In Muscat, there had long been strife between the Arab tribes of Oman and
the kingdom of Hormuz. Sampaio therefore strove by similar means to assuage Shaikh
Rashid Al-Muscati, and succeeded. Rashid was still ruler of Muscat in 1529 when Nuno
da Cunha took over as viceroy; Sampaio would surely not have tolerated an openly
hostile leader.42
 This sequence of events demonstrates that Portuguese rule could be
successful, and even sensitive, but it depended on the personalities of their governors
and captains, whether in India or the Gulf.
Another rebellion erupted in 1529, this time in Bahrain. Both the rebellion and
the Portuguese campaign against Bahrain are discussed in a letter of November 1529
written by Cristóvão de Mendonca, the fifth captain of Hormuz. 43
 This uprising had one
unexpected result - the exile to Portugal of Sharaf Al-Din, who had showed himself
hostile to Portuguese interests in the Gulf. Among the most powerful relations of Al-
Din was his nephew, Reis Badr A1-Din, the governor of Bahrain, who resisted all
39 DUP, vol. I, f. 471.
40 See Chapter One, section 1.
Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf p. 163. Despite the promises of de Sampaio, the
captain of Hormuz, Diogo de Mello, remained there until 1528. See Appendix II, Doc. 1.
42 See Chapter Three, section 1.
43ANTT, A G., vol. X, Gay. xx, 2-27, Cartade Cristóväo de Mendonca a el-rei D. João III, na qula Ihe
conta os acontecimentos e inimizades da India e o Estado da fortaleza, pp. 254-48. See Appendix II,
Doc. 1.
See also ANTT, A G., vol. X, Gay. xx, 2-27, p. 254 where he is called Rex Badradim who was
parente de Rex Saraffo.
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attempts to exact a higher tribute from him by the Portuguese. The Bahrainis avenged
themselves by massacring the Portuguese garrison to the last man and by hanging the
captain of the fortress from a palm tree.45
Given that Badr Al-Din had done serious damage (muito agravos) in Bahrain,
viceroy da Cunha despatched a punitive force under his brother Simão to suppress the
revolt and restore order.46
 Simão da Cunha soon displayed his military inexperience. On
20 September he arrived off Bahrain and wasted a great deal of gunpowder in saluting
the port.47
 More importantly he found that the fortress was formidable, not the weak
establishment that had been described to him.48
 This is one of many instances where
Portuguese intelligence was either out of date or simply inaccurate. With about 800
troops at his disposal, Badr Al-Din refused to surrender. 49
 An attempted Portuguese
landing was compromised by the 'sickly season'. 5° This happened more than once to the
Portuguese in the Gulf, because they did not properly understand the local weather and
wind systems. 5 ' In addition, local resistance on the island was fierce, causing the
already depleted Portuguese supplies of gunpowder to run out. Da Cunha sent for more
from Hormuz, but by the time it arrived his men were ailing; no one was strong enough
to carry the artillery from or to the ships. In a pathetic tableau, ropes were tied to the
feet of the sick, and they were dragged to the boats. 52 Thus, the Portuguese campaign
Couto, Décadas, vol. IV, Liv. vi, pp. 19-22, 25-27; A. Faroughy, The Bahrain Islands, p. 62.
46 ANTT, A.G., vol. X, Gay. xx, 2-27, P
. 
254. Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol. I, p. 397.
' The appointment of relatives to military or naval commands was an important feature of Portuguese
administration. Da Cunha lost one brother, Pero Vaz da Cunha, during the fighting and epidemic in
Mombassa. His second brother, Simão, fell at Bahrain in 1529. See ANTT, A G., vol. X, Gay. xx, 2-
27, p. 255; Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol. I, pp. 397-98.
48 ANTT, A.G., vol. X, Gay. xx, 2-27, p. 255.
Couto, Décadas, vol. IV, Liv. vi, pp. 24-25; ANTF, A.G., vol. X, Gay. xx, 2-27, p. 255.
50 See Introduction, section 4.
51 The climate was the main enemy of all the invaders who mounted campaigns against Bahrain. In
1559 the Turks from Al-Hasa launched an expedition and suffered in much the same way.
52 Barros, Asia, vol. IV, Liv. iii, pp. 174-77; Couto, Décadas, vol. IV, Liv. iy,
 pp. 23-30; F.
Castanheda, História do Descobrimentos, vol. VII, pp. 180-86; Correia, Lendas da India, vol. III, pp.
325-29.
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against Bahrain was a disaster. Two hundred men died, including Simão da Cunha, and
about the same number succumbed to disease. In the end only a small remnant of the
Portuguese force returned to Hormuz to tell the story of the assault. 53 It was the first
time since the arrival of the Portuguese in the Gulf that such an important commander
had been lost, an event the more shocking because it occurred during such an
inconsequential action. This shows the limitations of Portuguese military strength, and
the weaknesses of their strategy.
4.2. Portuguese-Ottoman Confrontation in the Gulf
After 1529 the Gulf was generally quiet, except for some minor problems in Hormuz.
Nevertheless, as the century wore on the Portuguese came to face threats of a very
different order, initially from the Ottoman Turks whose relentless campaigns brought
them to the northern and western regions of the Gulf. Relations between the two powers
might have been very different if João III had replied favourably to a letter sent by
Süleyman II in 1544. The Ottoman sultan sought agreement on the flow of commerce in
the Indian Ocean and the possibility of peaceful commercial exchange with the
Portuguese. 54
 Instead, the Portuguese-Ottoman confrontation flared up intermittently for
most of the sixteenth century and was centred on three regions: the Red Sea, the Indian
Ocean, and the Gulf. This chapter will deal with the conflict in the Gulf only.
After the battle of Diu in 1509 the Portuguese were well aware that any Islamic
power that controlled the Red Sea would pose a real threat to their Indian Ocean and
Gulf trade routes. Therefore on several occasions they tried, and failed, to control access
to the Red Sea. 55 The Portuguese were also aware that under the right circumstances the
' ANTT, A G., vol. X, Gay. xx, 2-27, p. 255.
S. Ozbaran, The Ottoman Response to European Expansion (Istanbul, 1994), p. 67.
Albuquerque failed to capture Aden and the Straits of Bab Al-Mandeb in 1513. Successive
Portuguese efforts in the Red Sea and Aden in 1517, 1520, 1525 and 1529 all met with failure. See
Sousa, The Portuguese Asia; Danvers; The Portuguese in India; The Commentaries of the Great
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Ottoman Empire might concentrate its efforts away from Europe towards Asia, and
especially India. 56
 This view was well-founded. After they invaded Egypt and I-Iejaz in
1517 and controlled part of the Red Sea coast, the Ottomans had spasmodically
attempted to destroy the growing power and commerce of Portugal in the East. They do
not appear to have extended their anti-Portuguese operations to the Gulf until 1546,
even though victories over the Safavids and Mamluks had brought the Ottomans to the
Red Sea and Gulf much earlier, during the first quarter of the sixteenth century. After
the Ottoman occupation of Baghdad in 1534, the need became apparent for resuscitating
the trade routes of these newly acquired territories. 57
 Inevitably, however, the
international trade routes of southern Iraq intersected with those of the Gulf, the Strait
of Hormuz, and therefore with Portuguese controlled space.
Therefore, in the long-term, it seems that Turkish policy was directed towards
the expulsion of the Portuguese, not only from the Gulf but from the Indian Ocean as
well. 58 The capture of Basra in 1546 - possibly triggered by Turkish concerns about
relations between AI-Ulyaan and the Portuguese in Hormuz - provided an opportunity
to set this campaign in motion. 59
 Basra became the centre of Ottoman naval activity in
the Gulf with a shipyard and a fleet of fifteen vessels intended for operations against the
Portuguese. 6° For practical purposes, Basra proved hardly more useful as an advance
Afonso Dalboquerque; S. M. Salim, Al Ehtelal Al-A wwal le Alyamen; Q
. 
A1-Nahrawli, Al-Barq Al-
Yamanifi Al-Fatah Al- Osmani (Riyadh, 1967).
560 W. F. Stripling, The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs 1511-1574, p. 93.
57 A1-Dulah Al-A uthmaneah Tarkekh wa Hadarah, ed. Akmal Al-Aldin Ehsan Oqli (Istanbul, 1999), pp.
40-43; Süleyman the Magnflcent and his Age, ed. M. Kunt and C. Woodhead (London, 1995), pp.
60-1.
58 M. Hajj i Khalifah, The Histoiy of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, (London, 1831), pp. 26-7.
N. Z. Murtada, Klshen Khlfa, trans. M. K. Nuras (Al-NajefAl-Ashraf, 1971), pp. 20 1-02.
60 The Sultan received the submission of Mi bin Ulyaan, the leader of the Al-Jazair Arabs. He remained
on good terms with the Ottomans for a while, but later joined Shaik Rashid bin Magamis in his
rebellion against them. He also dealt with the Portuguese in Hormuz in the 1550s. There are two
undated letters from Au bin Ulyaan and Shaikh Yahya to Luis Falcâo, the Portuguese captain of
Hormuz. For more details see F. Castro, Crãnica Vice-rei D. Jodo de Castro, pp. 359-65; Couto,
Décadas, vol. VI, Liv. ix, pp. 244-45.
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base than Suez.6 ' Despite its deficiencies, Basra came to occupy an important position
in Ottoman strategy. Yet the city's potential was inextricably bound up with the
Portuguese: while Hormuz was in hostile hands, Basra could not fulfil its promise as a
commercial centre, and neither could the Turks use the port as a base for expeditions
into the Indian Ocean. 62 The Gulf therefore became a contested space between the two
powers.
Within a few years of occupying Basra, and still incapable of engaging in naval
warfare against the Portuguese in the Gulf, in 1550 the Turkish army entered QatIf 63 and
two years later conquered Al-Hasa province from the mainland, not from the sea.64
Taken together, these conquests were intended to allow Turkish forces to strike at
Portuguese strategic points in the Gulf, and in particular Hormuz. 65 From a Portuguese
perspective, these advances were a source of great concern. Both the security and trade
networks of Hormuz were endangered by the expansion of Turkish authority. 66 Basra
and Al-Hasa were the keys to controlling overland trade to and from Aleppo. The flow
of East Asian spices continued through the Gulf, but any trade from Basra to Aleppo
61 Potache, 'The commercial relations between Basrah and Goa in the sixteenth centuly', p. 157;
Stripling, The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs 1511-1574, p. 93.
62 c H. Imber, 'The Navy of Suleyman the Magnificent ',Archivum Ottomanicum, 6 (1980), p. 273.
63 In 1550 the Arabs of QatIf, under pressure from the Turks, delivered up the fort of the city, an act
which dismayed the king of Hormuz. The viceroy of India, Afonso de Noronha, therefore sent his
nephew Antão de Noronha with 19 vessels and 1,200 men to recapture the fort. On reaching Hormuz,
he marched with 3,000 men provided by Turan Shah IV. A force of 400 Turks was garrisoned inside
the fortress, who defended themselves bravely, but after eight days evacuated the place in the dead of
night leaving the fort to the Portuguese. Noronha, fearing that the Turks might recapture it, and not
daring to maintain it, razed the fortress by blowing it up. However, the task was executed in such a
careless manner that forty Portuguese were buried in the debris. Couto, Décadas, vol. VI, Liv. ix, p.
246; Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. II, p. 152.
64 There is no evidence available before the second half of the sixteenth century that the Hormuzian
ruler of Bahrain and shaiks of QatIf and Al-Hasa paid homage or conveyed their submission to Sultan
Suleyman after he conquered Baghdad in 1534, as some writers have claimed in their studies. See A.
Al-Azzawi, Tareakh Al-Iraq bayn Ihtilalayn, (Baghdad, 1949), vol. IV, p. 44; S. Ozbaran, The
Ottoman Response to European Expansion, p. 136.
65 Ozbaran, 'The Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf, 1534-1581', JAH, no. 6, 1
(1972), pp. 60-61.
66 In a letter of 1547 from Manuel de Lima, the captain of Hormuz, appraised the viceroy of India of the
proximity of the Turks. He pointed out the dangers of the fall of Bahrain in the hands of the Turks,
and some of its attractions. S. Ozbaran, 'Bahrain in the sixteenth century', Al-Watheekah, 15 (1989),
p. 228.
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and the Mediterranean passed through zones of Turkish control. 67
 Turkish objectives
were to build up Basra's prosperity and to control both shores of the Gulf; goals which
quickly became apparent to the Portuguese, and which inevitably led to frequent clashes
between the rivals. 68
 There is some evidence that the Portuguese tried to avoid
hostilities by entering into negotiations with the Turks, offering a treaty whereby they
would obtain wheat in exchange for pepper. Nothing is known of the diplomacy, but it
seems that the Turks rejected this proposal. 69 On the other hand, the Turks in Basra
subdued the local Arab tribes, and gave new confidence to those merchants who
operated out of or via the city. 7° After 1546 there was an increased turnover in trade,
even before the Fertile Crescent was fully united under Ottoman rule. 7 ' The Turks knew
very well that a revival of trade with India was important for Basra, and for the caravans
travelling between it and the Mediterranean coast. They also needed a revival of trade to
help finance the costly occupation of the northern Gulf.72
In 1550 the Portuguese tried to drive the Turks out of the Gulf in a campaign
mounted by Antão de Noronha, the commander of the Hormuz fleet. They had already
established good relations with the Arab tribes in some parts of Basra and now urged
them to act against the Turks. 73
 Evidence suggests that the Portuguese already had some
knowledge of the tensions between the Arab tribes and the Turkish occupiers. Indeed,
the immediate cause of the first Ottoman expedition against the Portuguese had been
67 M. Meilink-Roelofez, Asian Trade and European influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between
1500 and about 1630, p. 133.
68 ANTT, CC, Part I, maco 87, doe. 71; M. Pearson, 'The Estado da India and the Hajj', pp. 105-15;
69 Stripling, The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs 1511-15 74, p. 93.
° ANTT, Cart. Ormuz, 27 September, 1547, fi. 123. Letter of D. Manuel de Lima to D. João de Castro.
He mentions that no merchants from Aleppo or Baghdad arrived in Basra after the Ottomans captured
it, and few 'traradas' came from Basra to }Iormuz.
' Süleyman the Magnflcent and his Age, p. 63.
72 ANTT, Cart. Ormuz, 23 June 1547, fi. 88. Letter of D. Manuel de Lima to D. João de Castro. This
letter says much about how the Portuguese perceived Ottoman political and economic strategy in the
Gulf, including their aim of enriching Basra.
See footnote 60 above.
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their assistance to rebellious Arab elements the previous year. 74
 Therefore, the first real
hostilities between the two powers in the region began in 1552, when the Sultan sent
Pin Reis, the Kapudan of Egypt, against the Portuguese with a fleet of thirty vessels and
1,600 troops. 75
 Pin Reis departed from Suez with orders to go to Basra and thence, in
conjunction with the force awaiting him there, to sail to Hormuz and reduce it to
submission. After that, if everything went according to plan, he should proceed and take
Bahrain. 76
 The expedition reached Muscat in July 1552, and Pin laid siege to the
Portuguese fortress there for a month. 77
 Notwithstanding the fortifications, the Turkish
forces were landed without resistance. We must assume that the Portuguese defences
were unfinished since João de Lisboa had been sent out to fortif' Muscat only three
months beforehand. 78
 This fact, along with the size of the Portuguese garrison, places
some doubt on the splendid victory which Pin Reis claimed to have won. After the
Turks had sacked the town, de Lisboa eventually surrendered, having been assured that
his life would be spared.79
These events at Muscat were significant for the overall success of the Turkish
expedition. The delay caused by the protracted operations there afforded an opportunity
for Alvaro de Noronha, the captain of Hormuz, to prepare his fortress for a long siege,
which began in August 1552.80 It also gave an opportunity for the merchants in the city
Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf; p. 168.
Hajji Khalifah, The Histo,y of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, p. 71; A. Aba Hussain, 'The Ottoman
Documents in the Bahrain Archives', Al-Watheekah, 31(1996), p. 182. For differing estimates of the
force see ANTI, CC, parte, I, maco 89, doe. 9, fi. 3v; Ozbaran, The Ottoman Response to European
Expansion, pp. 85-86.
76 ANTI, CC, part I a, maco 89, Doe. 9, f. 5r.
' In his 'Mirat Al-Memalik' ('The Mirror of Countries') SeydI Mi Reis gives the date of this campaign
as 961A.H. (1553). See The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral SeydlAli Reis, p. xiv; F.
Danvers, Report on the Indian Office Records Related to Persia and the Persian Gulf (London, n.d.),
p.9.
78 Not the famous Portuguese fortresses, Al-Jalali and Al-Merani. They were built later in 1587 and
1588.
Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. II, p. 163; ANTI', CC, Parte, I, maço 89, doe. f. 9, 3v.
80 Alvaro de Noronha had at that time about 700 troops. ANTI', CC, Parte, I, maço 89, doe. f. 9, 3v-5r.
Sousa suggested that there were 900 soldiers in the fortress. Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. II, p.
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to evacuate their families and property to the island of Qishm. Pin bombarded the
fortress of Hormuz without intermission for about a month; 8 ' however, in the face of
heavy losses and with the realisation that they could not prevail, the Turks abandoned
their siege in September and looted the city. 82 Pin Reis then went to Qishm. In so doing
he revealed his personal priorities during the campaign: he knew very well that the
merchants of Hormuz had taken refuge on the island. 83 Having secured some profit from
the affair, Pin tried to retire to Basra. 84 The Portuguese response, incidentally, had been
to fit out a fleet from Goa which sailed in September 1552 but turned back at Diu once
the danger had passed.85
Overall, these events show the lack of military experience of Pin Reis. The
admiral had his own parallel agenda during the expedition. It seems that he was more
interested in tapping the wealth of cities such as Muscat, Hormuz and Qishm than
'liberating' them and their people from Portuguese rule. This is why Pin, when he heard
that the Portuguese fleet was advancing towards him, 86 escaped through the Strait of
Hormuz with his spoils. In the event he was unable to clear the whole of his fleet, and
so departed with only three galleys. 87 One of his ships was lost near Bahrain, and with
the remaining two he was lucky to escape from his pursuers and return to Egypt. 88
 In
164. A Portuguese eyewitness to this event stated that the siege started on 31 August 1552. The man
in question was the priest of the church of Hormuz, Goncalo Roiz, who sent a carta to the priests and
the brothers in Coimbra in Portugal. Documentacào para a História das Missdes do Padroado
Portugués do Oriente India, vol. V, pp. 190-95.
81 Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. II, p. 164.
82 Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf; p. 169.
83 Couto, Décadas, vol. VI, Liv. x, p. 426.
84 Ibid.; GEP,vol. 19,p. 640.
85 Wilson, The Persian Gulf; p. 126.
86 Or alternatively, as Ozbaran points out, being informed that the report sent by the beglerbeg of Basra,
was unfavourable to him. (3zbaran, 'The Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf,
1534-1581', p. 50.
87 The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral SeydI Au Reis, p. 4; Couto, Décadas, vol. VI,
Liv. x, pp. 468-69.
88 Khalifah, The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, p. 94; The Travels and Adventures of the
Turkish Admiral SeydlAli Reis, p. 4.
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1553 Suleyman ordered Pin Reis's execution because, by disobeying orders, he had
compromised the expensive campaign, lowered Ottoman naval prestige, and left the
Portuguese with an undeserved reputation for invincibility.89
We have focused particularly on this first Turkish attempt to gain control of the
Gulf because it was the most important. Afterwards there were no further centrally-
organised expeditions against the Portuguese. Even the campaign against Bahrain in
1559 was not by the sultan's order.
Following the setbacks of 1552, Suleyman's attention turned to the Ottoman
vessels that were still at Basra. The sultan lost no time in appointing a new Kapudan to
shepherd the remains of the Gulf fleet to Suez - Murad Reis, who was the sanjak beg of
QatIf,9° had been responsible for the loss of Qatif in 1550, and was very anxious to
recover his reputation. Thus, in July 1553, he was ordered to retrieve the renmants of
Pin Reis's expedition. He sailed from Basra with sixteen galleys and kalyote, but failed
to break through the Strait of Hormuz. 9 ' The depth of the sultan's concern for his fleet is
shown by his next step,92
 namely his appointment of a professional Turkish Kapudan,
SeydI Au Reis (Ali Chelabi), to complete the task. 93
 Ali proceeded to Qatif but could
not gather any intelligence about the Portuguese. He then crossed to Bahrain where Reis
89 Khalifah, The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, p. 71; The Travels and Adventures of the
Turkish Admiral Seydi Ali Reis, p. xiv. There is another interesting story about this event, which says
that Pin Reis refused to give the beglerbeg of Basra, Qubad Pasha, some of his spoils and that he
escaped from him to Egypt. Therefore the beglerbeg of Basra immediately informed Süleyrnan that
Pin was a rogue. See A. Al-Azzawi, Tarekh Al-Iraq bayna Ihtilalayn, vol. IV, p. 70.
90 Khalifah, The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, p.72.
' Ibid.; Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. II, pp. 168-69; The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish
Admiral SeydlAli Reis, p. 4.
92 His worries were justified. At the same time that Murad Reis was sailing from Basra, Diego de
Noronha, the commander of the Hormuz fleet, sent some vessels with a number of troops to the
mouth of Shat Al-Arab to seek information about the Turks' whereabouts. See Couto, Décadas, vol.
VI, Liv. x, p. 487.
He was also known by the name 'Kiatibi Rum', meaning Turkish writer. He was author of Mohit
('The Ocean'). In fact, his work 'Mirat Al-Memalik' compares with the great works of other Muslim
travellers like Ibn Batuta. He boasted that he never ceased to hope to see Gujarat and Hormuz joined
to the Ottoman realm. His one desire was to see Sultan of the Ottomans as ruler of the world. See The
Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral Seydi Ali Reis, p. iii; Hajji Khalifah, The History of
the Maritime Wars of the Turks, p. 73.
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Jalal Al-Din Murad Mabmood, the Hormuzian ruler was not forthcoming with
'information about the fleet of Infidels'. 94
 When Reis prepared to leave Bahrain in
August 1554 the Portuguese attacked him near Khür Fakhàn. A second attack was
launched by other Portuguese vessels near Suhar on the Omani coast. 95 Fernando de
Noronha, who had returned from the Red Sea after a fruitless endeavour to capture
Dofar, went out to meet Ali, and made contact with him near Muscat on 25 August.
Stories about their encounter are confusing. The Portuguese historian Sousa stated that
'the enemy, not daring to risk a battle, endeavoured to escape with his whole fleet, but
six of his vessels could not escape, being taken by our caravels'. 96
 Conversely, the
Turkish historian Hajji Khalifah suggested that 'This battle was even greater than that
between Khair Al-Din Barbarossa and Andrea Doria in the Mediterranean Sea'.97
However, the main concern here is not to give details of the battle but merely to register
that the Turks suffered heavy losses. 98
 In addition to their losses in combat, the Turks
also had the misfortune to suffer from a severe storm which ran several of their vessels
aground, frustrating Ali's plans, and barely allowing him to escape to the coast of
Gujarat with only five vessels. 99
 Leaving his ships in charge of the local ruler, he
travelled overland for four years, across India and Persia, and he at last reached Istanbul
via Baghdad in May 1557.'°°
The Travels andAdventures of the Turkish Admiral SeydlAliReis, pp. 9-10.
Hajji Khalifah, The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, p. 73. For more details about this
battle see: The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral SeydI Ali Reis, pp. 11-16; Hajji
Khalifah, The Histo,y of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, pp. 73-5.
96 Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. II, p. 173.
' Hajji Khalifah, The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, p. 75.
Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. II, p. 173; The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral SeydI
Ali Reis, pp. 17-36. Hajji Khalifah, The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, p. 76.
100 The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral SeydI Ali Reis, pp. xv-xvi. Hajji Khalifah, The
History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, p. 77.
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The naval operations against the Portuguese in 1552-4 were extremely wasteful
of men and resources. Between them, the initial expedition and the attempts to salvage
the situation cost the Turks the whole of their Gulf fleet.
In the wake of these early Portuguese-Ottoman clashes, the situation in the Gulf
was turbulent. Both powers constantly watched each other's activities through their
spies in Hormuz, Bahrain and Basra.'°' In 1556 the Portuguese tried to take advantage
of an Arab revolt against the Turks at Basra. An Arab call for Portuguese assistance
conveyed by Antão de Noronha from Hormuz to Goa brought the mobilization of a fleet
under Alvaro da Silveira, the captido-mór. In the end, however, Silveira claimed that a
storm so disabled his forces at Basra that he was not in any condition to provide support
to the Arab chieftains there.'°2
It was not until 1559 that the Ottomans made the occupation of Bahrain a
serious independent objective within their Gulf strategy. This coincided with efforts
from within Bahrain to detach itself from outside influence.
After the arrival of the Turks, Bahrain stood between the two powers.'° 3 This
provided an opportunity for its governor, Jalal Al-Din Murad Mahmood Shah,'° 4 to play
one off against the other and thereby assert his own autonomy. Bahrain was still
nominally under Hormuz's authority, of which the aimual customs tributes were an
integral part, but Portuguese control over the islands and their commerce was never
absolute. Bahrain's location offered a unique opportunity to detach itself from
ANTT, A G., vol. V, Gay. xv, 17-40, Carta de Simào da Costa, pp. 137-38.
102 Couto, Décadas, vol. VII, Liv. iii, p. 206; Danvers, The Portuguese in India, p. 507.
103 See above, pp. 13, 62, 67, 114.
j° From early 1529 up to 1605 a single family known as 'Branghaar' held the governorship of Bahrain.
They were a well known Kurdish family of Sunni faith who changed to Shia a few years after their
rise. They were from the village of Herg, located in the Fãl district of southern Persia. The first
governor of this family was Reis Amin Jalal Al- Din Murad Mahmood Shah Branghar, and he ruled
Bahrain from 1529 to his death in 1577. He was succeeded by his son Reis Kamal Al- Din Mahmood
to 1602, when he too was killed. Finally, the brother of the second governor, Reis Amir Yousif Shah,
ruled Bahrain from 1602 to 1605 when he died in the conflict against the Portuguese and Hormuzian
attackers. The family continued to live in Bahrain even after they lost their governorship until 1629.
See A. Bushiri, 'The war of no battle - Bahrain in 1559', Dilmun. Journal oft/ic Bahrain Historical
and Archaeological Society, 18(1999-2000), pp. 20-1.
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Portuguese Hormuz and Turkish Al-Hasa without arousing the hostility of either. This
was precisely the intention of the Branghar Fãli family. First of all, they changed their
doctrine from Sunni to Shia, because most Babrainis were Shiites. This reinforced their
standing with the inhabitants of Bahrain. At the same time they had cordial relations
with the royal family of Hormuz because they were related to the vizier.'° 5 Furthermore,
because Bahrain was close to Al-Hasa and its overland routes,'° 6 good relations between
the two were an economic necessity. The Branghar governor exploited the fact that
many of the wealthier merchants in Al-Hasa were from Bahrajn.'° 7 Some important
prerequisites for Bahrain's independence - peaceful relations with its stronger
neighbours - were therefore in place.
It is not necessary here to relate the Turkish campaign in full. Diogo de Couto,
who recounts in detail the Portuguese side of the affair, states that Mustafa Pasha,
beglerbeg of Al-Hasa, prepared his expedition against Bahrain with the co-operation of
the beglerbeg of Basra.'° 8 In July the Turks began to besiege the fortress at Manama.'°9
Jalal Al-Din, commanding the garrison in managed to advise both the king
and captain of Hormuz of the situation." The response to the news in Hormuz was
fairly typical; a Portuguese fleet consisting of twenty-two grabs" 2 was sent to save the
105 Couto, Décadas, vol. VII, Liv. vii, p. 111.
106 See Introduction, section 4.
107 Notable among them were Mohammed bin Rahal and Mohammed bin Mesalem, who were
mentioned in the letter of Reis Rukn Al-Din, the vizier of Hormuz in 1545. See the reference to this
letter in Appendix II, Doc. 2.
108 Couto, Décadas, vol. VII, Liv. vii, p.1 10. An Ottoman account by one of those who fought in the
campaign lists the men and materiel sent from Basra to Al-Hasa, including two fighting galleys
(kadirga) and seventy light ships (terradas). S. Ozbaran, 'Bahrain in 1559', Osmanli Arastirmalari
III, The Journal of Ottoman Studies (Istanbul, 1982), pp. 93-94; Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. II,
p. 199. Compare with Couto, Décadas, vol. VII, Liv. vii, p.110; F. Al-Kandre, 'Hamlat Mustafa
Pasha Ala Al-Bahrain', Mujalat Al-Arab, 5 (2000), pp. 256-60; C. Orhonlu, '1559 Bahreyn Seferl'
trans. H. A. Al-Daquq, Mujalat Derasat Al-k/zlej wa Al-Jazreerah Al-A rabiah, 24 (1980), pp. 211-20.
109 See Introduction, section 4.
° Bushiri, 'The war of no battle', p. 23.
Sousa, The PortugueseAsia, vol. II, pp. 199-200.
112 Al-Kandre, 'Hamlat Mustafa Pasha Ala Al-Bahrain', p. 256. A grab was a type of oared vessel. See
Serjeant, The Portuguese of the South Arabian Coast, p. 143.
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island." 3
 Ten vessels from the fleet were detached and sailed towards Basra, most likely
to intercept any aid coming by sea from the Turkish arsenal there. Confronted with a
shortage of supplies and munitions and the death of their beglerbeg from disease, the
Turks decided to end the struggle. Even with their fleet in complete control of the
island, the Portuguese also had cause to cease hostilities: seventy men had been killed
and about thirty taken captive. Disease had taken its toll on both sides. Under the
circumstances there was little other option left than to make peace. The Turks
surrendered their arms to the Portuguese and gave a payment of 12,000 cruzados. In
return, the Portuguese undertook to transport the remaining Turkish troops back to
QatIf." 4
 Five months after they had landed on Bahrain with 1,900 soldiers, they left
Bahrain with only 200. The remaining 1,700 had died from hunger and fever.115
Looking at this sequence of events, there are several factors that caused the
failure of the Turkish assault on Bahrain. First of all, the legitimacy of the campaign
might be questioned. On 1 October 1559, the Turkish Sultan wrote to Jalal Al-Din
Murad granting him the title of Sanjak beg, which was given to local governors under
nominal Turkish rule." 6 In the same communication Suleyman made a specific
reference to the fact that Mustafa Pasha had taken it upon himself to attack Bahrain
without orders from Istanbul." 7 Second, the Turkish troops and their commanders had
no clear idea about Bahrain island and its situation. This can be observed from the
report written by a participant in the campaign, a minor official in Al-Hasa province."8
He could not define his location, which existed in name only; and he was ignorant of the
geography of the Arabian Peninsula. For example, he asserted that the desert of Najd in
Ozbaran, 'Bahrain in 1559', p. 94.
"4 Al-Kandre, 'Hamlat Mustafa Pasha Ala A1-Bahrain', p. 260.
" Couto, Décadas, vol. VII, Liv. vii, p. 152.
116 Ozbaran, The Ottoman Response to European Expansion, p. 136.
"7 See Appendix II, Doe. 5.
118 Orhonlu, '1559 Bahreyn Seferl', p. 212.
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the Arabian Peninsula was close to the Indian Ocean, and that Bahrain was far from Al-
Hasa.' 19
 Another reason for the failure of the Turkish army in the Gulf is that their
weapons were not good enough, most being collected from the farmers of Al-Hasa and
QatIf)2°
After several failed Turkish campaigns against the Portuguese, there emerged a
military stalemate between the two. By 1560 the Portuguese were unable to establish a
secure foothold in Basra and on the eastern shores of the Arabian Peninsula. Their
policy became one of increasing military intervention in southern Iraq; but their
apparent inability to tip the balance against the Turks, with whom the Arab population
had lost its patience, led the Arabs to become more dependent on their own resources to
drive out any occupying forces, including the Portuguese. This is what happened in
Oman in the early seventeenth century.' 2 ' For their part, the Ottomans failed to win
control over the Strait of Hormuz. Direct confrontation between the two did not cease in
1559. For example, in 1560-61 the Portuguese once again sent a fleet to assist the Arab
chieftains of Basra against the Turks, lured by the promise of a permanent presence in
the city. A storm dispersed the ships before they arrived at their objective.122
In the medium term, however, the indecisive Bahrain campaign of 1559 had
important diplomatic consequences. Commerce in the Gulf, especially between Bahrain
and Hormuz, was badly affected by the war. For this reason, to encourage the flow of
trade to and from their lands, the Turks tried to recast their relationship with the
Portuguese in Hormuz. To this end, in 1562 the beglerbeg of Basra sent an envoy to
Hormuz to negotiate with the Portuguese captain, Pedro de Sousa, for a resumption of
Al-Kandre, 'Hamlat Mustafa Pasha Ala Al-Balirain', p. 256.
120 Orhonlu, '1559 Bahreyn Seferl', p. 220.
121 See Chapter Five, below.
122 Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol. I, p. 522.
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commercial relations through the Gulf. 123 Moreover, in 1564 Sultan Süleyman tried to
consolidate his position with the Portuguese by receiving their ambassador Antonio
Teixeira.' 24 Proposals arising out of the exchange provide a reasonably clear picture of
Turkish priorities at this moment: free trade at Hormuz, and safe passage for people and
merchants of the Ottoman Empire trading to and from lands under Portuguese
domination.' 25 The surviving evidence does suggest an increase in the volume of trade
between the Portuguese and the Turks. In 1583, in Basra, there were various goods from
India and local pearls from the Gulf islands;' 26
 and there was, as Linschoten points out,
constant traffic between Hormuz and Basra.'27
Logically the Portuguese might have favoured measures to re-establish Hormuz
as a node in the commerce between the northern Gulf and the Indian Ocean.'28
However, any agreement with the Turks would have compromised Portuguese relations
with the Persian government. In weighing up the relative value of Turkish and Persian
friendship in the Gulf; it is striking that the Portuguese chose the latter. As a result no
agreement was signed.'29
Apart from this central guiding principal of Portugal's diplomacy, Portuguese
attitudes towards the Turks in the mid-sixteenth century were confused. As Maria Cruz
points out, during the reign of Sebastião the Portuguese determined to capture Basra,
with its formidable Turkish presence, at the same time as they inched towards
123 
'Ho ano de myll e quinhentos e sasenta e dous (1562) veo ha Ormuz hum embaixador do turquo
envyado pelo baxa de Bacora ha pidir pazes ao comde vizo rei da Imdia.' ANTT, A.G., vol. V, Gay.
xv, 17-40, Carta de Simão da Costa a el-rei D. Sebastião, p. 137.
124 Couto, Décadas, vol. VII, Liv. v, p. 44; M. Cruz, 'A < Questao de Bacorá >', p. 61.
125 Ozbaran, The Ottoman Response to European Expansion, p. 138. The Sultan's letter was dated 6
September 1564. See also Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol. I, p. 532.
126 E. A. Al-Juhri, 'Al-duar Al-tareakhi li Al-Basra Ala A1-khlej Al-arabi 1500-1600', Mujalat Derasat
Al-khlej wa Al-Jazreerah A1-Arabiah, 13 (1978), p. 90.
127 The Voyage ofJohn Huyghen Van Linschoten to the East Indies, vol. II, p. 35.
128 M. L. Dames, 'The Portuguese and Turks in the Indian Ocean in the Sixteenth century', JRAS, part 1
(1921), p. 25.
129 M. Cruz, 'A < Questao de Bacorá > na menoridade de D. Sebastião (1557-1568)', Revista da
Faculdade de Lettras, University of Lisbon, 6 (1986), p. 49.
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commercial understanding with the Ottoman 30 Portugal's failure or
unwillingness to broker a lasting settlement meant an inevitable drift towards further
conflict in the Gulf. Bahrain remained a buffer between the two powers, but
increasingly became the object of Turkish ambitions. However, after all this time the
Turks still did not fully comprehend the scale or complexities of the task in hand. This
can be seen in their plans to capture Bahrain in 1573 . 13 1 Significantly, they were unsure
whether or not the reduction of Bahrain was feasible, what preparations would be
required for such an enterprise, and what would be the most opportune time for it.
Turkish interest in Balirain intensified in 1575, but all of these preparations eventually
came to nothing.132
Beyond weaknesses in intelligence and uncertain direction in policy, the question arises
why the Turks failed to win any naval encounters in the Gulf, as in 1552 and 1554, or
near its ports and islands, as at Bal-irain in 1559? While they won most of the important
battles against other Muslim powers in the East - such as at Chãldirãn in 1514 and Murj
Dabeq in 1516 - not a single battle was won against the Portuguese at sea, even in an
enclosed sea. Turkish fleets in the Mediterranean successfully competed with the
galleys of their Christian opponents, even after the battle of Lepanto in 1571 when, for
instance, they took the Spanish fortress at Tunis in 1574.' This question will be
examined in the following discussion.
The Ottomans emerged as a naval power only in the second half of the fifteenth
century,' 34
 and almost all the experience that the Turkish sailors acquired was gained in
130 Cruz, 'A < Questao de Bacorá >', p. 54.
See the letter to the beglerbeg of Al-Hasa in Appendix II, Doe. 7.
32 Ozbaran, The Ottoman Response to European Expansion, p. 139.
133 A. Hess, 'The Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne Empire in the Age of Ocean Discoveries', AHR,
vol. 75, no.5 (1970), p. 1918.
Imber, 'The Navy of Suleyman the Magnificent', p. 211.
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135 Contrasts with the Portuguese experiencethe Mediterranean rather than the open sea.
are not difficult to find.
Within the Gulf more specifically, we might consider the extent to which
Turkish action was influenced by the report of Salman Reis in 1525. Salman advised the
sultan to confront the Portuguese at sea in order to simplify the task of expelling them
from their fortifications and settlements in the East. He described the port of Jidda, full
of ships and arms, as a dragon with an open mouth. He stated clearly that 'with these
ships and weapons it is possible to capture in their entirety the fortresses and quays
which the infidels rule in the land of India'.' 36 However, as Ozbaran notes, this was
certainly not an accurate assessment of the Ottoman Indian Ocean naval
establishment.' 37 Moreover, it could be argued from the conflict between the Portuguese
and the Turks that neither power learned much from their naval encounters. After the
battles of Diu in 1508 and 1538 the Portuguese could not prevent Muslim vessels from
the Red Sea coming against them in the Indian Ocean, or even in the Gulf. The Turks,
on the other hand, did not understand that Mediterranean ship types were unable to
serve safely in the Indian Ocean.' 38 They were not ocean-going vessels and were
inferior in armament to the Portuguese Indiamen.' 39 In addition, the Turks not only
faced Portuguese forces in the Gulf; they also had to deal with the climatic conditions.
Beigrave was wrong to suggest that the Turks were less affected by climate and disease
than the Portuguese.' 4° As noted in the introduction to this thesis, any foreign naval
135 Hess, 'The Evolution of the Ottoman Seabome Empire in the Age of Ocean Discoveries', p. 1918.
' Ozbaran, 'A Turkish report on the Red Sea and the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, 1525', pp. 83-4.
' Ibid., Süleyman the Magnflcent and his Age, p. 55.
138 Serjeant, The Portuguese of the South Arabian Coast, pp. 2-3.
' Imber, 'The Navy of SUleyman the Magnificent ',p. 272.
140 C. Beigrave, The Pirate Coast, p. 8.
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power in the Gulf would be handicapped by inadequate information about the region's
climate and sea conditions.'4'
Until the beginning of the seventeenth century the Turkish navy in the Gulf was
unable to fight on equal terms against the Portuguese or the English. In fact in 1607 it
was observed that a single English ship could defeat ten Turkish galleys.' 42 The Turkish
ships were poorly built and badly maintained. In addition, they were heavier and less
manageable than those in the European navies,' 43
 even if it seems that the ships of the
Indian Ocean were better built than the galleys of the imperial fleet. Indeed, it is
recorded that the Portuguese met Turkish fleets which had guns of good quality, in
general, and trained gunners whose skill at Diu in 1538 excited the admiration of their
OppOfleflts.' 44 From this we can assume that, perhaps, the chief defect in the Turkish
navy was not in the arms or ships, but in the administration and leadership of the fleets.
The Diu campaign of 1538 and that in the Gulf of 1552 give evidence of that. Even
Seydi Au Reis, who was one of the best-known naval commanders in the
Mediterranean, could not safely navigate near Ras al-Had on the Omani shore to enter
Bab Al-Mandab. He discarded his heavy cannon in order to reach the Indian coast.'45
These problems doubtless arose through lack of experience and ignorance of the works
of Ahmed Ibn Majid,' 46
 although Seydi Au himself authored a work called Mohit into
which he integrated information about navigation, routes, the monsoon system, and the
141 See Jintroduction, section 4.
142 H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The ClassicalAge, 1300-1600 (London, 1973), p. 44.
" Imber, 'The Navy of Suleyman the Magnificent ',p. 225.
Q. A1-Nahrwali, Al-Barq Al-YamanijI Al-Fath Al-Osmani, p. 70; in 1538, SUleyman Pasha set sail
with 72 ships against the Estado da India of Portugal. Suleyman the MagnfIcent and his Age, p. 61.
The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral SeydlAli Reis, pp. 16-7.
146 Ibn Majid said of navigation near the Gujarat coast: 'the head of the Gujarat coast extends more in
the sea, and it is closer to the Arab land than to the Indian shore'. In addition, he gave a warning to
navigators wanting to sail in those waters. See S. Ibn Majid, Kitab Al-Fawáidfi Usül llm Al-bahr wa
Al-qawa'd, p. 266.
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sailing seasons of the Indian Ocean.' 47
 Nevertheless, it was difficult for the Ottomans to
solve their naval difficulties when the balance of sea power in the Gulf was so tilted
against them.
After two unsuccessful attempts in the Gulf to save their fleet, the Turks had to
be satisfied with establishing themselves as a land-based power on the north-west of the
Gulf coast in Basra and Al-Hasa. The Turks were never able to maintain a large fleet in
the Gulf after the disasters of 1552 and 1554, and this left them with insufficient forces
to mount a large-scale campaign. There were also other obstacles to Basra being a
strategic base for Turkish forces. The city was far from any natural sources of timber or
other naval stores,' 48
 and the fact that the suburbs of the city were centres of Arab tribal
rebellion prevented supplies from reaching Basra.'
Consequently the function of Turkish ships in the Gulf after 1552 was no more
than to patrol its waters from time to time and to observe Portuguese or local Arab
activities, in particular in the district of Al-Jazir.'5°
A final point to discuss here is why the people of the Gulf did not assist the Turks
against the Portuguese, especially given what might be regarded as their natural
religious sympathies. There may be several reasons. On the one hand, the Turks
generally did not trust the Arabs, and their relations with the tribes of Iraq gave them an
unfavourable impression of Arab attitudes. Even in Syria, Egypt, and Yemen they did
not employ Arabs in their army or as commanders in their navy. On the other hand,
Turkish taxes, in particular the iltizam finance system,' 5 ' were as harmful to the Gulf
'' T. A. Shumovskii, Ahmed Bin Majid, Three Flowers in Knowing the Seas. Trans. Mohammed
Muner Morsi. (Cairo, 1969), P. 70.
148 Imber, 'The Navy of Suleyman the Magnificent ',p. 273.
149 The revolt of Ibn Ulyaan is an example. See above p. 185, footnote 60.
'° Ozbaran, 'The Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf, 1534-1581', p. 69; Imber,
'The Navy of SUleyman the Magnificent', p. 273.
151 Ozbaran, The Ottoman Response to European Expansion, pp. 28-9.
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Arabs as they were to other peoples brought under Ottoman rule during the early
sixteenth century. All the fixed annual sums produced by the tax went to Istanbul and
nothing worthwhile remained to fund local development. This was symptomatic of a
broader Ottoman disregard for their Arabic subjects, which sometimes led to
injustice.' 52 As a result the people of the Gulf evidently did not relish their position as
Turkish subjects.' 53
 After they entered the Gulf, the Ottomans did not realise, until the
Bahrain campaign of 1559, that even though the inhabitants of the western coast
regarded the Ottomans as their saviours from Portuguese violence, they did not want to
exchange one occupation force for another. In addition, most of the inhabitants on the
western coast of the Gulf and Bahiain were Shiites and the Ottomans were Sunnites,
which adversely affected their relations. This was manifested in the campaign against
the Portuguese in Bahrain in l559.' At the same time, the Shiites in southern Iraq and
on the west coast of the Gulf stood with the Safavids rather than the Turks.
4.3. Conflict between the Portuguese and Safavid Persia
The character of the Gulf was completely changed at the beginning of the sixteenth
century by the emergence of two military powers stronger than Hormuz: the Portuguese
with their maritime control; and the Safavid dynasty on the Iranian mainland. The
original Safavid dominions were north of Persia. By 1503 they had occupied Shiraz,155
and a few years later, by 1508, Shah Ismail ruled over Iraq Al-Arab and the former
Mushasha territories near Basra, through which the Safavids came close to one of the
152 Ozbaran, The Ottoman Response to European Expansion, p. 30.
An Ottoman document in the Bahrain Archive mentions that Mustafa Pasha, the beglerbeg of Al-
Hasa, seized the property of a notable Arab merchant in Al-Hasa province called Jumah bin Rahal. In
response he took all the pearl diving ships belonging to him and fled to Bahrain where he fought with
Jalal Al-Din Murad against the Turks in the campaign of 1559. This also shows that administrative
corruption was not a uniquely Portuguese problem. See Aba Hussain, 'The Ottoman Documents in
the Bahrain Archives', doc. MD 3, p. 379.
'i" See Bushiri, 'The war of no battle - Bahrain in 1559', pp. 20-7; Al-Kandre, 'Hamlat Mustafa Pasha
Ala Al-Bahrain', pp. 256-60; Orhonlu, '1559 Balireyn Seferl', pp. 211-20.
p. Sykes, A History of Persia, p. 159; p. Savory, Studies on the History of Safawid h-an, p. 79.
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main outlets of trade in the Gulf. Shah Ismail attempted to eradicate the Mushasha tribes
in Basra, but failed.' 56 Instead, the shah was content with tributes from the chieftains of
those tribes.' 57 Southern Iraq, which was ruled by a branch of the Muntafiq Arab tribe,
also became subject to Safavid overlordship.'58
Soon after these advances into Iraq Al-Arab, Ismail also received the submission
of Lãr and Hormuz. Following old custom, Hormuz continued paying muqarrariya to
the new rulers of Persia for some time; but we have already noted the surprise in 1508
when Safavid envoys to Hormuz encountered the Portuguese who forced them to return
empty-handed. 159
 It should be remembered that the Portuguese arrived during a struggle
between the Muslim powers of the Middle East, and during a period when regional
power structures were being redefined. The Ottoman and Safavid territories were still
expanding, and Persian policy in the Gulf was based on the consideration that conflict
with the Turks was inevitable.
The occupation of Iraq brought the Safavids closer to Aleppo than the Turks, but
this does not mean that they had any strategy of their own to control the mainland trade
routes at such an early stage. It is true that the Persians pushed the silk trade northwards
to areas around the Caspian Sea, where most silk production was concentrated; but the
problem was that they had to export silk to Europe through Turkish territory.' 60
 Shah
Abbas 1(1587-1629) therefore made numerous approaches to Europeans in the hope of
gaining political support against the Ottomans and, at the same time, an outlet for
Persian products by a more direct route.' 6 ' In short, Persia worked to avoid the Basra-
Aleppo route which at that time was in Turkish hands.
156 R. Q
. 
M. Merkhund, Tareakh RawdetAl-safa Nasri (Tehran, 1339 H.), vol. 8, p. 23.
E. A. Al-Juhri, 'Al-duar Al-tareakhi ii Al-Basra Ala A1-khlej Al-arabi 1500-1600', p. 86.
158 Al-Azzawi, Tarekh Al-Iraq bayna Ihtilalayn, vol. IV, p. 49.
159 See Chapter Three, section 3.
160 M. Meilink-Roelofez, The Earliest Relations between Persia and the Netherlands, p. 4.
161 A. Bocarro, Década 13, part I, p. 33.
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As mentioned in the last chapter, Portuguese plans to win the Safavids as allies
against the Ottomans proliferated in the early years of the Union, but were doomed to
failure.' 62 Indeed, the fate of Portuguese Hormuz was sealed with the accession of Shah
Abbas.' 63 One important keynote of his reign was the alteration of Safavid military
power through reform and modernisation. These reforms, as Lambton states, depended
on new regiments recruited from non-tribal elements, chiefly Georgians and Armenian
converts to Islam.' 64 The purpose was to make the state less dependent on the
traditionally armed dervishes or Qizilbash.' 65 It was these Turkoman tribes, and not the
Persians, who had secured the throne for Ismail I by their military and political
support.' 66 If Ismail and his son Tahmãsp spent much of their reigns in a delicate
balancing act between the Turkomans, the Qizilbash and the Tajiks, then Shah Abbas
was able to turn his attention to overseas and overland trade as a major source of state
revenue.' 67 Englishmen played an influential part in these developments.' 68 Certainly,
the Shah sent the Sherleys as his envoys to the Pope and to various European royal
courts to enlist support against their common enemy, the Ottomans.'69
The effects of Shah Abbas's reforms were widely felt. Lär and Shiraz both
played an important part in political events in Persia and the Gulf during the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The conquests of Qishm and Hormu.z were
162 Bocarro, Década 13, part I, pp. 34-6.
163 Sykes, A History of Persia, p. 172.
A. K. S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia (London, 1953), p. 107.
165 Sykes, A History of Persia, p. 176.
166 P. Sykes, Persia (Oxford, 1922), p. 72.
167 Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1 700, p. 26.
168 N. Falsafi, Zendagané Shah 'Abbãs Awãl, (Tehran, 1371 S.), vol. 4, pp. 1297-1304; R. E. Denison,
Sir Anthony Sherley and his Persian Adventure (London, 1933), pp. 116-17. The Persians learned
how to use guns, as Curzon mentions, since the Portuguese provided Shah Tahmãsp with auxiliaries
against the Turks. By the help of Sherleys' sons the new troops of the Shah, recently equipped with
firearms, were better able to oppose the Turkish forces. See Curzon, Persia and the Persian question,
vol. I, p. 573; Meilink-Roelofez, The Earliest Relations between Persia and the Netherlands, p. 5.
169 Davies, Elizabethans Errant, pp. 114-65, 225; Savory, Studies on the Histoiy of Safawid Iran, p. 76;
W. Foster, England's Quest of Eastern Trade, pp. 296-98; Falsaft, Zendaané Shah Abbãs Awãl, vol.
4, p. 1573.
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the work of the governor of Fãrs province, Imám Qlui Khän, the son of Allah-Verdi
Khãn, a Georgian convert to Islam whose career epitomises the success of Abbas's
military reforms.' 7° Imám Qlui Khãn set up the administration in the newly acquired
territories as Khán of Lãr and conqueror of the island. It would seem that Imám Qlui
Khãn held his territories as a hereditary fief, in the same way as under the Seljuq
system.
At some point, there was a significant change in Persian diplomacy in the Gulf;
a shift away from the Portuguese as potential allies and towards the Ottomans, their
long-standing enemies. It is important to identify some of the factors that brought about
this pivotal change in policy, though it is easier to understand if pragmatism is seen as a
common influence in Persian actions.'72
First, the Persians came physically closer to Hormuz after the Shah established
his headquarters at Isfahan. The Shah used a 'step-by-step' strategy to occupy several
important points in the Gulf which were under Portuguese control. Results included the
capture of Bahrain in 1602, Qishm in 1608, Gombroon in 1614, and attacks on other
Portuguese garrisons in the Gulf.' 73
 Shah Abbas firmly believed that the Portuguese
were invaders who unfairly monopolised the wealth of Hormuz, but he nonetheless
chose diplomatic means of dealing with them while he was at war with the Ottomans.
Economic factors led the Shah to doubt his policy towards both the Portuguese and the
Turks. International outlets for the silk trade - a Persian royal monopoly - were
controlled by one or the other. Thus, in August 1602 the Shah welcomed the Spanish-
Portuguese envoy, the Augustinian Antonio de Gouvea. 174
 In addition, Abbas appointed
170 Falsafi, Zendaané Shah 'AbbãsAwäl, vol. 4, pp. 154 1-42.
171 Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia, p. 107.
172 See Chapter Five.
' Abbas Mutalate Der Bab Bahrain Wa Jazair Khaleej Fars, p. 79.
174 A. de Gouvea, Rela cam em que se tratam as Guerras e Grandes victorias que alcançou o grade Rey
da Persia Xá Abbas do grào Turco Mahometto, & seufliho Amethe (Lisbon, 1611), Liv. I, f. 17. De
Gouvea wrote his book at Goa in April 1609.
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by faraman Imám Quli Khãn as the governor of Fãrs province to succeed his father
immediately after the latter died during the first siege of Gombroon. The Shah incited
Imám Quli Khan to get revenge for his father's death by ordering him to occupy
Gombroon, the main Portuguese trade centre on the Persian mainland.'75
Additionally, Persia's commercial relationship with the English and the
appearance of East India Company fleets in the Gulf in the 1610s changed Persian
policy towards the Portuguese. Evidence of Spanish commitment to the war against the
Turks was negligible which led the Persians to look elsewhere.' 76 The English provided
a suitable alternative.
With a more modern army at his disposal, at the beginning of the seventeenth
century Abbas felt confident enough to challenge Portuguese occupied Hormuz and
Bahrain in preference to attacking the Turks.' 77
 Yet the Persians were cautious in their
dealings with the Portuguese. They avoided direct conflict, knowing very well the
strength of the Portuguese navy. Essentially, Abbas played a political game with the
Spanish-Portuguese crown. On the one hand, he demonstrated to the king of Spain his
quiet diplomacy by sending several ambassadors and envoys to Madrid, like Allah
Verdi Beg and Bastam Quli Beg.' 78 In addition, he sent Hussain Au Beg with Anthony
Sherley to Spain and Europe with a message promising privileges in the silk trade for
active support against the Turks.' 79 On the other hand, he threatened the Portuguese in
the Gulf on specific occasions and used the shadow rulers of Lär and Shiraz. Thus,
politically, Abbas was more careful and successful than the Turks in his relations with
the Portuguese.
M. Aqeel, Al-Ta nfous Al-DualijI Al- Khaleej Al-A rabi 1622-1763, (Qatar, 1991), p. 61.
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The first test of Persian strength against the Portuguese was in Bahrain and it
came with little warning or planning. In 1601 Turan Shah VI died and was succeeded
his son Feruz Shah.' 8° The succession in Hormuz did not pass without incident. After a
few months, at the beginning of 1602, Rukn Al-Din Mas'ud, brother of the vizier and a
distant relative of the Lord of Fãl, Mu'in Al-Din Fäli, revolted against Portuguese rule
in Bahrain. Mas'ud's fear of Portugal's naval forces led him to call for Persian
support.' 8 ' Shah Abbas grasped this opportunity. He entrusted the task of occupying
Bahrain to Allah-Verdi Khãn, the governor of Fãrs province.' 82 Allah-Verdi Khãn sent a
force to Bahrain which, with the co-operation of Mas'ud' s troops, reduced the
Portuguese garrison to submission. This shows clearly that ahrain was captured by
treason, not by direct confrontation against the Portuguese.' 83 Once victory was assured,
the cycle of treachery was completed by the murder of Rukn Al-Din Mas'ud by the
Persians, which led to open conflict between the forces within Bahrain. It took the
arrival of Persian reinforcements, who had been delayed en route, to retrieve the
situation. Thereafter the Persians had to face the Portuguese force of Francisco de
Sotomayor, which Allah-Verdi Khn countered by sending a diversionary expedition to
invest the port of Gombroon (Bandar Abbas)' 84
 The Portuguese would have recaptured
Bahrain in 1603 when they sent Jorge de Castelo Branco with a fleet from Goa,' 85 but
° See Appendix I, no. 4.
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Persian merchant, whose pearls he coveted, was in turn assassinated by the merchant's brother (Rukn
Al-Din Mas'ud), who then seized the fort for the Persians'. See de Gouvea, Relacam em que se
tratam as Guerras e Grandes victorias que alcancou o grade Rey da Persia Xá Abbas do grão Turco
Mahometto, & seufllho Amethe, Liv. I, ff. 15- ff. 16.
82 Falsafi, Zendaané Shah 'Abbãs Awãl, vol. 4, p. 1486.
183 The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, p. 174.
184 Gouvea, Relacam, Liv. I, f. 16. Bandar in Persian, in the Portuguese sources known as Gomrün, is
near Bandel or Band Au. Bandar Abbas, is in the immediate vicinity of Naband. Bandar Abbas stands
on a bay about 16 km to the north of the eastern end of Qishm island, and 12 km from Hormuz. See
A. Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies (London, 1930), pp. 59-60.
185 Gouvea, Relacam, Liv. I, if. 16-17.
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Allah-Verdi Khãn again besieged Gombroon. Not only that, but he seized the territories.
at Grombroon of the kingdom of Hormuz. The Persian forces succeeded in holding the
island against several attempts by the Portuguese and Hormuzians to recover it. 186 The
Portuguese thus failed to retake the island, and the Persian vizier was put in charge of
the administration of Bahrain.'87
The capture of Gombroon was the second test of Shah Abbas's strength in the
Gulf. Gombroon itself was merely an insignificant fishing village, but it was situated
opposite Hormuz and served as a point of transshipment for caravans carrying goods to
and from the city.' 88 When Safavid troops pushed southwards to claim the muqarrariya,
they found Gombroon inadequately defended.' 89 The Sultan of Shiraz occupied Qishm
for the first time in 1608 and had a fortress erected next to the derelict Portuguese
building.' 90
 After some years of uneasy truce, Lisbon received news of the fall of
Gombroon into Persian hands in l6l4.'' Initially, the commanding officers of the
occupying force under Imám Qlui Khn doubled as military administrators of the
coastal district.'92
The expulsion of the Portuguese from Bahrain in 1602 was the prelude to their
expulsion from Hormuz and eventually from the whole Gulf. In 1603, after the fall of
Bahrain, Shah Abbas opened serious negotiations with the English, offering them a
186 Gouvea, Relacam, Liv. I, f. 63.
East India Company, Letters received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East
(London, 1896-1902), vol. 2, pp. 99-100.
188 Bocarro, Década 13, part II, pp. 511-12.
189 DRI, I, pp. 218-19, letter from King Philip III to the viceroy, Martim Afonso de Castro, dated 15
March 1608, Lisbon.
' 90 N Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, p. 251.
' DRI, vol. I, p. 219, King Philip II to viceroy Jeronimo de Azevedo, dated 5 March 1615, basd on a
letter from Luis de Gama, capitao de Ormuz; Bocarro, Década 13, part I, pp. 344-45.
192 Falsafi, Zendaané Shah 'AbbàsAwdl, vol.4, pp. 1482, 1519.
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share of the silk trade in return for help against the Portuguese.' 93 These negotiations
ended in co-operation between the two powers, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
***
It was lamentable for the Portuguese that Shah Abbas signed a peace treaty with the
Turks in 1618.194 Thereafter, Persia felt confident enough to engineer the ejection of the
Portuguese from Hormuz, where their presence had become intolerable. The
Portuguese, in order to defend their presence in the Gulf, never attempted to march from
Hormuz into Persia, launch an invasion, and attack the Shah of Persia in his capital, as
the Ottomans did. They simply lacked the resources in Hormuz to do this. Ironically, the
main military weakness of the Portuguese in the Gulf was rooted in a presumed strength
of their overall system - namely their commitment to sea power at the expense of
extensive territorial acquisitions.
In fact we cannot only blame the Portuguese authorities in Goa or in the Gulf for
the errors that occurred in these regions. We should not forget that the system of
Portuguese rule was becoming rather old fashioned by the end of sixteenth century, in
particular after the annexation of Portugal by Spain in 1580. If after sixty years the
Portuguese still lacked full control of the region, and were still slow to appreciate the
possibilities and pitfalls of regional diplomacy, then how after 1580 could the Spanish
begin to understand the Gulf region, its peoples, and its powers?
The Spanish Crown surely inherited a frail and flawed 'system' whose
remarkable achievement had been to survive more or less intact for over half a century.
Indeed, given these weaknesses, one might suggest that the longevity of Portuguese rule
was itself surprising. It follows logically to consider why the Portuguese presence lasted
so long if their structures of authority were so weak. Perhaps the Portuguese were more
resilient than we think. The survival of the Portuguese in the Gulf owed something to
Bocarro, Década 13, part I, pp. 33-6.
' R. Jaffariyãn, Safwah as Duhwr ta Zawal 950-1135 H.D, p. 277.
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their own strength and adaptability, their good fortune, and the disorganisation of their
enemies. After hanging onto Hormuz for almost a century, by the beginning of the
seventeenth century at least one of these three pre-conditions of survival had changed.
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Chapter Five: The Collapse of Portuguese Authority in the Gulf
'If you see European ships anchor off this bar [Hormuz],
flood the moat, and sleep in peace'
(Afonso da Albuquerque)
The object of this final chapter is to outline and assess the breakdown of Portuguese
military and political authority in the Arabian Gulf during the seventeenth century, with
particular emphasis on the fall of Hormuz in 1622. The background, the advent of
sustained European competition to the Portuguese and the intrusions of the Dutch and
English, and the military events specific to the region have been discussed elsewhere.
They will not be repeated at length here - a blow-by-blow account of the campaign
against Portugal in the Gulf would be superfluous. Sufficient material will be provided
to orient the reader.
Instead, this discussion seeks to examine the events, and the fall of Hormuz in
particular, from an 'internal' Gulf perspective, and with an emphasis on regional
diplomacy rather than military hardware. Though the Gulf was a fertile area for the
ambitions of the English and the Dutch, the collapse of Portuguse authority in the region
was much more than a struggle between the European powers. Many discussions of the
fall of Hormuz neglect the ambitions of, and interplay between, the peoples of the Gulf.
In this context, particular emphasis will be laid on the policy of Shah Abbas towards the
Arab tribes on the Persian coastline, the region of 'Arabistãn', at the beginning of the
seventeenth century. This seems to be the key to understanding the collapse of
Portugal's position in the Gulf. Acutely aware of his inability to launch a naval
expedition against Hormuz, the shah cultivated relationships with the coastal Arabs, in
particular those who were resident in Bushahr and Bandar Rig. These people owned
numerous terradas which they used in small-scale trade within the Gulf. They were
good sailors; they understood the climate and they possessed intimate knowledge of the
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coastline. To win the Arabs over and to ensure their loyalty, the shah exploited their
shared Shia faith. In this light, Portugal's handling of relations with the Arab peoples is
almost as important as its dealings with Persia in properly undestanding the fall of
Hormuz. Even after a century of experience in the Gulf, the Portuguese did not
recognise the importance of fostering local support for their regime. They neglected this
support at a crucial moment; the captains were too much involved in business to be
aware of the emergence of new powers on both shores of the Gulf. Though the Arab
tribes were still growing in influence at the beginning of the century, by its end they had
become extremely important. The isolation of Hormuz and the gradual envelopment of
the kingdom's territories will be one of the principal themes under discussion, though
attention will also be paid to the leading actors of the drama such as Ruy Freire.
That said, the Gulf cannot be divorced from the rest of the Portuguese empire
since economically, as well as administratively, Honnuz and Balirain were part of a
much larger system. The physical danger to the Carreira da India's shipping in the
Atlantic, posed by Dutch and English ships, increased markedly during the reign of
Philip III (1598-1621). The danger also arose directly in Asia at the sources of spices
and other goods bound for the European market. This Dutch and English challenge to
the Portuguese Cape route and the Asian country trades, and the Portuguese responses
to the challenge, dominated this period.'
5.1. The Challenge of the East India Companies
England's interest in Asian trade began a century before the founding of the East India
Company, after the epic voyages of Columbus and da Gama led both Iberian powers to
partition and monopolise the world's trade.2
 Perhaps from that time originated the
J. C. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580-1640 (Baltimore and London,
1993), P. 86.
2 P. Lawson, The East India Company: a Histo,y (London, 1993), pp. 7-8.
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question of how to break this Iberian monopoly - a monopoly, it must be remembered,
which the Protestant powers did not recognize. One well known example came in May
1527 with Robert Thorne's suggestion of reaching India by sailing to the north-west.
Thorne returned in October with nothing of value. All attempts to reach India by this
route ended in failure. 3 The merchant-adventurer Anthony Jenkinson made a rather
more practical contribution to the establishment of English commercial interests in the
east. In 1561 he undertook his second overland expedition to Asia, travelling from
England with instructions to open up commercial relations with Persia across Russia.4
Though Jenkinson's expedition was an isolated episode which left no mark on the
country - Shah Tahmasp refused to deal with the 'unbelievers' 5 - such enterprises were
nonetheless statements of intent. They were part of the same incremental process which
took Englishmen to the African coast, the Levant, Russia, and the eastern American
seaboard. 6 English self-confidence was boosted by the defeat of the Armada in 1588,
and perhaps militant Protestant imperialism, drawing on widespread anti-Catholicism,
was just as important as commercial ambition in drawing the English into the wider
world. 7
 The Spanish war offered outlets for both. Either way, the post-Armada period
was important in the formation of England's Asian interests.8
By 1600 the English were ready to sail east around the Cape of Good Hope
using accounts written by a handful of English adventurers like Ralph Fitch, or the
See D. Loades, England's Maritime Empire (Harlow, 2000), pp. 33-4; D. B. Quinn and A. N. Ryan,
England's Sea Empire, 1550-1642 (London, 1983), p. 138; R. Mukherjee, The Rise and Fall of the
East India Company (New York and London, 1974), pp. 60-1.
For details see Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and Persia by Anthony Jenkinson and other
Englishmen, ed. E. D. Morgan and C. A. Coote, (London, 1886); W. Foster, England's Quest of
Eastern Trade, pp. 14, 47.
R. Jaffariyãn, Safwah as Duhwr ta Zawal 950— 1135 H.D., p. 139.
6 The Oxford History of the British Empire, ed. N. Canny (Oxford, 1998), vol. I, chapters 11, 12.
J. C. Appleby, 'War, Politics, and Colonisation, 1558-1625', The Oxford History of the British
Empire, vol. I, p. 56.
8 Loades, England's Maritime Empire, pp. 120-21; Quinn and Ryan, England's Sea Empire, chapter 5,
pp. 133-53; J. C. Appleby, 'War, Politics, and Colonisation, 1558-1625', The Oxford History of the
British Empire, vol. I, pp. 55-78; F. Fernández-Armesto, The Spanish Armada (Oxford, 1988), pp.
269-70.
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Hollander Jan Huyghen Van Linschoten, about the riches of the East and Portugal's grip
on the region. 9 After the threat of Spanish invasion passed, a group of merchants
petitioned Elizabeth I and were granted permission to trade with India.' 0
 The first
expedition of the new company - the Company of Merchants of London trading into the
East Indies - began in 1601 under James Lancaster.' 1 This was the beginning of the
body that came to be known as the English East India Company (ETC).' 2 Though in due
course the Company succeeded in securing a foothold in India, its early voyages were
directed towards the Spice Islands, and especially the Moluccas. The principal interest
of the English, like other Europeans before them, was in the procurement of pepper and
other spices.' 3 Thus, from 1613 Sumatra became the chief supplier of pepper to the
Company. However, to diversify its activities, the Company exploited the existing
carrying trade, and found a market for English woollens. Rapid progress was made. The
Company was soon dispatching ships to Gujarat and to the Coromandel coast. 14 Thus, in
1608 the first English ship arrived at the Gujarati port of Surat; 15
 and in 1612 the
Company obtained a farman from the Mughal emperor confirming the trading
agreement there.' 6 Surat later became the first English headquarters in India and the
centre of the Company's commercial operations with the Red Sea and the Gulf.
Moreover, in 1616 the EIC established factories at Calicut and several other Indian
' Mukherjee, The Rise and fall of the East India Company, p. 59; P. J. Marshall, 'The English in Asia to
1700', The O.çfordHistoiy of the British Empire, vol. I, p. 267.
10 Sykes, A History of Persia, p. 188.
"J. Keay, The Honourable Company (London, 1993), P. 14.
12 For background see 0. Prakash, 'The English East Indian Company and India', in The Worlds of the
East India Company, ed. H. V. Bowen, M. Lincoln and N. Rigby, (Woodbridge, 2002), pp. 1-16; V.
Joseph, A History of the British East India Company 1615-1858 (Cheddar, 1987), p. 13.
13 B. P. Lenman, 'The East Indian Company and the Trade in Non-Metallic Precious Materials', in The
Worlds of the East India Company, pp. 101-02. The EIC also became involved in the diamond trade
of Borneo which the Portuguese controlled before the company arrived.
' P. J. Marshall, 'The English in Asia to 1700', P. 270.
15 To encourage foreign traders in Surat, the English and the Dutch companies had to pay less than four
and five per cent duty on all their goods there. J. Tavemier, Travels in India, vol. I, p. 8.
16 G. Birdwood, Report on the old Records of the India Office, (London, 1890), pp. 209, 211.
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cities. 17 Step by step, then, the EIC became much more than a maritime commercial
organisation as it evolved into a powerful imperial agency.'8
The EIC's first contact with the Arabian Peninsula occurred in 1607, when the
company instructed its third expedition to proceed to Bantam via the Arabian Sea.
Lancaster advised the Company to use the Arabian Sea as a distinct trading basin, with
the Gujarat-Red Sea axis as its main trade route. This opened the possibility of
relocating the Company's existing and much troubled trade with the Spice Islands to
Aden or Surat.'9
From 1614, the English also tried to gain a foothold in Persia. 2° The large stocks
of cloth there must have influenced these efforts. 2 ' In 1616, with the help of Robert
Sherley, three identical Persian farmans were obtained from the Shah ordering the
governors of the ports in Persia to assist English vessels in the Gulf. 22 Quickly the
English established themselves in Jask, to the south of Portuguese occupied Hormuz,
just inside the Gulf. 23 Three years later, in 1619, the Company established a factory
there to facilitate overland trade with the Persian capital at Isfahan. 24 From this strategic
point, and notwithstanding Portuguese control of the Persian coast, the English aimed to
' Birdwood, Report on the old Records of the India Office, pp. 209, 211; Prakash, 'The English East
Indian Company and India', pp. 3-4; Joseph, A History of the British East India Company 1615-1858,
p. 13.
H. V. Bowen, 'No Longer Mere Trade": Continuities and Change in the Metropolitan Development
of the East India Company, 1600-1834', The Worlds of the East Indian Company, p. 19.
' Keay, The Honourable Company, p. 73.
20 Foster, England's Quest of eastern trade, pp. 295-305.
21 R. W. Ferrier, 'The Armenians and the East India Company in Persia in the Seventeenth and early
Eighteenth Centuries', EcHR, 26 (1973), p. 41.
22 B. Sousa, Subsidiospara a história MilitarMaritima da India, vol. III, p. 33.
23 After examining numerous places such as Gombroon, Batinha, Bahrain, Rayshahr, and Jask, they
opted for the latter, which was situated about ninety miles (30 leagues) east of Hormuz. See East
India Company., Letters received by the East India Company from its servants in the East (London,
1896-1902), vol. 2, pp. 145-46, 208-9; The Register of letters & c. Of the Governor and Company of
Merchants of London trading into the East Indies 1600-1619, ed. G. Birdwood and William Foster
(London, 1893), p. 458, n. 1.
24 Birdwood, Report on the old Records of the India Office, p. 212; Wilson, The Persian Gulf p. 139.
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break into the Persian trade. 25
 This was initially in jewels which were bought and
forwarded for sale in Aleppo and Istanbul. 26
 The presence and activities of these English
agents undoubtedly affected Portuguese control of the area; yet at this point the
Company comprised nothing more than peaceful traders with no direct military
confrontations between the two. Portugal's reaction, however, was hostile. In July 1609
William Finch was able to conclude that 'The Portuguese are still the fundamental cause
of all our losses in India'.27
From a Persian perspective it should be remembered that at the beginning of the
seventeenth century Shah Abbas was still trying to establish contact with European
rulers to form an alliance against the Ottomans. Central to this was the opening of a
route for the exportation of Persian silk outside the area controlled by the Turks. 28 To
this end the Shah granted byfarman important privileges to Christian merchants who
wanted to trade with Persia; and because freedom of religion was as important at that
time as trade, the Shah also promised security to all, including the free exercise of their
faith.29
Within Persia the silk trade was monopolised by the royal family. According to
Della Valle, Shah Abbas was the greatest merchant in Persia. 3° The Shah was nominally
responsible for buying silk from local farmers and exporting it through the Gulf to
foreign buyers. 3 ' But, one may ask, why was silk sent through the Gulf and not directly
to India or to Europe via the overland route? The answer is quite simple. Since the
Turks occupied the old route between Persia and Europe, Abbas sought to deprive them
25 Foster, England's Quest of eastern trade, p. 298.
23 Lenman, 'The East Indian Company and the Trade in Non-Metallic Precious Materials', p. 104.
27 Letters received by the East India Company from its servants in the East, vol. 1, p. 26.
28 See Chapter Three, section 3.
29 M. Samnani, Shah Abbas Kaber, pp. 108-10; Falsafi, Zendagané Shah 'Abbãs Awãl, vol. 4, p. 1477.
30 The Travels of Pietro Della Valle in India, vol. II, p. 334.
Sanmani, Shah Abbas Kaber, p. 110. The revenue annual of the trade silk was about 8 million Persian
turn an.
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of the customs which they levied from silk, and to get a better price. More broadly, the
Shah hoped to keep the Gulf route under his control, not only for the sake of his
kingdom's economy, but also for his personal benefit. With some success he forced
Armenian merchants and others to help him make his new capital city of Isfahan a
commercial centre to rival Hormuz. Commercial ambition was a characteristic of the
Shah's reign, and is visible in many of policies; and it was ultimately the reason why he
ousted the Portuguese from Bahrain, Gombroon, Qishm and finally from Hormuz.32
***
The Dutch appeared relatively late in Eastern waters, between 1595 and 1597, as a
result of the outbreak of revolt against Spain with the consequent, and irreparable,
damage done to Antwerp in 1585 as the staple market of Asian spices in north-western
Europe. 33 In 1595 the first Dutch ships arrived on the Indian coast. 34
 The birth of the
Dutch East Indian Company (or VOC) followed in March 1602 with a charter granted
by the States-General. Like its English rival, the Dutch Company was a joint-stock
monopoly corporation. 35
 The Portuguese example showed the Dutch the need for a
centre of shipping, trade and governance in the East. They also came to the conclusion
that a monopoly of spices was necessary for profitable trade in these commodities.36
32 W. Floor, The Economy of Safavid Persia (Wiesbaden, 2000) p. 61.
Prakash, 'The English East Indian Company and India', p. 2. For background to these events see J. L.
Price, Tue Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Centuiy (London, 1998), pp. 1-15.
The Travels of Pietro Della Valle in India, vol. I, p. xii.
Prakash, 'The English East Indian Company and India', p. 2. The Dutch East India Company (the
Verenigde Oost-indische Compagnie or VOC), was a very large and complex organisation founded
from the unification of six smaller companies that had been trading to the East since 1594. In little
more than a decade the Company established 28 factories and 15 fortresses in East and South East
Asia. See EIC, Letters received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East, vol. 2, pp.
309-10; F. S. Gaastra, 'War, Competition and Collaboration: Relations between the English and
Dutch East India Company in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries' in The Worlds of the East
Indian Company, p. 50; B. J. Slot, The Arabs of the Gulf 1602-1784, pp. 69-72. See also J. Israel,
Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740 (Oxford, 1982).
36 Gaastra, 'War, Competition and Collaboration', p. 50.
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Bypassing the Gulf region, the Dutch initially paid more attention to South-East
Asia, in particular Sumatra, Java and Borneo. 37 Before too long, however, in 1611, the
first contact between the Dutch and Persia was brought about by the younger brother of
Robert Sherley, with the purpose of gaining a share in the Persian silk trade. 38 Shah
Abbas subsequently approached them without the knowledge of the English. In 1614 a
number of Amsterdam merchants, some of whom were involved with the VOC, tried to
promote business with Persia through Russia. 39 Two years later the Dutch established
themselves at Surat, following the English and exacerbating Portuguese concerns about
their security there.4° The commercial possibilities of silk were already evident in 1603,
when the Dutch captured a laden Portuguese merchantman and sold her cargo for a huge
sum.4 ' However, the purpose of the Dutch in Persia and the Gulf was not so much the
purchase of silk as the sale of pepper and other spices.42 This trade was destined to play
a key role in Dutch-Persian relations.
Thus, the first contacts between the new European naval powers and the
Portuguese were based on freebooting and piracy, themselves extensions of Dutch-
Iberian rivalry in Europe. 43
 As a matter of course the Dutch expended far more energy
against Portuguese elements of the Iberian Union than those of Spain, and Portuguese
concerns about the security of Hormuz were well-founded. Initially Dutch activities
were limited to attacks on Portuguese shipping on the Omani coast near Dofar. 45
 In
1609 there appeared a large Dutch fleet in the Arabian Sea. In 1614 a number of cargo
" M. Meilink-Roelofez, Asian Trade and European influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between
1500 and about 1630, pp. 207-38; Mukherjee, The Rise and Fall of the East India Company, p. 60.
38 Meilink-Roelofez, The Earliest Relations between Persia and the Netherlands, p. 5.
39Ibid.
40 Mukherjee, The Rise and Fall of the East India Company, p. 60.
" K. Glamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade 1620-1 700, (Copenhagen, 1958), p. 112.
42 Falsafi, Zendaané Shah 'Abbãs Awãl, vol. 4, p. 1499.
P. P. Shirodkar, 'Dutch-Portuguese Relations in the East (1580-1663)', Stvdia, 48 (1989), pp. 123-24.
Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire (London, 1965), pp. 25-26.
L. Cordeiro,Dois capitaes da India ( Lisbon, 1898), p. 147.
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vessels in Portuguese employment from Diu, Chaul, and Dabhul were seized near
Aden.46 In 1623 the VOC set up an establishment at Bandar Abbas at the Shah's
invitation.47 Outside the Gulf, moreover, between 1637 and 1663 the Dutch captured the
principal settlements of the Portuguese in the Spice Islands, Java, and India.48
Within a few years, then, the Portuguese found themselves confronted by foes of
a different calibre to the ill-armed Asians they had hitherto dealt with. The Dutch and
the English appeared in the East to dispute their maritime superiority, to oppose them as
commercial rivals, and eventually, as time proved, to precipitate the collapse of their
Eastern Empire. These European interlopers not only damaged the economic base of the
Portuguese presence by breaking into trades formerly monopolised by them, but also
conducted military operations against Portuguese establishments and shipping.
It is unnecessary here to describe in detail the conflict between these European
powers in the East,49 yet one must at least be aware that clashes in Asia made an
important contribution to Portugal's waning position in the world at large. In the 1620s
the relationship between the Gulf and the overall Portuguese system was perhaps at its
most important; for in this period, more than any other, the Gulf was not merely a detail
from a larger imperial canvass.
46 c G. Brouwer and A. Kaplanian, Early Seventeenth Century Yemen, (Leiden-New York, 1988), pp.
22-5.
B. J. Slot, 'The Dutch East India Company and Babram', Al-Watheaka, 4, (1984), p. 252. There is no
certain information about Dutch commerce in the Gulf at this time, though in December 1626
William Foster observed some Dutch ships with a cargo of goods in the factory of Bandar Abbas. See
W. Foster, 'A view of Ormuz in 1627', Geographical Journal, no. 4, (London, 1894), p. 161.
48 See Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire, pp. 106-27; and Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire
in Asia 1500-1 700, pp. 172-80.
' For good descriptions see Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire; Idem, The Portuguese Seaborne
Empire; Shirodkar, 'Dutch-Portuguese Relations in the East (1580-1663)'; Boyajian, Portuguese
Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580-1640; Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies.
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5. 2. The Fall of Hormuz in 1622
As has been demonstrated elsewhere in this thesis, the backdrop to early seventeenth-
century European entanglements in the Portuguese Gulf was instability and increasing
hostility from local peoples. 5° This situation made its own contribution to the fall of
Hormuz, but it also interacted with English policy towards the Portuguese. As a
consequence there are numerous points to be considered in order to properly understand
Portugal's loss of Hormuz to an alliance of English and Persian forces.
One point at least seems clear. The security of Hormuz was badly, perhaps
fatally, compromised when relations with Safavid Lãr broke down in 1607-8 over the
issue of the muqarrariya tribute payments.5 ' These muqarrarlyas played such a
profound role in relations between the Portuguese and the rulers of the Persian
provinces on the eastern coast of the Gulf that they also affected the position of
Hormuz. Thus, the fall of Hormuz was not sudden, but was the result of the
accumulated mistakes of sixteenth-century diplomacy. Instead of coming to tenns with
the expansion of Persian trade, the Portuguese administration in Goa and in the Gulf
contested it, compelling the Persians to buy commodities at fixed and inflated prices
and to ship their wares on Portuguese vessels. 52 These antagonistic and short-sighted
actions brought the Persian nemesis upon them.
When Shah Abbas came to the throne in 1587 the Portuguese fortress of Hormuz
was a thorn in his side. He spent most of his reign thinking about how to remove it.
Though the war with the Turks occupied most of their resources, by the beginning of
the seventeenth century the Persians had recaptured most of their territories.53
Furthermore, after gaining a considerable victory over the Uzbek tribes in the north in
50 See Chapter Three, section 2.
51 See Chapter Two, section 1.
52 See Chapter Two, section 1; S. Purchas, His Pilgrims, vol. x., pp. 334-35.
Samnani, Shah Abbas Kaber, p. 111.
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1618, Shah Abbas assented to a peace treaty with the Ottomans.54 This was regrettable
for the Portuguese since the shah immediately turned his attention towards the south,
and the Gulf. Quite simply, peace with his neighbours was the condition which allowed
the Shah to focus solely on the Portuguese in the Gulf. Thereafter Shah Abbas made
contact with the Arab tribes on the Persian coast and Lär, which gave the Persians
useful support in the eastern arm of the Gulf. Presumably the Shah was also aware of
the pressure that the Spanish were under in Europe, especially from the Dutch. 55 This
conjunction of circumstances left Persia in a strong position to challenge the Portuguese
in Hormuz and the Gulf
One element of the Shah's strategy was to cultivate relations with the English.
This was in complete contrast to the policy of his predecessor Tahmasp, and was a
threat evidently perceived by the Spanish authorities. In 1613, for instance, Philip III
warned the viceroy of India about Robert Sherley's mission to London, suggesting that
he might have had authority to buy English support against Hormuz with privileges in
Persian silk.56
A second part of his strategy was to deploy Persian satellites against the
kingdom of Hormuz. One such pawn was Qamber Beg, Khän of Lär. Qamber's pretext
for action against Hormuz was the issue of unpaid muqarrarlyas, though in fact they
had been suspended since Albuquerque's time. 57
 Nonetheless, the Khän did what he
could to obstruct the trade of I-Iormuz. Differences also arose over the silk trade. The
Persians, moreover, would not allow the Portuguese to have cattle or water from the
mainland of Persia.58
Jaffariyãn, Safwah as Duhwr ta Zawal 950-1135 H.D., p. 277.
J. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World 1606- 1661 (Oxford, 1982), chapter II.
56 Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol. II, p. 208.
Purchas, His Pilgrims, vol. x., p. 334.
58 Ibid.
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Hormuz's logistical weaknesses were further exploited in 1607 when the
Persians occupied two wells near Gombroon from which the island drew much of its
water. 59
 They also built two small fortifications near the old fortress. Following
negotiations, the wells were returned to the Portuguese, but the defensive works that had
been built close to the Portuguese mud fortress on the shore remained in place. As a
consequence the Portuguese lost exclusive control over the coastal area opposite
Hormuz:6° they were thus deprived of their last foothold on the mainland in a climate of
increasing Persian aggression. Significantly, in 1616, two years after the loss of
Gombroon, LuIs da Gama, the captain of Hormuz, advised Goa to bring water from
Qishm and Larak (Lareca) islands to supply his command, giving full details about the
advantages and disadvantages of both islands and their distance from Hormuz.6'
These events were part of the gradual isolation of Hormuz. Most areas of the
Gulf that had been subject to the kingdom came under the control of either the Persians
or the Arabs, both of whom opposed the Portuguese. In addition, Hormuz, and the
Portuguese by extension, lost the pearl banks of the western Gulf, which were not only a
very considerable source of revenue, but also a means of keeping influence with the
coastal Arab tribes through the provision of diving licenses.62
Notionally, however, diplomatic channels between the Persians and the Spanish-
Portuguese Union remained open, despite the growing rift. In 1604, for instance, the
ambassador, Lacerda, who accompanied Allah Verdi Beg when he returned back from
Goa to the Persian court, counselled that the silk caffilas should come from Persia direct
to Hormuz. He also warned the Shah not to contact other European nations. 63
 Such
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60 Abbas, Mutalate Der Bab Bahrain Wa Jazair Khaleej Fars, pp. 79-81; C. Boxer, Commentaries of
Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, p. xxi.
61 The attack on Gombroon left the population and garrison of Hormuz without fresh water. See Livro
das Moncôes, tomo III, pp. 3 60-62.
62 Slot, The Arabs of the Gulf 1602-1784, p. 98.
63 Gouvea, Relacam, Liv. I, f. 66; Livro das Moncöes, tomo I, doc. 3, pp. 11-2.
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'advice' from a religious envoy sent to deal with the Shah smacks of arrogance: the
Portuguese still behaved as if they were the masters of the Gulf, issuing directives to be
followed by their neighbours. Perhaps the Spanish crown still supposed that the Shah
needed its support against the Ottomans, and for the moment this might have been true.
The Shah's attitude to Spain's delegations certainly suggests this. On the other hand, in
1606 Shah Abbas made a point of reminding Spain's special envoy, Diogo de Santa
Anna,64 that he had won his victories against the Ottomans with his army and without
the help of Christian rulers.65
Yet it is interesting that diplomatic ties, however slender, survived until the very
eve of Persia's assault on Hormuz. Having received no news of Anthony Sherley's
embassy to Europe since 1599,66 in 1608 Abbas dispatched the Englishman's brother
Robert to make a pact with Philip III against the Turks, but the proposal was not well
received. 67
 In 1616 Sherley was sent on a second mission to Madrid with the object of
concluding a treaty by which the whole monopoly of the silk trade would be given to
Spain in return for suitable payment via the Portuguese. 68 The Spanish too tried on
several occasions to patch up relations with Persia for the sake of Hormuz. In 1618,
while Robert Sherley was still in Madrid, Philip sent an embassy to the Persian court at
Qazvin which was outwardly successful. 69 Shah Abbas gave a favourable reception to a
modified Spanish proposal that the silk monopoly be granted to the Portuguese. 7° Yet
this accomplishment was superficial. In reality Hormuz remained the Shah's chief
priority - it was only his pause for a suitable moment that delayed an assault on the
He was sent by the Archbishop of Goa, Frei Aleixo de Menezes, who was also the functioning
governor. See Appendix I, no. 2.
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D. Ross, Sir Anthony Sherley and his Persian Adventure (London, 1933), p. 22.
D. W. Davies, Elizabethans Errant, pp. 228-30; FalsafT, Zendaané Shah 'Abbãs Awãl, vol. 4, p.
1578.
68 Wilson, The Persian Gulf, p. 132.
69 Livro das Mon çdes, tomo IV, pp. 284-8 5.
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island. This moment came in March 1619 when Philip III explained the terms of the
Persian silk agreement to the captain of Hormuz. The actual implementation of the
agreement was to be made entirely dependent upon the restoration of Bahrain and
Gombroon by the Shah to the king of Hormuz.7 ' Yet, in this matter Philip was
dreaming: negotiations between the Spanish and the Persians failed and the agreement
never became operative. Quite simply - and irrespective of Persia's thinly veiled
intentions towards Hormuz - the Spanish king was too extreme in his demands. Philip
seems to have assumed the right of monopoly over all Asian trade, and was angered that
Persia permitted the EIC to establish their factory at Jask. 72 When the Spanish envoy
Figueroa demanded the restoration of Bahrain and Gombroon in his final interview with
the Shah at Isfahan in 1619, the latter used the occasion, in front of an audience of
foreign ambassadors, to declare his intention of driving the Portuguese from their
fortress at Hormuz. 73 At the same time he ordered afarman to be made out, granting the
sole trade in silks by sea to the English. Figueroa immediately left the Persian court for
Hormuz, from where he embarked for Goa in April 1 620.
The timing of the Shah's open break with the Spanish-Portuguese Union is
intriguing. Perhaps, on the one hand, Abbas felt that his forces were now up to the task
of dislodging the Portuguese. More important, though, was his need for naval support.
The occupation of Lär in 1602 and Gombroon in 1615 brought the Persians within
striking distance of Hormuz island, 75
 but they still needed the assistance of a naval
power strong enough to challenge the Portuguese at sea. Once both pieces were in place
Hormuz would surely fall. Even then, however, Abbas shrewdly assessed the outcome
" Livro das Moncôes tomo XI, pp. 126-27, tomo XII, pp. 140-50.
72 Sousa, Subsidios para a história Militar Maritima da India, vol. III, pp. 31-4.
The Travels of Pietro Della Valle in India, vol. II, pp. 238-39; Abbas, Mutalate Der Bab Bahrain Wa
JazairKhaeejFars, p. 86.
G. S. Figueroa, Comentarios de Garcia de Silvay Figueroa (Madrid,1903), tomo II, pp. 582-83.
See Chapter Three, above, and El, New ed., vol. IV, pp. 665-76.
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of the conflict between the Portuguese and the English in the Gulf before making his
final decision. This was noted by the Italian traveller Pietro Valle: 'I am in no doubt that
the question of peace or war between the Portuguese and the Persians greatly depends
on what happens between the Portuguese and the English.'76
The English and the Dutch played a further, indirect, role in shaping the Shah's
policy. The 'Treaty of Defence' of 1619 briefly united England with the Dutch Republic
in war against the Portuguese, in which the assault on Hormuz was the EIC's most
remarkable action. 77
 Their predatory activities in the Gulf and elsewhere divided
Portugal's forces and weakened their capacity to resist. In fact it is fair to say that the
Portuguese did not have the means to pay much heed to their problems in the Gulf.
Most of their military efforts were directed towards the defence of their eastern Asian
interests against Dutch attack. 78
 Moreover, the Spanish-Dutch war in Europe resumed in
1621. In the early seventeenth century the kingdom of Honnuz shrank under the
pressure of Persian and Arab attacks, as we have seen. 8° Yet despite these reverses
Hormuz was still a considerable economic power in the Gulf. Both its trade and
afándega revenue were growing during the last quarter of the sixteenth century century
and the first two decades of the seventeenth century which gave Shah Abbas more
impetus to conquer the island.8'
None of the foregoing discussion of Persia's diplomatic and military
preparations is intended to give the impression that the fate of Portuguese Hormuz was
entirely out of its own hands. We can also observe the slowness of the Portuguese to
respond seriously to the danger. This can be attributed to the inexperience of the
76 The Travels of Pietro Della Valle in India, vol. II, pp. 194 -95.
See Quinn and Ryan, England's Sea Empire, 1550-1 642, P p. 160-3; and J. C. Appleby, 'War, politics
and colonisation', Pp. 75-7.
78 Gaastra, 'War, Competition and Collaboration', pp. 5 1-2.
J. I. Israel, Conflicts ofEmpires (London, 1997), pp. 23-45.
80 See Chapter Four, section 3.
81 Purchas, His Pilgrims, vol. x., p. 335.
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Portuguese administration there. 82
 Along with their colleagues in Goa, they were
hesitant in beginning an open conflict with Persia. 83 As a result, all of those who held
grudges against Hormuz, from the inland tribes of the Arabian Peninsula to the southern
coast in Oman, rose up against the kingdom in the region between Julfar and Shuar.84
Moreover, there were serious troubles around Suhar between 1615 and 1616 because
the town was contested by several elements of the Al-Nabhan tribe.85
The hard fact was that the land between Julfar and Shuar on the western coast of
the Gulf was the only area that remained to the king of Hormuz in this period. Although
the king, Mohammed Shah V, asked the Portuguese captain there on several occasions
to supply troops to defend the area, it was impossible for him to do so because there
were insufficient men, and a modest naval force that numbered three small ships and
one galley without rowers or equipment. 86 Thus, Portugal's recurrent logistical
problems played a part in the erosion of Hormuz's authority. Having prohibited the king
from maintaining his own forces, 87 the Portuguese alone were physically incapable of
securing both their own interests and those of the kingdom of Hormuz.
Matters were not helped by continuing Portuguese neglect of local support. Even
in the early seventeenth century there were potential allies to be found, including Arab
tribes on the east coast of the Gulf which opposed the westward expansion of the
Persian state. One such group was led by a chieftain from Nakhelu called Au Kamal.
According to Falsafi, Kamal left the Persian coast with his followers because of
problems with the Persian court. He established a base near Julfar and offered himself
82 See Chapter Three, section 1.
83 Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, p. xxii.
Figueroa, Comentarios de Garcia de Si/va y Figueroa, tomo II, pp. 383-84.
85 For this see C. Boxer, 'New light on the Relations between the Portuguese and the Omani, 16 13-
1633', pp. 32-3.
86 Slot, The Arabs of the Gulf 1602-1784, pp. 102-03
87 See above, pp. 146-7.
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as an ally to Hormuz, promising to serve the Spanish in the defence of their kingdom.88
In return Kamal asked for money to recruit members of his tribe from Nakhelu and to
buy their loyalty. 89 However, neither the king nor the captain of Hormuz did anything to
exploit this opportunity: Kamal could have been very useful in mustering a great
number of Arabs opposed to the Persians. 9° Instead, in 1620, the Persians were allowed
to neutralize the threat posed by Kamal and his small force. 9 ' The Persians, in contrast,
were quick to enlist Arab support, much of it already alienated from the violence and
caprice of Portuguese rule. 92 A practical example came with the occupation of Lãr at the
beginning of the seventeenth century, after which Imám Quli Khãn allied himself with
several coastal tribes who supported small-scale maritime attacks on the Portuguese.93
However, even accepting the importance of Persian intrigue and Portuguese
frailty, the fact remains that the English played a pivotal role in the fall of Hormuz in
1622. The Portuguese continued to have misgivings about their arrival in Persia and
their Jask factory. Portuguese documents indicate alarm by 1614 at the latest, when
Jorge de Castel Branco, the captain of Hormuz, advised Jerónimo de Azevedo in Goa of
the first contacts between the English and the Persians (muito que os inglezes procuram
a amisade do rey da Persia). 94 Other warnings about the English and their ambitions
presumably arose from Robert Sherley's agreements with the Persian Shah. 95 Concern
escalated as the EIC deepened its involvement in Persian trade, with the Shah's evident
88 Falsafi, Zendaané Shah 'AbbãsAwai, vol. 4, p. 1553.
89 Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. III, pp. 217, 303.
90 L. Cordeiro, Como se Perdeu Ormuz, (Lisbon, 1896), p. 67.
Slot, The Arabs of the Gulf 1602-1 784, pp. 103-5.
92 Falsafi, Zendaané Shah 'Abbãs Awãl, vol. 4, p. 1553. The most important of the Arab tribes on the
Persian coast were resident in Bushahr and Bander Rig. Shah Abbas had more power over the Arab
coastal tribes of Bushahr and Bander Rig than in any other area on the Persian coast. See Slot, The
Arabs of the Gulf 1602-1 784, p. 63.
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94 Livro das Moncôes, tomo II, p. 469.
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encouragement. The Portuguese noticed that their ability to channel and tax seaborne
commerce in the Gulf was coming to an end.96
In 1619 Philip III took measures to preserve Iberian supremacy in the Gulf. Two
naval squadrons were sent to the region - one from Goa commanded by Francisco de
Lima with four naus, and another from Lisbon under Ruy Freire de Andrade - with
clear orders to drive off the English and secure Hormuz against a possible Persian
attack. 97
 The force placed under Ruy Freire consisted of two galleons and three small
vessels (urcas), carrying a total of 178 guns and more than 2,000 men. 98
 Freire reached
Hormuz in June 1 620. His arrival did not go unnoticed. A report from the factors at
Jask observed that 'the Portugals are grown great men, and begin to look big'.'°° In the
following November Freire sailed to Jask to intercept the English ships which were
expected to arrive there in December with the annual cargo of goods for Persia. He met
two ships of the EIC, the Hart and the Eagle, both of which escaped to Surat.'°1
As late as December 1620 Shah Abbas tried to reassure the Portuguese about his
dealings with the English;' 02
 but the Portuguese authorities in Goa realised that 'the
English would not tamely abandon the trade they had successfully begun'.'° 3 This was
confirmed on 7 January 1621 when fighting broke out at the Cape of Jask between Ruy
Freire's squadron and an English fleet of four vessels.' 04 The wind ran against the
96 Ljvro das Moncôes, tomo IV, pp. 6-7.
Cordeiro, Como se Perdeu Ormuz, p. 17; Sousa, Subsidios para a história Militar Maritima da India,
vol. III, p. 71.
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vol. III, pp. 76-77.
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Portuguese and the English had the better of the skirmish.'° 5 This engagement is
important for several reasons. It was the first military confrontatjop in the Gulf between
two European powers. It demonstrated that Portuguese vessels were less weatherly than
those of their northern rivals.' 06 Perhaps most importantly it served as a litmus test of
European strength in the Gulf. It was a timely illustration for the Persians of the
changing balance of power in the region, even if this balance had already been shifting
for some years. It had been reported in 1596 that the armadas did not patrol as
frequently as they should have done out of fear of Dutch and English ships, and because
of being poorly equipped.'°7
After the reverse at Jask, Freire turned his attention to the second objective that
he had been set by the king, namely securing Hormuz from Persian invasion. In this
respect his brief included the construction of a fortress on the island of Qishrn,'°8
presumably to protect the wells that were situated there for supplying water to
Hormuz.'°9 This project was carried out at an unfortunate moment: the fortification of
the island provided an excuse for Shah Abbas to start a war with the Portuguese. Such
an obvious counter to Persian ambitions in the region was sufficient provocation. The
Shah, through his envoy, protested against this operation to the Portuguese
administration at Hormuz: 'the Portuguese and the English, both, they should solve their
problems out of our sea boundaries'." 0 In any case, in the event of war with Persia it
would be of little use to have a fort dominating the wells at Qishm when the Portuguese
would not be able to transport water from there to Hormuz. These points were made to
105 W. Foster, The English Factories in India 1622-1 623 (Oxford, 1908), PP. 223-24; Birdwood, Report
on the Old Records of the India Office, p. 212; Sousa, Subsidios para a história Militar Maritima da
India, vol. III, p. 125.
106 See Cogs, Caravels and Galleons: the Sailing Ship 1000-1 650, ed. R. Gardiner (London, 1994), pp.
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228
Ruy Freire, either by Fernao de Albuquerque, the governor of India, or by Luiz de
Sousa, the captain of Hormuz." The king of Hormuz, however, was of a different
opinion. Mohammed Shah still retained his dream of restoring the old kingdom. He
considered that all the coasts of Persia were legally under his authority, not only Qishm,
and he therefore agreed with Freire's more aggressive stance. 112 In the end Freire
113'-ri..ignored the warnings of his colleagues and insisted on fortifying Qishm. iS was inS
first big mistake. It seems that the 'hot-headed' commander, a.s Boxer described him,
would not listen to reason and pursue the English at sea. 114 The outcome of the
engagement at Jask had planted the seeds of doubt in Freire's mind about Portugal's
maritime supremacy in the Gulf. A second failure would damage his aristocratic pride
and endanger his command.
Having chosen his path, in May 1621 Ruy Freire commenced construction work
at Qishm. Following their failure to oppose the Portuguese disembarkation, 115 the
Persians were easily reinforced from the mainland with the support of four hundred
Arab boats which were assembled on the Persian coastline, 6
 and the Portuguese and
Hormuzians found themselves closely besieged by about 25,000 men led by Abdullah
Hussain Khän. He was sent by Imám Quli Khän, who had been placed in charge of the
campaign by Shah Abbas." 7 While Freire was working on the fortress, two galleons
came from Goa to his assistance commanded by Manuel de Azevedo and John de
Livro das Moncôes tomo XII, p. 95. For more detailes about this argument see Cordeiro, Como se
Perdeu Ormuz, pp. 47-52.
I12 Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, p. 34.
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Silveira, who were, as Sousa noted, enemies of Freire; they were 'ill manned, and scarce
of ammunitions, and brought instructions that curbed the power of the admiral'.118
Later, at crisis point, these captains deserted Freire and returned to Goa."9
Some of the most serious instances of Portuguese atrocities and violence in the
Gulf occurred under Ruy Freire's command, giving rise to anger among the coastal
tribes on both the Persian and Arabian shores. Freire burnt and sacked nearly all the
ports and villages between Kung and Jask, and others in Julfar.' 2° These ravages were
carried out at an inauspicious time for the Portuguese. It would have been preferable to
adopt diplomatic means to deal with the people, because the Portuguese needed
assistance from the Gulf's inhabitants. Freire, however, believed that he could preempt
an assault on Hormuz by destroying local shipping, thus preventing the Khãn of Shiraz
from collecting a sufficient number of craft to transport his force over to Hormuz. He
might also impede the passage of reinforcements from the mainland to Qishm, and stifle
the pearl fisheries.' 2 ' In this he was wrong. As Boxer points out, this inhumane
behaviour only served to render the wretched inhabitants more bitter towards the
Portuguese than before.122
The Persians besieged Qishm for about nine months, from June 1621 until
February 1622. They took many casualties in their numerous assaults on the fortress,
and all their efforts to take it proved vain. There seems to have been a realisation among
the Persian commanders that the stronghold would not fall unless they controlled the
surrounding sea lanes. Accordingly they decided to put pressure on the English to assist
118 Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. III, p. 303.
° Ibid., p. 304.
120 See Chapter Three, section 3; Sousa, Subsidiospara a história Militar Maritima da India, vol. III, p.
167-68; Boxer, 'New light on the relations between the Portuguese and the Omani, 1613-1633', p.
37. Ruy Freire attacked Kung, Kuhistak, Saramiyen, Lafet, Jask, and Julfar.
12J For more details of these events on the Persian coast see Cordeiro, Como se Perdeu Ormuz, pp. 71-
88; Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, pp. 62-73.
122 Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, p. xxix.
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them in their operations against the Portuguese.' 23
 At the same time, in November 1621,
discussions took place between James I and the coun cil of the EIC at Surat with a view
to acting against the Portuguese in the Gulf, not only defensively but also offensively.
These deliberations did not produce a plan to capture Hormuz.' 24 Therefore, when nine
English vessels arrived at Jask from Surat on 26 December 1621, Imãm Quli Khãn used
the opportunity to exert pressure on the English.' 25
 He asked, surely by order of the
Shah, the commanders of the fleet for assistance against the Portuguese, holding out
promises of reward, but also threatening the withdrawal of the Company's trading
privileges in Persia and the confiscation of the silk that was then in transit. 126 The
Company was aware that the conflict between the Persians and the Portuguese had been
brought to a head by the favours that had been granted to them, and if they refused to
give assistance to the Persians it would mean the loss of the silk trade.' 21 In addition, it
should be noted that Ruy Freire ordered his naval forces to destroy Jask while he was
fighting the Persians in Qishm, as he thought this would not only harm the Persians but
also sever English trade with Persia. This attack on Jask succeeded and Portuguese and
Hormuzian forces plundered the town and the English factory.' 28 However, this proved
to be Freire's second mistake. It served to intensif' English hostility to the Portuguese
and ultimately to broaden out the conflict in the Gulf. The destruction of Jask also
demonstrates that the war between the Portuguese and their enemies was mainly an
economic struggle to control the Gulrs trade routes. As Cordeiro points out, Kung and
Jask were destroyed by Freire so that the English would not be able to come back to
123 Purchas, His Pilgrims, vol. X., p. 329; Boxer, Portuguese Conquest and Commerce in South Asia,
1500-1 750, p. 72.
124 Purchas, His Pilgrims, vol. X., pp. 329-30, 342.
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these ports to receive the silks that would be brought by caffilas in the monsoon
season. 12
In light of all this, and owing to the efforts of Edward Monox, the Company's
agent in Persia, the English decided to accept the Shah's 'request'.' 3° The curtailment of
Portuguese influence would bring certain advantages, and the English probably derived
sufficient encouragement from the outcome of the first battle in 1621 to be confident in
taking on the Portuguese once again. An agreement was drawn up on 9 January with
Imám Quli Khän in Kuhistak.' 3 ' The two parties agreed to the conduct of combined
operations against the Portuguese by land and sea on the general basis that: the fortress
of Hormuz would be given to the English on its capture; the spoils and the future
customs of Hormuz would be equally divided; English trade at Hormuz would be
forever duty-free; any Christian captives were to be at the disposal of the English and
the Muslims at that of the Persians; and the Persians were to pay half the expenses of
the English fleet during its operations. The Khn accepted all but the surrender of the
castle, which he suggested should be jointly occupied until the Shah decided its long-
term future.' 32 The agreement between the two sides was not a national treaty and so it
did not outlive the immediate purpose of its signature.
The English joined the siege of Qishm in the last week of January 1622.133
Negotiations were held between Monox and Freire. Freire reminded Monox that he was
129 Cordeiro, Como se Perdeu Ormuz, p. 86.
130 Foster, The English Factories in India 1 622-1 623, p. 32.
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Cordeiro, Como se Perdeu Ormuz, see Appendix 'Sexto Documento', pp. 295-96. Pietro Valle
observed here that the English, because of their ignorance of Persian, had been hoodwinked by Quli
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translated after the fall of Hormuz, they discovered that it was the town, not the fortress, they had
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giving his assistance to 'Moores' against Christian forces. Monox countered that he
came not 'to treat of busynisses of such antequitye, but to treat of sattisfaxione and
revenge for the warrs begun and attempted by himselfe, Rufrero, against our fleete in
Jasques, to the losse of a very worthy commander'. 134 These talks brought no resolution:
Freire refused to surrender, and the fortress was bombarded with little effect.'35
Ultimately the garrison rebelled against their commander, seemingly at the instigation
of their priests, and surrendered the fort to the English.' 36 In February 1622 Freire was
sent with his men to Surat, from where he escaped to Muscat.' 37 The hapless Lascarin
auxiliaries were not so fortunate. A savage revenge Was exacted against them by the
Persians: having first promised mercy, the Khän had them massacred like a flock of
sheep. In fact both sides, the English and the Persians, violated the terms of
surrender.138
The fall of Qishm to the English-Persian alliance was crucially important
because of its role as a major supplier of agricultural products to feed I-Iormuz. In
addition, its fall was the first step precipitating a crisis in Hormuz because it deprived
the garrison and inhabitants of Hormuz of one of their sources of water. 139 Thus, when
Qishm was besieged, there was more than melodrama in Simão de Mello's exclamation
that 'Hormuz is lost'.' 40 In addition, the loss of Ruy Freire was a serious blow. It seems
that de Mello - the new commander - did not have the spirit or the gift of leadership
required by his predicament.
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xxxv, 109; Falsafi, Zendaané ShahAbbãsAwãl, vol.4, p. 1547.
' Purchas, His Pilgrims, vol. X., p. 333. See Chapter Two for more details.
140 Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, p. 116.
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On receiving news of the fall of Qishm and the siege of Hormuz, in March 1622
Fernão de Albuquerque sent a relief squadron from Goa composed of seventeen light
vessels commanded by Constantino de Sá Noronha. Noronha, however, was poorly
qualified for the task.' 4 ' He showed little urgency, in spite of the situation's gravity.
When his fleet was scattered by a storm shortly after leaving Goa at the beginning of
April, he anchored at Muscat where he was joined by Ruy Freire, who was intent upon
returning to Hormuz to retrieve his reputation. 142 In the meantime de Mello, thinking
that the enemy would be satisfied with Qishm, began the futile task of brokering peace
with the Persians, but without any success.' 43 Moreover, relations within Hormuz
remained tense. Mohammed Shah berated de Mello because of his inaction over
The campaign progressed to Hormuz on 9 February 1622 with the arrival of an
expedition comprising six English ships and about two hundred boats carrying 3,000
Persian troops commanded by Imárn Quli Khãn.' In the agreement between the allies
it was arranged that the Persians would attack from the side of the city, while the
English bombarded the fortress from their vessels and artillery positions they had
constructed on land.' 46 The English contribution to the assault was significant. They
destroyed the Portuguese fleet at Hormuz, ship by ship, tightening the siege and
blocking the arrival of aid from Goa.' 47
 Allied troops drove the Portuguese into Hormuz
'' Other commanders of limited capacity included Manuel de Azevedo, João de Silveyra, Simão de
Mello. See Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. III, pp. 303-04, 308.
142 The Travels ofPietro Della Valle in India, vol. II, p. 397; FalsafT, Zendaané Shah 'Abbds Awãl, vol.
4, pp. 1547-48.
I4 Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. III, p. 309.
144 Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, pp. 105-06.
Foster, The English Factories in India 1622-1623, pp. 76, 151; Sousa stated that 12,000 Persians
came over in their Barques. Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. III, p. 309; Purchas, His Pilgrims, vol.
X., p. 346. A full account of the siege of Honnuz can found in L. Cordeiro, Como se Perdeu Ormuz,
pp. 173-281; Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, pp. 116-70.
' Foster, The English Factories in India 1622-1623, pp. xi, 76.
147 Purchas, His Pilgrims, vol. X., p. 331.
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fortress, the city's main defence, and the Persians began to entrench themselves outside
its walls.' 48 In fact the fortress was already weakened through lack of military supplies.
The Portuguese knew their days were numbered. Given the blockade by sea no relief
could be expected from Goa or elsewhere, and for this reason the garrison did not
defend Hormuz with much tenacity.' 49 Moreover, as Sousa mentions, treason played a
part in the fall of Hormuz. In agreement with other members of the garrison who were
not willing to make a final stand, LuIs de Brito was let down from the wall by a rope
and concluded articles of surrender with the English. De Mello opposed this, but his
troops refused to fight on without water, food, and gunpowder.' 5° In a final throw of the
dice de Mello tried to buy off the Persians but their demands were extortionate.151
The siege of Hormuz ended in early May 1622 when a final agreement was
made between the belligerents.' 52 The English and the Khãn of Shiraz entered the
fortress as victors on 3 May.' 53 Sousa gives a sense of the occasion's tragedy: the
Portuguese 'were leaving a great treasure, and the honour of their country, in the
enemies' hands'.' 54 The last king of Hormuz, Mohammed Shah IV, was held by Imám
Quli Khän under Shah Abbas's orders that he should be brought to Isfahan.' 55
 The terms
'' Purchas, His Pilgrims, vol. X., p. 330.
149 Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, p. 107.
'5° Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. III, pp. 309-10.
151 The Persians demanded 500,000 tumãn in cash, and an annual tribute of 200,000 tumãn. K. Bayani,
j'arekh Nezami Iran, (Tehran, 1335 S.), p. 522.
152 Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. III, p. 310; Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de
jindrada, p. 83; Foster, The English Factories in India 1622-1623, p. xi.
'' Cordeiro, Dios Capitâs da India, p.42; Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. III, p. 310.
154 Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. III, p. 310.
155 Shah Abbas, to humiliate the king, not only refused to see him but even ordered the king to be
placed in an iron cage, where he was sustained by the alms of those who passed by. In 1625, a report
from the EIC mentioned that the king of Hormuz was in Shiraz, where the Khän allowed him a timän
a day for his cost of living. See Foster, The English Factories in India, 1624-29, p. 85; Boxer,
Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, p. 172-73.
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of surrender allowed the captain, soldiers, and more than 2,000 Portuguese to depart for
Muscat with their goods and weapons.156
In 1622 when the Portuguese lost the island Simão de Mello said 'Oh, Sir
captain! After the accounts of what happened, we have grievance to God and to his
Majesty as a result of the total destruction of the fortress of Hormuz. We needed lions to
defend it'. 157
 In contrast, the king had stood up in the council of Horrnuz before the fall
and exclaimed, 'Gentlemen, Hormuz is lost, since so weak and cowardly a captain has
come to govern it'.'58
Finally, perhaps, we have reached the truth of the Portuguese in the Gulf; they
gained the region, and in particular Hormuz, as warriors but they lost it as merchants.
***
We cannot pass over this event without trying to answer the main question that it
prompts, namely why Hormuz fell faster than expected. What were its deficiencies?
Was it just in the fabric of the fortress? Or was it in the structure of the Portuguese
administration and its men?
Conflict had been almost inevitable ever since the Persjans claimed the coastline
of the Gulf. Open warfare was triggered by the arrival, and apparent aptitude, of the
English. Until 1619 the possibility of settlement instead of war had been kept alive by
the respective embassies of Robert Sherley and Figueroa.' 59 Nevertheless, Spanish
claims for the security of Hormuz, including its mainland supply and watering places,
56 Cordeiro, Como se Perdeu Ormuz, pp. 149-50; Danvers, The Portuguese in india, vol. II, pp. 211-
12.
GEP vol. 19, p. 640. In Portuguese: 'Ah, senhor capitAo! que conta há-de dar a Deus e a Sua
Majestade da perdicão das suas fortress, tendo leôes que ihas defendiam'.
158 Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, pp. 106, 116.
' 59 Livro das Moncôes, tomo IV, pp. 153-54.
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were incompatible with the Shah's idea of sovereignty over the coast. Horrnuz could not
live and maintain its 40,000 inhabitants without supplies from the mainland,160
In discussing the military reasons for the fall of Hormuz, we should not be
content with emphasising the poor morale and organisation of the Portuguese garrison.
Even the English commanders faced considerable difficulty in getting their men to
participate in the campaign because it was 'no merchandizing business'.' 6 ' Only by
means of threats and coercion were they induced to take part in the operations against
Qishm and Hormuz.' 62 However, this is not to say that military factors - however old
fashioned and unsophisticated they may seem - were unimportant. English heavy
artillery and the skills of its crews did terrible damage to the fortresses at both Qishm
and Hormuz.' 63 Moreover, the disproportion between the respective fleets can only be
accounted for by the extraordinarily poor gurmery of the Portuguese because, as Boxer
observed, they did not lack courage.' 64
 Another significant tactical factor was the
Persian mining of both fortresses. They mined to such good effect that the tower of
Santiago, the main bastion of the fortress of Hormuz, was blown up. This work with
mines continued from the end of March until the end of April 1622.165
Regarding the performance of the Portuguese administration, it may be observed
that the military planning of captains such as Ruy Freire and Simão de Mello was poor.
The tactics of the attackers were clear and successful, and benefited from additional
help from the Arab tribes on the Persian coast.' 66
 We know that English fleet was there,
160 Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. III, p. 303.
' Foster, The English Factories in India 1622-1623, p. ix.
' Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de And,-ada, p. xxxii.
163 Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-1825, p. 111; Foster, The English Factories in India
J622-1 623, p. xi; Purchas, His Pilgrims, vol. X., pp. 338-41.
164 Foster, The English Factories in India 1622-1623, p. ix; Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy
freyre de Andrada ,pp. xxvi, xxxvii- xxxix.
165 Purchas, His Pilgrims. vol. X., pp. 353-55; Cordeiro, Dios Capitâs da India, p. 42.
166 These Arabs succeeded in hiding about 400 boats from Ruy Freire. For more details of these events
and the English-Persian alliance in the fall of Hormuz see Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy
Freyre deAndrada, pp. 125-54; Purchas, His Pilgrims, vol. X., pp. 331, 335-36, 339-41.
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but it could not transport between 3,000 and 12,000 Persians from the mainland, and
from Qishm to Hormuz. Only the terradas of the Arabs could accomplish this task. In
contrast, so far as Hormuz was concerned there were no effective measures taken to
protect the city and fortress. One might ask if the outcome at Hormuz would have been
different if its captain had followed the advice of Albuquerque, which was also
subscribed to by its king: 'If you see European ships anchor off this bar, flood the moat,
and sleep in peace' •167 However, there were real and substantive differences between the
king and the captain, together with other Portuguese officers, about how best to organise
the defence. Mohammed Shah's criticisms were numerous:
'If we are to defend ourselves, why has not the moat, which is at present
choked up at the foot of the bulwark-of Santiago- been cleared? In addition,
why not send to collect the vast supplies of wood which are in the magazines
of the a(fándega, factory, hospital, and other houses? Why are the
fortifications which the captain Francisco de Sousa began, still unfmished?
Moreover, why are not the supplies and other provisions collected, of which
the shops of the merchants are full enough to last many men for ten years?
And likewise why not fill the cisterns of the king with the vast amount of
water with which all the houses of this city are provided; for all of which we
have men enough, and let us not leave all this to the enemy, whose entry we
cannot stop, since no fortification has been made in the streets and city; and
if what ought to be done was going to be left undone'.168
Several important issues arise from this. Why was Hormuz so underprepared for an
assault? Perhaps we should not forget that de Mello was appointed to his position in
Hormuz only in Junuary 1622. This, however, raises the additional question of why
Hormuz was left without an experienced commander at such a time?
Mohammed Shah also disliked de Mello's passive deployment of the Portuguese
squadron at Hormuz. The galleons had been withdrawn to close under the fortress, and
their crews disembarked. The king counselled a more aggressive stance: 169 these vessels
could wreak havoc among the 200 or so Persian terradas around the island of
167 Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, p. 113.
' 68 Ibid.,p. 114.
Purchas, His Pilgrims, vol. X, pp. 365-67.
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Hormuz.' 70 Though Mohammed Shah also wondered why the most powerful and
heavily-gunned galleons were still in India, he nonetheless thought that the existing
vessels could successfully oppose the English forces at sea - losses sustained in any
engagement were preferable to allowing the enemy an unopposed entry into Hormuz.
De Mello, as the Commentaries note, carried out some of what the king asked; but the
waters around Hormuz were left uncontested.' 7 ' Typically, the weather also played a
part in isolating Hormuz from relief. By the time Manuel de Sousa reached Goa from
Hormuz with the son of the king and messages for the viceroy, the sailing season was
over and no assistance could be sent) 72
 Again, the monsoon system exerted its
considerable influence over the exercise of naval power.
Arguably, however, the damage had been done long before Portugal's enemies
appeared off Hormuz in 1622. Early warnings were issued by the newly appointed
ouvidor of Hormuz, Francesco de Gouvea, in 1608, who brought attention to the
weakness of the fortress and deficiency of the cisterns. He reported to his king that the
Persians were so close at hand that they could be before the fortress walls within an
hour.' 73 In addition, a letter of January 1612 from Lisbon to the governor of India
contained advice which officials failed to heed. The letter's importance lies in its
description of the condition of the fortress at Hormuz: it 'lacks artillery, and that which
it has is so old and lacking in metal and if the occasion were to arise, there is no piece
that could fire for two days at a stretch'.'" In fairness the negligence was not
ubiquitous. Captain Francisco de Sousa paid attention to some of the fortress's defects
when faced with the threat of an English fleet bound for the Gulf 75 Unfortunately, de
'° Cordeiro, Dios Capitds da India, p. 37.
171 Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, pp. 114- 15.
172 See Introduction, section 4.
Il35teensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, p. 251.
174 Livro das Moncôes, vol. II, p. 144.
175 Foster, The English Factories in India 1 622-1 623, p. viii.
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Sousa died at the end of summer 1621. 176 He was succeeded in January 1622 by de
Mello,' 77
 who was not de Sousa's equal in reputation or experience, and who had not
given a good account of himself as captain of Mombassa.' 78 Crucially de Mello did not
continue the renovations begun by his predecessor. Rather he restored the old feeling of
false security. The people of Hormuz thought that 'a worthy and beloved leader was
replaced by an indifferent stranger', and one who, moreover, antagonised Ruy Freire.
In this matter, one of the Portuguese captains commented that 'The truth of the matter is
that we are lost through our sins and not by reason of the strength or power of the
enemy'.' 8° Boxer, in his analysis of the fall of Hormuz, blamed de Mello. He concluded
that the loss of the fortress was chiefly due to his obstinacy in ignoring Mohammed
Shah's exhortations to take action.'8'
If the tactical decisions of de Mello at Hormuz were questionable, we may also
question the strategy of Ruy Freire which occasioned them. Given that the
Commentaries were written to justify his actions in the Gulf during the Hormuz crisis,
we must take a more critical look at Freire's role in the events that led to the fall of the
island in 1622. His ability as a commander has already been questioned.' 82 Freire's
strategy provoked the Persians and the English, and to make matters worse, prior to the
fall of Hormuz his forces were exhausted in the fortification of Qishm and punitive
raids along the Persian coast. More generally it seems that Freire relied too much on
English neutrality in his quarrel with the Persians; his campaigns convey the impression
17(1 Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. III. p. 299. De Sousa died, in fact, as a result of his labours in
trying to strengthen the fortress which had been so neglected. On his passing some people in Hormuz
5aid 'when the captain is dead, Hormuz is doomed'. Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de
4ndrada, p. 89.
171 Cordeiro, Como se Perdeu Ormuz, 'Quinto Documento', p. 291.
178 Bocarro, Decada 13, part I, pp. 242-43.
' Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. III. p. 303.
180 Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada ,p. 119.
Ibid., p. xliv.
182 See Chapter Three, section 3.
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that he was operating in a world where the initiative would always remain in his hands.
This might simply have been a symptom of Portuguese policy which, as Niels
Steensgaard suggests, was too deeply engaged in the control of Gulf trade, with little
regard for the international repercussions.' 83 But Freire's actions also accord with Slot's
hypothesis that the mentality of Portuguese noblemen, especially their arrogance and
individualism, was not really suited to the maintenance of an empire consisting of small
outposts with limited military means.184
There are also other good reasons to doubt Freire's suitability for the role of
regional commander. It seems he was very impetuous in his plans and was not a man
who co-operated well with his colleagues, as evidenced by a story involving one of his
most important officers.' 85 In short Freire made enemies more than he found friendships
in the Gulf. Garcia de Figueroa looked back to the loss of Gombroon in 1614 as
evidence of strained relationships, and consequent inertia, within the Portuguese
hierarchy. He observed that with Goa's full appreciation of the Persian threat, the
viceroy Jerónimo de Azevedo had spent the monsoon of 1614 cruising off northern
India to avoid an encounter with the English fleet.' 86 Figueroa added that the
independence of Ruy Freire was resented by the aged Albuquerque, who virtually ended
it by appointing Simão de Mello to the captaincy of Hormuz.' 81 Freire, by concentrating
on one objective, had virtually lost his fleet, which should have been the main defence
183 Steensgaard, Cw7acks, Caravans and Companies, pp. 9-11, 412-14.
184 Slot, The Arabs of the Gulf 1602-1784, p. 109-10.
185 See the details of this story in Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, pp. 38-46.
186 Figueroa, Comentarios de Garcia de Silva y Figueroa, tomo IT, p. 470.
187 The youth of Ruy Freire caused him to make many mistakes, and that is what led Fernão de
pibuquerque to write to him after he heard the news about Qishm: 'it had been just and right if you
had considered my previous warnings, and not so confident of yourself, before putting hand to that
work; for you with your thirty years had not been dreamt of in this world yet they tell me that you
were fully persuaded you could correct what my seventy years wrote you, in so weighty and
important a matter'. See this letter in Cordeiro, Como se Perdeu Ormuz, Appendix I, Primeiro
Docuniento.
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for Hormuz.'88 According to Figueroa, many warnings about Hormuz had been ignored
in the past, and the Portuguese officials in Goa and Hormuz reacted too late to the
danger facing the island. Eventually, when disaster struck, Fernão de Albuquerque
dispatched a mere dozen open barques with about 447 men as late as 2 April 1622; and
not a single vessel of that fleet got further than Muscat)89
From the above discussion it seems that the main reason for the fall of Hormuz was the
lack understanding between the Portuguese captains, as they reacted against each other
with hostility. A spectacular example occurred during the siege of Qishm. Freire's
continued resistance was based on the assumption that reinforcements would arrive
from Hormuz. Eventually, de Mello sent Gonçalo de Silveyra to him, but with only one
vessel carrying ammunition. Freire reiterated his need for assistance, to which de Mello,
taking offence, responded with a letter to the governor in India in which he accused
Freire of arrogance, ignorance and bullying.' 90 Rather ironically it had been the hostility
between Albuquerque and Freire that had led the governor to appoint de Mello as
captain of Hormuz in the first place, much to Freire's disgust. It seems that
Albuquerque was dissatisfied from the moment he received the king's order to appoint
Freire to Hormuz and to oust the English from the Gulf by force. Perhaps because of
this he neglected to deal with important events which occurred in the Gulf at that time.
There can be no doubt, then, that such petty rivalries exacerbated the physical
and structural weaknesses of the Portuguese in the Gulf when they should have been
united against their enemies. As Sousa concluded, 'This caused the ruin of Hormuz; if
Freire had been there, Honnuz would never have been lost') 9 ' The rather unsatisfactory
alternative is to believe English claims that Hormuz could not have held out in any case
188 Ibid.
' Boxer, commentaries of captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, p. xlii.
° Sousa, The Portuguese Asia, vol. III, pp. 308-09.
Ibid., vol. III, p. 308.
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for more than a day or two longer, irrespective of whether its provisions were
exhausted.
5.3. Postscript: After the Fall
The impact of the fall of Hormuz was not confined to the fortress itself; it brought the
collapse of Portuguese strategy in the East - the end of the policy which had been set
out by Albuquerque during the first Portuguese campaigns in Asia. The fall of Hormuz
revealed the truth of Almeida's contention that there would be no benefit to the empire
in fortresses.' 92
 In the case of I-Iormuz, Albuquerque's suspicion of maritime supremacy
was the island's undoing.' 93 The loss of Hormuz, however, did not end Portugal's
involvement in the Gulf— to use Curtin's terms, the trade diaspora of the Portuguese did
not work itself out after 1622, but rather it evolved into a more competitive system
without the impediments of 'empire'.'94
To be sure, with the fall of Hormuz the Portuguese lost one of the buttresses of
their empire. Its loss snapped the chain of Portuguese fortresses along the East African
and Asian seaboard at its strongest and richest link. Quite naturally, strenuous efforts
were made to retake Flormuz in the ensuing years by Ruy Freire and others. However,
nothing effective could be done to recapture the island in 1623, 1624 and 1630 through
lack of men and munitions.' 95 When Freire was on the verge of success in 1625, the
arrival of an Anglo-Dutch naval force at Gombroon forced him to raise his siege.'96
Most commentators agree that the English did rather well out of the capture of
Hormuz. Sizeable reparations to James I for 'piracy' against a friendly nation did not
192 See Chapter One, p. 77.
' For the Gulf in general in this period see R.J. Barendse, The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean World
of the Seventeenth Centu,y (New York, 2002), especially chapters 2 and 7.
'94 p . Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 3-4.
195 The Travels ofPietro Della Valle in India, vol. II, p. 397.
196 5ykes, A History ofPersia, pp. 192-93.
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dent the East India Company's future prospects for trade with Persia.' 97
 Wilson
suggested that it was difficult to discover what the Company gained from this action.198
However, Boxer posits the opposite view. The fall of Hormuz meant freedom from
customs dues and exceptional privileges in the Persian trade, moreover, without the
threat of Portuguese vessels in the Gulf.'99
If, after 1622, the English saw in Hormuz a free port more convenient than Jask
for the prosecution of their trade, Shah Abbas, in contrast, found only a potential rival to
his own ports on the mainland. After the Persians had plundered everything movable,
the Shah ordered the destruction of Honnuz. Some of its broken fabric was used to
build a new port, Bandar Abbas, on the site of a formerly insignificant fishing village.200
In most respects Bandar Abbas succeeded Hormuz; the latter's population and trade
were diverted there, and for a century and a half it served as the main trade centre of
Persian silk and Bahraini pearls, and the principal foothold of the EIC in the Gulf. The
Shah also granted the island of Kharg as an emporium for the Dutch in the Gulf.20'
For the period after 1622 there is little information available about Portuguese
activities in the Gulf. Nevertheless, we can at least conclude that Portuguese influence
did not end after the destruction of Hormuz. Between 1622 and 1729 there seems to
have been an almost continuous commercial and a considerable military presence in the
Gulf. Indeed, the profitability of Portuguese enterprise in the Gulf region increased after
1622. Once opened to all foreign ships, the huge volume of business brought massive
investment. For example, the Portuguese invested annually in the spice and cloth trades
" Foster, The English Factories in India 1 622-1 623, pp. viii, xiii.
Wilson, The Persian Gulf: p. 194.
199 Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada , p. xliii.
200 As an eyewitness, William Foster saw the Persians still there in 1627. For five days they sent their
vessels across to Hormuz to fetch stones for this purpose from the ruins of the old town. See Foster,
'A view of Ormuz in 1627', p. 161. See also G. Schweizer, 'Bandar Abbãs mid Hormoz', p. 12;
Wilson, The Persian Gulf: p. 151.
201 T. Herbert, Travels in Persia, (London, 1928), p. 43; Birdwood, Report on the old Records of the
India Office, p. 213.
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just between Muscat and Basra more than 500,000 ashrafi, or twice the revenue of
Hormuz in 1622.202 In addition, in 1625 they established a factory at Bandar Kung?° 3 In
agreement with Shah Abbas, the Portuguese were to enjoy a share of all customs dues
levied on goods entering the port, in the same way that the English did at Gombroon.204
In fact, the Portuguese recognized, albeit too late, that by welcoming foreign merchants
and investing in commercial facilities they could influence trade without the use of
force.
In the aftermath of Hormuz the Portuguese made Muscat their new regional
headquarters and tried to raise it to the stature of Hormuz, in both trading activity and
missionary work.205 Persian plans to follow up their victory at Hormuz came to nothing,
but Muscat was still vulnerable to attack and proved a very troublesome possession.
Most of these problems stemmed from internal changes in Oman. After he defeated the
last ruler of the Al-Juboor dynasty in Oman, Nassar bin Marshad Al-Yarubi proceeded
to unify most of the Omani territories under his rule. 206 Under Nassar's leadership there
was a drive to expel the Portuguese from Oman. In 1643 the Imám took Suhar, and in
1648 he succeeded in attacking all the Portuguese outposts on the Omani coast except
Muscat and Matrah. The Imám Sultan bin Saif Al-Yarubi (1649-79), who succeeded
Imám Naser, rapidly completed the objectives of his predecessor.207 Muscat was
captured in 1650,208 and Sultan bin Saif succeeded in maintaining a formidable fleet of
warships, comprising mainly captured Portuguese vessels supplemented by others
purchased from the VOC and EIC. Thus, from the reign of Imám Sultan bin Saif the
202 See Chapter Two, section 2.
203 See Map VI.
204 Falsafi, Zendaané Shah'AbbAs Awãl, vol. 4, p. 1562; Hamilton, A New Account of the East indies,
p. 59.
205 DRI, vol. VIII, Liv. xvi, p. 347; Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf; p. 191.
206 A. Al-Salmi, Tu/ifat al- 'a 'yan Bi-Sirat 'A/il 'Uniãn, p. 50.
201 S. Al-lzkawi, Ka.fAl-Gümma al-jdmi Lli-akhbãr Al-ummha, p. 105; P. Vine, Tue Heritage of
Oma?l, pp. 80-87.
208 A. H. Al-Salmi, Tuhfat al- 'a 'yän Bi-Sirat 'Ahi 'Uniän, p. 51.
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Omanis prosecuted a war against the Portuguese in the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea,
along the east coast of Africa, and on the Indian coast, that would continue well into the
eighteenth century.209
Even then the Portuguese were still able to involve themselves in the Gulf's
commercial affairs and to have some success against the shipping of their enemies.21°
This continued presence was nurtured by more stable relations with Persia. In 1625 the
shah agreed to a tribute payment for Qishm. Furthermore, Portuguese merchants
continued to have a considerable trade with Basra, and they established an important
factory there.2
Yet, in spite of their commercial resilience, after the fall of I-Iormuz the
Portuguese could no longer act as masters of the Gulf. Its loss was a staggering blow to
their economic policy in particular since Hormuz had been Portugal's main economic
centre in the region. For Barendse, the loss of Hormuz led to the 'restructuring' of
Portuguese trade in the Gulf, and his work has done much to illustrate how this came
about. 212 Subrahmanyam agrees with this assessment, for the Portuguese still held
Muscat which became 'an important staging post for Portuguese trade to Basra,
Baghdad, and Mosul'. The loss of Hormuz caused some dislocation; but the loss of
Muscat had far worse consequences.213
The events of 1622 had repercussions for the international struggle between
Europe's maritime empires, even if I-lormuz had been a relatively easy victim.
209 Al-Izkawi, KasfAl-Gümma al-jãmiLli-akhbdrAl-umrnha, p. 105; G. Ames, 'The straits of Hormuz
fleets', p. 400.
210 Slot, The Arabs of the Gulf 1602-1 784, p. 65; Wilson, The Persian Gulf p. 154.
211 Slot, The Arabs of the Gulf 1602-1 784, p.65.
212 arendse, The Arabian Seas, pp. 341-44.
213 Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1 700, pp. 157-58.
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Conclusion
'...when recently the Portuguese, by crossing this our sea [este nosso mar]
discovered the East Indies, they came there with peaceful and not warlike
intentions towards the rulers and peoples of those parts, signifying to them that
they sought nothing from them but friendship and commercial relations. However,
in those places where we were ill-received and all kinds of peace and trade were
denied us we took up arms and, having conquered them by force, placed them
under our rule."
Thus ran an assessment in the Livro das Cidades Fortalezas (1581) of Portugal's
experience in the East. When denied peaceful freedom of trade, the Portuguese crown
took what it needed by force.
In the first chapter of this study, which dealt with the economic history of
Portugal in the fifteenth century, it was suggested that the Portuguese crown had
financial problems, and that the long process of exploration and discovery had strong
economic motives. As King Manuel famously declared, 'the purpose of launching the
expedition for discovering the sea-route to India is to spread Christianity and to grab
the wealth of the East'. 2 After nearly a century and a half of enterprise in the East,
Portugal was still a relatively poor country. 3 There is a well-known Arab saying: 'If
the landlord beats the drum, all the family members will dance', and that is exactly
what happened during the 'Portuguese era' in the East. When they first arrived,
Portuguese captains were almost invincible; but they soon began to shirk their
military responsibilities and paid more attention to enriching themselves through
trade. The spread of this malaise accelerated after 1580. In seeking out the profits of
the East, to the neglect of its security, the Portuguese sowed the seeds of their
empire's destruction.
'See Villiers, 'The Estado da India in South Asia', in The First Portuguese Colonial Empire, p. 42,
citing Thomaz 'Estrutra politica e administrativa do Estado da India no seculo XVI , ., p. 8.
See Chapter One, section 1, pp. 69-70.
J. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580-1640, p.167.
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But what was this 'empire'? We really need to examine objectively Portugal's
achievements in the East. It is still quite common to read about the rapid and lasting
diffusion of Portuguese military, economic and political influence in the Arabian
Gulf, Indian Ocean and beyond. 4 The result was a vast 'empire', not necessarily of
territory along Spanish lines, but of outposts, trade routes and maritime violence.
During the sixteenth century this system extended from East Africa, the Red Sea and
the Gulf in the west, to the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago and China Sea in the east.
Practical results included a substantial proportion of direct European-Asian trade and
a strong position in the internal Asian country trades.
From this re-examination of the Portuguese presence in the Gulf - an
important node in the system described above - it is clear that their contemplated
Afro-Asian empire never developed beyond the limited boundaries of isolated
Portuguese strongholds. For a time the Portuguese created an emporium; but they did
not found an empire. The main problem posed by the Portuguese was that they built a
vast 'empire' without expanding and developing its constituent economies. As
Villiers points out, in Southeast Asia, as in the Indian Ocean more generally, the
Portuguese did not open up any new trade routes or introduce any new goods into the
trading network. 5 Local coastal trade continued exactly as it had for centuries before
the Portuguese arrived, and longer voyages along the principal trade routes of the area
were still made by indigenous shipping, more often than not without the permission of
the Portuguese authorities or Cartaz, as discussed above. 6 They depended on the old
commercial system, with a few administrative modifications, and the products of the
' See the introduction and the researches in Nadwet AL-derasat Al- Omaniah; Nadwet Ras Al-
khaimah Al- Tarekheiah'.
Villiers, 'The Estado da India in South Asia', p. 53.
6 See Section 2.4, above.
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Indian Ocean. This was admittedly a network with huge potential. What they added to
the existing system were new types of tax, including their quintessential cartaz. From
the foundation of the Estado da India, Portugal lost sight of its imperial obligations
under the effect of what Verlinden called the 'hypnosis' of spices. 7 Surely it was
Portuguese shipping, not the necklace of fortresses around the Asian littoral, which
was designed to control the Indian Ocean. Even 'control' might be as unhelpful a
concept as 'empire' in this respect.8
In real terms Portugal's impact on the Gulf region was not really commercial -
there were few economic developments during their occupation. They found no new
products for export; they developed no new markets for European products in the
East; and even at the height of their power they were unable to remove Asian
merchants from the commerce of the Gulf and Indian Ocean. 9 The latter, of course,
ran precisely counter to the production of revenues upon which Hormuz depended.
Hormuz fits very well Curtin's definition of a 'trade diaspora' - a plural society where
two or more cultures existed side by side.'° The city enjoyed a commanding position
at the mouth of the Gulf, and Portugal's attempt to direct Persian, Arab and even
Turkish traffic certainly made an impression. But ships and merchants always
operated beyond this Portuguese cordon, and even slipped through it; and the
'monopoly' of seaborne trade was very different in character from Hormuz's
C. Verlinden, 'Spices or Empire in Africa, Asia, and Brazil', in Maritime History: The Age of
Discovery, ed. J. Hattendorf(Malabar, 1996), vol. 1, p. 92.
8 G. Winius, The Black legend of Portuguese India, p. xvii.
' For this argument in detail see: J. C. V. Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society (Amsterdam, 1955); N.
Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies; G. Masselman, The Cradle of Colonialism
(New Haven & London, 1963); M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofez, Asian Trade and European influence
in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about /630 (The Hague, 1962).
'° P. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, p, 11.
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influence prior to the arrival of the Portuguese. 1 ' Even the cartaz system, in which the
Portuguese took pride, was copied from similar devices in the Indian Ocean and from
the trade licences of Hormuz.
It is also clear that the Portuguese did not introduce any new elements into the
traditional commerce in the Gulf between the Persian and Arabian ports. Nor even did
they try to link the land routes between the Red Sea and the Gulf. They concentrated
not on the protection and encouragement of production in the Gulf, but on their ability
to control important nodes through which trade passed. The character of navigation in
the Gulf - a much smaller sea than it appears, with quite predictable shipping routes -
allowed the Portuguese to ensure that a good proportion of vessels were forced to call
in at Hormuz.' 2 Also, it is to the credit of Hormuz's new masters that the port retained
its significance during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Perhaps the
Portuguese could claim that trade between the Gulf and India increased under their
stewardship, but the revenue of Hormuz was already large when the Portuguese
arrived, and about 98 per cent of it came from taxes on transit trade. When Hormuz
fell in 1622 the state of its treasury bore witness to lack of investment in the city
under Portuguese control. It would be no exaggeration to say that the Portuguese
crown and its agents were primarily tax collectors, and that the Estado da India was
essentially a system of organised violence against the indigenous peoples within its
boundaries. In the Gulf we have seen evidence of extortion from merchants and rulers
alike, and of violence towards its inhabitants. By the 1 620s such flagrant exploitation,
in tandem with arbitrary acts of violence, left the Portuguese isolated and detested. It
See Chapter One, section 1, pp. 59-60.
12 For a good, recent description of coastwise shipping in the Gulf see R.J. Barendse, The Arabian
Seas: The Indian Ocean World oj'the Seventeenth Century (New York, 2002), pp. 40-49.
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is little wonder that the peoples of the region looked for opportunities to overturn their
authority.
This is where we must return to the nature of the Portuguese presence in the
Gulf. As noted elsewhere in this thesis, the physical fabric of Portuguese authority
comprised a network of military outposts with warships to protect them and to
monitor trade and channel it in particular directions. Thus, an infrastructure of
military occupation was designed to sustain the parasitic presence of the Portuguese in
the East. Given their narrowly focused approach to 'empire', the agents of Portugal
relied on this military strength; but in the end the resources deployed were unequal to
the task of defence for a variety of reasons outlined above. For the purposes of this
conclusion it is worth reiterating some of these reasons.
Excellent tax collectors though they were, on the strength of their political and
military performance in the Gulf, the Portuguese had neither the experience nor the
personal qualities necessary to maintain an over-extended presence in the East.
Viceroys and governors were usually the worst offenders, but they brought a crowd of
poor relations with them. We can conclude that although the Portuguese were much
involved in business, they were unable to replicate the success of the Dutch and
English in the sphere of commercial organisation, and joint stock companies in
particular. 13
As a result of this fact, the decline of the Estado da India, and of the
Portuguese Gulf in particular, arose not only from external pressure from Asian and
European enemies, but from internal weaknesses. Corruption figured prominently in
this respect. Bribery was rife, especially after the initial period of discovery.
Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance, p. 42. For more recent analysis of centralised Companies
versus private entrepreneurship on the Portuguese model, see Barendse, The Arabian Seas, 299-
301.
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Important administrative posts were sold to the highest bidder, or in effect those who
collected the most taxes for the Portuguese treasury. Experience and suitability for
command were secondary considerations. Again at the risk of simplification, almost
every Portuguese official in the east, from the highest to the lowest, was out to make a
fortune. As Masselman noted, perhaps the High Judge at Goa in 1552 was one of a
few conscientious officials who complained to the king about the state of the Estado:
'In India there is no justice, either in your viceroy or those who are to mete it out. The
one object is "the gathering of money by every means". There is no Moor who will
trust a Portuguese. Help us Senor, for we are sinking." 4
 Even the chronicler Diogo do
Couto described the decadence of the Portuguese in India. For example, when he
wrote about the vedores, in Hormuz or any trade center, they drew handsome salaries
for their self-appointed errands arid took with them at royal expense all of their
friends, together with ample gold for their transactions. He added 'if you should walk
into one of their houses, you might think yourself in a warehouse, rather than the
home of a vedor de fazenda'.' 5 Couto devoted a whole chapter to the fraudulent
payment of soldiers who were still on the lists after their death, and whose pay was
still being drawn.' 6 Ultimately, neither the dispatch of new officers from Portugal nor
formal power of appointment gave the king real influence over the activities of his
distant office holders. 'The state might therefore languish whole its own officials
swallowed its incomes'.17
If the quality of Portuguese manpower can be questioned, then its quantity
must also be viewed as a practical barrier to Portuguese success, certainly in the long-
14 Masselman, The Gradle of Golonialism, p. 221.
' From a summary of the Soldado Prático, in Winius, The Black Legend ofPortuguese India, p. 18.
16 ibid., pp. 11-19.
17 Barendse, The Arabian Seas, p. 301.
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term. This problem was built into the very structure of Portuguese authority during its
formation. In his excitement at the opportunities unfolding before him in Asia,
Manuel I ignored the warning from his first viceroy Francisco de Almeida. Almeida
was honest with his king about the possible dangers of over-stretched and
undermanned outposts, and argued for greater concentration of force at fewer key
points.' 8 João de Castro also saw clearly how the increase in the number of scattered
fortresses was weakening the position of the Portuguese in the East.' 9 As a result, the
Estado da India was often dependent on mercenaries and auxiliaries for its defence,
whether Indians, Persians, Africans or others. Though they could, and did, fight well
for their masters, such troops did not adequately compensate for the shortage of
trained Portuguese. Most scholars agree that the Portuguese in the East numbered no
more than 10,000 men during the sixteenth century. 2° It seems that the shortage of
men in the Gulf was linked with Portuguese Goa, because of the high death rate there.
Between 1604 and 1630 about 25,000 Portuguese soldiers died in Goa, from diseases
such as malaria and cholera.2'
More important than fanaticism, and perhaps more serious than administrative
abuse, was the diplomatic environment in which Portuguese forces had to operate.
Failure in this field left the Portuguese establishment badly exposed. The East, as is
well known, was of immense size, complexity and diversity of races, religions,
cultures, and forms of government. Long distance trade was conducted through a
series of entrepôts where merchants and seamen of differing races and beliefs lived
pragmatically and in general peacefully together. To somehow penetrate this system
18 BNL-FG, codice no.1461, Carta de Almeida a Rio de Portugal, Goa, 20 September 1508.
' Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in India (1497-1550), p. 302.
20 Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1700, p. 217.
21 M. N. Pearson, 'The Portuguese in India' in The Cambridge Histoiy of India (Cambridge, 1987),
vol. I, p. 93.
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was the challenge faced by the Portuguese after 1497. From it, they learnt how to
divide and how to conquer. In the Subcontinent and Southeast Asia they quickly
appreciated that something could be gained from spreading friction between Hindus
and Muslims. Divisions in Islam between Sunni Ottomans and Shia Persians brought
some hope of achieving similar results in the Gulf. 22 Co-operation, however selective,
was a necessary part of this strategy. In Asia the Portuguese envisaged that native
allies, Muslims included, would help found an empire; native troops would defend it;
native women populate it; and native skills benefit its lords. 23 Early on, the
Portuguese crown anticipated that its subjects would enter into commercial
partnerships with Asian merchants, including Muslims.24 So far as the Gulf was
concerned, private traders do seem to have flourished, though we know comparatively
little about their operations. However, when it came to the Estado and its agents, we
may question the choices that were made between conflict, co-operation and simple
neglect. Diplomacy required an understanding of the different configurations of
politics, power, and people in the East. Popular opinion that likened the arrival of the
Portuguese in the Gulf to the coming of a plague reveals something of the problem.25
Generally, though not on every occasion, Portuguese efforts in the diplomatic sphere
were deficient and left them unable to maintain alliances with this tribal leader or that
local potentate. Cumulatively, the lack of Portuguese friends brought about local
resistance to their occupation. A prime, and, as it proved, costly, example was the
Safavid dynasty. Despite a near continuous state of hostilities between the Persians
and the Ottomans, either active or in suspension, the Portuguese in the Gulf could not
22 Scammell, 'Indigenous Assistance in the Establishment of Portuguese power in the Indian Ocean',
pp. 167-68.
23 AP0 vol. IV, p. 316.
24 Ibid., pp. 76, 542, 819.
25 A. Al-Kalifa, and M. Rice, Bahrain Through the Ages the Histo,y, p. 38.
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exploit the situation to their advantage. By 1622 few non-Europeans had anything to
gain from trying to prop up the Portuguese regime.
Weaknesses in the fabric and exercise of Portuguese rule must also be
superimposed upon structural changes within the empire during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. Portugal ceased to be an independent kingdom in 1580. The
union with Spain played some part in the fall of many of its overseas outposts. Most
obviously, the union exacerbated European competition for wealth as an agent of
decline, and provided legitimate opportunities for the Dutch and English to
dismember Portugal's interests in Asia. We have already demonstrated how the
English Company was central to the fall of Hormuz; 26 but Hormuz was only one of a
number of territorial losses sustained by Portugal in the seventeenth century. The
encroachment of other Europeans simply added to the isolation of Portuguese Hormuz
in the later sixteenth century. Another problem that became apparent after 1580 was a
loss of support from the mother country. This was shown in the crisis of 1622, when
the governor of India requested ecclesiastical contributions towards the defence of
Hormuz in lieu of support from the crown. 27 For the kings of Portugal, Asia was
intended to be self-supporting, a source of pure profit. But long before the end of the
sixteenth century the Estado 's governors needed extra funds, and these funds were
usually brought from Hormuz.28
 In fact, at a strategic level the lack of money, and the
impotence of the King of the Union to do anything about the situation in Asia, were
important contributory factors in the decline of the Portuguese system. This was as
26 See Chapter Five, section 2.
27 Boxer, Commentaries of Captain Ruy Freyre de Andrada, p. xlii. The governor, therefore, received
100,000 cruzados from the coffers of the Casa da Misericordia in Goa.
28 Winius, The Black legend ofPortuguese India, p. xxviii.
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evident in Goa as much as it was in Hormuz from the last decade of the sixteenth
century.29
Villiers, in his examination of South Asia, seems to accept the truth of the
statement with which we opened this conclusion, namely that 'it was.. .an essential
element of Portuguese policy to establish friendly relations with the local rulers and to
win the obedience of their subjects, as far as possible by peaceful means'. 3° In this
there are also echoes of Almeida's explanation in 1506 to the rulers and people of
Malacca, that the fortress which he ordered to be built there was solely for the
protection of the Portuguese arid their merchandise, and not built with any warlike
intent. Surely such protection was not required in the Indian Ocean at the beginning of
the sixteenth century? Either way, the first encounters between the Portuguese and the
peoples of the Gulf were very different in character. The Portuguese came as invaders
and acted accordingly.
However, even in the Gulf, the nature of their presence changed as they
gradually came to terms with the situation. Within Hormuz and Malacca, the
Portuguese scarcely altered the administrative structures that they had inherited from
the kings and sultans. Most importantly they kept the system of separate jurisdictions
for the different foreign communities, each under its own Shah-bander or Khwaja.3'
In fact they did little to tamper with the existing laws. In Hormuz, as elsewhere, the
people were generally allowed to remain subjected to their traditional laws and under
the jurisdiction of their local leaders. Moreover, the Portuguese themselves preferred
to graft onto their system the legal system and codes they found in the places where
29 Veen, Decay or Defeat?,
 p. 4.
30 Villiers, 'The Estado da India in South Asia', in The First Portuguese Colonial Empire, p. 40.
" See Chapter Two of this work and P. Purbatjaraka, 'Shabander in the Archipelago' in Journal of
Southeast Asian Histoiy, 2 (1961), pp. 1-4.
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they settled. 32
 All of this points to an attempt to maintain the status quo in Hormuz.
Thus, the Portuguese became more flexible in their treatment of Hormuz's inhabitants
- even if they lacked understanding and tact elsewhere - and they came to appreciate
the pattern of commerce, in particular the viceroys, governors, and captains who, from
the second half of the sixteenth century, spent most of their time dealing with trade
rather than the administration of the kingdom of Hormuz. To be fair to Villiers, the
Gulf reflects Portugal's pragmatic decision that large-scale conquest was not feasible
in the East. 33 Portugal's initial use of force to establish a presence in the Gulf soon
gave way to the definition of rights by treaty (in 1515, 1523, 1543, and so on), even if
we must assume that the Hormuzians had little scope for negotiation. Unlike Goa and
Malacca, Hormuz was never an integral part of the crown's estate; it was part of the
Estado by treaty. 34 Treaties of peace and commerce concluded between the Estado da
India and local rulers at least demonstrate that the Portuguese fully recognised the
legitimacy of those rulers and their right to rule, and show that they did not seek to
overthrow them and incorporate their sovereign territories into a greater territorial
'empire'.
32 See for more details A. B. Sousa, Subsidiospara a história Mi/liar Maritima da India, vol. I.
Villiers, 'The Estado da India in South Asia', p. 41.
See Villiers, 'The Estado da India in South Asia', p. 43, citing Thomaz 'Estrutra politica e
administrativa do Estado da India no seculo XVI'., pp. 9-10.
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Appendix I: Lists of Rulers and Officials during the period
of this study
1. Kings of Portugal
Manuel I (the Fortunate)
JoAo III
Sebastiâo
D. Henrique, regent
Felipe 1(11 of Spain)
Felipe 11(111 of Spain)
Felipe III (IV of Spain)
1495-152 1
152 1-1557
1557-1578
1578-1580
1580-1598
1598-162 1
162 1-1640
2. Viceroys (v.) and Governors (g.) of India
Dom Francissco da Alnieida (v.)
Afonso da Albuquerque (g.)
Lopo Soares de Albergaria (g.)
Diogo Lopos de Sequeira (g.)
D. Duarte de Meneses (g.)
D. Vasco da Gama (v.)
D. Henrique de Meneses (g.)
Lopo Vaz de Sampaio (g.)
Nuno da Cunha (g.)
D. Garcia de Noronha
D. Estêvão da Gama (g.)
Martim Afonso de Sousa (g.)
D. João de Castro (v.)
Garcia de Sá (g.)
Jorge Cabral (g.)
D. Afonso de Noronha (v.)
D. Pedro de Mascarenhas (v.)
Francisco Barreto (g.)
D. Constantino de Braganca (v.)
D. Francisco Coutinho (v.)
JoãodeMendonça(g.)
D. Antão de Noronha (v.)
D. Luls de Ataide (v.)
D. Antonio de Noronha (v.)
AntOnio Moniz Barreto (g.)
D. Diogo de Menezes (g.)
D. Luls de Atalde (v.) (second appt.)
Ferrno Telles de Meneses (g.)
D. Francisco Mascarenhas (v.)
D. Duarte de Menezes (v.)
Manuel de Sousa Coutinho (g.)
Matias de Albuquerque (v.)
D. Francisco da Gama (v.)
Aires de Saldanha (v.)
D. Martim Afonso de Castro (v.)
D. Frei Aleixo de Meneses (ArchbishoP) (g.)
André Furtado de Mendonca (g.)
Ruy Lourenço de Távora (v.)
D. Jerónirno de Azevedo (v.)
1505-1509
1509-15 15
1515-1518
1518-1 522
1522-1524
1524
1524-1526
1526-1529
1529-1538
1538-1540
1540-1542
1542-1545
1545-1548
1548-1549
1549-1550
1550-1554
1554-1555
1555-155 8
1558-1561
156 1-1564
1564
1564-1568
1568-157 1
1571-1573
1573-1 576
1576-1578
1578-158 1
1581
158 1-1584
1584-1588
1588-1591
159 1-1597
1597-1600
1600-1605
1605-1607
1607-1609
1609
1609-1612
1612-1617
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D. JoAo Coutinho (v.)	 1617-1619
Fernando de Albuquerque (g.)	 16 19-1622
Sources: A. Marques, History of Portugal; Bocarro, Década 13 da História da india; Baião (ed.)
Historia da Expansão Portuguesa no Moundo, 3 vios; C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire
1415-1825; Documentacão Ultramarina Portuguesa, 4 vols, ed. A. S. Rego; Documentos Rem etidos da
India ou Livro das Moncöes, ed. Raymundo A. B. Pato, 4 vols.
3. Captains of Hormuz Fortress
Pero de Albuquerque
D. Garcia Coutinho
João Rodriguez de Noronha
Diogo de Melo
Cristóvão de Mendonça
Belchior de Sousa
Antonio da Silveira
Martim Afonso de Mello Jusarte
D. Pedro de Castelo Branco
Doutor Pero Fernandes
D. Fernando de Lima
Fernão de Avares Cernache
Martim Afonso de Melo Jusarte (second appt.)
Luis Falcâo
D. Manuel de Lima
Bernalidim de Sousa*
D. Alvaro de Noronha
Antão de Noronha*
D. Pedro de Sousa
D. Goncalo de Meneses
Matias da Albuquerque
Ruy Gonçalves da Camara
Pedro Coutinho
Diego Moniz Barreto*
Garcia de Melo*
LuIs da Gama
D. LuIs de Sousa*
D. Francisco de Sousa
Simão de Mello
* Period of office uncertain
15 15-15 18
15 18-1522
1522-1524
1524-1528
1528-1530
1530-1532
1532-1535
1535-1537
1537-1538
1538
1538 (May)
1538
1538-1545
1545-1547
1547-1548
1548-1550
1550-1555
1555-1561
1562-1565
158 1-15 83
1583-1587
1587-1589
1602-1604
1604-1608
1608-16 12
1613-16 19
1619-1 620
1620-162 1
162 1-1622
Sources: D. Farinha, Os Portugueses no Golfo Pèrsico, 150 7-1538; Documentacão
Ultrarnarina Portuguesa, 4 vols, ed. A. S. Rego; Documentos Remetidos da India ou Livro
das Moncöes, ed. Raymundo A. B. Pato, 4 vols
4. Kings of Hormuz
Turan Shah IV
Mohammed Shah II
Salgur Shah II
Fakhru Al-Din Turan Shah V
Mohammed Shah 111*
Farkh (Faroq) Shah I
Turan Shah VI*
15 14-1522
1522-1534
1534-1 544
1544-1 564
1564-1565
1565-1582
1582-1598
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Feruz Shah	 1598-16 10
Mohammed Shah IV 	 16 10-1622
* Regnal dates uncertain
Sources: J. Aubin, 'Le Royaume d'Ormuz Au Debut du XVI' Siécle,'; J. Qaemmaqmai,
Hormuz dar Rawa but Iran wa Portugal; The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, trans. W. F. Sinclair.
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Appendix II: Documents in Translation
Document 1. Letter from Cristóvão de Mendonça to King João Ill, concerning events in India
and the administration of the fortress of Hormuz. Portuguese. Dated 18 November 1529.
ANTT, As Gavetas, vol. X, Gay. xx, Maço 2-27. PP. 254-58.
[Greeting]
I have informed your Excellency through Manuel de Macedo about conditions in the
kingdom of Hormuz. After the previous governor had left Hormuz, Simão da Cunha was
despatched to Bahrain. I will tell your Excellency what has happened there.
The king of Hormuz had appointed Reis Bader Al-Din, a relative of the vizier Sharaf
Al-Din, as viceroy in Bahrain. When your Excellency ordered Sharaf Al-Din to be arrested,
the governor gave an order to dismiss Reis Bader Al-Din from Bahrain on the ground that he
had done serious damage in the country. Hence he dispatched Belchior de Souza, the
Portuguese captain of the navy at that coast, with three or four vessels and accompanied by a
Muslim vizier, with letters from the king to Reis Bader Al-Din, ordering him to hand over the
fortress to the new vizier who had posted him there. The governor ordered Belchior de Souza
to arrest Bader Al-Din and bring him as a prisoner. Beichior de Souza knew that Bader Al-
Din had received information about his plans; he handed the letters to him as soon as he
arrived there. Yet Bader Al-Din refused to hand over the fortress and was extremely cautious.
De Souza informed the governor of Hormuz of this event.
Fifteen days before he left, the governor of Hormuz decided to send Simão da Cunha
to capture the fortress and, if possible, arrest Bader Al-Din as well. He took with him 455
soldiers, including all the knights who had escaped death in Mombassa, and others who were
in Hormuz at that time. When Simão Cunha had reached Bahrain, Reis Bader Al-Din
informed him that he considered himself under the subjection of the king of Hormuz and that
he had no desire to fight; on the other hand, there were many who did not agree with him in
this point of view. Simão da Cunha noticed that contrary to what he had heard, the fortress of
Bahrain was most formidable. He had been told that it was a weak establishment. When the
soldiers embarked they set up their artillery, which immediately bombarded the fortress until
the gunpowder ran out. He sent to Hormuz for more, and when the assistant arrived, all of his
men were sick. By the following day the soldiers became sicker so that there was no one
strong enough to carry the artillery to the ships. They were no longer able even to walk to the
ships to board. In the end a lot of ships and warriors were sent from Hormuz to bring the ships
and the soldiers back. Of the total 455 soldiers who went there, no one was left alive and not
suffering from the epidemic. Two hundred of them had died, and about the same number were
very ill and on their way to death. Simão da Curtha has died of the fever, and also Francisco
de Mendonça and many of the knights. Considering the number who came back ill, it seems
to me that if we do not lose a hundred of them it will surely be a miracle. Relative to the fort
and the town, I believe that your Excellency has been informed by Manuel de Macedo about
its condition. After de Macedo left, Khwaja Ibrahem was arrested, as I wrote to you. Diogo de
Melo left Hormuz with the governor [of India] without paying anything of what he owed to
the king of Hormuz, and so did his assistants, as I wrote to your Excellency in this matter I
have discharged what I owe to my lord and to your Excellency, with the aim of spreading
justice and peace. I have already informed your Excellency of the damage that de Melo has
done to your interests, and they have brought to you a copy of the decree I have issued
regarding the benefit of the king of Horrnuz. I do not know whether that will have reached
you without being falsified.
According to the investigation conducted by the governor of India and the official, if
it has not been concluded in lawful fashion your Excellency may hold them both responsible.
With regard to the taxes in this kingdom, I am doing my utmost to serve your Excellency and
261
to exact payment. However, in view of the sum that is required to be paid, which was forty
thousand ashrafi before the governor increased it, I believe that it will be difficult for the king
of Hormuz to pay it, unless your Excellency orders that the king should not be further
constrained. This I cannot see to without an order from your Excellency, if you keep me in
my position for a few years more, to pay your Excellency before the end of the year.
Bahrain, the most important region in the kingdom, is now in revolt against the
kingdom and has so far not paid anything. If it were restored and forced to pay again, as in the
past, it would make payment easier for the king of Hormuz. As your Excellency knows,
Shaikh Rashid is performing the function of vizier. He is a good man, and in my view he is
highly loyal to us, but lacks the character to face such serious problems as those in Hormuz.
My lord, in comparison the loyalty of the Reis Sharaf Al-Din to you, is less than that of
Shaikh Rashid, but this Muslim has not been born in these islands so he is unable to govern
this kingdom, because he is very diffident and afraid. Such a man will not able to collect the
taxes properly. As soon as the governor had left the city of Hormuz I received news of the
Turks. Before this news reached me I came by information that the Turkish Reis, called Mir
Husain, had captured Aden and had also captured all the ships and prevented them from
leaving the harbour lest they should let us know about this, and that four gualees had put in to
Dhofar to secure it. At the beginning of every year I send somebody to get information about
the movements of the Turks.
Regarding the news of Basra, I am still at war with it because its inhabitants [the Arab
tribes] refused to hand over the ships they have. If the previous captains of the fortress of
Hormuz had done as I have been doing for some time to make them hand them over, we
would now be at peace with them. However, I will never make peace with them as long as I
am in this city, not until they hand over the ships that are seriously harmful to your
Excellency's interests. As I have already written to your Excellency, the fortress of Hormuz
has been poorly maintained by previous captains. I now have only four or five barrels of
gunpowder and very little artillery, even though this fortress should have more than that of
Rhodes. As your Excellency knows, people from all over the world call in here in Hormuz:
Genoese, Venetians, Turkish, Jews, Armenians, and other people. The first thing they wish to
do is to visit the fortress. Of course we cannot allow them to do this because inside it is just
like a straw loft.
What I really must say to your Excellency is that, if the Turks should want to capture
any place of ours this year, the first would be this fortress, for it is very close to the Straits of
Hormuz and also it is your most important possession in these parts. As it is of enormous
advantage to your Excellency, therefore, you should supply the things it needs by not giving
the governors direct orders to do that.
I have completed half of the extension of the fortress, yet the governor [of India] has
blamed me for not finishing it. He wants to extend the fortress without assigning more than
four hundred soldiers, and I think that there is no call to do so as long as he refuses to put
more soldiers in it, because a large fortress with a small garrison would be even weaker.
I have already told your Excellency of the harm that is done by the governors of India
who arrive here, and you do not allow them to come to Hormuz only in case of necessity, but
they still arrive here. I would remind your Excellency once more that there is nothing so
damaging to your Excellency's interests than this, for their arrival here leads to Hormuz being
emptied of all inhabitants, because these people take over their houses, and at the end of their
stay, they set fire to those houses and run out. In addition, the Muslims here are suffering very
much from these governors, and they denied their behaviors as well. No one can punish them.
I beg your Excellency to be sure that in my capacity as captain of the fortress I am
much troubled by the governors' arrival here. I have completed the period of my position, and
I think the governor [of India], Nunho da Cunha who came here recently, has told you about
my term of service, although my news is very painful for him to tell you, because he stands
by and agrees with the work of Diogo de Melo. I will tell your Excellency all this in detail as
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soon as I arrive [in Lisbon]; I say these words because I think it will be useful for your
Excellency
In view of the sensitivity of the post, the translators of this fortress should be
competent and intelligent men. When Nunho da Cunha arrived, AntOnio do Loronha took
over the position of translator. He is now with your Excellency, and has been replaced by a
young man who knows neither Persian nor any other language. In addition to this he is a great
thief.
There is another thing; Diogo de Melo has made a complaint about me to the
governor. He claims that I issued decrees that caused him harm and trouble. De Melo has
therefore cast aspersion on my regulations, which I have refuted with exploration. The
governor ordered a secret investigation to be initiated and the witness testimony to be sent to
your Excellency. I do not think the governor himself was unbiased in this case; because his
secretary never leaves the house of de Melo all night. The governor has said that Lopo Vaz
made a mistake when he put me in charge instead of himself in this case. I hope that your
Excellency will investigate these matters and be assured that I will not be unjust to Diogo de
Melo, because everybody knows that he is a relative of mine. What really forced me to do as I
have done was the strongly-worded letter that your Excellency sent to all the governors
concerning the injustice and harm that the inhabitants of Hormu.z suffered for a long time,
which is still in my possession and in all matters I am governed by the letter, together with my
conviction that service to God and to your Excellency requires me to act with justice and
without any other consideration. What I have done has been influenced only by my wish to
serve your Excellency because it is above all other considerations. I beg your Excellency to
consider and fully understand this.
Written in Hormuz, 18 November 1529.
I kiss Your Excellency's hand.
Cristóväo de Mendonca
263
Document 2. Letter from Reis Rukn Al-Din, vizier of Hormuz, to Reis Sharaf Al-Din Al-
Fall, the exiled former vizier of Hormuz concerning relations between Maneng Bin Rasid, the
king of Al-Hasa, and Reis Mohammed, the governor of Bahrain. Persian. Dated 1545?
ANTT, As Gavetas, vol. IV, Gay. xv, Maço 11-2. PP. 357-9.
[Greeting and short preamble]
I understood all that you have written to me. I can tell you that all regions [in the
Gulf] are quiet, and that there is nothing going on in Hormuz worth writing about. As for your
orders to me to serve the king of Horrnuz, God knows how I have served and advised him. In
fact, he has a different temperament and does not take my advice or that of others into
consideration. He acts according to his view. It seems to me that he cannot agree with anyone.
I want you to know that he bears the responsibility for all his behaviour. I pray to God and
hope that you will come as you said in your letter, and that in Goa you will learn the news of
his work here.
News of Reis Mohammed, the ruler of Balirain, he is in good health, but the king of
Al-Hasa, Xeque Maneng Bern Rasyd [Shaikh Mãnini Ibn Rashid], has made an advance on
QatIf and he is determined to seize Bahrain. Several messages passed between them and they
signed an armistice. After a few days, the king of Al-Hasa returned, with a great number of
his soldiers, to re-establish himself in QatIf in a new fortress he ordered to be built and he
demolished the old one. As soon as his soldiers and the rest of his assistants knew of his
intention to fight against the Muslims of Bahrain, most of them left him with their wives and
children. Among them were Mafamed Bern Raaall35 and cairn Bern Raaall and their families,
who put themselves under the service and protection of the governor of Babrain. In addition, a
leading Muslim called Xeque Mafamed Bern Muçalaam,36 from Al-Hasa, also went to
Bahrain with his relative.
[...] The king of Al-Hasa arrived at Basra; the chieftains of that place opened the
gates of the city to him and offered him their allegiance as king. At that time the ruler of
Bahrain took advantage of this and with some Persians and Arabs attacked QatIf. He burnt a
hundred and fifty of his ships large and small. After a while, the king of Al-Hasa heard that
the ruler of Bahrain was burning his ships. Hence, he ordered all the vessels belonging to the
merchants of Bahrain at Basra to be taken, with their goods. But the leaders of the city
rejected this course of action and drove the king of Al-Hasa out of their city, offering the rule
of Basra to one of his relatives called Xeque Yhayha. 37 Moreover, they returned to the
merchants of Bahrain their ships and their merchandise.
Shaikh Yahia is a good man because he is seeking good relationships with the
Portuguese. The king of Al-Hasa returned back to his own city with his dream of control over
Bahrain. It will not be so difficult for him to do this because he has great power and many
warriors.
After I heard of all these new events in the Gulf, I joined the captain of Hormuz
Martini Afonso de Melo and his secretary to tell him of this news. I advised him that it is
necessary to send a Portuguese fleet towards Bahrain Island to protract that place; otherwise,
they should build a fortress in the port of QatIf to ensure the security of Bahrain. However,
the captain and his secretary said that the king of Portugal had spent a lot of money in India
and Hormuz; therefore, he could not send such a fleet to Babrain. Hence, the captain
suggested that if the ruler of Bahrain has a plan to prepare a fleet to take over the port of
QatIf, he should take possession of the taxation from the Persian merchants in Bahrain for one
year in order to do it. According to this suggestion, de Melo sent a letter to the ruler of
35 Recte Mohammed Ibn Rahal.
36 Shaikh Mohammed Ibn Musliam.
Shaikh Yahia.
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Bahrain, telling him that this work would be of service to the king of Portugal, and if he won
control over QatIf, he could gain its profits for himself only. They assured him that the king of
Hormuz was also in agreement with them as he sent a letter to him as well.
Both Mafamed Bern Raaall and Xeque Mafamed Bern Muçalaam have volunteered to
give good aid to the expedition, but this project has not yet been implemented. In addition, I
remind you that as part of my service to the king of Portugal, at the beginning of each year
and at my own expense, I send some people to Cairo, Aden and elsewhere to find out any new
news about the Sultan of the Turks and his navy captains. However, still I have received no
information about what you asked me in your letter to find out about the Turks.
I beg you to believe me when I tell you that I am happy to serve God and serve the
king of Portugal. I think Your Excellency knows that.
I pray, as do we all, that God may grant you long life and ensure your well-being.
Reis Rukn Al-Din, Hormuz alguazil de Ormuz.
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Document 3. Letter from Bernardim de Sousa to King JoAo Ill regarding the Turkish attack
on Hormuz. Goa. Portuguese. Dated 20 November 1545.
ANTT, As Gavetas, vol. I, Gay. ii, Maco 10-17. PP. 915-18.
[Greeting and preliminary inquiries]
The governor of India, Martim Afonso, learned, from a Venetian who came from
Cairo specifically to notify us, that the Turks will soon arrive in Hormuz. The governor
himself had that information from three prisoners who had escaped from Suez; he believed
this news especially when Luls FalcAo wrote to inform him that he had received the same
information and he asked [the governor] to send aid to the fortress [of Hormuz] because of the
small number of soldiers there.
As a result of this, the governor knew how Luls Falcão was in great need of those
soldiers. He summoned me to the service of your Excellency and required me to accompany
my brother, Gorge de Sousa, because if the Turks arrived in Hormuz that would certainly
prevent it from being supplied with the provisions and men that it needs. That should have
happened before November, which came eight months before my departure. In view of the
fact that he was sending me on such an important mission which would be advantageous to
you, I set off delightedly and considered it an honour, even though the operation was
excessively expensive. This was because of the large numbers accompanying me and because
the cost of living in the country [Hormuz] were higher than anywhere here [in Goa].
Seven or eight days after we arrived at Hormuz, we were given a one hundred per
cent assurance that the Turks would not come to the Strait of Hormuz during this winter. The
sailors who gave us this information assured us that the preparations were actually completed
and that about 25 to 30 Turkish galiots had been prepared and set out from Suez to Azebibi38
to relieve it after it was surrounded by the king of the area.
LuIs Falcão informed me that six years ago the king of Al-Hasa, Shaikh Mãnini, had
seized the fortress and city of Qatif from the kingdom of Hormuz. Since that time, the king of
Hormuz and his vizier had been asking the former captains for aid to restore that fortress and
the city. This is according to our obligations regarding all the fortresses subject to the king of
Hormuz, not just this fortress that we captured for him during our period here. However, the
former captains used to constantly make excuses, claiming the lack of sufficient soldiers
capable of going there, but now there is no excuse because we are here with a group of men
who are no longer needed because of the non-arrival of the Turks. The king of Hormuz and
his vizier promised to bear all the costs of the campaign, despite the fact that they were not
obliged to. They only asked for a hand from the Portuguese soldiers who can accompany me,
and likewise some necessary artillery and gunpowder.
LuIs FalcAo, also was convinced that the restoration of QatIf city and its fortress
would be of useful service to your Excellency, as it would give us more respect in the Gulf
After taking all these things into consideration, I thought that it would be more useful to go
there, especially since the matter did not represent any risk and required no more than
occupying our soldiers, which was better than allowing them to remain idle in Hormuz.
After making this decision, I completed my preparations swiftly and formed a
company of 200 Portuguese and between six to seven thousand Persians and Arabs
commanded by the king of Hormuz and his vizier Reis Noor Al-Din, the son of the Reis Saraf
Al-Din.
38 There is no port or city bearing this name on the Arabian part of the Red Sea coast, which was
occupied by the Ottomans at that time. Perhaps the Portuguese mean the Yemeni city of Zubaid,
located between A1-Hudaydah and Mocha.
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A few days after our departure from Hormuz, we arrived at Bahrain where we
remained for a few days in order to complete the assembling of the fleet and to get supplies
necessary for the siege, because we were not so far from QatIf.
Immediately after gathering everything that was necessary, I set out again and on the
following day we invaded the harbour of QatIf during the night and stepped ashore before
dawn. We faced in the city three or four thousand soldiers who killed about thirty or forty of
the Persians and two Portuguese. However, after we had killed a larger number of them, they
withdraw from the city, from which the inhabitants had already escaped. Since the land was
now safe, we landed the artillery on the coast and immediately began bombarding the walls of
the fortress. This work took four days, the maximum period that the artillery could sustain. As
a result of that work we were only able to bring down one section of the fortress to a height
which allowed the use of ladders, I decided to storm the city before bringing down a larger
section of the walls, because that operation would take another day. I knew after that, that the
king himself was coming to the city to protect it, because he was in Al-Hasa at that time. He
commanded thirteenth or fourteenth thousand warriors and a large number of knights and
riflemen. In addition to that were the difficulties caused us b$' the fortress's artillery and guns,
and the [announcements of the state of alert which were constantly taking place because of
the attacks of those three or four thousand soldiers whom we had faced at the time of
disembarking our soldiers. This greatly troubled our soldiers, especially the Persians who
were unaccustomed to these efforts.
Despite the dangers of entering the city by means of the ladders, I preferred this way
rather than waiting for another attack. However, when the enemy understood our plans to
erect these ladders, they began to run out of the fortress from midnight. I acknowledge to your
Excellency that this event caused great celebration in our camp. In order to prevent most of
them from escaping, the Portuguese climbed the walls during the night and killed some and
injured many, an operation which amazed the Muslims accompanying us more than it amazed
the frightened enemy, because it was not normal for them to storm a fortress at night.
I found out on the following day that Shaikh Mãnini had arrived at a place which was
too near to the fortress, and he commanded an army to defend the city. According to my
information, no sooner did he learn that the city had fallen, than he returned from whence he
had come. After destroying what could be destroyed of the fortress, I handed it over to Reis
Noor Al-Din in the same way that we handed over all the fortresses which belong to the
kingdom of Hormuz. After that, I returned to Hormuz, because it was nearly time for me to go
back to India.
Since all those who accompanied me returned safely except two soldiers, and one
who died as a result of disease, divine providence must have been protecting us because the
land of Bahrain is not very healthy. Your Excellency was already aware of that circumstance
because of the death of the soldiers who accompanied Simâo da Cunha. Bahrain does not
concede any advantage to QatIf, despite the proliferation of the vegetation and the thickness
of the plant cover, because it is impossible to describe a more beautiful place than this in the
world.
I hope that God grants Your Majesty a long life, as do we all.
Written in Goa on 20 November 1545.
Bernardim de Soua
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Document 4. Letter from the ruler of Hormuz Mohammed Shah to King João III. Arabic and
Portuguese. 9 Shaban 932 H. from Sousa, J. de, Documentos Arabicos para a História
Portugueza Copiados dos Originaes da Torre do Tombo (Lisbon, 1790). pp. 162-164.
[Greetings]
The reason for writing this letter to Your Excellency is that the kings of the kingdom
of Hormuz, from the old times, came from this royal family. Therefore, after you were one
hundred per cent certain about that, Your Excellency ordered me to rule this kingdom. From
that day I fixed justice and took away all oppression and injustice against my people.
However, your officials in this kingdom did not agree and were not satisfied with what I did,
they acted against me all the time. Moreover, they dispatched me to Goa, and took over rule
at Hormuz. Not only that, your officials injure my honour and my respect, causing great harm
to myself in front of everybody. Your Excellency, I put in your hand this matter, to let it be
known that your officials in Hormuz now can issue any order or write any message in my
name, so please do not consider their letters. All this happened to me by the order of your
captain, Martim Afonso de Mello, who supported and encouraged them in their works. I hope
if Your Excellency receives this letter, please will you consider very well what is written
inside? If you can remove those people from Hormuz and give your order to the next viceroy
in Goa not to hear anything from the tongues of my enemies and not to fallow their shameful
behaviour. Lastly, do not send your response to this letter to the captain of Hormuz and his
assistants, because they never wished peace and comfort for me.
With my regards.
9 Shaban 932 H.
From Mohammed Shah Sultan of Hormuz.
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Document 5. Order from Sultan Suleyman to the ruler of Bahrain, Murad Shah. Date 28 Du
al-Hijjah 966 H. (1 October 1559).
Turkish documents. Formal Archive. Vol. 3. (p.139, no.1). Printed in A1-Watheekah, no. 1,
(Bahrain, 1982), P. 149.
You have sent agents to present your submission to the High Court of the Sultan. The Sultan
has sent an order appointing you as sanjak beyi of Bahrain. The beglerbeg and government
troops who are in that area have been ordered not to interfere in Bahrain. But we heard now
that the beglerbeg of Al-Hasa, Mustafa Pasha, with some troops under his command, has
invaded Bahrain, which led you to seek help from infidels [the Portuguese. The infidels
captured ships. As Mustafa and his followers deserved dismissal and punishment for attacking
without a farmãn, they have been dismissed. Another beglerbeg and other begs are being sent
to replace them. Murad should do everything to help them get to their posts. You should co-
operate with the begs in preventing the infidels from doing harm of our provinces.
Document 6. Command to the beglerbeg of Basra. Given to Mehmed on 28 Du al-Hijjah 966
(1 October 1559).
Turkish documents. Formal Archive. MD 3 (p.140, no.1). Printed in Al-Watheekah, no.
24, (Bahrain, 1994), p. 185.
The beglerbeg of Baghdad sent a letter stating that the beglerbeg of Al-Hasa had, without
permission, attacked the governor of Bahrain.
[The governor of Bahrain] sought help from the infidels who captured all the ships and
galleys [kadirga] of the beglerbeg of Al-Hasa.The infidels are about to come and help the
aforementioned governor of Bahrain. In order to protect ships in the area of Basra, arms and
weapons are needed. This and everything pertaining to that region has been noted. In the past
the ruler of Bahrain made his submission to the Porte and was given [Bahrain] as a sanjak. No
order has been issued to the aforementioned [beglerbeg of Al-Hasa] to interfere in the affairs
of Bahrain. My Noble Command was sent to Murad to send the troops which are there safely
to [Al-Hasa].
I have commanded that when the Mehmed arrives: (1) you [the beglerbeg of Basra]
should find a suitable person to convey my Noble Command to the aforementioned [the ruler
of Bahrain]. (2) You should also send conciliatory letters to him. You should also do your
best to return the troops who are there [in Bahrain] to this [your] side without causing any
harm. (3) The ships, troops, and weapons which you have ordered are about to be sent. You
should also procure the necessary materials and patrol [the area]. (4) You should live in peace
with all who show loyalty to the Porte and not interfere in their provinces. When it is
necessary to do so, you should inform us [in these cases], act according to my Noble
Command, and inform us quickly how you put it into effect and with whom you have sent it.
(5) You should also give an account of the state of the troops who remain with him [the ruler
of Bahrain]. (6) In my Noble Command, which is going to be sent to Murad, a space is left for
the name of the person who is going to carry the letter. You should break its seal and write the
name of whoever is appointed, reseal it, and send it. The beglerbeg of Al-Hasa is given to
Murad who is the governor of Mosul and who must keep and guard the area.
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Document 7. Order to the chief of Amirs of Al-Hasa. Dated 10 Safar 981 H. (11 June 1573).
Turkish.
Archive of the Cabinet of the Ottoman Prime Minster. Dafter Mohemat. Flukm 92 (p.l4O,
no.33). Printed inAI-Watheekah, no. 1, (Babrain, 1982), p. 147.
We received a letter from the Judge of Al-Hasa informing us that Bahrain has more
than three hundred villages. He added some information about the situation in Bahrain
and the easy way to occupy it. But you [the chief of Amirs of Al-Hasa] did not
mention: how could we capture Bahrain, the best time for that, and the artillery that
we need to achieve this task? If you received my order ask the Judge of Al-Hasa is he
sure about the news which he informed us about Bahrain, and if there is a lack of
soldiers on the island and how can we capture it. Ask him is he thinking that we
should dispatch our soldiers and what is the specific time for them to arrive there? If
so, how many of the total of the army will be enough to occupy Bahrain? Could he
give us a rough amount of the revenues of the island? Write to us all the answers of
those questions and any further details about Bahrain.
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Map I
The original nucleus of the kingdom of Portugal
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Map III
I-lormuz and the entrance of the Gulf
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Plate IV
Hormuz fortress
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Map-V
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Map VI
The Persian coast in the sixteenth century
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Plate VII
Wind system in the Gulf and Arabian Sea in winter and summer
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